Optimized Deuterium Ionizer for Pulsed and Continuous Neutron Sources for Well Logging Applications
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In response to escalating global energy demands driven by industrialization and the pressing need for decarbonization, this paper explores the potential of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) as a sustainable energy solution in Africa. Focusing on nuclear security and non-proliferation concerns, the study assesses Africa's energy landscape, emphasizing the need for diverse and reliable power sources. While highlighting the scalability and cost-effectiveness of SMRs, the analysis acknowledges potential challenges associated with their introduction, particularly concerning nuclear security and non-proliferation. Given the recommendation to use High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU) in some SMRs, it is important to critically consider the security implications of transporting nuclear materials, the proximity of the public to the plant, and the time taken to respond to planned assaults. The possibility of using HALEU makes the nuclear material more prone to adversaries such as sabotage, theft, and terrorism. Utilizing PESTLE analysis, this research seeks to outline the detailed political, economic, social, technological, environmental, and legal readiness of Africa to embrace the first-of-a-kind technology (SMR) while fulfilling its mandate to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Examining regulatory frameworks, international cooperation, and safety protocols, the study underscores the importance of regional collaboration to prevent the misuse of nuclear technology for military and malicious intent. Drawing insights from successful case studies, the paper concludes by synthesizing key findings and proposing recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders. These recommendations encompass regulatory enhancement, capacity building, technology transfer, and diplomatic efforts to strengthen nuclear security, non-proliferation, and safeguards in Africa.
The immobilization of irradiated highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel is a critical component of nuclear waste management and non-proliferation efforts. In Kazakhstan, at National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan special attention is given to managing legacy HEU fuel from research reactors. One such case involves the IGR research reactor, whose first core containing irradiated HEU uranium-graphite fuel was operated from 1961 to 1966 and removed following reactor modernization. This fuel now requires a reliable and secure immobilization strategy. Here, this paper presents the development of a technological process for immobilizing this fuel to reduce its enrichment to below 20 % in terms of 235U content. The proposed method involves down-blending irradiated HEU fuel with depleted uranium, followed by encapsulation in a Portland cement matrix. Full-scale experiments were conducted to assess the uniformity of uranium distribution within the matrix. The results confirm the effectiveness of this approach, ensuring reliable immobilization of fuel in accordance with international requirements, including IAEA standards and Kazakhstan's regulatory framework. These findings contribute to the broader effort of adapting immobilization strategies for the safe management of spent fuel from research reactors.
Plutonium plays a key role in global actinide research and nuclear fuel cycle technologies, and yet, our fundamental understanding of its inherent radiation-induced chemical behavior is limited. These radiation-induced processes cannot simply be switched off, as they are as fundamentally inherent to plutonium as the impact of relativistic effects on its f-electrons. In less chemically complex actinide systems, such as aqueous solutions of neptunium and americium, both steady-state and transient radiolysis products play a significant role in the redox cycling of their oxidation states, which ultimately impacts their chemistry and transport. However, plutonium's multiple, coexisting, and chemically active oxidation states, which comprise of bare ions and dioxo cations, provide additional redox pathways that complicate the aforementioned radiation-induced competition kinetics. Mechanistically understanding the response of these multiple oxidation states, both equilibrium and non-equilibrium, to intense ionizing radiation fields is essential for predicting the behavior of plutonium under a host of conditions that support technological innovation in global nuclear energy and non-proliferation efforts. Here, advances in radiation-induced plutonium solution chemistry will be presented, including new results from time-resolved electron pulse and steady-state gamma and alpha irradiations.
