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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2006

Thermal Simulator Development: Non-Nuclear Testing of Space Fission Systems

Non-nuclear testing can be a valuable tool in the development of a space nuclear power system. At the NASA MSFC Early Flight Fission Test Facility (EFF-TF), highly designed electric heaters are used to simulate the heat from nuclear fuel to test space fission power and propulsion systems. To allow early utilization, nuclear system designs must be relatively simple, easy to fabricate, and easy to test using non-nuclear heaters to closely mimic heat from fission. In this test strategy, highly designed electric heaters are used to simulate the heat from nuclear fuel, allowing one to develop a significant understanding of individual components and integrated system operation without the cost, time and safety concerns associated with nuclear testing.

Bragg-Sitton, Shannon M.↗
DOE OSTI2023

Optimal and Nominal Nuclear Testing Programs

The intent of this paper is to encourage thought on what the Test Site Verification Team (TSVT) might encounter primarily in terms of observable infrastructure when deployed to assess and verify an explosion, and/or a nuclear-testing program, site, or facility. A primary objective is to present the concept of a continuum of nuclear-testing programs between optimal and nominal end members as defined primarily by their observable infrastructure. Key objectives are: 1. Define optimal and nominal nuclear testing programs; 2. Discuss underground development for nuclear operations; 3. Discuss underground nuclear operations, safety, and health; 4. Compare drift complexes of optimal and nominal testing programs; 5. Compare drift complexes for nuclear testing and commercial production; 6. Discuss a potential future look of underground development and operations. A secondary objective is to interpret the intent of the three TSVT verification scenarios, primarily by defining “consistent with” nuclear or non-nuclear or listing criteria that “verify” nuclear or non-nuclear. Before discussing optimal and nominal nuclear testing programs, an understanding of the three verification scenarios is deemed beneficial.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
NASA NTRS2007

Development of High Fidelity, Fuel-Like Thermal Simulators for Non-Nuclear Testing

This viewgraph presentation reviews the development of a simulator for non-nuclear tests for the development of a space nuclear power system. The development of the Instrumented Thermal Simulator is to assist in developing an understanding of individual components and integrated system operation without the cost, time, safety concerns associated with nuclear testing. The presentation shows the design, the electrical integration, the hardware, and the assembly of the simulators. There are slides that show the test plan, the analysis, and the initial results.

Bragg-Sitton, Shannon↗
DOE OSTI2025

Stockpile Stewardship and Nuclear Testing: A Technical Assessment

Since 1992, the United States has retained confidence in its nuclear weapon stockpile without performing any tests that produce nuclear yield. Instead, it has invested in a stockpile stewardship program (SSP) based on the same approach that was validated through fifty years of experience during the nuclear testing era. As the test moratorium continues and new information becomes available, it is both necessary and appropriate to periodically revisit the question of whether or not nuclear testing should resume. In a recent article by Dr. Mark Schneider, he asserts that the United States should return to nuclear testing to address the issues that negatively affect our country’s nuclear deterrent. A serious, technically informed evaluation of the most significant of the issues Dr. Schneider has raised is provided in this paper. The conclusion of this evaluation is that the strategy of a well-funded SSP coupled with rigorous assessments to identify if there is a specific need for a nuclear test is sound and cost-effective approach. Any decision otherwise needs to take into careful consideration all the classified SSP successes and data pertaining to the particular issues in question.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Dense Seismic Array Study of a Legacy Underground Nuclear Test at the Nevada National Security Site

The complex postdetonation geologic structures that form after an underground nuclear explosion are difficult to constrain because increased heterogeneity around the damage zone affects seismic waves that propagate through the explosion site. Generally, a vertical rubble-filled structure known as a chimney is formed after an underground nuclear explosion that is composed of debris that falls into the subsurface cavity generated by the explosion. Compared with chimneys that collapse fully, leaving a surface crater, partially collapsed chimneys can have remnant subsurface cavities left in place above collapsed rubble. The 1964 nuclear test HADDOCK, conducted at the Nevada test site (now the Nevada National Security Site), formed a partially collapsed chimney with no surface crater. Understanding the subsurface structure of these features has significant national security applications, such as aiding the study of suspected underground nuclear explosions under a treaty verification. In this study, we investigated the subsurface architecture of the HADDOCK legacy nuclear test using hybrid 2D–3D active source seismic reflection and refraction data. The seismic data were acquired using 275 survey shots from the Seismic Hammer (a 13,000 kg weight drop) and 65 survey shots from a smaller accelerated weight drop, both recorded by ~1000 three-component 5 Hz geophones. First-arrival, P-wave tomographic modeling shows a low-velocity anomaly at ~200 m depth, likely an air-filled cavity caused by partial collapse of the rock column into the temporary postdetonation cavity. A high-velocity anomaly between 20 and 60 m depth represents spall-related compaction of the shallow alluvium. Hints of low velocities are also present near the burial depth (~364 m). The reflection seismic data show a prominent subhorizontal reflector at ~300 m depth, a short-curved reflector at ~200 m, and a high-amplitude reflector at ~50 m depth. Comparisons of the reflection sections to synthetic data and borehole stratigraphy suggest that these features correspond to the alluvium–tuff contact, the partial collapse cavity, and the spalled layer, respectively.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS2004

