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Mortality among workers at the Rocky Flats Plant, 1951–2017

The Rocky Flats (RFs) Plant operated from 1951–1989 as part of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear complex. Its primary mission was weapons component fabrication, whereby workers were potentially exposed to radioactive and non-radioactive hazards. RF worker mortality was compared to the general population, and dose-response relationships between mortality and radiation organ doses were examined. RF workers first employed between 1951 and 1979 for ⩾30 d were identified (n = 9397). Vital status was determined using national and state death records up to 2017. Organ doses from external photons and neutrons irritation and internalised plutonium (Pu), americium (Am), and uranium (U) were modelled as cumulative lagged total doses per year. Beryllium exposure was evaluated as an effect modifier using data from the DOE Nationwide Beryllium Medical Program. Statistical analyses included standardised mortality ratios (SMRs), Cox proportional hazard models, and excess relative risk (ERR) models. Approximately 53.2% of workers were deceased by the end of the study. Nearly 90% were monitored for radiation exposure, with a mean weighted absorbed dose of 59.0 mGy for the lungs. Nearly 45% of workers had intakes of alpha-particle emitting radionuclides, and 46.7% were monitored for neutrons. Leading causes of death included ischemic heart disease (n = 999) and lung cancer (n = 361). The highest SMRs were observed for berylliosis (SMR: 176.9; 95% CI: 76.2, 348.7; n < 10) and asbestosis (SMR: 4.65; 95% CI: 2.23, 8.55; n = 10). Dose-response analyses showed no statistical increase in risk from low-dose radiation including lung cancer (ERR per 100 mGy: −0.02; 95% CI: −0.11, 0.08; n = 361) and Parkinson’s disease (ERR per 100 mGy: 0.13; 95% CI: −0.26, 0.31; n = 57). Approximately 45% of workers were monitored for beryllium, with a weak non-significant indication of effect modification for lung cancer risk. The RF cohort showed no evidence of a statistically significant increase in mortality from occupational radiation exposure. However, this study was limited by low statistical power, which inhibits the ability to detect effects. Future pooling of Million Person Study (MPS) cohorts will provide further insights, particularly regarding Pu as a carcinogen.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Leveraging Radiofrequency Identification Success Beyond Hazardous Material Inventory Management at a National Laboratory

Effective inventory management can be overshadowed by conflicting priorities in organizational procedures, particularly in research-focused institutions such as national laboratories that handle expensive, delicate, and hazardous materials. Here, this study investigated the potential of radiofrequency identification (RFID) technology, currently used for hazardous chemical inventory, in applications with higher metal interference and absorption, specifically pressure release device (PRD) compliance and nuclear container management, at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). This study was done to document best practices to enhance inventory identification speeds for inventory reconciliation and inventory recall and to explore optimal configurations for RFID implementation compared to traditional manual methods of equipment management. Tests were conducted to determine the ideal RFID tag orientation (read at angles of 0°, 90°, and 270°), various container layouts (linear, separated, curved, operational), and ID methods such as manual, barcode, and RFID performing three trials per method per orientation. Results indicated that 0° was the optimal read angle for minimizing metallic interference, and the operational and curved arrangements significantly outperformed the linear and separated configurations in read speed. 3D printed mounts were developed and tested, increasing the read range of the RFID reader by up to 235% in cases of high metallic interference. The RFID technology demonstrated an average speed increase of 65% over a simplified manual identification, which supports the conclusion that RFID is a more efficient method for large hazardous inventory management and equipment reconciliation. Additionally, capturing meta-data, such as location and date, can be used to query for inventory recall and automated updating of record information.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 35, No. 1, January-June 1994]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT: 1 Chernobyl Accident Management Actions, A. R Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 25 The IAEA-ASSET Approach to Avoiding Accidents is to Recognize the Precursors to Prevent Incidents, F. Reisch; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 36 A Review of the Available Information on the Triggering Stage of a Steam Explosion, D. F. Fletcher; 58 Analysis and Modeling of Flow-Blockage-Induced Steam Explosion Events in the High-Flux Isotope Reactor, R. P. Taleyarkhan, V. Georgevich, C. W. Nestor, U. Gat, B. L. Lepard, D. H. Cook, J. Freels, S. J. Chang, C. Luttrell, R. C. Gwaltney, and J. Kirkpatrick; 74 An Analysis of Disassembling the Radial Reflector of a Thermionic Space Nuclear Reactor Power System, M. S. El-Genk and D. V. Paramonov; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 86 Standards for High-Integrity Software, D. R. Wallace, D. R. Kuhn, L M. Ippolito, and L. Beltracchi; DESIGN FEATURES: 98 Adoption of New Design Features for the Next Generation Nuclear Power Reactors, L. S. Tong; 114 Review of Nuclear Piping Seismic Design Requirements, G. C. Slagis and S. E. Moore; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 128 PC-Based Probabilistic Safety Assessment Study for a Geological Waste Repository Placed in a Bedded Salt Formation, S. A. Khan; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 142 Managing Aging in Nuclear Power Plants: Insights from NRC’s Maintenance Team Inspection Reports, A. Fresco and M. Subudhi; 150 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 153 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 158 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 168 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31, 1993; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 177 Symposium on Radioactive and Mixed Waste—Risk as a Basis for Waste Classification; 177 1995 Incineration Conference 178 Ninth Power Plant Dynamics Control and Testing Symposium; 174 The Authors