This paper provides an introduction to using acoustic monitoring to advance detection techniques for pyroprocessing in support of nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation. The usage of free air acoustic monitoring has been previously demonstrated at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) facilities such as the Advanced Test Reactor and the National Security Test Range. However, the proposed work revolves around a new deployment environment, the Fuel Conditioning Facility, that brings forward several questions regarding the performance of the technology in non-free air media. The confinement of the pyroprocessing equipment to a heavily shielded hot cell, the atmosphere of the hot cell containing argon gas, and the radiation dose inside the hot cell are all new environments for acoustic monitoring. To our knowledge, acoustic measurements have not been completed in such an environment before. This offers a new opportunity to study not only the acoustic signatures of the equipment inside of the hot cell, but also the propagation of the signals through the hot cell and at distances away from their origination. The objective of this paper is to explain the planned instruments to monitor the Fuel Conditioning Facility in order to evaluate acoustic signals emitted from equipment during various stages of operation. Identifying these signals can potentially enable the identification of specific pieces of equipment used in pyroprocessing and produce information of their operational status. If successful, this type of monitoring could offer a new method to aid in safeguards and proliferation detection of pyroprocessing activities.
Nuclear science plays a key role in non-proliferation activities supporting advanced reactor technologies. Nuclear data underpin predictions and interpretations of nuclear material behavior and signatures in reactor fuel production, use, transport, and storage. Advanced reactors provide new challenges compared to the current fleet of thermal fission reactors. This report consolidates reported nuclear data needs from representative workshops, conferences, and publications, identifying six themes for recommended future investments supporting non-proliferation and safeguards applications. While also identified as data needs, major fission product evaluations and (α,n) reactions were omitted as there are ongoing activities producing new data under NA22/Objective O. Each theme is summarized below with example data and association with the nonproliferation mission for advanced fuels and reactors.
Detecting shielded special nuclear material, such as nuclear explosives, is a difficult challenge pursued by non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, and nuclear security programs worldwide. Interrogation with intense fast-neutron pulses is a promising method to characterize concealed nuclear material rapidly but is limited by suitable source availability and proven instrumentation. In this study we have pioneered a demonstration of such an interrogation method using a high-intensity, short-pulse, laser-driven neutron source that offers potential benefits compared to conventional neutron sources. The measurement results reported here represent the first experimental demonstration of this interrogation approach on enriched uranium items and demonstrate the feasibility of a precise measurement using realistic nuclear materials, representative of field scenarios, even with just a single laser-driven neutron pulse. Bright pulsed sources can overcome the nuisance background of items with strong internal neutron sources, improving analytical power, while single-shot assay is attractive in high-throughput situations where time is at a premium. The science and technology of this type of neutron production is developing rapidly, and we anticipate that practical mobile interrogation systems will become available based on the detection concepts demonstrated here to meet the growing measurement needs.
Every country that has made nuclear weapons has used uranium enrichment to do so. Despite the centrality of this technology to international security, there is still no reliable physical marker of past enrichment in the open literature that can be used to perform forensic verification of historically produced weapons on gas centrifuges. We show that the extremely low radioactivity from uranium alpha emissions during enrichment leaves detectable and irreversible calorimetric signatures in the common enrichment gasket material PTFE, allowing for historical reconstruction of past enrichment activities at a sensitivity better than one weapon’s quantity of highly enriched uranium. Fast scanning calorimetry also enables the measurement of recrystallization enthalpies of sequentially microtomed slices, confirming the magnitude and the type of radiation exposure while also providing detection of tampering and a method for analyzing field samples useful for treaty verification. Furthermore, this work opens the door for common items to be turned into precise dosimeters to detect the past presence of radioactivity, nuclear materials, and related activities with high confidence.
Microchannel plate with improved thermo-electric properties are a high risk, high payoff development undertaken by a consortium of effort that links the Argonne National Lab, the Space-Science Lab at UC Berkeley and the small businesses (Incom Inc.) that will commercialize the advanced technology in open MCPs and LAPPDs. This development will satisfy the needs for new instrumentation for homeland security (non-proliferation) sensors to screen vehicles and cargo for Special Nuclear Materials (SNMs) and scientific detectors for astrophysics, electron microscopy, time-of-flight mass spectrometry, molecular and atomic collision studies, and fluorescence imaging applications in biotechnology and medical imaging products including positron emission tomography (PET scanning).
