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At least 37 records · Page 2

Recent Radioactive Material Package Testing Experiences at Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) was a pioneer in the testing of radioactive material shipping packages and has been performing such tests for over 50 years. Currently, except for Type B thermal tests, testing is performed at the purpose-built Packaging Research Facility that is located at the National Transportation Research Center - a U.S. Department of Energy User Facility. Packages used for the transportation of Type B quantities of radioactive materials must be capable of meeting normal conditions of transportation (NCT) requirements and hypothetical accident conditions (HAC) requirements as defined in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 71. Evaluation of package designs to these criteria typically involves a combination of analysis and physical testing. Required physical tests include free drop, crush, puncture, penetration, compression, vibration, water spray, water immersion, and thermal. The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Packaging Evaluation Facility (PEF) at the National Transportation Research Center (NTRC) provides an inclusive testing capability for a wide variety of packages needed for shipment of radioactive materials. Since PATRAM 2019, ORNL has performed several sets of tests including testing of two designs of the Defense Program Package (DPP-3 and DPP-1) and several Special Form Capsules. This paper provides an overview of the testing performed as well as a summary of advancements made to the ORNL package testing program during that time.

Martinez, Oscar↗

Greater Efficiency in the Management of Low-Level Radioactive Material - 18305

The World Nuclear Association is the international organization representing the global nuclear industry. Its mission is to promote a wider understanding of nuclear energy among key international influencers by producing authoritative information, developing common industry positions, and contributing to the energy debate. Membership encompasses companies from the whole fuel cycle (from uranium mining through to decommissioning) as well as support services. Through discussions and survey of the Association's Waste Management and Decommissioning Working Group, it is clear that there is an issue relating to the management of cleared and/or low level radioactive material, particularly during decommissioning where it represents more than 90% of all wastes generated. The group has found that the status quo on the reuse, recycling and disposal of cleared and/or low-level radioactive material arising from the civil nuclear industry (all successfully tested and implemented options) is untenable, and believes that this message should be conveyed to relevant influencers internationally. This message is key and features prominently in a methodological guide being prepared by the group's experts on managing waste from decommissioning which will work through case studies (relating to both technical and financial management) and showcase good practice to support the development of a successful decommissioning strategy. There are currently nearly 450 operating civil nuclear power reactors in the world with many associated nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear research facilities. During the operation and subsequent decommissioning of nuclear facilities, cleared and low-level radioactive material is routinely generated from normal activities, including clothes, rags, metal equipment, concrete structures, etc. For low-level radioactive material, most of this material can be freed from its added radioactivity through survey and simple cleanup (decontamination if necessary). When properly managed and regulated these activities pose no real health issues for people or the environment. It is understandable that there are increasing public demands and expectations for the reuse and recycling of valuable resources, which nuclear - like many other sectors - can no longer ignore. There are efficiencies to be found through technical solutions (resulting in waste volume reductions, better sorting of waste, etc.), which would enable mitigation of environmental impacts and increased preservation of these natural resources. In addition, it will reduce volumes for storage and disposal which are rare resources. There must be a balance struck between the availability of disposal, and recycling and reuse, depending on the outcomes of assessments. Both the advantages in terms of preserving natural resources and disposal capacity should enable the industry to gain credibility with stakeholders. Taking Europe as an example, excellence in the implementation of the reuse and recycling of metals and of disposal of very-low waste, would, if widely shared between countries, no doubt lead to greater efficiency. International and national leaders from industry, regulators and governments should enable the concurrent availability of these three safe management options in each country, worldwide. Whenever an option considered is supported by a solid industrial business case, operators and regulators can (and must) concurrently deploy and operate safe reuse, recycling and disposal. This flexible approach should be deployed; the Association is of the firm conviction that the exclusive commitment to a single option cannot be sound on any grounds. (authors)

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HMPT: Basic Radioactive Material Transportation

Hazardous Materials and Packaging and Transportation (HMPT): Basic Radioactive Material Transportation Live (#30462, suggested one time) and Test (#30463, required initially and every 36 months) address the Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) function-specific [required for hazardous material (HAZMAT) handlers, packagers, and shippers] training requirements of the HMPT Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Labwide training. This course meets the requirements of 49 CFR 172, Subpart H, Section 172.704(a)(ii), Function-Specific Training.

