Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Political science”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

S&TR Jan-Feb 2024 (Wind Tunnel - EMIT Issue)

At Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, we focus on science and technology research to ensure our nation’s security. We also apply that expertise to solve other important national problems in energy, bioscience, and the environment. Science & Technology Review is published eight times a year to communicate, to a broad audience, the Laboratory’s scientific and technological accomplishments in fulfilling its primary missions. The publication’s goal is to help readers understand these accomplishments and appreciate their value to the individual citizen, the nation, and the world.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Miscalculation, Misperception and Risk Reduction

In the current security environment, the most likely wars for which the US and its allies must be prepared are wars against nuclear-armed states. Such wars bring unique risks of both vertical and horizontal escalation. Some are “accepted risks;” for example, the US may choose to escalate a conflict to clarify its commitment to an issue and defend its interest. Other are “unacceptable risks;” especially, the risk of miscalculation by the U.S. or an adversary. The focus here is on this latter category. Miscalculation is an error of judgment—the failure to accurately assess a situation. Miscalculation can result from hidden, incomplete, or ambiguous information, or from inaccurate processing of available information because of bias, overconfidence, denial, delusion, etc. Miscalculation is related to misperception. For some, they are synonymous. This paper characterizes the risks of miscalculation and introduces a discussion of a risk mitigation strategy.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

Evaluating China's Road to Cyber Super Power

This report examines open source, non-classified qualitative analysis to evaluate China’s current cyber maturity. Evidence for this document draws on materials from academia, private cybersecurity companies, and national security research institutions. Private sector threat intelligence firms produce high quality analysis on Chinese APTs tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and investigation from companies such as FireEye illuminate China’s ability to wield cyber means for its security ends. None of the materials cited in this assessment originate from classified United States or foreign government sources. Any references to United States government sources are sourced entirely to unclassified information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Role of Nuclear-Conventional Intermingling on State Decision-making and the Risk of Inadvertent Escalation

The questions answered by this report are: What are the implications of nuclear and conventional intermingling on crisis stability and the potential risk of miscalculation?, and Specifically, how might entanglement influence US and competitor decision making during crisis and conflict? In practice, there are three main forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling. First, intermingling between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems can occur via the fielding of dual capable delivery systems like missiles or aircraft. Second, intermingling can happen due to the co-location of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and their support structures—for example, the co-location of strategic bombers and general-purpose aircraft, or the co-location of strategic submarines and general-purpose vessels. Third, intermingling can occur via convolving nuclear and conventional military command and control systems, to include ballistic missile early warning and potentially space surveillance systems as well. All three forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling have significantly increased since the end of the Cold War, driven by both technological and doctrinal changes. However, there are important differences in the rationale behind, and also the risks associated with these three different forms of intermingling. The mere existence of dual capable systems is not new— deploying such systems can increase the effectiveness of forces, and it can also provide more flexibility. The major powers have both employed and threatened with dual capable systems for decades, and they have done so without nuclear escalation. Similarly, the major powers co-located nuclear and conventional systems in the Cold War, and they did so for variety of reasons that had nothing to do with complicating the adversary’s risk calculus. The Soviet Union, for example, decided to co-locate its nuclear and conventional forces for economic and administrative reasons. Although today it might be recognized as a useful deterrent tool, it was not their primary intention. Major powers want to convince rivals that the co-location of forces creates a high bar for targeting and raises the risk of nuclear escalation, but they also want to have the flexibility of this not being true in an actual crisis or conflict.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Eight Levers of Coercive Conflict: No More, No Less

Few concepts are more important to our nation than the principle of deterrence. It is at the very core of our national security strategy. Despite its lasting import to our nation, and the rest of the world, we still lack a complete and explicit formulation of the calculus of deterrence. This has, at times, resulted in failed policies costing the Nation lives and wealth. With the ultimate objective of making the Nation more secure, we establish a complete and explicit formulation of deterrence calculus, which consists of eight levers. As it turns out this formulation also applies to the calculus of compellence, and is thus a unifying model of coercive conflict.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

US Nuclear Testing: Health Consequences and Policy Decisions

With the approval of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to begin the research on a nuclear bomb in 1941 to the last test conducted by the U.S. in 1992, the fifty-year history of the nuclear weapons testing program has been an expansive topic of research. The program's growth is credited to the race to build the first atomic weapon for war. The termination of the Soviet Union and many other factors, including concerns about the adverse health effects of radioactive fallout, influenced the decline of the need for the program. The discovery of the negative health effects caused by low-level radiation and the subsequent studies influenced sitting U.S. presidents in passing policies that significantly impacted the nuclear weapons testing program.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

US Perspectives on the Conventional/Nuclear Interactions and the Impacts on Nuclear Escalation Risks and Future Arms Control Prospects