The international community is slowly beginning to recognize the intersections between the law and policy on international security – particularly arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament – and the body of human rights law that addresses gender equality. Notably absent from this discussion is the field of nuclear security. Despite its historical underpinnings as an inherently domestic activity, nuclear security is thoroughly grounded in international treaty law. Yet, nuclear security is often overlooked in the international security context and has not been well situated with international instruments that address gender equality. We argue that gender equality in nuclear security should be understood as an important component of broader efforts to achieve equal opportunities for women in work and critical to ensuring women are included in conflict prevention efforts. Linking nuclear security to broader international efforts to increase gender equality in security and conflict prevention will provide a clearer structure and framework for gender equality initiatives in the nuclear security field. This is critically important given that estimates indicate that women comprise only twenty percent of the nuclear security workforce. Moreover, situating nuclear security in a broader international legal framework will simultaneously help states meet their gender equality commitments emanating from other instruments. This paper will first analyze the relationship between nuclear security and broader international security efforts, in particular arms control treaties and non-proliferation regimes. It will then survey the relevant international and regional frameworks for gender equality, particularly those that have applicability in the security context. This paper will next explore the relationship between nuclear security and these frameworks on gender. We find that some instruments provide support for gender equality initiatives in nuclear security because of their mandate to states to provide structural gender equality, and others are particularly relevant where they call for women's participation in conflict prevention. This paper concludes with recommendations to states that are concerned about the underrepresentation of women in nuclear security.
Portal monitoring is one method in a suite of options for treaty verification and can assist in verification of treaty accountable items (TAIs). Portal monitor technology spans a wide range of sensors, including radiation detectors, break-beams, or weight sensors. For radiation-detecting portal monitors, they are able to confirm absence / presence of a radiological signature and to track TAI direction of motion. Portal monitoring uses measurements from strategically placed sensors (e.g., radiation detectors) to record the entry or egress of TAIs. The implementation of portal monitoring relies on three key elements: perimeter definition, portal locations, and sensor technology, and can be implemented in either time-bound or continuous operations depending on what is permitted by the Treaty.
Building on prior work developing a Strategic Trade Atlas promoting understanding of global trade flows of strategic goods, a Nuclear Trade Atlas was developed based on publicly available trade data. The Nuclear Trade Atlas examines trade patterns and trends for seventeen commodities based on a two-step assessment of the trade’s nuclear relevance: first estimating the probability that trade classified under a given Harmonized System (HS) code represents a specific commodity included in the export control lists of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and second estimating the probability that the listed, often dual-use, commodity would be indicative of nuclear use. These estimates combine to provide a measure of the likelihood trade classified under a given HS code may be nuclear relevant. By exclusively focusing on the HS codes most highly ranked by this measure, the resulting data visualizations comprising the Nuclear Trade Atlas provide those responsible for regulating or monitoring nuclear trade greater understanding of relevant global trading patterns and trends. The Atlas includes both commodity- and country-based views of nuclear trade. It is published as a book and as an interactive tool. Besides trade data, the interactive Atlas also includes data about countries’ non-proliferation commitments, allowing users to take this information into consideration while analyzing specific trade flows.
The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), and complimentary zero-power ATR Critical (ATRC) reactor, located at Idaho National Labs (INL), are undergoing conversion from Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). Both have a variety of testing locations that can receive large variations in flux due to its unique serpentine design, consisting of five lobes surrounding nine flux traps (see Figure 1). Initial criticality and power distribution throughout the core are controlled by core-external outer shim control cylinders (OSCCs). Distinct test loops allow for testing at specific temperatures, pressures, and irradiation conditions such as flux and fission density. The ATR is one of the key nuclear engineering research and testing facilities within the DOE National Laboratory Complex, and the ATRC supports its operation [1]. Currently, the Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) within the National Nuclear Security Administration of the DOE is working to convert the remaining research reactors, including the ATR, from 93% HEU fuel to 19.75% LEU fuel (LEU) to support non-proliferation [2]. Extensive materials testing at INL and internationally has demonstrated that a high-density uranium molybdenum (U 10Mo) alloy can meet the performance requirements of the remaining high powered research reactors. The current LEU fuel element design is named the LOWE element. However, there are many technical challenges to address before the conversion to LEU can be successful, including the accurate characterization of the reactor core physics with LEU fuel. To ensure safe operation of the ATR, reactor engineers prepare a CSAP (Core Safety Assurance Package) before each cycle. The purpose of the CSAP is to verify the reactor performance calculation used to determine if the selected fuel loading meets operational, experimental, and safety criteria. Many of the criteria in the CSAP are limits on reactivity insertion in various accident scenarios.