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Leveraging ARM Data to Improve Models for Predictive Understanding of Energy and Security Challenges

Extreme weather and natural hazards can disrupt the energy sector, affecting demand, generation, transmission, distribution, consumption and operational planning at regional and national scales. These disruptions stem from a broad range of atmospheric phenomena, including winter storms, freezing rain, wet snow loading, severe convection, flooding and landslides, wildfires, prolonged heat, and drought. Many of these same phenomena can also affect national security through impacts to transportation and infrastructure. To support the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) focus on energy resilience and national security, the Atmospheric Radiation Measurement (ARM) User Facility is uniquely positioned to contribute measurement data, analyses, and modeling frameworks that can significantly improve predictive understanding of these hazards to mitigate their effects. To explore this opportunity, ARM convened a two-part virtual workshop in November 2025. The workshop engaged interdisciplinary experts in atmospheric science, energy systems, modeling, and operations. The goal of the meeting was to engage with these interdisciplinary experts to address three questions: • What are examples of atmospheric processes that represent significant risks to energy security or national security and where are those risks greatest? • What measurements or measurement strategies would improve ARM’s capacity to address these issues? • How can ARM and users of the ARM facility better work with the Energy Exascale Earth System Model (E3SM) and multi-sector modeling communities to apply ARM data to improving E3SM simulations of these phenomena? Participants were asked to submit white papers ahead of the meeting to initiate thinking on these themes and to help organize discussions. Workshop sessions were then organized around themes identified in the white papers. First from the white papers and then through subsequent discussions, workshop participants identified many examples that address the three questions listed above. Participants called out energy system vulnerabilities to weather phenomena such as the impact of freezing rain, strong winds, and excessive heat on power grids. They also noted the effects that weather phenomena could have on energy demand or supply (e.g., through effects of extreme temperatures). They called out security vulnerabilities such as impacts to crops from aerosol-borne pathogens and risks to industry due to melting permafrost in the Arctic. In all, over a dozen meteorological phenomena were linked to energy or security vulnerabilities. For many of the identified phenomena, participants pointed out where ARM was well poised to address issues (e.g., through measurements of cloud microphysics to inform studies of freezing rain) but also noted needs for additional measurements or modified measurement strategies. For example, adaptive scanning of severe weather would be valuable for probing winter storms or severe convection. Participants pointed out the value in integrating external observations with ARM measurements and with applying artificial intelligence (AI) to ARM observation analysis and they advocated for using model simulations to help optimize measurement strategies through Observing System Simulation Experiments (OSSEs). It was clear from the workshop that there are many ways that ARM observations can be used to mitigate energy and security concerns, but meeting participants were also asked to identify what they considered to be the greatest opportunities by ranking issues pertaining to the three workshop questions. This was accomplished through a survey administered to participants between the two virtual sessions. The highest-priority phenomena identified were winter storms, severe convection, and arctic processes. Discussion in the second session, therefore, focused primarily on these three areas, which were most fully developed in exploring ARM opportunities. Nevertheless, it was also clear that ARM has opportunities to contribute to all the identified topics. This report describes the workshop, including input from discussion and white papers (Sections 2 and 3) and a list of priority recommendations (section 4). Many other ideas for ARM contributions are discussed in individual white papers (Appendix D).

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Determining Unabated Airborne Radionuclide Emissions Monitoring Requirements Using Inventory-Based Methods

Compliance with the airborne radionuclide emission monitoring requirements in the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP; Title 40 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations Part 61, Subpart H) and State requirements in Washington Administrative Code 246–247: Radiation Protection – Air Emissions and 173-480: Ambient Air Quality Standards and Emission Limits for Radionuclides were evaluated for Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) operations. Additional guidance may be found in the U.S. Department of Energy Handbook, Environmental Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Environmental Surveillance. To meet regulatory requirements, reviews of planned or proposed projects and activities provide the basis for implementing necessary monitoring adjustments or for implementing changes to projects and activities in a timely manner. Potential unabated off-site doses were evaluated for emission locations managed by PNNL and licensed to the Department of Energy. These locations were at facilities in Richland, Washington (i.e., the Hanford Site and PNNL–Richland campus) and in Sequim, Washington, (PNNL–Sequim campus). This report describes the inventory-based methods and provides the results for the NESHAP assessment performed in January 2024 for calendar year ending 2023.