This short paper is organized around a few discrete questions. How have U.S. perspectives on conventional and nuclear interactions evolved in recent years? How have these changing perspectives shaped U.S. thinking on perceived nuclear escalation risks with Russia, both long standing and newly emerged? And finally, what do these U.S. perceptions of interactions and risks mean for future potential arms control either in the conventional or nuclear arena? The answers to these questions appear to show some promise for future work in this area. Conventional and nuclear interactions are increasing, and thus the two domains cannot be kept as deliberately or artificially separated as in the past. There is a growing mutual recognition regarding the interplay between conventional and nuclear capabilities in the strategic stability equation. There is also an increasingly shared recognition in the United States and Russia that nuclear escalation risks are likely to originate in conventional crises or conflict, placing an imperative on some form of conflict prevention procedures at the lower end of the spectrum. This requirement suggests some potential areas for risk reduction measures outside of those traditionally considered in conventional and nuclear arms control over the past several decades.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Perspectives on Next Steps in Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Much has happened in arms control over the last year as this chapter has been in development. The prospects for arms control as a viable national security tool have, if anything, grown darker. Russia has falsely equated tearing down the remaining arms control edifice with creating potential leverage vis-à-vis its actions in Ukraine. China has failed to update its talking points on being a responsible arms control actor with its massive nuclear force expansion. The United States has stated clearly that it is open for business on arms control and risk reduction, but it unfortunately has no customers in Russia and China. It remains unclear what specifically the United States is selling in terms of what it wants in a potential agreement. Competitive dynamics and an atmosphere of great power competition are driving all parties further away from the table.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2026

On Theories of Change: Rethinking the Ban Treaty and Disarmament Strategies

A week before Israel bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Rafael Grossi had lunch with the Financial Times. In the interview, Grossi expressed both optimism and pessimism about the nuclear landscape: he was hopeful about prospects for diplomacy, including with Iran. But he also expressed longer-term concerns about a proliferation cascade and rising nuclear risks, in particular, Russia’s nuclear threats amidst the war in Ukraine. “In the past, this was quite taboo,” he said, “but now people talk about tactical nuclear weapons like something which could be contained or permissible.” Given subsequent events in Iran, along with the expiration of New START in 2026 and expanding nuclear arsenals in Russia and China, pessimism would seem to trump hope for prospects for nuclear disarmament.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

The Dynamic Tripolar Strategic Balance: A Net Assessment (Workshop Summary)

On December 9-10, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled “The Dynamic Tripolar Strategic Balance: A Net Assessment.” The discussion was guided by the following key questions: • By what metrics should the strategic balance be assessed? • How dynamic is the balance? How fragile? • Is the United States gaining strategic advantage, losing it, or holding steady, overall? • In order to gain new advantages or re-gain advantages lost, can or should the United States prioritize some domains and accept more risk in others? If so, which ones?

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2026

In Search of Strategic Advantage: Understanding the Landscape of Technology Competition

In an era of seemingly ever-increasing global tensions, technology competition is often mentioned as a pathway for U.S. and allied success. The opening arguments are often very simple. “This is the most important struggle of the 21st century.” “We cannot afford to lose this competition.” “The United States must not fall behind in this race.” “We must be faster, more agile, more committed, more thoughtful than our competitors.” Competition around a particular technology is described as a once in a generational struggle with immense stakes. “This is a Sputnik moment” is a common analogy. The solutions proposed are fairly straightforward – more of everything. We should spend more money. We should build more widgets or more factories. We should innovate more. We should focus more. We should attract more talent. We should file more patents. We should produce more PhDs. If we do more of everything, we will have more technology than our opponents, they will see our technological advantage, they will not challenge us, and therefore we will win. If we fail to do these things, we will lose. To paraphrase Homer Simpson, in national security policy discussions technology competition has become the cause of, and solution to, all of life’s problems. And yet, beyond doing more across the board technology competition is not at all simple. First, it is a concept increasingly muddled together with other big issues such as innovation policy, national defense strategy, great power competition, allied cooperation, public-private partnerships, and a host of other issues. Certain policies, systems, coalitions, and so on may be excellent for tackling one challenge, but far less optional for others. Second, it is inherently dynamic, an action-reaction cycle between multiple players. A brilliant opening move can be squandered or successfully countered in subsequent moves. Third, there are limits to what you can do - limited time, limited financial resources, limited human capital, and limited knowledge of what lies ahead. One is forced to choose.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS1994

Presidential Leadership in the Development of the U.S. Space Program

Papers presented at a historical symposium on Presidential leadership in the space program include the following: 'The Imperial Presidency in the History of Space Exploration'; 'The Reluctant Racer: Dwight D. Eisenhower and United States Space Policy'; 'Kennedy and the Decision to Go to the Moon'; 'Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning'; 'The Presidency, Congress, and the Deceleration of the U.S. Space Program in the 1970s'; 'Politics not Science: The U.S. Space Program in the Reagan and Bush Years'; 'Presidential Leadership and International Aspects of the Space Program'; 'National Leadership and Presidential Power'; and 'Epilogue: Beyond NASA Exceptionalism'.

Launius, Roger D.↗