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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 37 records · Page 2

Remote Sensing of Landuse Changes and Implications for Landuse Policy

This final report describes grant activities under which students were to study landuse changes by comparing planning and zoning documents using remote sensed data data analyzed and interpreted in the laboratory. Students were recruited through mathematics, political science and engineering classes an clubs. Work protocols were then organized for research on the county's growth patterns over the last three decades. Students and investigators made planes to identify specific scenes in Landsat and other data which would satisfy the research parameters. Finally, statistical and imaging software was identified and some was acquired.

Kennedy, Ken↗

Human Dimensions of Deforestation and Regrowth in the Brazilian Amazon: Integrating Data from Satellites, Demographic Censuses, and Field Surveys

This report summarizes research activities and products from a collaborative project on the "Human Dimensions of Deforestation and Regrowth in the Brazilian Amazon," awarded to Charles H. Wood (PI; Department of Sociology, University of Texas at Austin, now in the Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida), Steven E. Sanderson (Co-PI; Department of Political Science, University of Florida, now Dean of Emory College, Emory University) and David L. Skole (Co-PI; Institute for Earth, Oceans and Space, University of New Hampshire, now in the Department of Geography and Basic Science Remote Sensing Initiative, Michigan State University).

Wood, Charles H.↗

GIS Methodology for Planning Planetary-Rover Operations

A document describes a methodology for utilizing image data downlinked from cameras aboard a robotic ground vehicle (rover) on a remote planet for analyzing and planning operations of the vehicle and of any associated spacecraft. Traditionally, the cataloging and presentation of large numbers of downlinked planetary-exploration images have been done by use of two organizational methods: temporal organization and correlation between activity plans and images. In contrast, the present methodology involves spatial indexing of image data by use of the computational discipline of geographic information systems (GIS), which has been maturing in terrestrial applications for decades, but, until now, has not been widely used in support of exploration of remote planets. The use of GIS to catalog data products for analysis is intended to increase efficiency and effectiveness in planning rover operations, just as GIS has proven to be a source of powerful computational tools in such terrestrial endeavors as law enforcement, military strategic planning, surveying, political science, and epidemiology. The use of GIS also satisfies the need for a map-based user interface that is intuitive to rover-activity planners, many of whom are deeply familiar with maps and know how to use them effectively in field geology.

Powell, Mark↗

Keeping Classified Information Secret in the World of Quantum Computing

Quantum computing is a technology that promises to revolutionize computing by speeding up key computing tasks in are as such as machine learning and solving otherwise intractable problems.Some influential American policymakers, scholars, and analysts are extremely concerned about the effects quantum computing will have on national security. Similar to the way space technology was viewed in the context of the US-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War, scientific advancement in quantum computing is seen as a race with significant national security consequences, particularly in the emerging US-China rivalry.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Round Table Discussion: Science in a Political World

The conference Working on the Fringe ended with a round-table discussion of the bigger picture of what it takes to ensure science gets done, in this case optical and IR interferometry.

political world round table IR NASA headquarters↗

The space telescope: A study of NASA, science, technology, and politics

Scientific, technological, economic, and political aspects of NASA efforts to orbit a large astronomical telescope are examined in a critical historical review based on extensive interviews with participants and analysis of published and unpublished sources. The scientific advantages of large space telescopes are explained; early plans for space observatories are summarized; the history of NASA and its major programs is surveyed; the redesign of the original Large Space Telescope for Shuttle deployability is discussed; the impact of the yearly funding negotiations with Congress on the development of the final Hubble Space Telescope (HST) is described; and the implications of the HST story for the future of large space science projects are explored. Drawings, photographs, a description of the HST instruments and systems, and lists of the major contractors and institutions participating in the HST program are provided.

