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At least 37 records · Page 2

RAVEN AS A TOOL FOR DYNAMIC PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT: SOFTWARE OVERVIEW

RAVEN is a software tool under development at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) that acts as the control logic driver and post-processing tool for the newly developed Thermo-Hydraylic code RELAP- 7. The scope of this paper is to show the software structure of RAVEN and its utilization in connection with RELAP-7. A short overview of the mathematical framework behind the code is presented along with its main capabilities such as on-line controlling/monitoring and Monte-Carlo sampling. A demo of a Station Black Out PRA analysis of a simplified Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) model is shown in order to demonstrate the Monte-Carlo and clustering capabilities.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Trade Studies of Space Launch Architectures using Modular Probabilistic Risk Analysis

A top-down risk assessment in the early phases of space exploration architecture development can provide understanding and intuition of the potential risks associated with new designs and technologies. In this approach, risk analysts draw from their past experience and the heritage of similar existing systems as a source for reliability data. This top-down approach captures the complex interactions of the risk driving parts of the integrated system without requiring detailed knowledge of the parts themselves, which is often unavailable in the early design stages. Traditional probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) technologies, however, suffer several drawbacks that limit their timely application to complex technology development programs. The most restrictive of these is a dependence on static planning scenarios, expressed through fault and event trees. Fault trees incorporating comprehensive mission scenarios are routinely constructed for complex space systems, and several commercial software products are available for evaluating fault statistics. These static representations cannot capture the dynamic behavior of system failures without substantial modification of the initial tree. Consequently, the development of dynamic models using fault tree analysis has been an active area of research in recent years. This paper discusses the implementation and demonstration of dynamic, modular scenario modeling for integration of subsystem fault evaluation modules using the Space Architecture Failure Evaluation (SAFE) tool. SAFE is a C++ code that was originally developed to support NASA s Space Launch Initiative. It provides a flexible framework for system architecture definition and trade studies. SAFE supports extensible modeling of dynamic, time-dependent risk drivers of the system and functions at the level of fidelity for which design and failure data exists. The approach is scalable, allowing inclusion of additional information as detailed data becomes available. The tool performs a Monte Carlo analysis to provide statistical estimates. Example results of an architecture system reliability study are summarized for an exploration system concept using heritage data from liquid-fueled expendable Saturn V/Apollo launch vehicles.

Mathias, Donovan L.↗

Conversion of Questionnaire Data

During the survey, respondents are asked to provide qualitative answers (well, adequate, needs improvement) on how well material control and accountability (MC&A) functions are being performed. These responses can be used to develop failure probabilities for basic events performed during routine operation of the MC&A systems. The failure frequencies for individual events may be used to estimate total system effectiveness using a fault tree in a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Numeric risk values are required for the PRA fault tree calculations that are performed to evaluate system effectiveness. So, the performance ratings in the questionnaire must be converted to relative risk values for all of the basic MC&A tasks performed in the facility. If a specific material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) task is being performed at the 'perfect' level, the task is considered to have a near zero risk of failure. If the task is performed at a less than perfect level, the deficiency in performance represents some risk of failure for the event. As the degree of deficiency in performance increases, the risk of failure increases. If a task that should be performed is not being performed, that task is in a state of failure. The failure probabilities of all basic events contribute to the total system risk. Conversion of questionnaire MPC&A system performance data to numeric values is a separate function from the process of completing the questionnaire. When specific questions in the questionnaire are answered, the focus is on correctly assessing and reporting, in an adjectival manner, the actual performance of the related MC&A function. Prior to conversion, consideration should not be given to the numeric value that will be assigned during the conversion process. In the conversion process, adjectival responses to questions on system performance are quantified based on a log normal scale typically used in human error analysis (see A.D. Swain and H.E. Guttmann, 'Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications,' NUREG/CR-1278). This conversion produces the basic event risk of failure values required for the fault tree calculations. The fault tree is a deductive logic structure that corresponds to the operational nuclear MC&A system at a nuclear facility. The conventional Delphi process is a time-honored approach commonly used in the risk assessment field to extract numerical values for the failure rates of actions or activities when statistically significant data is absent.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Analysis of VTR Primary Pump Coastdown