42 ENGINEERING↗

U.S. Department of Energy/Argonne National Laboratory Training Courses for Packaging, Transportation, and Storage of Radioactive Material - 17269

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Packaging Certification Program (PCP), Office of Packaging and Transportation, Office of Environmental Management, has sponsored a suite of training courses that have been conducted since the early 1990s. Of these training courses, Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) conducts three courses: (1) Quality Assurance (QA) for Radioactive Material Packaging, (2) American Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Pressure Vessel Code for Nuclear Transport and Storage, and (3) Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials Transport Security. Argonne has been working with the University of Nevada, Reno, to develop an accredited graduate-level program in nuclear packaging. The Graduate Certificate in Nuclear Packaging (GCNP) program provides an applied knowledge-based curriculum in packaging for nuclear and radioactive materials that complements other graduate programs at the University (for additional information, see https://www.unr.edu/degrees/nuclear-packaging/certificate). (authors)

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Comparison of U.S. Special Permit/Exemption/Authorization Processes for Licensing Type B Radioactive Material Packages - 17513

In the United States, there are three regulators (agencies) associated with licensing Type B radioactive material packages for shipping. They are the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the United States Department of Transportation (DOT). Each regulator has requirements and guidance which implement United States Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR 71 - Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material and 49 CFR 171 through 180 - Hazardous Materials Regulations. Periodically, select packages may not clearly fit within the requirements or guidance. In such cases, the planned shipper can petition the applicable agency for a special permit/exemption/authorization approving the shipment with the specified deviations from the requirements or guidance. If equivalent safety is successfully demonstrated to the applicable regulator, such authorization may be obtained. This paper compares the: 1) DOE exemption process; 2) the NRC special package authorization process; and, 3) the DOT special permit process. (authors)

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Assessment of Quality Assurance Measures for Radioactive Material Transport Packages not Requiring Competent Authority Design Approval - 13282

The majority of transports of radioactive materials are carried out in packages which don't need a package design approval by a competent authority. Low-active radioactive materials are transported in such packages e.g. in the medical and pharmaceutical industry and in the nuclear industry as well. Decommissioning of NPP's leads to a strong demand for packages to transport low and middle active radioactive waste. According to IAEA regulations the 'non-competent authority approved package types' are the Excepted Packages and the Industrial Packages of Type IP-1, IP-2 and IP-3 and packages of Type A. For these types of packages an assessment by the competent authority is required for the quality assurance measures for the design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance and inspection (IAEA SSR 6, Chap. 306). In general a compliance audit of the manufacturer of the packaging is required during this assessment procedure. Their regulatory level in the IAEA regulations is not comparable with the 'regulatory density' for packages requiring competent authority package design approval. Practices in different countries lead to different approaches within the assessment of the quality assurance measures in the management system as well as in the quality assurance program of a special package design. To use the package or packaging in a safe manner and in compliance with the regulations a management system for each phase of the life of the package or packaging is necessary. The relevant IAEA-SSR6 chap. 801 requires documentary verification by the consignor concerning package compliance with the requirements. (authors)

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Development of a Helical Closure for Radioactive Material Shipping Packages

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) Packaging Technology group proposed a closure design for the outer packaging of a prototype Type B shipping package being developed for the Department of Energy (DOE). The closure design provides an efficient means of securing the containment vessel (CV) within the radioactive material packaging. This design has a simplified operation, requires less components, and less maintenance when compared to current radioactive material package closure methods. This paper will review and discuss the materials, designs, processes, and testing activities that were considered and pursued in the development of the novel closure for the outer packaging of new radioactive material shipping packages.