Smith, Robert William↗

The science, technology, and politics of ballistic missile defense

America's missile defense systems are deployed at home and abroad. This includes the Groundbased Missile Defense (GMD) system in Alaska and California, the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe (EPAA), and regional systems in the Middle East and Asia. Unfortunately these systems lack workable architectures, and many of the required elements either don't work or are missing. Major review and reconsideration is needed of all elements of these systems. GMD performance in tests has gotten worse with time, when it ought to be getting better. A lack of political support is not to blame as the DoD spends about $10 billion per year, and proposes to add about $5 billion over the next five years. Russia objects to the EPAA as a threat to its ICBM forces, and to the extensive deployment of U.S. military forces in countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania, once part of the Soviet Union. Going forward the U.S. should keep working with Russia whose cooperation will be key to diplomatic gains in the Middle East and elsewhere. Meanwhile, America's missile defenses face an enduring set of issues, especially target discrimination in the face of attacks designed to overwhelm the defenses, stage separation debris, chaff, decoys, and stealth. Dealing with target discrimination while also replacing, upgrading, or adding to the many elements of U.S. missiles defenses presents daunting budget priorities. A new look at the threat is warranted, and whether the U.S. needs to consider every nation that possesses even short-range missiles a threat to America. The proliferation of missiles of all sizes around the world is a growing problem, but expecting U.S. missile defenses to deal with all those missiles everywhere is unrealistic, and U.S. missile defenses, effective or not, are justifying more and more offensive missiles.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Selling the Space Telescope - The interpenetration of science, technology, and politics

Attention is given to the politics of initiating the Space Telescope program and to the manner in which the coalition, or working consensus, for the Telescope was assembled, in particular, the role played by astronomers. It is contended that what ensued was a case study in the influence of government patronage on a large-scale scientific and technological program. It is concluded that while a politically feasible Space Telescope did result, in the selling process the Telescope had been both oversold and underfunded.

Smith, Robert W.↗

The Russian Model of Internet Control and Its Significance

Russia has emerged as an exemplar of an innovative and experimental – though not always completely consistent or successful – alternative approach to information manipulation and control that differs significantly from the more-often discussed Chinese “Great Firewall” system and other approaches with an emphasis on systemic technical censorship. The Russian model relies on a mix of less overt, more plausibly deniable, legalistic, and often non-technical mechanisms to manipulate online information flows, narratives, and framings, to affect and shape public opinion without resort to universal censorship. The government uses surveillance, a panoply of vague laws, the prosecution or censorship of exemplars, proxy actors and hard to track extra-legal pressures, hacking and leaks, and a heavy emphasis on content production and manipulation to influence narratives and shape public opinion. This model for the domestic control of information not only fits with Russia’s own political system, but is likely to prove more resonant and easier to emulate across many other countries in which a systematic-censorship approach is not technologically or politically feasible. The learning and experimentation involved in this type of domestic information manipulation also has direct applicability to the use of information operations in international political and military competition. The future of this model will likely depend on continuing innovation, not least on the leveraging of advances in artificial intelligence and big data analysis. If successful, however, this might look very different from the future of information control in China – and have significantly different repercussions for democracies and the international system.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

E-36: The First Proto-Megascience Experiment at NAL

E-36, an experiment on small-angle proton-proton scattering, began testing equipment at the National Accelerator Laboratory (NAL) using a newly achieved 100 GeV proton beam on February 12, 1972, marking the beginning of NAL’s experimental program. This experiment, which drew collaborators from NAL, the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (Dubna, USSR), the University of Rochester (Rochester, New York), and Rockefeller University (New York, New York) was significant not only as a milestone in Fermilab’s history but also as a model of cooperation between the East and West at a time when Cold War tensions still ran high. An examination of the origin, operation, and resolution of E-36 and the chain of experiments it spawned reveals the complex interplay of science and politics that drove these experiments as well as seeds of the megascience paradigm that has come to dominate high energy physics research since the 1970s.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Defending the Homeland: Growing Foreign Challenges to the U.S. Missile Defense Posture