40 CFR 61 Subpart H↗

PNNL-Richland Campus Radionuclide Air Emissions Report for Calendar Year 2023

This report documents radionuclide air emissions that result in the 2023 highest effective dose equivalent (EDE) to an offsite member of the public, referred to as the maximally exposed individual (MEI). The report has been prepared in compliance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Protection of the Environment, Part 61, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, Subpart H, “National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other than Radon from Department of Energy Facilities” and Washington Administrative Code Chapter 246-247, “Radiation Protection–Air Emissions.” The dose to the PNNL-Richland campus MEI from routine emissions sources, excluding radon, in 2023 from campus sources is 2.0E-5 mrem (2.0E-7 mSv) EDE. The dose from radon emissions is 4.0E-7 mrem (4.0E-09 mSv) EDE. No nonroutine emissions occurred in 2023. The total radiological dose to the MEI from all PNNL-Richland campus radionuclide emissions, including fugitive emissions and radon, is 2.1E-5 mrem (2.1E-7 mSv) EDE, or more than 100,000 times less than the federal and state standard of 10 mrem/yr, with which the PNNL-Richland campus is in compliance.

40 CFR 61 Subpart H↗

PNNL-Richland Campus Radionuclide Air Emissions Report for Calendar Year 2024

This report documents radionuclide air emissions that result in the 2024 highest effective dose equivalent (EDE) to an offsite member of the public, referred to as the maximally exposed individual (MEI). The report has been prepared in compliance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Protection of the Environment, Part 61, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, Subpart H, “National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other than Radon from Department of Energy Facilities” and Washington Administrative Code Chapter 246-247, “Radiation Protection–Air Emissions.” The total dose to the MEI from all PNNL-Richland campus radionuclide emissions in 2024, including fugitive emissions and radon, is 1.3E-05 mrem (1.3E-07 mSv) EDE, or 100,000 times less than the federal and state standard of 10 mrem/yr, with which the PNNL Richland campus is in compliance. The dose attributable to radon emissions is 4.1E-10 mrem (4.1E-12 mSv) EDE.

40 CFR 61 Subpart H↗

PNNL Sequim Campus Radionuclide Air Emissions Report for Calendar Year 2025 : Department of Energy – Office of Science Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Science’s Pacific Northwest Site Office has oversight and stewardship duties associated with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Sequim Campus. Facility operations include radiological operations with the potential-to-emit low levels of radioactive materials. This report is prepared to document compliance with the 40 CFR Part 61, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, Subpart H, “National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other than Radon from Department of Energy Facilities,” and Washington Administrative Code Chapter 246-247, Radiation Protection–Air Emissions. The PNNL Sequim Campus is in compliance with the federal and state 10 mrem/yr standard for 2025 operations.

40 CFR 61 Subpart H↗

PNNL Richland Campus Radionuclide Air Emissions Report for Calendar Year 2025

This report documents radionuclide air emissions that result in the 2025 highest effective dose equivalent (EDE) to an offsite member of the public, referred to as the maximally exposed individual (MEI). The report has been prepared in compliance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Protection of the Environment, Part 61, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, Subpart H, “National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other than Radon from Department of Energy Facilities” and Washington Administrative Code Chapter 246-247, “Radiation Protection–Air Emissions.” The total dose to the MEI from all PNNL Richland Campus radionuclide emissions in 2025, including fugitive emissions and radon, is 1.8E-05 mrem (1.8E-07 mSv) EDE, or more than 100,000 times less than the federal and state standard of 10 mrem/yr, with which the PNNL Richland Campus is in compliance. The dose attributable to radon emissions is 1.5E-13 mrem (1.5E-15 mSv) EDE.

