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Mitigating the Threat of Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation via Nuclear-Submarine Programs

Brazil is building a nuclear-powered attack submarine, South Korea has in the past asserted its need for nuclear-powered attack submarines to deal with the threat of North Korean nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and Iran has asserted more vaguely its need for naval nuclear propulsion. All three countries are non-weapon-state parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Their interest in naval reactors brings with it two challenges to the NPT: 1) The safeguards “loophole” under which a country can withdraw nuclear materials from IAEA safeguards indefinitely for allowed “non-peaceful activities;” and 2) A justification for the acquisition of national uranium-enrichment facilities because the international suppliers of enrichment services have peaceful-use requirements. In fact, Brazil’s acquisition of enrichment was driven by its navy. It is argued, however, that nuclear-powered attack submarines have advantages over modern conventional attack submarines primarily in their ability to transit great distances at high speed whereas only a few countries have foreign military commitments requiring such capabilities. For defense of nearby waters against foreign navies, attack submarines are merely one component of a complex system of anti-submarine aircraft and surface vessels and underwater sensor networks. Conventional attack submarines are no less effective and much less costly than nuclear-powered attack submarines in this role.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nukes in the Post-Cold War Era A View of the World from Inside the US Nuclear Weapons Program

Why do we have nuclear weapons? What is in the US stockpile, how is it deployed and controlled, and how it has changed over the years? What is in the “nuclear weapons complex” and what does each lab and plant do? How do the DOE/NNSA Design Labs interact with the Intelligence Community? How does the US stockpile, NW complex, and NW policy compare with those of other countries? What is easy and hard about designing nuclear weapons?

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Electromagnetic Signature Technique as a Promising Tool to Verify Nuclear Weapons Storage and Dismantlement under a Nuclear Arms Control Regime

The 2010 ratification of the New START Treaty has been widely regarded as a noteworthy national security achievement for both the Obama administration and the Medvedev-Putin regime, but deeper cuts are envisioned under future arms control regimes. Future verification needs will include monitoring the storage of warhead components and fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondaries, and other materials. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under future arms control regimes will pose new challenges. Since acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes, non-nuclear non-sensitive signatures may provide a significant verification tool without the use of additional information barriers. The use of electromagnetic signatures to monitor nuclear material storage containers is a promising technology with the potential to fulfill these challenging requirements. Research performed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to confirm the presence of specific components on a “yes/no” basis without revealing classified information. Arms control inspectors might use this technique to verify the presence or absence of monitored items, including both nuclear and non-nuclear materials. Although additional research is needed to study signature aspects such as uniqueness and investigate container-specific scenarios, the technique potentially offers a rapid and cost-effective tool to verify reduction and dismantlement of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons.

low frequency electromagnetics, nuclear materials ↗

Fit for Purpose: An Evolutionary Strategy for the Implementation and Verification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons requires States Parties to designate a “competent international authority or authorities” for negotiating and verifying the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons programs. Ensuring that such an authority or authorities is able to be fit for purpose when required to meet these tasks will be crucial for both the future implementation and legitimacy of the Treaty. To address this challenge, this article proposes the early creation of a two-part organizational structure, comprising an implementation support unit and a dedicated scientific and technical advisory body, to begin the process of institutionalizing the treaty, and build the technical basis for meeting its verification goals should a nuclear-weapon-possessing state decide to join. The article then discusses how such two-part structure could be scaled-up as a standing international organization tasked with the coordination of an ad hoc inspectorate, which would also cooperate and complement the work of existing nuclear verification organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. This evolutionary and adaptive strategy to institution building could empower the new Treaty by supporting the emergence of a new regime complex for nuclear disarmament, while taking into account the initially limited financial and technical resources of its member states.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Of Clouds and Craters: The History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing

“Now!” With that word, the Atomic Age – and the era of nuclear weapons testing – dawned. The advent of World War II’s first irresistible weapon, which had been secretly tested in the New Mexico desert in July 1945, would help hasten the inevitable: complete victory for the Allies. Codenamed Trinity, the test was the first of over a thousand conducted by the United States between 1945 and 1992. Nuclear weapons would change future clashes as well. The looming Cold War, with roots stretching all the way back to 1917, was history’s first conflict between two, major nations armed with nuclear weapons. It is clear the existence of those weapons played an important role in maintaining a tenuous peace between the United States and the Soviet Union; it is also clear nuclear weapons testing played a prominent role in fueling both the arms race and the success of deterrence. Yet, the history of nuclear weapons testing is rarely remembered, even though nuclear tests have been performed in the very recent past. Of the estimated 2,000-plus nuclear tests ever performed, the U.S. is responsible for approximately half. This is the story of U.S. full-scale nuclear weapons testing.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Applying QMU to Nuclear Weapon Stewardship

