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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Proof of principle study: synchrotron X-ray fluorescence microscopy for identification of previously radioactive microparticles and elemental mapping of FFPE tissues

Biobanks containing formalin-fixed, paraffin-embedded (FFPE) tissues from animals and human atomic-bomb survivors exposed to radioactive particulates remain a vital resource for understanding the molecular effects of radiation exposure. These samples are often decades old and prepared using harsh fixation processes which limit sample imaging options. Optical imaging of hematoxylin and eosin (H&E) stained tissues may be the only feasible processing option, however, H&E images provide no information about radioactive microparticles or radioactive history. Synchrotron X-ray fluorescence microscopy (XFM) is a robust, non-destructive, semi-quantitative technique for elemental mapping and identifying candidate chemical element biomarkers in FFPE tissues. Still, XFM has never been used to uncover distribution of formerly radioactive micro-particulates in FFPE canine specimens collected more than 30 years ago. In this work, we demonstrate the first use of low-, medium-, and high-resolution XFM to generate 2D elemental maps of ~ 35-year-old, canine FFPE lung and lymph node specimens stored in the Northwestern University Radiobiology Archive documenting distribution of formerly radioactive micro-particulates. Additionally, we use XFM to identify individual microparticles and detect daughter products of radioactive decay. The results of this proof-of-principle study support the use of XFM to map chemical element composition in historic FFPE specimens and conduct radioactive micro-particulate forensics.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI2024

Charging, aggregation, and electrostatic dispersion of radioactive and nonradioactive particles in the atmosphere

Electrostatic dispersion can significantly impact the microphysical behavior of charged particles and ions until reaching zero space charge. However, although radioactive particles can be strongly charged in air, the influence of electrostatic dispersion has been neglected in understanding their behavior. This study is aimed at investigating the time evolution of the charge and size distributions of radioactive and nonradioactive particles in air and developing simple approaches for applications. With processes involving charging, aggregation, and electrostatic dispersion, a comprehensive population balance model (PBM) has been developed to examine particle charge/size distribution dynamics. It is shown that compared to nonradioactive particles, the charge and size distributions of radioactive particles may evolve differently with time because radioactivity and electrostatic dispersion can significantly affect the charging and aggregation kinetics of the particles. It is found that, after the Fukushima accident, background aerosols in the pathway of radioactive plumes might be highly charged due to ionizing radiation, suggesting that radiation fields may strongly influence in situ measurements of charged atmospheric particles. The comprehensive PBM is simplified, and then the verification and application of the simplified PBMs are discussed. This study provides useful insight into how radioactivity can affect the dynamic behavior of particles in atmospheric systems including radiation sources.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Environmental evaluation of radioactivity levels and associated radiation hazards in groundwater around the WIPP site

Groundwater may contain radioactive substances which can be dangerous to human health. Concentrations of natural radionuclides polonium (Po), thorium (Th), uranium (U), and radium (Ra) isotopes were measured in groundwater samples collected from different locations in the vicinity of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site in Carlsbad, New Mexico. The average values of gross activity concentrations of 210 Po, 228 Th, 238 U, 234 U, 226 Ra and 228 Ra isotopes were determined to be 1.62 Bq L -1 in shallow groundwater and 5.88 Bq L -1 in deep groundwater, respectively. The total radioactivity in deep groundwater was higher than that in shallow groundwater, and most of the radioactivity in the water is from 226 Ra. Furthermore, the effective doses for ingestion of natural radionuclides were about 0.333 mSv y–1 for shallow groundwater and about 1.338 mSv y –1 for deep groundwater samples, which are higher than the World Health Organization (WHO, 2017) guideline level (0.1 mSv y –1 ) for drinking water. Ra dominated the total ingestion dose, contributing 93.06 % and 75.40 % of the total effective doses to the deep and shallow groundwater, respectively. The ingrowth and decay of natural radionuclides suggested that 228 Ra/ 226 Ra ratio can be a useful indicator of the source of radioactive contamination. The radioactivity data obtained from the investigated groundwater samples can be used to establish a baseline for radioactivity levels in groundwater around the WIPP site.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗
DOE OSTI2023

Review of particle deposition to and removal from clothing, skin, and hair after a radioactive airborne dispersal event