Simulations were performed to evaluate how different flow coastdown rates impact transient results. These simulations were performed with a preliminary SAS4A/SASSYS-1 model of the VTR to assess the advantages and disadvantages of delaying a pump trip following a control rod scram. When the control rods are inserted into the core by the reactor protection system, fission power will drop quickly. Pumps should be tripped soon after to avoid decreasing the power-to-flow ratio too much and preventing thermal shock of components in and above the core. The primary motivation for this report is characterizing the temperatures of these components with various delays between the control rods scramming and the primary pumps tripping. In the simulations with a control rod scram and a delayed pump trip, even if one of the pump coastdown mechanisms fails, a faster pump trip and coastdown is preferable. This can be achieved both by shortening the delay between the scram and trip as well as by decreasing the inertia provided by the coastdown mechanism. Based on the results of these simulations, there is no benefit to delaying when the pumps trip following a control rod scram. In other scenarios, however, a slow flow coastdown rate is preferable. Results from unprotected loss of flow simulations are presented to demonstrate that a slower coastdown reduces how much temperatures increase within the core. An initial flow halving time of between five and seven seconds was predicted to produce peak in-core temperatures with sufficient margins to the limiting criteria. For halving times less than five seconds, peak temperatures significantly reduce margins. For halving times greater than seven seconds in the unprotected loss of flow cases, the resulting peak temperatures are lower, but this leads to unfavorable results for the previous cases with a control rod scram. In order to achieve an acceptable balance between cases with and without a preceding control rod scram, the results presented in this report support an initial flow halving time in the five-to-seven second range, although ongoing PRA analysis could produce results that support a coastdown beyond this range.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Nuclear safety Enhanced: A Deep dive into current and future RAVEN applications

As the horizon of nuclear energy expands with the advent of small modular reactors, IV generation reactors, and fusion reactors, there is a growing perspective that the licensing process could benefit from a more comprehensive approach. Moving beyond traditional deterministic and PRA analysis might pave the way for a novel safety analysis paradigm propelled by the increasing computational power at our disposal. This paper explores different methodologies that can improve the outcomes of nuclear safety analysis. These range from uncertainty quantification techniques, aimed at enhancing the precision of safety margins, to deploying dynamic event trees by driving system code simulations, capturing the potential evolutions of severe accidents. These methodologies introduce innovative dimensions to safety analysis, considering the consequences of postulated events and the dynamics of accident sequences. However, they also bring forth challenges, especially in managing the complexity and sheer volume of potential scenarios. The paper touches upon some strategies to counter these challenges, emphasizing the importance of adaptability and continuous evolution in the face of emerging nuclear safety concerns. Additionally, the paper sheds light on the need for advanced tools to apply these methodologies. Among these tools is RAVEN, an open-source software designed for parametric and probabilistic analyses. Its core components, including distribution, sampler, and reduced order model, enable various applications, from risk assessment and mitigation to dynamic learning and plant control logic simulations.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Decision Analysis Methods For the Analysis of Nuclear Terrorism Threats with Imperfect Information