Housley, William M. [Savannah River National Labor↗

Remote Detection of Radioactive Materials Using Long Wavelength Infrared Laser Driven Avalanche Breakdown [Slides]

The yearly goals of the "Remote Detection of Radioactive Materials Using Long Wavelength Infrared Laser Driven Avalanche Breakdown" experiment are broken into two parts. Year 1: Perform proof-of-concept scaling experiments for detection of radioactive materials at 10m standoff distance, characterizing avalanche breakdowns with the 9.2μm long pulse beam line and optimizing diagnostics. Years 2-3: Extend technique to 30m detection distance, characterizing the effect of long propagation paths on sensitivity, improving diagnostic sensitivity and resolution, and characterizing the effects of turbulence and aerosols.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Study on release and transport of aerial radioactive materials in reprocessing plants

The release and transport characteristics of radioactive materials at a boiling accident of the high active liquid waste (HALW) in a reprocessing plant have been studied for improving experimental data of source terms of the boiling accident. In the study, a heating test and a thermogravimetry and differential thermal analysis (TG-DTA) test were conducted. In the heating test using a simulated HALW, it was found that ruthenium was mainly released into the air in the form of gas and that non-volatile elements were released into the air in the form of mist. In the TG-DTA test, the rate constants and reaction heat of thermal decomposition of ruthenium nitrosyl nitrate were obtained from TG and DTA curves. (authors)

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Remote detection of radioactive material using mid-IR laser–driven electron avalanche

Remote detection of a distant, shielded sample of radioactive material is an important goal, but it is made difficult by the finite spatial range of the decay products. Here, we present a proof-of-principle demonstration of a remote detection scheme using mid-infrared (mid-IR) (λ = 3.9 μm) laser–induced avalanche breakdown of air. In the scheme’s most basic version, we observe on-off breakdown sensitivity to the presence of an external radioactive source. In another realization of the technique, we correlate the shift of the temporal onset of avalanche to the degree of seed ionization from the source. We present scaling of the interaction with laser intensity, verify observed trends with numerical simulations, and discuss the use of mid-IR laser–driven electron avalanche breakdown to detect radioactive material at range.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

The future of RADCALC- the radioactive material and waste transportation software program - 15154

This paper provides a thorough review of RADCALC, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)-developed software tool to assist DOE sites in making radioactive material and waste packaging and transportation determinations in compliance with applicable Federal regulations and DOE Orders and Standards. There are more than 400 registered users of the RADCALC tool across the DOE complex. DOE has also authorized a limited number of users from certain universities and foreign countries. DOE periodically upgrades the software consistent with changing domestic and international requirements, as well as needs unique to DOE. Due to recent changes in regulatory requirements by the Department of Transportation (DOT), it is necessary that the current version of RADCALC should be updated in a timely manner. Prior to investing funds in software upgrades, DOE decided to evaluate the nature of changes required and level of operational support and looked for alternatives for meeting sites' operational needs. DOE formed a joint review team consisting of experts from Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG) sites, commercial waste treatment facilities and the National Laboratories. This team evaluated the RADCALC software, commercially available software packages, and internal DOE site-developed programs against an established set of criteria. The team also reviewed and prioritized regulatory changes and user-recommended enhancements. Based on extensive review, the team recommended that DOE continue to support RADCALC noting that RADCALC is a cost-effective, technically robust tool that can perform complicated radioactive material shipping determinations. The tool promotes accuracy, consistency, and completeness between shipments by a single shipper, between shippers at a given site, and between sites. The isotopic coverage, decay algorithm and the range of calculations are without compare either within DOE or in industry in a tool of this kind. The team also recommended that DOE should actively promote RADCALC use throughout the DOE complex and consider cooperative arrangements with the Department of Defense or other government entities that may have similar needs. (authors)

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Data Collection Handbook to Support Modeling Impacts of Radioactive Material in Soil and Building Structures