Non-nuclear Testing of Reactor Systems in the Early Flight Fission Test Facilities (EFF-TF)

The Early Flight Fission-Test Facility (EFF-TF) can assist in the &sign and development of systems through highly effective non-nuclear testing of nuclear systems when technical issues associated with near-term space fission systems are "non-nuclear" in nature (e.g. system s nuclear operations are understood). For many systems. thermal simulators can he used to closely mimic fission heat deposition. Axial power profile, radial power profile. and fuel pin thermal conductivity can be matched. In addition to component and subsystem testing, operational and lifetime issues associated with the steady state and transient performance of the integrated reactor module can be investigated. Instrumentation at the EFF-TF allows accurate measurement of temperature, pressure, strain, and bulk core deformation (useful for accurately simulating nuclear behavior). Ongoing research at the EFF-TF is geared towards facilitating research, development, system integration, and system utilization via cooperative efforts with DOE laboratories, industry, universities, and other NASA centers. This paper describes the current efforts for the latter portion of 2003 and beginning of 2004.

VanDyke, Melissa↗
NASA NTRS1963

Introduction to Nuclear Propulsion: Lecture 15 - Nuclear Test Operations

The test operation of nuclear power plants, specifically nuclear rockets, bears some interesting similarities to the operation of chemical rocket tests as well as, of course, many differences. A significant feature common to both nuclear and chemical rocket tests is that all the fuel for the entire operation is loaded at the start of the test. As a direct consequence of this fact, the operation of nuclear power plants must be surrounded with adequate safety precautions, as is indeed the case in the operation of chemical rockets, A second direct consequence is that in both types of testing a very thorough and complete checkout is made before starting the test.

TEST METHOD↗
DOE OSTI2022

The 1958 Nuclear Test Moratorium

Against the backdrop of international concern about radioactive fallout, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain agreed to a moratorium on nuclear testing. Neither monitored nor enforceable, the moratorium was not much more than a gentleman’s agreement. Nonetheless, it proved remarkedly durable, beginning on October 31, 1958, and lasting until September 1961. After France began nuclear testing in 1960, followed by the shooting down of an American U-2 spy plane over Soviet air space, and a failed summit meeting of international leaders, the Soviet Union resumed testing. The United States followed shortly thereafter.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Issues in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Ratification Debate: A 20 Year Retrospective

Two decades after the U.S. Senate declined in 1999 to give its consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty remains in legal and political limbo. Legally, the treaty cannot enter into force without U.S. ratification. However, the Senate’s rejection does not strip the treaty of its force as an element of customary international law or alter the will of other signatories to see it enter into force. Politically, the debate over the virtues and flaws of the treaty remains as strong as ever, with some CTBT advocates pushing energetically for U.S. re-review while some opponents seek ways to “un-sign” the treaty. Meanwhile, despite the Senate’s rejection of the treaty, the United States acts in a manner consistent with its main obligations by maintaining a moratorium on explosive nuclear testing and providing financial support (as well as technical expertise) to the CTBT Organization (CTBTO)—in particular the CTBTO’s International Monitoring System (IMS). The CTBT may well remain in such limbo for a long time to come, unless some catalytic event comes along to re-shape national perceptions and priorities, one way or the other. The treaty’s future, whatever it might be, will be determined in part by how much perspectives might have changed in light of interim developments. Our purpose is to shed light on some of those developments and to assess their relevance. The 1999 ratification debate addressed a large number of issues. Rejection was driven by various policy and technical judgments. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine those technical judgments in light of what has been learned over the following two decades. On some technical matters, there was explicit recognition of extant uncertainties, as well as a conviction and hope that time would dispel them. To be doubly clear, our purpose is not to recommend a way forward on CTBT ratification. The policy judgments of 1999 and 2020 are beyond the scope of this paper. This technical re-examination proceeds as follows. It begins with a short background section to introduce the key technical matters in discussion in the U.S. ratification process. Then it moves systematically through each of those topics with a review of relevant background information, a discussion of key points in debate, an analysis of subsequent experience, and a current assessment. The historical analysis draws on many sources including the primary documents of the Congressional debate, the official article-by-article interpretation by the Department of State, and the statements of key players in the process. We also relied on key technical reports and publications by subject matter experts that have addressed in more detail many of the issues in our focus. These sources include the 2002 and 2012 reports of the National Academy of Sciences as well as publications by senior technical staff of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) who were actively involved in the ratification debate, including then-Laboratory Director Bruce Tarter. We also conducted several interviews with government officials from the 1990s, past laboratory directors, and other members of the scientific community. But, except where individuals are specifically cited by name, the judgments offered here are our own and should not be attributed to any other individual or to LLNL as such.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Recovery and Calibration of Legacy Underground Nuclear Test Seismic Data from the Leo Brady Seismic Network