Protection of commercial nuclear fuel cycles against adversary groups who may attempt to steal weapons-usable material is an issue of interest to the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy. The wide array of potential nuclear fuel cycle configurations and the security measures that could be deployed to protect them pose a daunting system design problem. In general, there are billions of potential design configurations. Moreover, the design choices are not independent – the effectiveness of one design feature or security measure can affect the desirability of other design choices. To explore this issue, we develop a mixed-integer optimization problem that solves a complex decision tree to allocate security resources across a commercial nuclear fuel cycle configuration. A nominal UREX+ reprocessing facility is used to demonstrate how the model allocates resources across a particular fuel cycle facility and shows how the problem can be scaled up to include other facilities and design features in the fuel cycle. In our model, the defender first chooses a set of safeguards to implement in order to mitigate the risk of a terrorist theft from various unit operations in the reprocessing facility. The attacker observes the defender’s strategy choice and executes an attack to acquire material, including the possibility of declining to attack at all. The model considers the terrorist as an intelligent adversary with a set of attack strategies known to the defender. The strategic choices made by both the defender and attacker affect the probability of a successful attack by the terrorist and in turn affect the distribution of consequences to the defender. We use a decision tree to illustrate the interactions among costs, decisions, correlated uncertainties, and outcomes, and then show how to formulate the problem as a mixed-integer program with an equivalent solution. The novel features of our formulation include the following. First, as discussed above, we use a sequential game-theoretic formulation (a Stackelberg game). This formulation assumes the attacker can observe the defender’s actions before the attack is executed. Many previous game-theoretic studies have assumed attacker and defender act simultaneously without knowledge of the other’s strategy choice. We believe the sequential game formulation is more applicable for knowledgeable insider adversaries, the focus of this study. Second, we build on our previous work that has developed a methodology to reflect the correlation among probability distributions represented as discrete chance nodes in a decision tree. We illustrate how this methodology can be applied to two chance nodes in a decision tree that relate the quality of the materials that might be stolen or diverted by an adversary with the yield of a weapon that might be constructed from that material. In a decision tree, the dependence of the yield on the quality of the material could be modeled with conditional probabilities of the weapon yield given the quality of the materials obtained. For three outcome discretizations, this would require the assessment of nine conditional probabilities from domain experts as part of the model building effort. In contrast, our methodology will allow this same representation of the tree based on the assessment of the correlation between these two chance nodes by the experts, which we believe is a much easier and more reliable assessment task. The advantage of this approach increases as the number of dependent chance nodes grows in a decision tree representation of this problem. Third, we extend this approach to the approximation of the dependence between discrete binary events such as success or failure represented by binary chance nodes in a decision tree or in the special case of a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) based on an event tree. This extension is a novel application in this domain, and uses Monte Carlo simulation to determine the appropriate conditional probabilities on the binary chance nodes when the number of correlated uncertainties is more than two. Fourth, we show how these decision trees or probability trees can be formulated and solved as equivalent integer programming (IP) problems. The advantages of the IP representation include the opportunity to use the computing power associated with powerful optimization solver algorithms available on high speed computers to solve very large versions of these trees, and the ability to include several such models of different facilities into a much larger IP with connecting constraints that represent budget restrictions, number of available inspection opportunities in a given time window, or other dependencies among these facilities. Policy makers can use the resulting model to inform their decisions about how to assess terrorism risk and to safeguard the commercial nuclear fuel cycle.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Resilient Grid Operational Strategies

Extreme weather-related disturbances, such as hurricanes, are a leading cause of grid outages historically. Although physical asset hardening is perhaps the most common way to mitigate the impacts of severe weather, operational strategies may be deployed to limit the extent of societal and economic losses associated with weather-related physical damage.1 The purpose of this study is to examine bulk power-system operational strategies that can be deployed to mitigate the impact of severe weather disruptions caused by hurricanes, thereby increasing grid resilience to maintain continuity of critical infrastructure during extreme weather. To estimate the impacts of resilient grid operational strategies, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) developed a framework for hurricane probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). The probabilistic nature of this framework allows us to estimate the probability distribution of likely impacts, as opposed to the worst-case impacts. The project scope does not include strategies that are not operations related, such as transmission system hardening (e.g., undergrounding, transmission tower reinforcement and substation flood protection) and solutions in the distribution network.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

UKy-CAER Heat Integrated Transformative CO 2 Capture Process in Pulverized Coal Power Plants

The goal of this Phase II Topical Report is to summarize the work for public domain conducted on project DE-FE0031583. Building upon the Design Basis completed during Phase I and in accordance with the Statement of Project Objectives (SOPO), the University of Kentucky (UK) Center for Applied Energy Research (CAER) (Recipient) along with team members has completed the Front End Engineering Design (FEED) for its advanced, versatile post-combustion CO 2 capture system (CCS) at the 10 MWe large pilot scale to be installed at the Wyoming (WY) Integrated Test Center (ITC), using a heat integrated process with split-rich fed, two-stage stripping and any advanced solvent to enhance the CO 2 absorber performance and lower the cost of CO 2 capture. The proposed project (Phases I-III) involves the design, fabrication, installation, testing and evaluation of a large pilot scale facility that will demonstrate the UK CAER transformative CCS integrated with an operating power plant. The work performed in Phase I, detailed in the Phase I Topical Report that was submitted in March 2019, included formation of a project team, securing the host site, and completing pre-FEED design basis, a cost estimation, a preliminary techno-economic analysis (TEA) and an environmental information volume (EIV). The work performed in Phase II, detailed in this Phase II Topical Report, includes completion of FEEDs, completion of a process risk analysis (PRA), obtaining necessary permits, updating the EIV and TEA, updating the cost and schedule estimate for the Phase III scope of work (SOW) and securing the necessary cost share. Updated information is provided on the current status of the UK CAER CCS technology and the project is ready to begin immediately detailed design, construction and operation of the proposed pilot.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

