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At least 37 records · Page 2

Enhancing Security and Resiliency in Operational Technology Environments Through Network Slicing and Federated Learning

The growing convergence of Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) within Industry 4.0 environments has introduced new demands on industrial network infrastructure. As cyber-physical systems become increasingly interconnected, ensuring the secure, timely, and efficient exchange of critical data is essential. This thesis explores how network slicing, a method of creating isolated virtual network segments, can be applied within OT environments to address challenges such as latency, security, and resource allocation. The first research question addressed in this thesis is: How can OT networks take advantage of NFV and SDN technology to become cyber resilient? This study examines the operational, security, and architectural implications of introducing network slicing into traditionally static OT infrastructures such as Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and SCADA. Through simulated deployments and case studies, the research demonstrates how slicing enables better isolation between critical and non-critical services, thereby improving response time, throughput, and security in sensitive environments. The second question considers: How to dynamically implement network slicing and take advantage of network resources towards integrating decentralized machine learning? In response, this thesis proposes a framework that combines Software-Defined Networking (SDN), Network Function Virtualization (NFV), and Federated Learning (FL) to enable real-time analytics while maintaining data locality. The proposed approach reduces the burden on centralized infrastructure and minimizes privacy risks by supporting on-site training of models across distributed OT nodes, coordinated through dynamically allocated network slices. The third focus explores: How slicing helps to increase the resiliency of OT networks through the orchestration of a dynamic DMZ? To answer this, the thesis presents a method for creating and managing Dynamic Demilitarized Zones (DMZs) using network slicing. This enables flexible and automated isolation of sensitive subsystems during threat scenarios or high-risk operations. Coupled with intelligent orchestration and containerized security services, the dynamic DMZ significantly enhances the system's ability to respond to cyber incidents without halting production. Ultimately, this thesis contributes a comprehensive architecture that blends network slicing with machine learning, secure segmentation, and automation, paving the way for resilient, adaptive, and intelligent OT environments. Performance evaluations across multiple scenarios show improvements in system reliability, threat response time, model accuracy, and resource utilization, providing a strong foundation for future industrial automation systems.

Rodiles Delgado, Brian G↗

Equipment Self-Assessment Guide Checklist

This Equipment Self-Assessment Checklist is designed for asset owners and operators (AOOs) responsible for the deployment, operation, maintenance, or cybersecurity oversight of grid systems and digital energy technologies. It provides a structured inspection checklist for evaluating the security, integrity, and operational trustworthiness of equipment across substations, generation sites, distributed energy resources (DERs), and control environments.

32 - ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZA↗

Language-Theoretic Data Analysis to Support ICS Protocol Baselining

Critical infrastructure stakeholders need to baseline their systems to understand expected protocol communications. Baseline behaviors may vary based on operational context. Expected operations during a maintenance window, for example, may be different from normal operations. Furthermore, constructing system baselines for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is difficult and time-consuming. ICS processes generate artifacts expressed across heterogeneous data sources such as network traffic and device logs. This paper explores the hypothesis that such ICS artifacts form a language in the language-theoretic sense. From a theoretical perspective, the variety of implementations of ICS protocols and constrained environment of OT networks provide a rich application domain for language-theoretic approaches. We present several use cases related to the practical construction of system baselines: grammars for data fusion, language dialects for device fingerprinting, and security automata for system baselining

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Living-off-the-land Techniques Unlikely to Supplant Energy Sector-Focused OT-Specific Malware

Despite increased reports of energy sector-focused threat actors using living-off-the-land (LOTL) techniques, it is unlikely LOTL techniques will wholly supplant malware in energy sector operational technology (OT)-focused cyber operations. Threat actors leverage LOTL techniques to access energy sector networks, abstracting process information and maintaining persistence. Although threat actors using LOTL techniques have successfully interrupted energy sector industrial control environments, designed features of OT-specific malware likely increase the cyber-physical impact of an attack and delay recovery of critical functions and services. Malicious actors will very likely continue to use LOTL techniques for stealth, while designing malware to bolster final impacts on cyber-physical systems in energy sector OT environments.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Deploying Software-Defined Networking in Operational Technology Environments

Software Defined Networking for Operational Technologies, referred to as OT-SDN, is a leading technology to secure critical infrastructure and command and control (C2) systems. As the name implies, OT-SDN networks are programmable, which allows system owners to utilize the characteristics of their physical process to inform the security of their network. There are best practices for deploying OT-SDN into an environment, whether it is all at once or over time (hybrid) that the network is converted to SDN technologies. Through the development of data mining tools and standardized process control, OT-SDN can be deployed reliably. These tools will minimize or eliminate any communication failures during the transition and provide the network owner with complete documentation of their environment. This documentation could enable or facilitate the network owner to pass any audits or policy checks (Authority to Operate) before being allowed to utilize the OT-SDN infrastructure.