Explosive Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) – aka dirty bombs – are seen as a credible method to carry out a radiological terror attack. After exploding a radioactive source, the radionuclide-laden plume will be blown downwind of ground zero, with particles falling out and potentially depositing on people caught in and under the cloud. Some of these people may not show any sign of radiation sickness and therefore not realize they have been contaminated and may take the radioactive particulate with them on their daily activities, thus spreading the radioactive particulate outside the initially contaminated area. This paper reviews the scientific literature to better understand the rate at which particulate deposits on and is removed from the different “surfaces” of a person, i.e., hair, skin, and clothing. Prior research indicates that: 1) particle deposition is usually higher on skin than on hair and clothing; 2) particle deposition is greater for a person with higher skin moisture, 3) stronger wind increases the deposition flux onto a person, and 4) the fraction of particulate deposited on the hair, skin, and clothing respectively depends on the length of the hair, assuming all the hair surface is available for deposition. The studies taken into consideration show that the largest uncertainty in particulate deposition onto a person is due to clothing type because of the different possible weave arrangements and tightness which translate into differences in actual surface area and surface roughness. A factor of 2-to-20 variation in deposition rate was found. Removal of the particulate from the contaminated person may be due to wind, a person's movement, and/or contact transfer, i.e., by touching a different clean surface. Experiments show that the majority of the particulate is resuspended within 2–6 h mostly depending on the intensity of physical activity. The largest uncertainty in particulate removal from skin depends on the skin moisture, transfer rate of single-contact, and how many objects/people a person touches per hour. No data for hair were found for particle removal and resuspension. The studies considered did not utilize radionuclides directly; however, data on adhesion of radioactive vs. their non-radioactive counterpart have shown that the uncertainty due to the radioactivity of the particles is lower than that due to other factors. In conclusion, an idealized scenario involving a single building in the path of the cloud showed the impact of building-influenced flow on the cloud transport path and mixing, which affects the radiological dose the downwind population is exposed to and consequently the health effects.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗
DOE OSTI2020

Impact of boundary layer simulation on predicting radioactive pollutant dispersion: a case study for HANARO Research Reactor using the WRF-MMIF-CALPUFF modeling system

Wind plays an important role in cases of unexpected radioactive pollutant dispersion, deciding distribution and concentration of the leaked substance. The accurate prediction of wind has been challenging in numerical weather prediction models, especially near the surface because of the complex interaction between turbulent flow and topographic effect. As such, in this study, we investigated the characteristics of atmospheric dispersion of radioactive material (i.e. 137 Cs) according to the simulated boundary layer around the HANARO research nuclear reactor in Korea using the Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF)-Mesoscale Model Interface (MMIF)-California Puff (CALPUFF) model system. We examined the impacts of orographic drag on wind field, stability calculation methods, and planetary boundary layer parameterizations on the dispersion of radioactive material under a radioactive leaking scenario. We found that inclusion of the orographic drag effect in the WRF model improved the wind prediction most significantly over the complex terrain area, leading the model system to estimate the radioactive concentration near the reactor more conservatively. We also emphasized the importance of the stability calculation method and employing the skillful boundary layer parameterization to ensure more accurate low atmospheric conditions, in order to simulate more feasible spatial distribution of the radioactive dispersion in leaking scenarios.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Opportunities in the Synthesis and Design of Radioactive Thin Films and Nanoparticles

Studies of radioactive isotopes at the liquid-solid or gas-solid interface are enabling a detailed mechanistic understanding the effects of radioactive decay on physical, biological, and chemical systems. In recent years, there has been a burgeoning interest in using radioactive isotopes for both imaging and therapeutic purposes by attaching them to the surface of colloidal nanoparticles. By merging the field of nanomedicine with the more mature field of internal radiation therapy, researchers are discovering new ways to diagnose and treat cancer. In this perspective, we discuss state-of-the-art radioactive thin films as applied to both well-defined surfaces and more complex nanoparticles. Here, we highlight the design considerations that are unique to radioactive films, which originate from the damaging and potentially self-destructive emissions produced during radioactive decay and highlight future opportunities in the largely underexplored area between radioisotope chemistry and nanoscience.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Regulatory Treatment of Non-Core Sources of Radioactivity for Advanced Reactor Designs