Quantification of Margins and Uncertainty (QMU) is a principle means and metric by which nuclear weapons performance is measured. At Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Nuclear weapon QMU is predominately a Physics assessment of the performance margin and associated uncertainties of not achieving the designed nuclear performance. To more completely apply QMU to Nuclear Weapon Stewardship, a Systems Engineering or systematic approach is being employed to identify and define requirements, allowing assessment of performance with QMU. This paper describes the basics of QMU and how it is applied below the highest level nuclear performance function down and throughout the nuclear weapon design architecture. The intended audience for this paper is a novice QMU practitioner at LLNL. The application of QMU to the entire set of nuclear weapon functions demands a broad engagement of Science and Engineering disciplines. Using a hierarchical flow-down requirements structure, performance functions and failure modes are identified for all levels of system requirements. There can be multiple failure modes per functional requirement. For each function there is a spectrum of possible outputs that can vary from outright failure to excellent performance. The possible consequences and impacts on the next higher level functions will also vary. Since performance variations exist in a weapon functional hierarchy, the assessment process needs and benefits from a system perspective. Incorporating QMU into assessments using a Systems Engineering approach to stockpile management provides a means to quantify weapon performance risks against a multitude of possible failure modes and from the highest level functions down to the lowest level component functionality. Performance risk management is a core practice of nuclear weapon management. Assessing the likelihood and consequences of the many possible failure modes is done yearly as part of Annual Assessment Reviews (AAR). When annual surveillance discovers an anomaly defect as part of weapon surveillance, investigations are launched and QMU is a key tool for quantifying performance impacts. QMU assessments are separated into two pieces, failure mode assessments and QMU analysis.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Project on Nuclear Gaming: Investigating the Impact of Nuclear Weapons Capabilities on Deterrence: May 2-3, 2018 Workshop Summary

In the future, it may be possible for states to construct nuclear weapons with alternative effects that are optimized for specific military purposes. These nuclear weapon concepts might employ features such as enhanced radiation outputs (ER), electromagnetic pulse (EMP), or other approaches such as high-precision, low-yield systems (HPLY) that reduce collateral damage, but improve lethality to targets. Some have speculated that such weapons could have the effect of lowering the threshold of use for nuclear weapons by reducing the negative incentives to their use or by providing new military applications for nuclear weapons. A nuclear arsenal that includes weapons with alternate effect regimes may also have an impact on the calculus of escalation in a conflict scenario. This project of the University of California, Berkeley (UCB), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) investigates the potential impacts of alternate nuclear weapons effects regimes on deterrence and strategic stability using experimental gaming methods. The purpose of this document is to capture the research questions, assumptions, scenario characteristics, and other details that provide the framework used to address this challenge presented during the first workshop discussion hosted by the Center for Global Security Research at LLNL with subject matter experts from government, academia, and the private sector. The report also summarizes feedback from participants. Topics discussed during the workshop included alternative effects of nuclear weapons, existing approaches for modeling and measuring conflict, and the state of the art in experimental game design.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Towards a tactical nuclear weapons treaty? Is There a Role of IAEA Tools of Safeguards?

In recent years, there is growing interest in formal negotiations on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. With the negotiations of New START, there has been much speculation that a tactical nuclear weapons treaty should be included in the follow on to New START. This paper examines the current policy environment related to tactical weapons and some of the issues surrounding the definition of tactical nuclear weapons. We then map out the steps that would need to be taken in order to begin discussions on a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. These steps will review the potential role of the IAEA in verification of a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. Specifically, does IAEA involvement in various arms control treaties serve as a useful roadmap on how to overcome some of the issues pertaining to a tactical nuclear weapons treaty?

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Leveraging U.S. nuclear weapons policy to advance U.S. nonproliferation goals : implications of major theories of international relations.

National policymakers are currently considering a dilemma of critical importance to the continued security of the United States: how can U.S. nuclear weapons policies be leveraged to benefit U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals in the near-term, without sacrificing U.S. national security? In its role supporting U.S. nuclear weapons policy, Sandia National Laboratories has a responsibility to provide objective technical advice to support policy deliberations on this question. However, to best fulfill this duty Sandia must have a broader understanding of the context of the problem. To help develop this understanding, this paper analyzes the two predominant analytical perspectives of international relations theory to explore their prescriptions for how nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policies interact. As lenses with which to view and make sense of the world, theories of international relations must play a crucial role in framing the trade-offs at the intersection of the nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policy domains. An analysis of what these theories suggest as courses of action to leverage nuclear weapons policies to benefit nonproliferation goals is then offered, with particular emphasis on where the policy prescriptions resulting from the respective theories align to offer near-term policy changes with broad theoretical support. These policy prescriptions are then compared to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review to understand what the theories indicate policymakers may have gotten right in their dealing with the nuclear dilemma, and where they may have gone wrong. Finally, a brief international relations research agenda is proposed to help address the dilemma between nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation policies, with particular emphasis on how such an agenda can best support the needs of the policy community and a potential 'all things nuclear' policy deliberation and decision-support framework.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Nuclear Weapon Life Cycle [Slides]

