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At least 37 records · Page 2

Minimum Detectable Quantity Calculation for Radiation Portal Monitors

The minimum detectable quantity of a radiation portal monitor is the smallest amount of radioactive material that can be detected passing through the monitor (with a specified detection probability). The minimum detectable quantity is a function of many factors, including isotope, velocity, distance between pillars, height of portal and vehicle, source distribution and position, background radiation, background suppression, detector volume and positions, detector efficiency, decision metrics and algorithms, the presence of NORM (naturally occurring radioactive material), and alarm thresholds. Experimentally testing a radiation portal monitor to failure for all combinations of these factors is extremely time-consuming and often cost prohibitive. This document outlines a straightforward method for quickly estimating the minimum detectable quantity for moving sources over a large variety of conditions with a minimal number of static measurements. The document also describes a proof of concept software application that the International Atomic Energy Agency has designed based on the described method that can be used by Member States to estimate a monitor’s minimum detectable quantity.

Blessinger, Christopher S.↗

Ionizing-radiation beam monitoring system

A transmissive ionizing-radiation beam monitoring system includes an enclosure structure with at least one ultra-thin window to an incident ionizing-radiation beam, where the ultra-thin window is highly transmissive to ionizing-radiation. Embodiments include at least one thin or ultra-thin scintillator within the enclosure structure that is substantially directly in an incident ionizing-radiation beam path and transmissive to the incident radiation beam, and at least one ultraviolet (UV) illumination source within the enclosure structure facing the scintillator. Embodiments include at least one machine vision camera within the enclosure structure located out of an incident ionizing-radiation beam path and including a camera body and lens having a projection of its optical axis oriented at an angle of incidence of 45±35 degrees to a surface of the scintillator.

Friedman, Peter S.↗

Performance of High Stopping Power Bismuth-Loaded Plastic Scintillators for Radiation Portal Monitors

Plastic scintillators are widely used in radiation portal monitors because of their low cost and availability in large sizes. However, due to their low density and low effective atomic number (Z), they offer low intrinsic efficiency and little spectroscopic information. The addition of high-Z constituents to these plastics can greatly increase both their total stopping power and the amount of photoelectric absorption, leading to full-energy deposition and thus useful gamma spectra. Herein, we present the performance of the latest formulation of Bi-loaded plastic scintillators showing their useful spectroscopic information up to relatively high energy (~1 MeV) due to their high stopping power compared to the current commercially available plastics. These Bi-loaded plastics use 20 weight percent (wt%) Bi-pivalate (8 wt% elemental Bi) dissolved in polyvinyltoluene (PVT) matrix and conventional fast fluors (~10 ns decay time). These Bi-loaded plastics achieve up to approximately 6000 photons/MeV and have been produced in sizes up to 17 in 3 . The performance of these Bi-loaded plastics is also demonstrated in the existing portal monitor hardware (Rapiscan Model TSA Trainer 770) showing the possibility to provide improved sensitivity as a drop-in replacement with continued scale-up.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Ionizing-radiation beamline monitoring system

Embodiments are directed generally to an ionizing-radiation beamline monitoring system that includes a vacuum chamber structure with vacuum compatible flanges through which an incident ionizing-radiation beam enters the monitoring system. Embodiments further include at least one scintillator within the vacuum chamber structure that can be at least partially translated in the ionizing-radiation beam while oriented at an angle greater than 10 degrees to a normal of the incident ionizing-radiation beam, a machine vision camera coupled to a light-tight structure at atmospheric/ambient pressure that is attached to the vacuum chamber structure by a flange attached to a vacuum-tight viewport window with the camera and lens optical axis oriented at an angle of less than 80 degrees with respect to a normal of the scintillator, and at least one ultraviolet (“UV”) illumination source facing the scintillator in the ionizing-radiation beam for monitoring a scintillator stability comprising scintillator radiation damage.

Friedman, Peter S.↗

Ionizing-radiation beamline monitoring system

Embodiments are directed generally to an ionizing-radiation beamline monitoring system that includes a vacuum chamber structure with vacuum compatible flanges through which an incident ionizing-radiation beam enters the monitoring system. Embodiments further include at least one scintillator within the vacuum chamber structure that can be at least partially translated in the ionizing-radiation beam while oriented at an angle greater than 10 degrees to a normal of the incident ionizing-radiation beam, a machine vision camera coupled to a light-tight structure at atmospheric/ambient pressure that is attached to the vacuum chamber structure by a flange attached to a vacuum-tight viewport window with the camera and lens optical axis oriented at an angle of less than 80 degrees with respect to a normal of the scintillator, and at least one ultraviolet (“UV”) illumination source facing the scintillator in the ionizing-radiation beam for monitoring a scintillator stability comprising scintillator radiation damage.