The recent resurgence in advance (non-light water) reactor development has been paralleled by the development of risk-informed performance-based (RIPB) licensing pathways. Specifically, the creation of the RIPB Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) approach and subsequent endorsement by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) now provides advanced reactor vendors with a defined RIPB method to develop an affirmative safety case for licensing. In addition, the Technology Inclusive Content of Applications Project (TICAP) has published guidance on developing a license application based on the LMP approach. To support the utilization of risk information as part of advanced reactor design and licensing efforts, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)/American Nuclear Society (ANS) Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (JCNRM) has developed a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) standard for advanced reactors. The standard, which was formerly approved by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in 2021 and recently endorsed by the NRC in trial use Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.247, is an integral standard, covering from initiating events to offsite consequence. A major feature of the standard is that it permits the inclusion of any source of radioactivity material at the site within the plant PRA. Therefore, non-core sources of radioactivity, such as fuel storage, fuel processing, and purification systems, can be included within a single comprehensive plant PRA. For those advanced reactor vendors utilizing a RIPB licensing approach, there is an opportunity to include the non-core sources of radioactivity within the RIPB framework for licensing decision-making, such as the categorization of events, classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs), and evaluation of the adequacy of defense-in-depth (DID). For advanced reactor designs that contain multiple non-core sources of radioactivity, or for monolithic plant sites that include associated fuel facilities, this approach could potentially simplify licensing applications through the use of a single, uniform, and consistent decision-making framework across all radioactive sources at the site. In addition, a RIPB approach could provide additional insights regarding plant behavior, flexibility regarding licensing decision-making, and potentially allow the use of risk information as part of the plant oversight process. Risk-informing these aspects of advanced reactor licensing would also be consistent with the NRC’s risk policy statement. However, there is diverse regulation and guidance regarding the licensing of non-core sources of radioactivity and generally limited experience using RIPB approaches for the evaluation as part of licensing.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Perma-Fix Environmental Services Macroencapsulated Debris at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Perma-Fix Environmental Services (PERM) Macroencapsulated Debris, Radioactive Lead (Pb) Solids, Cadmium/Mercury/Silver (Cd/Hg/Ag) Containing Batteries from U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Generators (PERM000000027, Revision 28 [PERM 2021]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the PERM Macroencapsulated Debris, Radioactive Pb Solids, Cd/Hg/Ag Containing Batteries from DOE Generators meets all performance objectives of DOE Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The PERM Macroencapsulated Debris, Radioactive Pb Solids, Cd/Hg/Ag Containing Batteries from DOE Generators stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Second Quarter Transportation Report - Fiscal Year 2021 - Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site, Radioactive Waste Management Complex

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) in Area 5. This report summarizes the second quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2021 and serves as a quarterly report for the following types of shipments: Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLW) Mixed Low-Level Radioactive Waste (MLLW) Classified Non-Radioactive (CNR) Waste Classified Non-Radioactive Hazardous (CNRH) Waste

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2026

Ultra-pure nickel for structural components of low-radioactivity instruments

The next generation of nuclear and particle physics rare-event search experiments demand structural materials combining ultra-low levels of radioactive contamination with exceptional mechanical strength. Here, this study evaluates chemical vapor deposition (CVD) nickel as a low radioactive background candidate structural material for such applications. Manufacturer-supplied CVD Ni grown on aluminum substrates was assayed via inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) employing isotope-dilution. These material assays produced measured bulk concentration of 232 Th, 238 U, and nat K at the levels of ~70 ppq, ≲100 ppq, and ~900 ppt, respectively, which is the lowest reported in nickel. Surface-etch profiling uncovered higher concentrations of these contaminants extending ~10 μ m beneath the surface, likely associated with the aluminum growth substrate. Additionally, the CVD Ni underwent tensile testing alongside standard Ni samples. CVD Ni exhibited a planar tensile strength of ~600 MPa, significantly surpassing standard nickel. However, heat treatment was found to reduce the tensile strength to levels comparable to standard Ni, with implications for high-temperature weld joining methods. The results reported are compared to the one other well documented usage of CVD Ni in a low radioactive background physics research experiment and a discussion is provided on how the currently reported results may arise from changes in CVD fabrication or testing process. These results establish CVD Ni as a promising low-radioactivity structural material, while outlining the need for further development in surface cleaning and weld-joining techniques to fully realize its potential in large-scale, low radioactive background rare-event search experiments.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2023

RCT Module 2.12: Shipment and Receipt of Radioactive Material [Slides]

The basis of regulations governing the packaging and shipping of radioactive material is to keep radioactive material from affecting the environment during transportation and to keep the environment from affecting the integrity of the radioactive material. The package itself is to be designed and constructed to be the effective barrier between the environment and the radioactive material; thus, most of the regulatory restrictions apply to the package and the method of shipment used to transport the package. To reduce any potential hazard, the regulatory requirements become more restrictive as the quantity, concentration, and potential hazard of the radioactive material increase.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Regulatory Development Challenges and Opportunities for the Safe and Secure Transport of Radioactive Materials