This presentation provides an overview of the processes of the nuclear weapon life cycle, joint nuclear weapon life cycle responsibilities, key players in the life cycle process, joint nuclear weapon life cycle phases, the Phase 6.X process, and refurbishment activities.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Applying QMU to Nuclear Weapon Stewardship

Quantification of Margins and Uncertainty (QMU) is a principle means and metric by which nuclear weapons performance is measured. At Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Nuclear weapon QMU is predominately a Physics assessment of the performance margin and associated uncertainties of not achieving the designed nuclear performance. To more completely apply QMU to Nuclear Weapon Stewardship, a Systems Engineering or systematic approach is being employed to identify and define requirements, allowing assessment of performance with QMU. This paper describes the basics of QMU and how it is applied below the highest level nuclear performance function down and throughout the nuclear weapon design architecture. The intended audience for this paper is a novice QMU practitioner at LLNL.

42 ENGINEERING↗

The Need for a Strong Science and Technology Program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex for the 21st Century

In this paper I argue for the need for a strong Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex as the basis for maintaining a credible deterrence capability. The current Nuclear Posture Review establishes a New Triad as the basis for the United States deterrence strategy in a changing security environment. A predictive science capability is at the core of a credible National Nuclear Weapons program in the 21st Century. In absence of nuclear testing, the certification of our current Nuclear Weapons relies on predictive simulations and quantification of the associated simulation uncertainties. In addition, a robust nuclear infrastructure needs an active research and development program that considers all the required nuclear scenarios, including new configurations for which there is no nuclear test data. This paper also considers alternative positions to the need for a Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons complex.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

An international monitoring system for verification to support both the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the nonproliferation treaty

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons calls for states to meet regularly to consider measures for the verified, time-bound and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapon programs. Key to this effort is mapping a comprehensive set of nuclear weapon program indicators and further developing international capacity to monitor them. Distinct from the deadlocked Conference on Disarmament, this new forum will have an opportunity to examine and elaborate disarmament verification concepts. One relevant concept is a Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation International Monitoring System (NDN-IMS), elaborated from a proposal most recently noted by the United Nations Open-ended Working Group (A/71/371). As a flexible framework, an NDN-IMS, could help unite diverse technologies and mechanisms around the purpose of disarmament verification in ways that support the existing nonproliferation regime and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Elements could include satellite imagery from new constellations, wide area environmental sampling, and civil society reporting.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear Weapon Deterrence Principles

Presentation Overview: Nuclear Weapon Deterrence Principles; Deterrence Basics; Key Elements of Nuclear Deterrence; Nuclear Deterrence Theories; Nuclear Deterrence Cold War; Nuclear Deterrence Today; New Deterrence Challenges

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear Weapon Security DOD Perspective

Presentation Overview: Nuclear Weapon Security DOD Perspective; DOD and DOE Nuclear Security Policy Standards; Weapon Secure Storage Methods; Modes of Transportation: DOD and DOE; Security Breeches; Basic Security Classification Practices

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Approaches to integrating nuclear weapons stockpile management and arms control objectives.

Historically, U.S. arms control policy and the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise have been reactive to each other, rather than interdependent and mutually reinforcing. One element of the divergence has been the long timescale necessary to plan and create substantive changes in the infrastructure vs. the inherent unpredictability of arms control outcomes. We explore several examples that illustrate this tension, some of the costs and implications associated with this reactive paradigm, and illustrate that, while the nuclear weapons enterprise has long considered the implications of arms control in sizing capacity of its missions, it has not substantively considered arms control in construction requirement for capabilities and products. Since previous arms control agreements have limited numbers and types of deployed systems, with delivery systems as the object of verification, this disconnect has not been forefront. However, as future agreements unfold, the warhead itself may become the treaty limited item and the object of verification. Such a scenario might offer both the need and the opportunity to integrate nuclear weapons and arms control requirements in unprecedented ways. This paper seeks to inspire new thinking on how such integration could be fostered and the extent to which it can facilitate significant reduction in nuclear stockpiles.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Of Clouds and Craters: The Incredible Story of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing

This report provides brief descriptions of US Nuclear weapons testing between 1945 and 1992. Editor's note: The United States’ last full-scale nuclear weapons test was conducted 30 years ago on Sept. 23, 1992. Divider was a Los Alamos test and took place in Nevada. It was the nation’s 1,054th nuclear test over a 47-year period.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