This handbook is an update of the 1993 version of the Data Collection Handbook and the Radionuclide Transfer Factors Report to support modeling the impact of radioactive material in soil. Many new parameters have been added to the RESRAD Family of Codes, and new measurement methodologies are available. A detailed review of available parameter databases was conducted in preparation of this new handbook. This handbook is a companion document to the user manuals when using the RESRAD (onsite) and RESRAD-OFFSITE code. It can also be used for RESRAD-BUILD code because some of the building-related parameters are included in this handbook. The RESRAD (onsite) has been developed for implementing U.S. Department of Energy Residual Radioactive Material Guidelines. Hydrogeological, meteorological, geochemical, geometrical (size, area, depth), crops and livestock, human intake, source characteristic, and building characteristic parameters are used in the RESRAD (onsite) code. The RESRAD-OFFSITE code is an extension of the RESRAD (onsite) code and can also model the transport of radionuclides to locations outside the footprint of the primary contamination. This handbook discusses parameter definitions, typical ranges, variations, and measurement methodologies. It also provides references for sources of additional information. Although this handbook was developed primarily to support the application of RESRAD Family of Codes, the discussions and values are valid for use of other pathway analysis models and codes.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nuclear Security Interface Considerations for Regaining Control of Discovered Nuclear and Radioactive Materials

Recognizing that regaining control of orphan radioactive and nuclear material is challenging, the international community has developed requirements and guidance to support countries in addressing the problem. However, limited guidance is available on the practical nuclear security related issues that arise when nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control (MORC) is encountered and efforts are undertaken to regain control. For example, the IAEA Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-19, “National Strategy for Regaining Control over Orphan Sources and Improving Control over Vulnerable Sources”, provides recommendations on a methodology for establishing a national strategy for regaining control of orphan sources. However, except for Pu239 in radioactive sources, nuclear material is outside the scope of this safety guide, and practical safety and security measures below the level of national strategy are not discussed adequately.This paper discusses the interfaces between the stakeholder groups and the responsibilities of each when encountering common scenarios that deal with MORC transitioning to regulatory control. The stakeholders include but are not limited to individuals who encounter MORC, and providers of formal and informal transport systems, and traditional and ad hoc storage solutions. This paper explores practical legal, financial, and institutional issues that hinder implementation of required safety and security practices. This paper also offers strategies that can be implemented on the individual, organizational, national, and international level to regain control of MORC.

Shannon, Michael↗

RECERTIFICATION OF THE MODEL 9977 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGING

The Model 9977 Packaging was initially issued a Certificate of Compliance (CoC) by the Department of Energy’s Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) for the transportation of radioactive material (RAM) in the Fall of 2007. This first CoC was for a single radioactive material and two packing configurations. In the five years since that time, seven Addendums have been written to the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) and five Letter Amendments have been written that have authorized either new RAM contents or packing configurations, or both. This paper will discuss the process of updating the 9977 SARP to include all the contents and configurations, including the addition of a new content, and its submittal for recertification.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

THE DESIGN OF RADIAL HONEYCOMB LATTICES FOR IMPACT ENERGY ABSORPTION IN RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS PACKAGES

In this research we present a variation on the corrugation technique of honeycomb lattices, for cylindrical honeycombs, making them much easier to design for impact energy absorption in radioactive materials packages. This variation, termed radial honeycomb lattices, eliminates the residual strain and saddle effect. The use of honeycomb lattices provides advantages over the typically used foams. While foams are effective at absorbing impact energy, they can burn, their material properties are difficult to control, they can degrade over time, and procurement of raw materials can be dependent on timing of manufacturer batch runs. While the weaknesses of foam are strengths for honeycomb lattices, lattices have a different set of problems. Typically, when cylindrical honeycomb lattices are manufactured, they are manufactured flat, wrapped around a mandrel of the desired radius, and then brazed. This approach introduces residual strains, resulting in the saddle effect, which limits both the radial thickness and cylinder length. The radial honeycomb lattice approach presented here makes the design of thicker and longer cylinder honeycombs possible. To address these issues, we propose a honeycomb lattice which changes in cross-section from the inner to the outer radius of the cylinder. This causes the lattice to automatically wrap into a cylinder as it exits the corrugating gears. The theoretically bounding case, of a square cross-section at the inner radius, transitioning through a hexagon, to a diamond cross-section at the outer radius, results in a maximum thickness of approximately 41% of the inner radius. Full mathematical derivations, implemented in computer code, allow for the design of an entire radial honeycomb lattice, including the corrugating gears. To accomplish this only the radial thickness, inner cross-section shape, cell size, and nominal gear radius need to be specified, making the design of these lattices very efficient. Radial honeycomb lattice prototypes have demonstrated that the honeycomb does indeed wrap into a cylinder as intended, without the saddle effect, and can therefore be used to create thick-walled cylinders of any length. These design improvements make cylindrical honeycomb lattices much more accessible as a design element for radioactive materials packages