Drafting regulations for transport safety and transport security achieve two separate objectives, which can lead to divergent outcomes. With transport safety, the principle goal is to protect the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation, while in contrast, the principle goal of transport security is to protect the material from malicious actors. While many Member States may have transport safety regulations for radioactive materials, transport security regulatory development is still in its nascent stages globally. Trying to develop harmonized transport safety and transport security regulations could lead to challenges ranging from differences in terminology used in transport safety versus terminology uses in transport security, roles and responsibilities for the variety of stakeholders involved in transport, and finally, the possible role of multiple competent authorities in governing the transport of dangerous goods, which includes radioactive material. While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently developing a process of a methodology for drafting transport security regulations, any process must address both safety considerations and security requirements. (As the most vulnerable part of the life cycle of radioactive materials, the need for harmonized transport safety/transport security regulations is essential.) This paper investigates the regulatory elements of the safety-security interface for nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Examining challenges including use of terms, the role of multiple competent authorities, and practical challenges involved in the safe and secure transport of radioactive material, the paper analyzes the need for integrated regulatory development for the safe and secure transport of these materials.

Anderson, Kimberly↗
DOE OSTI2020

International Symposium on Transport Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material; Tokyo, Japan, November 2019

As an outcome of the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit of 2016, held in Washington D.C., the Governments of Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Spain, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirmed, through INFCIRC/909, their will to further improve the overall security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials. With this goal in mind, each expressed their commitment to further exchange national practices with other countries through the IAEA and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). They also committed to actively support the IAEA as the central organization for coordinating activities and developing guidance documents and to support the GICNT and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in developing and implementing its nuclear transport security activities. Both of these organizations address the commitments regarding nuclear transport security as outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit 2016. In an effort to continue the momentum from the Nuclear Security Summit, the Government of Japan, in cooperation with the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (ISCN/JAEA), hosted the International Transport Security Symposium in November 2019. With over fifty countries invited to attend, the event exchanged and promoted good practices in several topical area sessions related to the security of nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Topical sessions included Laws and Regulatory Framework, Physical Protection Systems, Response Actions, and Insider/Information Security. The Symposium built support for transport security and encouraged IAEA Member States to actively work regionally and internationally with the IAEA’s transport security programme through the practical implementation and incorporation of IAEA Nuclear Security Series recommendations and guidance into their national frameworks for transport security. From these sessions, to the host detailed a recommended path forward for future engagements in the security of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. The paper will discuss the Symposium’s outcomes and highlight the forward momentum made by both signatories and non-signatories for the strengthening of all the critical elements of a State’s transport security regime, including physical protection systems, insider threats to the nuclear and radioactive material supply chains, planning and capabilities for law enforcement response to malicious transport security events, and employment of technology to address critical vulnerabilities to the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Holt, Katherine↗
DOE OSTI2024

Radioactive Waste Management Basis (Rev.6)

This Radioactive Waste Management Basis (RWMB) documents radioactive waste management practices adopted at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) pursuant to Department of Energy Order (DOE O) 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. The purpose of this RWMB is to ensure that LLNL manages radioactive waste in a safe and environmentally-compliant manner, protective of worker and public safety.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Decade of Innovative Approaches to Treating and Dispositioning Radioactive Waste at the Savannah River Site - 20620

This year marks the 70. anniversary of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS), located near Aiken, South Carolina. SRS is a key industrial complex responsible for environmental stewardship, environmental cleanup, waste management, and disposition of nuclear materials. SRS also continues to have a role in critical defense-related activities and the reprocessing of used reactor fuel. The SRS encompasses 803 square kilometers (310 square miles) in parts of Aiken, Barnwell, and Allendale counties. The Liquid Waste Mission starts with the safe receipt and storage of radioactive liquid waste in the waste tanks, which principally includes Cold War legacy waste, but also waste from support of National Aeronautics Space Administration missions, medical isotope production, and research activities. This 133,000 cubic meters (m{sup 3}) (35 million gallons [Mgal]) of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) is currently held in 43 large underground waste tanks. The capacity of each of these tanks range from 2,800 m{sup 3} to 5,000 m{sup 3} (0.75 to 1.33 Mgal) and were placed in operation between 1954 and 1986. In July 2009, the DOE awarded a stand-alone contract to execute the Liquid Waste Mission at SRS. The Liquid Waste Contractor selected was Savannah River Remediation LLC1 (SRR), which is responsible for receipt, storage, retrieval and treatment of all HLW, disposal of the decontaminated low-activity waste fraction, as well as operationally closing cleaned HLW tanks. Since July 2009, SRR has successfully grouted and operationally closed six large underground tanks, poured 1,476 canisters of vitrified HLW (a stable glass waste form), treated approximately 34,200 m{sup 3} (9.0 Mgal) of HLW, and dispositioned over 41,200 m{sup 3} (10.9 Mgal) of decontaminated salt solution as low-level waste (LLW) into the Saltstone Disposal Units (SDUs) being constructed by SRR on site. The innovative work performed by SRR in the LLW portion of its mission has earned it the Richard S. Hodes Award. The work conducted by SRR is the same work championed by the late Richard S. Hodes, a respected physician, statesmen, and Chairman of the Southeast Compact Commission for Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Life cycle Management of 324 Project High-Activity, Mixed/Low-Level Radioactive Waste - 20506