Friedman, Peter S.↗

Ionizing-radiation beam monitoring system

Embodiments are directed generally to an ionizing-radiation beam monitoring system that includes an enclosure structure with at least one ultra-thin window to an incident ionizing-radiation beam. Embodiments further include at least one scintillator within the enclosure structure that is substantially directly in an incident ionizing-radiation beam path and at least one ultraviolet illumination source within the enclosure structure and facing the scintillator. At least one pixelated imaging system within the enclosure structure is located out of an incident ionizing-radiation beam path and includes at least one pixelated photosensor device optically coupled to an imaging lens.

Friedman, Peter S.↗

Expectation-propagation for weak radionuclide identification at radiation portal monitors

We propose a sparsity-promoting Bayesian algorithm capable of identifying radionuclide signatures from weak sources in the presence of a high radiation background. The proposed method is relevant to radiation identification for security applications. In such scenarios, the background typically consists of terrestrial, cosmic, and cosmogenic radiation that may cause false positive responses. We evaluate the new Bayesian approach using gamma-ray data and are able to identify weapons-grade plutonium, masked by naturally-occurring radioactive material (NORM), in a measurement time of a few seconds. We demonstrate this identification capability using organic scintillators (stilbene crystals and EJ-309 liquid scintillators), which do not provide direct, high-resolution, source spectroscopic information. Compared to the EJ-309 detector, the stilbene-based detector exhibits a lower identification error, on average, owing to its better energy resolution. Organic scintillators are used within radiation portal monitors to detect gamma rays emitted from conveyances crossing ports of entry. The described method is therefore applicable to radiation portal monitors deployed in the field and could improve their threat discrimination capability by minimizing “nuisance” alarms produced either by NORM-bearing materials found in shipped cargoes, such as ceramics and fertilizers, or radionuclides in recently treated nuclear medicine patients.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

(Paper) TRIPWIRE: Multi-modal Distributed Sensing For Repository Verification

Underground geological repositories for storing used nuclear fuel are being planned and developed around the world. Research is being performed to understand technical aspects of sealing entombed materials and underground repositories to ensure the radiological and nuclear materials remain contained. To support safeguards verification for these facilities research at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is underway to develop and demonstrate a multi-modal sensor system, TRIPWIRE, for containment verification in inaccessible radiological and nuclear waste repositories. The TRIPWIRE system will continuously monitor ionizing radiation and electromagnetic fields in the vicinity of emplaced nuclear materials buried in a repository, reporting on disturbances with a real-time alarm control station. The system will use long-length scintillating fiber bundles (SFBs) to perform area radiation monitoring; these will be coupled to kilometer-scale multimodal optical communication fibers – all light sensors and electronic components used with this system will be located above ground. Electromagnetic fields, and changes in local dielectric conditions caused by intrusion and soil movement, will be monitored using commercial grade, ported "leaky" coaxial cables (PCCs), with control electronics also located above ground. Tamper-indicating self-diagnostic assessments will be done using optical and electronic time domain reflectometry in the SFBs and PCCs, respectively. The result will be a long, kilometer-scale multi-modal SFB-PCC system. Simulation and modeling are being used to inform the work and a demonstration of the system's utility is planned at a nuclear storage facility in the future.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

Progress of Tripwire: Multi-Modal Distributed Sensing for Repository Verification

This project is developing and demonstrating a multi-modal sensor system, TRIPWIRE, for containment verification in inaccessible radiological and nuclear waste repositories. The TRIPWIRE system will continuously monitor ionizing radiation and electromagnetic fields in the vicinity of emplaced nuclear materials buried in a repository, reporting on disturbances with a real-time alarm control station. The system will use long-length scintillating fiber bundles (SFBs) to perform area radiation monitoring; these will be coupled to kilometer-scale multimodal optical communication fibers – all light sensors and electronic components used with this system will be located above ground. Electromagnetic fields, and changes in local dielectric conditions caused by intrusion and soil movement, will be monitored using commercial grade, ported "leaky" coaxial cables (PCCs), with control electronics also located above ground. This paper documents the results of the simulations and modeling efforts that have helped identify the optimal placement of the SFBs. Additionally, the paper includes the current progress on the multi-modal SFB-PCC system, including the fabrication of long-length (>3-m) fibers and their coupling to optical fibers.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

Progress of Tripwire: Multi-modal Distributed Sensing for Repository Verification

This project is developing and demonstrating a multi-modal sensor system, TRIPWIRE, for containment verification in inaccessible radiological and nuclear waste repositories. The TRIPWIRE system will continuously monitor ionizing radiation and electromagnetic fields in the vicinity of emplaced nuclear materials buried in a repository, reporting on disturbances with a real-time alarm control station. The system will use long-length scintillating fiber bundles (SFBs) to perform area radiation monitoring; these will be coupled to kilometer-scale multimodal optical communication fibers – all light sensors and electronic components used with this system will be located above ground. Electromagnetic fields, and changes in local dielectric conditions caused by intrusion and soil movement, will be monitored using commercial grade, ported "leaky" coaxial cables (PCCs), with control electronics also located above ground. This paper documents the results of the simulations and modeling efforts that have helped identify the optimal placement of the SFBs. Additionally, the paper includes the current progress on the multi-modal SFB-PCC system, including the fabrication of long-length (>3-m) fibers and their coupling to optical fibers.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