High Energy Arcing Fault (HEAF): Sandia National Laboratories 2023 Report

High Energy Arcing Faults (HEAFs) are hazardous events in which an electrical arc leads to the rapid release of energy in the form of heat, vaporized metal, and mechanical force. In Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs), these events are often accompanied by loss of essential power and complicated shutdowns. To confirm the probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) methodology in NUREG/CR-6850, which was formulated based on limited observational data, the NRC led an international experimental campaign from 2014 to 2016. The results of these experiments uncovered an unexpected hazard posed by aluminum components in or near electrical equipment and the potential for unanalyzed equipment failures. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), in support of the NRC work, collaborated with NIST, BSI, KEMA, and NRC to support the full-scale HEAF test campaign in 2023. SNL provided high speed and real time from visible and infrared video/data of tests that collected data from copper and aluminum busses from switchgears and bus-ducts. Part of SNL work was to place cameras with high-speed data collection capability at different vantage points that provide the NRC a more complete and granular view of the test events.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

High Energy Arcing Fault (HEAF) Photometrics 2022 Test Report

High Energy Arcing Faults (HEAFs) are hazardous events in which an electrical arc leads to the rapid release of energy in the form of heat, vaporized metal, and mechanical force. In Nuclear Power Plants, these events are often accompanied by loss of essential power and complicated shutdowns. To confirm the probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) methodology in NUREG/CR-6850, which was formulated based on limited observational data, the NRC led an international experimental campaign from 2014 to 2016. The results of these experiments uncovered an unexpected hazard posed by aluminum components in or near electrical equipment and the potential for unanalyzed equipment failures. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), in support of the NRC work, collaborated with NIST, BSI, KEMA, and NRC to support the full-scale HEAF test campaign in 2022. SNL provided high speed visible and infrared video/data of ten tests that collected data from HEAFs originated on copper and aluminum buses inside switchgears and bus ducts. Part of the SNL scope was to place cameras with high-speed data collection at different vantage points within the test facility to provide NRC a more complete and granular view of the test events.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Structural Health Monitoring Analysis for the Orbiter Wing Leading Edge

This viewgraph presentation reviews Structural Health Monitoring Analysis for the Orbiter Wing Leading Edge. The Wing Leading Edge Impact Detection System (WLE IDS) and the Impact Analysis Process are also described to monitor WLE debris threats. The contents include: 1) Risk Management via SHM; 2) Hardware Overview; 3) Instrumentation; 4) Sensor Configuration; 5) Debris Hazard Monitoring; 6) Ascent Response Summary; 7) Response Signal; 8) Distribution of Flight Indications; 9) Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA); 10) Model Correlation; 11) Impact Tests; 12) Wing Leading Edge Modeling; 13) Ascent Debris PRA Results; and 14) MM/OD PRA Results.

Yap, Keng C.↗

Method and system for dynamic probabilistic risk assessment

The DEFT methodology, system and computer readable medium extends the applicability of the PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) methodology to computer-based systems, by allowing DFT (Dynamic Fault Tree) nodes as pivot nodes in the Event Tree (ET) model. DEFT includes a mathematical model and solution algorithm, supports all common PRA analysis functions and cutsets. Additional capabilities enabled by the DFT include modularization, phased mission analysis, sequence dependencies, and imperfect coverage.

Dugan, Joanne Bechta↗

The Challenger disaster was caused by an Apollo decision

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment.