Software Defined Networking, Operational Technolog↗

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator: Cohort 2 - runZero Public Report

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) sponsors the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator™ (CECA) to expedite the deployment of emerging security technologies that address the most urgent security concerns facing modern and future electric grids. CECA Cohort 2 assessed solutions focused on hidden risks due to incomplete system visibility and device security and configuration. Improving visibility can be achieved through operational technology (OT) asset identification solutions, including capabilities like automatic discovery, vulnerability reporting, and configuration monitoring. Solutions that monitor and identify assets in information technology (IT) networks in other domains are widely used; however, there is far less adoption of monitoring solutions for operational technology environments. Wider adoption may increase with increased confidence in the ability for these solutions to understand and respond to the specific requirements of OT environments. CECA Cohort 2 evaluated the active and passive asset discovery capabilities of market-ready solutions, documented and analyzed results, and identified gaps in functionality or capabilities. This report and describes how these results can help advance the adoption of these and similar solutions in the electric sector.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator: Cohort 2 - Asimily Public Report

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) sponsors the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator (TM) (CECA) to expedite the deployment of emerging security technologies that address the most urgent security concerns facing modern and future electric grids. CECA Cohort 2 assessed solutions focused on hidden risks due to incomplete system visibility and device security and configuration. Improving visibility can be achieved through operational technology (OT) asset identification solutions, including capabilities like automatic discovery, vulnerability reporting, and configuration monitoring. Solutions that monitor and identify assets in information technology (IT) networks in other domains are widely used; however, there is far less adoption of monitoring solutions for operational technology environments. Wider adoption may increase with increased confidence in the ability for these solutions to understand and respond to the specific requirements of OT environments. CECA Cohort 2 evaluated the active and passive asset discovery capabilities of market-ready solutions, documented and analyzed results, and identified gaps in functionality or capabilities. This report and describes how these results can help advance the adoption of these and similar solutions in the electric sector.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop various cybersecurity tools, trainings, and reports to aid federal facility managers – and other building owners and operators – in better applying frameworks and lessons learned from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), risk management framework (RMF), DOE’s cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2), and a wide variety of industry best practices and guidance documents (i.e., NIST 800 series, Department of Defense United Facilities Criteria). This set of tools, collectively known as the FEMP Facility-Related Control System Cyber Toolkit (FRCS Cyber Toolkit)2, is focused on cybersecurity concerns from facility-related control systems and other operational technology (OT), such as industrial control systems (ICS). The FRCS Cyber Toolkit can be applied across six of the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors designated by the Department of Homeland Security, including government facilities, healthcare and public health, commercial facilities (e.g., public assembly, offices, lodging), financial services (e.g., banking and insurance), emergency services (e.g., fire and police stations), and information technology. With increasingly converged IT and OT systems, it is crucial to address OT cybersecurity considerations and assess how the seam of these two systems could impact the overall cybersecurity posture of a facility. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of the best possible method to use FRCS Cyber Toolkit (section 2.0) and distilled cybersecurity best practices for the federal facilities to address growing non-linear cyber threats (section 3.0). Recommendations in this document are aggregated from several NIST and other documents (see Appendix A for additional details).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices Version 2.0

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices Version 2.0

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Advanced Reactor Control Systems Authentication Methods and Recommendations

In the dynamic landscape of Operational Technology (OT), and specifically the emerging landscape for Advanced Reactors, the establishment of trust between digital assets emerges as a challenge for cybersecurity modernization. This report reviews existing approaches to authentication in Enterprise environments, and proposed methods for authentication in OT, and analyzes each for its applicability to future Advanced Reactor digital networks. Principles of authentication ranging from underlying cryptographic mechanisms to trust authorities are evaluated through the lens of OT. These facets emphasize the importance of mutual authentication in real-time environments, enabling a paradigm shift from the current approach of strong boundaries to a more malleable network that allows for flexible operation. This work finds that there is a need for evaluation and decision making by industry stakeholders, but current technologies and approaches can be adapted to fit needs and risk tolerances.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Scan2Sim: Software to Convert Network Scans to Emulations

Within operational technology (OT) systems design, the construction of testing environments for simulation is often a tedious, manual process that slows down safety and security evaluations. This document details the design and functionality of Scan2Sim, a program designed to construct high-fidelity topological schematics for OT systems without significant manual human input. Scan2Sim may take as input a detailed network scan of a system, and produces an instruction set to re-create the original scanned network within a virtualized simulation network. This construction is achieved via heuristic methods of machine template selection, which allows for a fast, performant approach to automated environment construction. The current tool is designed to produce topology schematics compatible with the Minimega, a tool designed by Sandia National Laboratories for repeatable experimentation management.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

CloudZero Phase 2 Technical Report

Expand upon the successful Phase 1 net zero cloud test proof of concept by moving actual OT systems to the cloud and proving cloud feasibility to support various OT technologies such as IoT, Machine Learning, etc. Explore threat analysis when these technologies are moved to the cloud. A detailed analysis in NREL ARIES Cyber Range will be used to conduct deeper analysis of cloud suitability to support OT and net zero system operations in a higher fidelity representative environment. Outputs will identify, quantify, and document the results and cyber security risks associated with the move of these OT technologies in a formal delivered report. Programmatic Benefits: Identify cloud integration challenges for energy systems characterize the cloud threat space, contribute to policy and standards discussions, empower the sector to change their cloud culture where appropriate.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Virtual Environment Platform for OT/IT Training Enhancement