U.S. DOE contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) manages the 324 Building and is preparing to remotely excavate and disposition the radioactive soil beneath the building to allow further deactivation of the building. The 324 Building is a non-reactor Category 2 Nuclear Facility located in the 300 Area of the Hanford Site. Records indicate that in October 1986, approximately 516 liters of a concentrated liquid waste stream containing cesium-137 ({sup 137}Cs) and strontium-90 ({sup 90}Sr) spilled onto the floor of a hot cell, B-Cell, in the 324 Building. The spill contained an estimated 1.3 million curies (Ci) of radioactivity. A breach in the sump of B-Cell was discovered in November 2009 during characterization of the soil under the building. Exposure rates in excess of 10,000 R/hr were detected through a system of access pipes installed under the hot cell, and an estimated 1.557 E+05 Ci of {sup 137}Cs and 6.842 E+04 Ci of {sup 90}Sr are in the soil beneath B-Cell. The magnitude of the soil contamination below B-Cell represents one of the most challenging remediation activities in the DOE complex. The objective of CHPRC's 324 Project is to remotely excavate and disposition the highly contaminated soil under the hot cell so building deactivation and stabilization activities can resume. Depending on the volume and radioactivity of contaminated soil under B-Cell, the material will be dispositioned either at the Hanford Site's Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) or in grout monoliths that will be created in the hot cells (A, C and D) next to B-Cell during future building demolition activities. The current project scope includes installing structural supports under the walls of B-Cell and using remotely operated equipment to remove debris from the hot cell, remove debris mixed with grout on the floor, saw through and remove the cell floor and liner, and excavate contaminated soil under B-Cell to a depth of up to 3.66 meters (12 feet). Addition or removal of debris in A-Cell may be required to support B-Cell cleanout and excavation activities. The base approach is to disposition debris and soil bins in the Radiochemical Engineering Cell (REC) monoliths, and subsequently disposition the monoliths during building demolition. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Total Mercury Analysis of Radioactive Waste Containing Multiple Mercury Species

In this work, a direct mercury analyzer (DMA) was used to analyze total mercury in radioactive waste samples containing methylmercury and other forms of mercury including Hg o (elemental) together with inorganic ionic mercury species and complexes. These samples were also analyzed using Cold Vapor Atomic Absorption Spectroscopy (CVAAS) and/or Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectroscopy (ICMS). Comparative statistical evaluation of the results from spike solutions/simulants, liquid radioactive waste samples, and interlaboratory performance test samples demonstrated that the various methods generated accurate and/or equivalent total mercury data and equivalent precision (2σ ± < 20%). Triplicate total mercury analysis of an exemplar radioactive waste resulted in an average value of 54.1 mg/L (as Hg) using CVAAS, 55.1 mg/L using ICPMS and 56.0 mg/L using DMA. A primary advantage of the DMA in a radioactive environment is avoiding multi-step, labor-intensive, time-consuming and waste-producing sample preparation protocols needed for CVAAS and ICPMS. DMA was determined to be the preferred method for measuring total mercury in the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) radioanalytical laboratory based on analytical performance combined with ease of use in a radiological containment unit.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2023

Investigating radioactive negative ion production via double electron capture

The relative cross sections for radioactive negative ion production via double electron capture have been measured for collisions between a 40 keV projectile beam of uranium-238 and potassium vapor. This was performed at the collinear resonance ionization spectroscopy (CRIS) experiment at CERN-ISOLDE and is a step towards measuring the electron affinities (EAs) of elements that cannot be efficiently produced in negative ion sources at radioactive ion beam (RIB) facilities. This includes short-lived radioactive isotopes that have low production quantities and heavy and superheavy elements that systematically have smaller EAs than work functions of available ion source materials. Negative ions are particularly sensitive to electron–electron correlation effects, which make such studies ideal for benchmarking atomic structure models that go beyond the independent particle model. While the EAs of most light elements have been measured, experimental investigations on heavier elements, namely the actinides, remain scarce due to their radioactive nature and production difficulty. By developing negative ion production by charge exchange, we aim to make these studies feasible at RIB facilities.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