Harry W Jones↗

The Challenger Tradgedy was Caused by an Apollo Mistake, Terminating Risk Analysis

NASA’s attitude toward risk changed drastically between the Apollo and Space Shuttle design. [1]Apollo engineers were seriously alarmed about riskbecause of the fatal Apollo 1 fire and the fact that the estimated probability of another fatal accident was extremely high. The predictions were so appalling thatmanagement terminated risk analysis to avoid public apprehension. Because risk analysis was not done, the Space Shuttle design accepted excessively high andunknown risk. The immediate cause of the Challengertragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in coldweather that impaired the O-ring seals, but the fundamental cause was the high risk of the shuttle design. Before Challenger, management asserted that the probability of a fatal accident was 1 in 100,000.Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a shuttle failure.

Harry W Jones↗

Accounting for Point Estimate Uncertainty in Space Systems Reliability and Risk Analysis

Understanding and accounting for uncertainty in risk analysis is a critical step in the management and communication of risk in engineered systems. The component and system-level analysis to determine the probability of a negative outcome and its consequence is often quantified by a point estimate. Many Program and Enterprise decisions involving technical concerns and issues rely on reliability engineering activities to produce quantified risk analysis to inform the decision making process. At NASA, it is common to use a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) to inform the overall risk to Loss of Mission or Loss of Crew that involves integration across all spacecraft subsystem fault trees to produce an overall probability of mission failure. The point estimate is an estimate of this overall probability and is an immediate result of a fault tree model. It is the result of a model where the probability of each event is taken to be equal to its mean. The value provides an approximation of the overall mean without running any uncertainty calculations (e.g., no sampling). Using only the point estimate can lead to a false sense of precision and the point estimate may not match the resulting mean when uncertainty is taken into consideration. This paper will explore five conditions that can cause the PRA model mean to diverge from the point estimate and will provide engineers and managers insight into the importance of understanding uncertainty in the elements of PRA models.

Paul J Collier↗

RAVEN as a tool for dynamic probabilistic risk assessment: Software overview

RAVEN is a software tool under development at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) that acts as the control logic driver and post-processing tool for the newly developed Thermal-Hydraulic code RELAP-7. The scope of this paper is to show the software structure of RAVEN and its utilization in connection with RELAP-7. A short overview of the mathematical framework behind the code is presented along with its main capabilities such as on-line controlling/ monitoring and Monte-Carlo sampling. A demo of a Station Black Out PRA analysis of a simplified Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) model is shown in order to demonstrate the Monte-Carlo and clustering capabilities. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Dynamic Fire PRA Roadmap

Modeling and implementing fire safety for nuclear power plants is a costly activity. Because of the complexity of fire phenomenon and multiple operational procedures, it is difficult to computationally provide assurance that the mitigation methods are adequate for critical areas using current analysis methods. An economical method to provide more accurate modeling and optimize mitigation methods is needed to improve nuclear power viability. This report describes the initial investigation into modeling and simulation tools for application of fire as part of the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA), formerly Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC). The report provides a framework of how 3D modeling and simulation techniques could be combined with a dynamic Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) to reduce compounding conservatism present in current Fire PRA methods. Electrical Power Research Institute has analyzed current Fire PRA practices and identified the most significant contributors to risk and areas for improving analysis. This framework describes how to apply dynamic PRA and simulation methods for key contributors/scenarios, credit missing factors of manual fire suppression, and applying conditional probabilities.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Comparative Analysis of Static and Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Implementation of risk-informed design allows the design team to thoroughly explore the risks of a system while iterating the operations concept, design, and requirements until the system meets mission objects and is achievable within constraints. To arrive at a space system design that is likely to meet all constraints placed upon mass, cost, performance and risk, the system requirements must be understood and traded against each other as early as the conceptual design phase. Depending on the project phase and the goals of the risk analysis, various PRA methodologies could be used to produce quantitative risk estimates to enable such a process. In order to better understand the applicability, advantages, and limitations of various PRA methodologies, a comparative analysis of three bottom-up, component-based PRA approaches was performed. The three methods examined are a traditional static fault tree, a fault tree hybrid, and a dynamic Monte Carlo simulation. Each approach was used to assess a generic reaction control system (RCS) thruster pod and mission. The methods are assessed in terms of the process of modeling a system, the actionable information produced for the design team, and the overall fidelity of the quantitative risk evaluation generated. The paper also discusses the applicability of each methodology to the different phases of system development.

Probablistic↗