40 CFR 61 Subpart H↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 32, No. 4, October-December 1991]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 477 Report on the International Symposium on the Use of Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Operational Safety—PSA '91, S. Chakraborty and M. Khatib-Rahbar; 488 Good Relationships Are Pivotal in Nuclear Data Bases, A. S. Heger and B. V. Koen; 494 Technical Note: The Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel's Evaluation of the Ulysses Space Mission, J. A. Sholtis, Jr., D. A. Huff, L. B. Gray, N. P. Klug, and R. O. Winchester; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 502 The Severe Accident Analysis Program for the Savannah River Nuclear Production Reactors, M. L. Hyder; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 511 A Framework for Selecting Suitable Control Technologies for Nuclear Power Plant Systems, R. A. Kisner; DESIGN FEATURES: 521 Containments for Gas-Cooled Power Reactors History and Status, P.W. Williams; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 537 Indoor Radon: A Natural Risk, N. H. Harley and J.H. Harley; On the Importance of the Atmospheric Parameters in the Fission Products Distribution of a Severe Reactor Accident, M. C. Barla and A. R. Bayulken; Book Review: Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation BEIR V, C. R. Richmond; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 555 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 567 Effects of Component Aging on the Westhinghouse Control Rod Drive System, K. Sullivan and W. Gunther; 577 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 580 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 582 Operating U 8 Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 596 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 610 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 614 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1991; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 520 Workshop on PC PRAISE: A Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Personal Computer Code for Nuclear Power Plant Piping Reliability Assessment; 536 Fifth Workshop on Nuclear Power Plant Containment Integrity; 624 New OECD "International Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE)"; 625 Harvard School of Public Health Announces Short Courses; 625 Eighth Power Plant Dynamics, Control and Testing Symposium; 626 Second Training Course on Off-Site Emergency Planning and Response for Nuclear Accidents; 618 The Authors; 622 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol 32.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Summary of Analytical Services for the Hanford Site Radionuclide NESHAP Program

This document is a summary of the point source analytical requirements used to demonstrate compliance for the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site operations with 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 61, “National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants,” (NESHAP) Subpart H, “National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities,” and the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 246-247, “Radiation Protection – Air Emissions.” This reference collects information from multiple source documents and is not intended to create, supersede, replace or over-ride any existing contractual, DOE, federal or state statutes, regulations, compliance agreements, orders, permits, licenses or other requirements. The requirement source document governs where any difference may exist. The Hanford Mission Integration Solutions (HMIS) Environmental organization has been contracted by DOE to manage and report data collected from the sampling and monitoring of radioactive air emissions point sources, colloquially called stacks. The Environmental organization coordinates the analyses and reporting of samples collected at various facilities across the Hanford Site. These facilities operate approximately 52 stacks that require sampling, monitoring or estimating radioactive air emissions. The stacks are operated by Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), Central Plateau Cleanup Company (CPCCo), Hanford Tank Waste Operations & Closure (H2C), Hanford Laboratory Management and Integration (HLMI), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Stack samples from CPCCo, HLMI and H2C facilities are collected by the operating contractor staff, delivered to HMIS, and then shipped to an offsite contracted laboratory for analyses. The field and laboratory sample data uploaded into the Sample Management and Analytical Results Tracking (SMART) database are used to calculate sample volumes and concentrations. Sample concentrations are evaluated for compliance with federal and state regulations, permits, and license requirements. The SMART database also calculates total curies released for sampled point sources and stacks. Point source effluent concentrations and releases are published annually in publicly available reports. The BNI and PNNL operate several DOE-Hanford Field Office (HFO) stacks subject to the requirements of 40 CFR 61, Subpart H and WAC 246-247. The concentrations, curies released and dose modeling evaluation for these stacks are included in the DOE-HFO annual radionuclide NESHAP report. The sample collection, analyses and emissions estimates for these stacks are outside the scope of HMIS contracted responsibilities and not addressed further in this document.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

AERO-MAP: a data compilation and modeling approach to understand spatial variability in fine- and coarse-mode aerosol composition

Abstract. Aerosol particles are an important part of the Earth climate system, and their concentrations are spatially and temporally heterogeneous, as well as being variable in size and composition. Particles can interact with incoming solar radiation and outgoing longwave radiation, change cloud properties, affect photochemistry, impact surface air quality, change the albedo of snow and ice, and modulate carbon dioxide uptake by the land and ocean. High particulate matter concentrations at the surface represent an important public health hazard. There are substantial data sets describing aerosol particles in the literature or in public health databases, but they have not been compiled for easy use by the climate and air quality modeling community. Here, we present a new compilation of PM2.5 and PM10 surface observations, including measurements of aerosol composition, focusing on the spatial variability across different observational stations. Climate modelers are constantly looking for multiple independent lines of evidence to verify their models, and in situ surface concentration measurements, taken at the level of human settlement, present a valuable source of information about aerosols and their human impacts complementarily to the column averages or integrals often retrieved from satellites. We demonstrate a method for comparing the data sets to outputs from global climate models that are the basis for projections of future climate and large-scale aerosol transport patterns that influence local air quality. Annual trends and seasonal cycles are discussed briefly and are included in the compilation. Overall, most of the planet or even the land fraction does not have sufficient observations of surface concentrations – and, especially, particle composition – to characterize and understand the current distribution of particles. Climate models without ammonium nitrate aerosols omit ∼ 10 % of the globally averaged surface concentration of aerosol particles in both PM2.5 and PM10 size fractions, with up to 50 % of the surface concentrations not being included in some regions. In these regions, climate model aerosol forcing projections are likely to be incorrect as they do not include important trends in short-lived climate forcers.