TRADITIONAL TECHNIQUES OT/IT Concepts Operational Technology (OT) and Information Technology (IT) concepts can often be difficult to visualize Teaching Methods Traditional teaching methods lack the intuitive & immersive aspects of hands-on activities Caveat: Unless taught by Team B! Physical Limitations Digital Twins require existing systems/hardware to mirror UPDATED TECHNIQUES Virtual Environment By making use of a virtual environment, we can represent abstract concepts in a more approachable and digestible way Increased Engagement Students are more engaged with the activities and are more likely to retain the information they are given. New/Emerging Technologies As the system is currently growing and developing, the technologies in use, as well as those represented by the system, stay up-to-date.

Deroller, Nicholas F.↗

HERMES: A cyber-energy SAAS platform to provide real-time 2d and 3d interactive visualizations [SWR-23-15]

HERMES is a novel visualization SAAS platform for achieving real-time visualization of large-scale environments involving cyber-energy devices. The platform receives data from emulated environments which include physical hardware and network devices that represent a complex IT / OT system. The platform is capable of streaming, filtering, storing, and visualizing all data within the environment and scaling vertically and horizontally. This capability enables high fidelity visual analysis of events to be performed in real time as well as the collection and storage of historical data for forensic analysis.

Van Natta, Joshua↗

Model Driven Deception for Defense of Operational Technology Environments

Due to the strong integration of real-world physics, OT deception platforms must operate differently than traditional IT deceptions. For instance, turning off a valve will be detected downstream by other sensors because the flow will reduce and stop. Additionally, controllers and applications leverage data from sensors to send control commands to each other. A believable deception must be integrated with the system to project the effects of events. An attack will likely attempt to control the physical process in a negative manner. To make the attacker believe they are achieving their objective, it must predict the effects of these actions, to a reasonable degree. Our approach to simulating a model to generate realistic decoy behavior is explored including description of two approaches: a physics model-based approach and a data driven approach. The performance of two machine learning techniques are investigated in their ability to learn a good enough model of the physics of the system.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Real-World Cyber Security Demonstration for Networked Electric Drives

In this article, we present the design and implementation of a cyber-physical security testbed for networked electric drive systems, aimed at conducting real-world security demonstrations. To our knowledge, this is one of the first security testbeds for networked electric drives, seamlessly integrating the domains of power electronics and computer science, and cybersecurity. By doing so, the testbed offers a comprehensive platform to explore and understand the intricate and often complex interactions between cyber and physical systems. The core of our testbed consists of four electric machine drives, meticulously configured to emulate small-scale but realistic information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) networks. This setup both provides a controlled environment for simulating a wide array of cyber-attacks, and mirrors potential real-world attack scenarios with a high degree of fidelity. The testbed serves as an invaluable resource for the study of cyber-physical security, offering a practical and dynamic platform for testing and validating cybersecurity measures in the context of networked electric drive systems. As a concrete example of the testbed's capabilities, we have developed and implemented a Python-based script designed to execute step-stone attacks over a wireless local area network (WLAN). This script leverages a sequence of target IP addresses, simulating a real-world attack vector that could be exploited by adversaries. To counteract such threats, we demonstrate the efficacy of our developed cyber-attack detection algorithms, which are integral to our testbed's security framework. Furthermore, the testbed incorporates a real-time visualization system using InfluxDB and Grafana, providing a dynamic and interactive representation of networked electric drives and their associated security monitoring mechanisms. This visualization component not only enhances the testbed's usability but also offers insightful, real-time data for researchers and practitioners, thereby facilitating a deeper understanding of cyber-physical security dynamics in networked electric drive systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Module Testing Procedures and Results for the CMS Phase-2 Outer Tracker Upgrade at Fermilab

The High-Luminosity LHC (HL-LHC) will operate at significantly increased luminosities and is expected to deliver about 3000 $fb^{-1}$ of proton-proton collision data at $\sqrt{s}=14$ TeV over a decade of operation. To maintain efficient tracking and triggering performance under high pileup and radiation conditions, the CMS experiment is upgrading its tracking detector for Phase-2 operations. The upgraded Outer Tracker (OT) will consist of Pixel-Strip (PS) and Strip-Strip (2S) silicon modules capable of providing tracking information to the Level-1 trigger at 40 MHz. Production and qualification of OT modules have been ongoing for about one year across several assembly and testing centers in the US, Europe, India, and Pakistan, requiring extensive testing to ensure stable operation in the HL-LHC environment. Fermilab is responsible for the production and testing of a significant fraction of the OT modules. The testing activities include IV characterization of silicon sensors, noise and pedestal measurements, verification of communication between module components, and burn-in studies using cold-box systems operated under controlled thermal conditions. Results from module testing and qualification studies performed during production will be presented.

Baradia, Sweta [UC, Davis (main)]↗