Long-length Scintillating Fibers for Nuclear Geological Repositories

This research focuses on the usage of plastic scintillating fibers as ruggedized detectors in long-length sections coupled to long-length standard optical fiber segments for the purpose of radiation detection and monitoring. This technology addresses a need for monitoring radiation in difficult-to-access or inaccessible areas, such as monitoring: radioactive waste within geological repositories, nuclear material storage facilities, spent fuel dry storage areas, inaccessible areas within nuclear facilities including reactors and reprocessing facilities, decommissioning of nuclear facilities, and other similar areas. The fiber can be placed along the tunnels of a geological repository to monitor the radiation field along its length. This can detect an increase of radiation due to movement, leakage, or unexpected opening of the containers, as well as decrease in the radiation due to removal of material. These capabilities have been demonstrated at INL’s Radioactive Scrap Waste Facility by successfully detecting the removal of an interim storage containers from the storage area. The poster focuses on explaining the technology and its capability in monitoring deep geological repositories (DGRs), especially in the domain of safety and international safeguards. As more countries consider the development of DGRs, technologies such as the one being presented can help establish continuity of knowledge of the material, maintain public confidence, and ensure safe operation of the facility. Furthermore, the poster looks at the future steps of the technology and its potential role in the international safeguards regime.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

Comparison of Supervised and Un-Supervised Machine Learning Algorithms for Threat Detection and Scintillator Performance for Radiation Portal Monitoring

Following the events of September 11, 2001, international border crossing have been equipped with radiation portal monitors (RPMs) to identify illicit radioactive material. Polyvinyl toluene (PVT) scintillators are commonly used due to their low cost and reasonable maintainability, however they offer low spectral resolution. Despite the fact that over twenty years has transpired since this event, radioisotopes are still typically identified by hand-crafted classification algorithms, e.g., total counts or energy windowing, and exhibit relatively poor performance in detecting threats at the low false alarm rates required to support the stream of commerce. While some improvement to performance has been realized via the use of supervised machine learning, these classification algorithms typically utilize simulations in lieu of real data due to the sparsity of data for one or more classes. Accordingly, the performance of these algorithms is somewhat less than optimal when examining experiments or simulations with model mismatch. Consequently, in this work, we examine the application of a number of unsupervised machine learning, anomaly detection based algorithms, to circumvent the inverse crime when analyzing spectroscopy data for RPMs. We also compare anomaly detection results with those obtained via the use of supervised classification detection ML algorithms when model mismatch is introduced between the simulated threat items utilized for training/testing. Finally, we compared the performance of the PVT scintillators to those obtained with higher resolution detectors using both anomaly detection and supervised classification algorithms.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Operational Guidelines for Use of Radiation Portal Monitors in Nuclear Facilities

This article provides guidelines (not requirements) for the testing, operation, and maintenance of radiation portal monitors used to scan pedestrian and vehicular traffic entering or exiting nuclear facilities to prevent unauthorized removal of nuclear material. The intended audience is facility managers, supervisors, and operators who are responsible for establishing and maintaining radiation detection systems, who are likely well acquainted with physical security procedures, but may not have a familiarity with the operation of radiation detection.

Enders, Alexander [Oak Ridge National Laboratory (↗

Performance characterization of 5×5×12 mm 3 virtual Frisch-grid TlBr detectors

Thallium bromide (TlBr) is a promising material for semiconductor gamma-ray detectors due to its high atomic number (Tl = 81, Br = 35), high density (7.56 g/cm 3 ), and relatively low melting point (460 °C). These properties give TlBr several competitive features, including high detection efficiency, good energy resolution, and lower fabrication costs, making it suitable for applications requiring compact, highly sensitive gamma-ray detection systems. Recent developments of TlBr detectors have progressed toward thicker crystals, up to 10–20 mm, configured as pixelated or virtual Frisch-grid (VFG) devices with volumes >1 cm 3 . Despite these advances, challenges remain in practical implementation, including material and fabrication issues that affect energy resolution, device stability, performance, and longevity. These challenges are similar to those faced by HgI 2 and lead-halide perovskite detectors. Here, this study presents results from characterizing over 100 position-sensitive 5×5×12 mm 3 virtual Frisch-grid detectors fabricated by Radiation Monitoring Devices Inc. For a prototype Radioisotope Identification Device (RIID). The work identified factors limiting the performance and longevity of TlBr detectors, including stochastic response variations that limit the energy resolution to 2–3 % (at 662 keV) for most devices, performance degradation associated with defect decoration, and contact delamination. Addressing these issues advances the use of TlBr and similar materials for reliable, high-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