Johnson, William R. [Savannah River National Labor↗

Radioactive Material Inventory Optimization Using the Plutonium-239 Equivalent Curie Methodology

ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to provide the technical basis for application of the Plutonium 239 equivalent curies (PEC) concept used to optimize and limit the material-at-risk (MAR) in the Irradiated Materials Characterization Laboratory (IMCL) located at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC). The PEC concept offers a method to normalize all radionuclides to a common radiotoxic hazard index that can be summed to a single value. This paper describes the technical approach to applying the PEC concept, documents the weighting factors and specific activities to be utilized in the calculation, and provides an example of the application of the concept to a radionuclide distribution that is representative of materials encountered in the IMCL. The IMCL is operated to provide a dynamic, re-configurable capability to analyze and characterize irradiated or non-irradiated radioactive material samples. The operations unique to the IMCL include sample storage, preparation, and analysis using experiment-specific instrumentation such as, Electron probe micro-analyzer (EPMA), Focused ion beam (FIB), Transmission electron microscope (TEM), and Scanning electron microscope (SEM). The methodology used to characterize the radioactive material inventory enables the IMCL to operate in such a way that complements their capability and program goals without compromising the safety of the worker, co-located worker, or the general public. The PEC concept offers a method in which all radionuclide inventory is normalized to a common radiotoxic hazard index that can be summed to a single value. The PEC concept is useful in the comparison of various material types for hazard categorization and for identifying worst-case and bounding inventory.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Capability Needs for Irradiated and Radioactive Materials Research (Ad hoc Committee Summary Report)

It is essential for the U.S. nuclear energy community to have access to world-leading equipment suitable for conducting research on both nuclear fuels and structural materials, including neutron irradiated–and therefore activated–materials. To address future research infrastructure requirements to support the DOE-NE mission, the Office of Reactor Fleet and Advanced Reactor Deployment established an ad hoc committee to gather information on potential capability gaps for radioactive materials and radiation effects research. This document summarizes the discussions of the committee addressing the high-level challenges in irradiated and radioactive materials research and the capabilities needed to address these challenges. After considering the various needs, the committee agreed on the four top-level targets and priority capability gaps.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Peer Review Comments on the Authorized Limits Technical Document (OREM-19-2573) for Disposal of Waste Containing Residual Radioactive Material at the U.S. Department of Energy Industrial Landfill IV, Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

Argonne National Laboratory is assigned responsibility by DOE/EM-4 to conduct a peer review of the proposed Authorized Limits (ALs) for disposal of waste containing residual radioactive material at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Industrial Landfill IV, Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The ALs document package (Document Number OREM-19-2573, dated May 2020) was sent to Argonne by DOE on June 1, 2020 (Oak Ridge 2020a). Argonne started the review immediately and held several BlueJeans meetings with Oak Ridge and DOE to discuss review comments. The first BlueJeans meeting was June 17, 2020. Oak Ridge presented a briefing of the AL package, followed by discussion of the assumptions, methodology, and parameters used in the analysis. A follow-up BlueJeans meeting was held on June 24, 2020, at which Argonne presented both general and specific review comments in PowerPoint slides. This set of slides - Review Comments on the “Authorized Limits for Disposal of Waste Containing Residual Radioactive Material at DOE Industrial Landfill IV, Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee” - was then emailed to Oak Ridge and DOE after the BlueJeans meeting on June 24, 2020. A PDF version of this slide set is included as Appendix A.

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