The Leo Brady Seismic Network (LBSN, originally the Sandia Seismic Network) was established in 1960 by Sandia National Laboratories to monitor underground nuclear tests (UGTs) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly named the Nevada Test Site). The LBSN has been in various configurations throughout its existence, but it has generally been comprised of four to six stations at regional distances (~150–400 km) from the NNSS with approximately evenly spaced azimuthal coverage. Between 1962 and the end of nuclear testing in 1992, the LBSN—and a sister network operated by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories—was the most comprehensive United States source of regional seismic data of UGTs. Approximately 75% of all UGTs performed by the United States occurred in the predigital era. At that time, LBSN data were transmitted as frequency-modulated (FM) audio over telephone lines to a central location and recorded as analog waveforms on high-fidelity magnetic audio tapes. These tapes have been in dry temperature-stable storage for decades and contain the sole record of this irreplaceable data; full waveforms of LBSN-recorded UGTs from this era were not routinely digitized or otherwise published. We have developed a process to recover and calibrate data from these tapes. First, we play back and digitize the tapes as audio. Next, we demodulate the FM “audio” into individual waveforms. We then estimate the various instrument constants through careful measurement of “weight-lift” tests performed prior to each UGT on each instrument. Finally, these coefficients allow us to scale and shape the derived instrument response of the seismographs and compute poles and zeros. Finally, the result of this process is a digital record of the recorded seismic ground motion in a modern data format, stored in a searchable database. To date, we have digitized tapes from 592 UGTs.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Transportable absolute yields of underground nuclear explosions. Application to the North Korean nuclear tests

The method developed and presented here improves our nuclear explosion monitoring capability by providing a new independent and transportable method to determine the explosive yields of seismically recorded events associated with foreign weapons development. Here we report new independent absolute yield and depth of burial estimates of the North Korean nuclear tests which are commensurate with previously determined source parameters. The key advantage of this method over other methods which estimate absolute explosive yields is that this method does not require any a priori calibration, and can be immediately applied to any region of interest. This method uses the source information obtained from the spectral ratios of envelopes of measured seismic coda waves to invert for model-derived yield and depth of burial. The only requirements of this method are that the region of interest must contain several (> 3) seismic sources which have been well recorded (SNR > 2) by a set of shared stations. For regions with only a few events (~ 3) and/or extremely band-limited observations for which the depth of burial is unknown, an earthquake with a known magnitude may be required to obtain an accurate and robust yield estimate.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Non-Nuclear Test Facility Development to Support Verification and Validation Needs

This study focuses on developing a non-nuclear test facility to help meet the verification and validation (V&V) requirements of a water-cooled small modular reactor (SMR) system. The scaling analysis necessary for reactor system experimentation and assessment model V&V considers various reactor system accident scenarios such as main steam line break (MSLB), steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), and containment condensation and heat transfer. The goal is to identify key physics based phenomena of interest (POI), specific figures of merit (FOMs), and the state of knowledge (SOK) by employing phenomena identification and ranking table (PIRT) studies. Important physics phenomena such as heat transfer, fluid dynamics, structural integrity, and material selection must be addressed when scaling a thermal-hydraulics system. Alongside these considerations, modifications to the facility may be needed to align the scaled system with the available footprint (height and space) of the facility. These modifications may include infrastructure upgrades, changes to the piping layout, implementation of safety measures, and installation of new instrumentation and control systems. The test facility aims to provide a scaled-down version of prototypic facilities for comprehensive V&V activities by overcoming these challenges and making the necessary modifications. This approach minimizes scaling distortion, simulates prototypic plant conditions, and accurately models accident event progressions. Thus, the facility will be capable of adequately modeling a scaled SMR system to support the design, development and licensing needs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Uncertainty quantification of fireball features extracted from nuclear test films using computer vision