Mahowald, Natalie M. (ORCID:000000022873997X)↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 29, No. 1, January-March 1988]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT: 1 Core History and Nuclide Inventory of the Chernobyl Core at the Time of Accident by Gerald Kirchner and Cornelius C. Noack; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 6 Nonprescriptive Nuclear Safety Regulation: The Example of Loss of Offsite Power by M. W. Golay, V. P. Manno, and C. Vlahoplus, Jr., 20 Nuclear Power Safety Goals in Light of the Chernobyl Accident by C. Whipple and C. Starr; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 29 Containment Loads from Severe Accidents—U.S. Program by W. Kerr and M. K. Dey; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 36 Safety Characteristics of Modern High-Temperature Reactors: Focus on German Designs by W. Kröger, H. Nickel, and R. Schulten; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 49 Radiation Hormesis and Nuclear Safety by C. C. Congdon; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 58 Evaluation of Nonradiological Water Chemistry at Power Reactors by Harvey Zibulsky, James J. Kottan, Walter J. Pasciak, Mary Ann Castrogivanni, and Sujit Banerjee, 64 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 67 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 85 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 94 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 100 Status of Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Licensing Review Compiled by E. G. Silver, 103 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1987; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 5 Northwestern University Short Course on Radiation Safety, 28 International Approach to Nuclear Safety (After Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl), 57 RPI Short Course on Modern Developments in Boiling Heat Transfer and Two-Phase Flow, 107 20th DOE/NRC Nuclear Air Cleaning Conference, 110 Third International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Power Plant Thermal Hydraulics and Operations, 108 The Authors, 111 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 28.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Design and Validation of Mechanical & Autonomous Systems in Harsh Environments [Poster]

The autonomous systems within the Mobile Hot Cell provide advanced capabilities over traditional hot cells, pushing the boundaries of these systems in harsh environments. The degraded state of some radiological devices and the variety of designs present a series of challenges that require innovative tooling and procedural solutions. By leveraging technical knowledge and experience from disposition experts at SwRi and other institutions, initial design concepts were produced using rapid prototyping techniques. These concepts were then validated and optimized in a non-hazardous test bed, resulting in iterative improvements at minimal cost.

07 - ISOTOPES AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Development of Radiation and Fire Resistant Polyurethane Foam in Support of Deactivation and Decommissioning [Poster]

FoamBag™ is a two-part polyurethane foam that has been down selected as a possible engineering solution for the decommissioning of radiologically contaminated pipes. Our main objective consists of establishing an internal barrier (plug) to mitigate the release of residual contamination prior to cutting operations and required pipework for deactivation and decommissioning projects. To ensure worker safety, we will also be analyzing hazards associated with the off gasses present during curing.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Dynamic Scaling Analysis of Accelerated Irradiation Testing on Additive Manufacturing Materials by Positron Annihilation

The timely applications of Additive Manufacturing (AM) materials in nuclear environments require accelerated irradiation tests, mainly ion irradiation to enable rapid prototyping. Low dose ion irradiation would cause sub-nanostructure changes by generation of lattice defects, vacancies, vacancy clusters and voids and void swelling caused by cellular dislocations. Positron Annihilation Lifetime (PAL), a novel technology, sensitive towards sub-nanostructure morphology with high accuracy (about 10-7 vacancy per atom), supported by Transition Electron Microscope (TEM) would be applied to identify the type and total size of the defects. The subsequent PAL measurements and TEM surface studies would be followed by PAL analysis that includes sophisticated trapping model. The PAS results would become an input to dynamic scaling analysis (that predicts radiation effects from low dose studies for high dose effects), which incorporate mean-field theory model. The final effect is an in-depth understanding of the microstructure evolution of AM materials under ion irradiation which can be extrapolated to the studies of neutron irradiation, since ion-irradiation takes less time and do not cause the irradiation hazard. The working hypothesis is that PAL technology, that have excellent sensitivity to low-defect concentration would help to identify ion-induced material damage on the atomic and nano-scale level, which then could be extrapolated to understand the neutron damage better.

accelerated irradiation testing↗