The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), and complimentary zero-power ATR Critical (ATRC) reactor, located at Idaho National Labs (INL), are undergoing conversion from Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). Both have a variety of testing locations that can receive large variations in flux due to its unique serpentine design, consisting of five lobes (see Figure 1). Initial criticality and power distribution throughout the core are controlled by core-external outer shim control cylinders (OSCCs). Distinct test loops allow for testing at specific temperatures, pressures, and irradiation conditions. The ATR is one of the key nuclear engineering research and testing facilities within the DOE National Laboratory Complex, and the ATRC supports its operation [1]. Currently, the Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) within the National Nuclear Security Administration of the DOE is working to convert the remaining research reactors, including the ATR, from 93% HEU fuel to 19.75% LEU fuel (LEU) to support non-proliferation [2]. Extensive materials testing at INL and internationally has demonstrated that a high-density uranium molybdenum (U 10Mo) alloy can meet the performance requirements of the remaining high powered research reactors. However, there are many technical challenges to address before the conversion to LEU can be successful, including the accurate characterization of the reactor core physics with LEU fuel. Reactor physics safety evaluations currently use Monte Carlo for the 21st Century (MC21), a continuous-energy Monte Carlo radiation transport code [3]. Existing MC21 models of the ATR and ATRC cores have a validation basis for use in neutronics analyses with HEU fuel. The models are used to support safety analyses that include comparisons to the safety requirements for the reactors. However, the use of the LOWE element in the ATR and ATRC is not currently covered by the current model validation basis. To deploy the new fuel type, extensive computational reactor physics support is necessary to support the use of LOWE in the ATR and ATRC. Therefore, LOWE requires a rigorous validation basis, aligned with that of HEU fuel, that takes advantage of the existing software tools and processes currently used for the ATR and ATRC. The experiment to validate of the MC21 models for determining power, the Power Impact Validation Experiment, will consist of two flux runs in the ATRC, one with fully HEU loading and one with a single LOWE element. Both flux runs will be instrumented with 20 sets of azimuthal fission wires and 3 sets of axial fission wires, as shown in Figure 4. Standard flux run methodology will be used [4]. Power Impact Validation Experiment data will be compared against MC21 calculated data, both for absolute fission rate accuracy and to determine the relative change in fission rates between the two runs. The results of the Power Impact Validation Experiment and subsequent evaluations will provide the validation basis for MC21 for use with LOWE elements. Key features of the Power Impact Validation Experiment include: (1) Two flux runs to allow for LOWE perturbed measurements to be compared to already validated measurements taken from a full core of HEU fuel, (2) Optimization of instrumentation to balance analytical needs with practical considerations (e.g., limited time window to count beta particles from fission products), and (3) Standard ATRC core loading, including both driver positions and flux traps, to minimize cost while remaining representative of typical ATR core loading.
Much has happened in arms control over the last year as this chapter has been in development. The prospects for arms control as a viable national security tool have, if anything, grown darker. Russia has falsely equated tearing down the remaining arms control edifice with creating potential leverage vis-à-vis its actions in Ukraine. China has failed to update its talking points on being a responsible arms control actor with its massive nuclear force expansion. The United States has stated clearly that it is open for business on arms control and risk reduction, but it unfortunately has no customers in Russia and China. It remains unclear what specifically the United States is selling in terms of what it wants in a potential agreement. Competitive dynamics and an atmosphere of great power competition are driving all parties further away from the table.