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy requested that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conduct a Congressionally directed study on homeland missile defense, pursuant to Section 1692 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. In accordance with the statutory language, this study considers whether the security benefits obtained by deployment of homeland missile defenses of the United States are undermined or counterbalanced by adverse reactions of potential adversaries, and considers the effectiveness of homeland missile defense efforts of the United States to deter the development of ballistic missiles. Almost a half-century has elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and almost two decades since the former withdrew. Since withdrawing, the United States has sought to develop and deploy a layered missile defense system to defend against regional threats to U.S. and allied interests abroad and to counter limited threats to the U.S. homeland. As such, missile defense supports key national defense policy objectives. Protecting the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners. Deterring attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. Assuring allies an strengthening U.S. diplomatic activities in peacetime and crisis. We offer five key findings: 1. The primary benefit of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is the protection it provides the U.S. homeland against a limited but evolving rogue-state missile threat. While this system has never been tested in combat, it appears thus far to have effectively paced North Korea’s development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of such a defensive capability, the United States would likely have been more heavily exposed to North Korean actions, would have operated at a much higher-risk posture, and would have had less negotiating room with which to navigate coercive tactics and crises. Its allies would have been more concerned about U.S. willingness in time of crisis and war to run the risks of protecting them. The GMD system also serves as a hedge against Iranian breakout. 2. Potential adversaries continue to develop long-range ballistic missiles despite deployment of a U.S. homeland missile defense system. This includes both rogue states and major power rivals whose long-range missile programs predated the deployment of U.S. missile defenses. While North Korea has continued its long-range missile developments and achieved an intercontinental capability, Iran has not yet reached this threshold. The broader proliferation of long-range missiles anticipated in the late 1990s has not materialized. 3. While Russia has used the existence of a U.S. homeland missile defense system as a justification for its substantial and continuing weapon modernization program, neither Russian force modernization nor the limited U.S. homeland missile defense system has altered the strategic balance. Russia has long considered U.S. missile defenses—both theater and homeland—as directed against its strategic forces and as a capability that could rapidly advance, thereby eroding Russian confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Russia’s political and military actions appear excessive and negatively impact areas such as arms control, but they do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 4. China’s expansion and diversification of nuclear and missile forces has been influenced by its concerns about U.S. homeland missile defense, but those concerns are only one of many factors in China’s force planning. Although China’s actions to preserve and expand its assured retaliation prospects have not fundamentally altered the strategic balance, its buildup and lack of transparency about its force modernization goals are troubling. Taken together, the aggregate pattern of China’s modernization activities over the past two decades strongly suggests a concerted effort to develop a modern military force commensurate with its intended geopolitical status. Whatever China’s legacy concerns over the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces, its ability to overwhelm the GMD system appears intact today and will be further strengthened in the years ahead as it continues its long-term modernization program. China’s political and military actions negatively affect U.S. security interests but do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 5. The basic finding that benefits have not so far been undermined by adverse reactions is a function of circumstances that are increasingly in flux. The existing GMD-centered system is under increasing pressure from the pace and scope of North Korean missile deployments. The proposed “layered” system seeks to mitigate this impending capability gap in the near term and to complement future capabilities, such as the Next Generation Interceptor, when they come online. Given the pace of U.S. missile defense developments since 2000, it is possible that adversary advances in capability will outpace the U.S. system’s ability to adapt. Additionally, because this layered system is in principle more readily scaled, it will almost certainly be viewed skeptically by China and Russia. In a context of growing great-power security competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) should consider undertaking a broader net assessment of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese force balance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Nuclear decisionmaking, complexity and emerging and disruptive technologies: A comprehensive assessment

The complex interactions of emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) could significantly impact nuclear decision-making, particular in an escalating regional conventional conflict. Such conflicts may present governments with a range of nuclear decisions: whether to introduce a nuclear dimension to a crisis, whether to cross the nuclear threshold through limited nuclear use, how to respond to a limited nuclear attack, whether to expand the scope and intensity of initial limited attacks, and whether to escalate to an all-out nuclear war. At each decision point, EDTs create potential risks as well as rewards. EDTs are likely to influence the context for nuclear decision-making and the choices between different courses of action. EDTs could impact the context of nuclear decision-making by improving or degrading situational assessment, the ability to deliberate, and the ability to manage one’s nuclear forces. EDTs could influence the choice between nuclear restraint or escalation by affecting the perceived strategic benefits, escalatory risks, and operational requirements associated with different courses of action. Even though particular combinations of EDTs could precipitate nuclear use in some scenarios, they could encourage restraint in others. The impact and relevance of the same combinations of EDTs might be different at various nuclear decision points. The availability of specific combinations of EDTs at different stages of a conflict would also vary because of the attrition and one-time-use nature of some capabilities. In later stages of a conflict, the decision maker’s confidence in different combinations of EDTs would depend on their previous experience in using them. While the interactions of EDTs are likely to bring additional complexity to a nuclear decision-making process, EDTs are also not the only source of complexity. Broader strategic, military, operational, legal, moral, and emotional factors are also likely to play an important role. These factors may dominate decision-making in a range of potential cases.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