Films from the US’s historic nuclear testing era comprise the only extensive collection of imagery depicting high-yield detonations. These films offer unique insights into the characteristics of flows occurring on scales that are difficult to replicate experimentally, and they are a valuable source of data for the validation of models used to describe nuclear detonations. In recent work, we implemented modern computer vision and machine learning techniques to extract features of the fireball following nuclear detonation. With a training dataset of fireball films, we fine-tuned a You Only Look Once 11 (YOLO11) model to detect and track the fireball. Applied to a video, the outer bounding box produced in each frame by YOLO11 is used as an input prompt to Meta’s Segment Anything Model 2 (SAM2), which is shown to accurately predict the boundary of the fireball over time with high resolution. These state-of-the-art computer vision foundation models exhibit impressive visual accuracy in their results but lack an output of values that robustly quantify uncertainty in scientific applications. In this paper, we develop procedures for uncertainty quantification of extracted fireball features. We outline the application of a parallel attention mechanism to calculate uncertainty ranges that complement and better pose model validation data. This higher quality fireball validation data may serve to improve prognostic models describing nuclear detonations in support of nuclear forensic and emergency response activities.

Khristy, Joel [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000209963060)↗
DOE OSTI2021

Characterizing major and trace element compositions in fallout melt glass from a near-surface nuclear test

We report the chemical and isotopic compositions of fallout melt glasses from nuclear tests contain a range of information constraining the physical conditions within the fireball and the mechanisms of fallout formation but historic studies tended to exclude the behavior of stable major and trace elements. Here, we present a large study specifically focused on major and trace element relationships within a population of macroscale fallout samples from a single event. We interpret these data to better constrain how fallout melt glass formation in near surface environments is influenced by that environment and demonstrate how major and trace element abundances can provide useful insights into chemical processes within the fireball. Data confirm that the uranium in the fallout glass population derives from two isotopically distinct endmembers: isotopically enriched uranium (presumably from the weapon), and natural composition uranium that may be a combination of anthropogenic and environmental materials from within the blast zone. The similarity between major and trace element concentrations in fallout and corresponding local soils from the event site confirm the local soils as the most probable source of entrained material into the fireball and the source of carrier material into which the bomb vapor was incorporated. The lack of correlation between major and trace element abundances with size indicates that volatility driven processes, such as condensation from the fireball, do not control the composition of macroscale fallout melt glass. Although the fallout has major and trace element chemical characteristics broadly similar to those of the local, associated soils, some systematic differences are observed between the two populations. Fallout melt glass is depleted in volatile elements such as K, Na, Tl and Pb, consistent with heating to temperatures above ~1000 °C for 3-10 s. This is supported by the results of laser heating experiments performed on rhyolitic soil at temperatures (1600-2200 °C) and timescales (1-120 s) that are broadly relevant to fallout formation conditions. Relative enrichments of metals such as Cu and Co do not correlate with the abundance of uranium, suggesting that fallout also records input of near field anthropogenic materials. Our observations suggest that major chemical features can be related to processing in the fireball and used to inform the thermal-chemical evolution of the system. Ultimately, these data are consistent with a fallout formation mechanism that involves rapid melting of surface materials to form carrier material melts with minor incorporation of bomb vapor and a degree of volumetric volatile loss due to heating.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Testing in an Hour [Slides]

A PowerPoint presentation that covers the history of nuclear testing from 1945 to 1992. The presentation gives a historical overview of the topic and covers both above ground and underground testing.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Nuclear Testing and the Joint Task Force System

During the 1940s, 50s, and early 60s, the United States conducted eight nuclear test operations in the far reaches of the Pacific Ocean. These operations were possible only because of a military command and control organization, the joint task force. Commanded by the Army Navy, and Air Force on a rotating basis, each of the seven JTFs provided the means by which the thousands of ships, planes, material, and personnel were moved over thousands of miles of ocean. The first task force, JTF-1, was created to test the destructive effects of the Fat Man bomb on Naval vessels at Bikini Atoll in the summer of 1946. Commanded by Vice Admiral William “Spike” Blandy, JTF-1 was a purely military operation supported by the MED. Never meant to be a permanent organization, JTF-1 was dissolved soon after completing its mission.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