Nature of this 2021 Module update from previous AFC-CBRs: Use of U,Pu MOX life cycle cost data from late 1970s Non-proliferation Assessment Systems Analysis Program (NASAP). This archived data has been updated in 2018-2019 to reflect today’s regulatory and economic conditions and is presented in 2017. For the lower unit cost MOX fabrication case the PuO 2 from the reprocessed LWR SNF is assumed to be fabricated immediately after aqueous PUREX reprocessing, thus minimizing the time for undesirable actinide radioisotopes, from the standpoint of radiation safety, to build in. Fabricated MOX utilizing separated and multi-year stored Pu from aqueously reprocessed SNF has also been added to this Module as a second LWR MOX fabrication variant, requiring additional and more costly glovebox design and operations to protect personnel. This new NASAP-informed data augments historical data and unit cost projections appearing in the 2009 (Shropshire et al 2009), 2012 (Dixon et al 2012), and 2017 Dixon et al 2017) AFC-CBRs. The “What-it-takes” 2017 unit fabrication cost values based on the updated NASAP studies are escalated to 2020$ for this 2021 Update Report.
Molten salt reactor (MSR) with Thorium (Th) fuel cycle has attracted growing attention due to its merits such as safety, low radioactive waste production, and non-proliferation. The design and safe operation of MSR rely on a thorough understanding of the thermophysical properties of molten salts over a wide range of composition and temperature. However, experimental data of Th-based molten salts are limited due to the inherent challenges of dealing with corrosive molten salts and the radioactive nature of actinides. Here, in this work, thermophysical properties including density, heat capacity, thermal expansion coefficient, and mixing energy of binary NaCl-ThCl 4 and ternary NaCl-ThCl 4 -UCl 3 molten salts are explored using ab-initio molecular dynamic simulations (AIMD) with the dDsC dispersion correction. The calculated mixing energy of binary NaCl-ThCl 4 exhibits a minimum close to the eutectic composition. The heat capacity of the mixtures is linearly dependent on the mole fraction of each component. 7-fold and 6-fold coordinated Th complexes are dominant in the mixtures. 8-fold coordinated Th complex increases with ThCl 4 fraction due to the formation of network structures. The average coordination number of Th exhibits a minimum near the eutectic composition. The minimum mixing energy for the ternary mixtures is observed in systems with a composition close to [NaCl] 0.5 [ThCl 4 ] 0.25 [UCl 3 ] 0.25 . The density positively deviates from the ideal solution in mixtures near this composition. These results are important to fill the data and knowledge gap of ThCl 4 molten salts.
Many next generation light water reactor (LWR) concepts, such as mobile small modular reactors, are seeking to use smaller core dimensions than conventional reactor types. Smaller reactor cores require an increase in fissile material to maintain reactivity. For non-proliferation purposes, enrichment increases are limited to less than 20% (high assay low enriched uranium, [HALEU]) and so higher uranium density fuels than UO 2 must be considered. To this end, uranium-molybdenum alloys were tested using the Fission Accelerated Steady-state Test (FAST) approach. The experiment test matrix is focused on identifying the temperature transition between low swelling and high fission gas retention to break away swelling and low fission gas retention. This paper documents the results of irradiation tests and post-irradiation examinations (PIE) including neutron radiography, rodlet profilometry, fission gas collection analysis, and optical metallography. The results of these tests showed that unconstrained U-Mo fuels (solid, Na-bonded rodlets) have a swelling threshold between 400-450°C with minimal fission gas release below this point. Higher temperature solid fuel showed microstructural zoning with small pore networks while lower temperature solid fuels have a uniform microstructure with large pore networks. U-Annular Mo fuels where swelling had some self-constraint imposed upon it, were shown to have much reduced swelling compared to their solid counterparts as well as very low fission gas release for irradiation temperatures up to 500°C. These initial results show that the use of U-Mo in constrained fuel geometries could be used as a high uranium density HALEU fuel for LWRs.