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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2005

Reaction Control System Thruster Cracking Consultation: NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Materials Super Problem Resolution Team (SPRT) Findings

The shuttle orbiter s reaction control system (RCS) primary thruster serial number 120 was found to contain cracks in the counter bores and relief radius after a chamber repair and rejuvenation was performed in April 2004. Relief radius cracking had been observed in the 1970s and 1980s in seven thrusters prior to flight; however, counter bore cracking had never been seen previously in RCS thrusters. Members of the Materials Super Problem Resolution Team (SPRT) of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) conducted a detailed review of the relevant literature and of the documentation from the previous RCS thruster failure analyses. It was concluded that the previous failure analyses lacked sufficient documentation to support the conclusions that stress corrosion cracking or hot-salt cracking was the root cause of the thruster cracking and lacked reliable inspection controls to prevent cracked thrusters from entering the fleet. The NESC team identified and performed new materials characterization and mechanical tests. It was determined that the thruster intergranular cracking was due to hydrogen embrittlement and that the cracking was produced during manufacturing as a result of processing the thrusters with fluoride-containing acids. Testing and characterization demonstrated that appreciable environmental crack propagation does not occur after manufacturing.

MacKay, Rebecca A.↗
NASA NTRS2024

Test and Analysis of the 8-foot Diameter Cylindrical Sandwich Composite Test Article CTA8.2B: As part of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center Shell Buckling Knockdown Factor Project

The buckling response of thin-walled cylindrical structures have long been shown to be sensitive to various imperfections. That is, imperfections related to load introduction, boundary conditions, material property variation, and geometric deviations can all contribute to experimentally obtained buckling loads being lower than the buckling loads predicted for perfect representations of the same thin-walled cylindrical structure. To account for the influence of geometry-based imperfections of a thin-walled cylindrical structure on buckling response, a design factor (also known as a buckling knockdown factor) is used during the design phase. Guidelines for buckling knockdown factors are readily available in NASA SP-8007, Buckling of Thin Walled Circular Cylinders, which was updated in 2020. Prior to this recent update, NASA SP-8007 had not been updated since 1969, and since that time, computational analysis, experimental testing, and manufacturing methods have significantly improved. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Shell Buckling Knockdown Factor Project (SBKF, NESC Assessment 07-010-E) had the goal of developing buckling design recommendations for select classes of metallic and composite launch-vehicle structures [3]. Specifically, the test and analysis results from the fourth SBKF composite test article SBKF-P3-CYL-CTA8.2B, which is referred to as CTA8.2B, are described in this paper. This test was the fourth in a series of four tests on sandwich composite cylinders that will be used to experimentally validate analysis methods, which in turn can be used to develop new analysis-based shell buckling design guidelines for typical sandwich composite launch vehicle cylindrical structures. Publications describing previous test validation with analysis are available in Refs. CTA8.2B was designed to occupy one corner of the design space with approximately equal bending stiffnesses in the axial and transverse directions and have a larger ratio of radius to effective shell thickness. Each test article had a unique design and was designed to occupy a specific region of the design space. CTA8.2B was an 8-foot diameter honeycomb-core sandwich cylinder that was fabricated and tested at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). The primary objectives of this test were to interrogate the structural capability of a composite test article, and to verify the test article design and analysis approach for cylinders subjected to axial compression and combined axial and bending loads. First, descriptions of the test article design and test are given in Section 2.0, and modeling and analysis methods used in support of the test article design and testing activities are described briefly in Section 3.0. Then, select test results are presented and compared to predicted results in Section 4.0, and concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.0. Finally, drawings of CTA8.2B and references used to support the test and analysis are provided in the Appendix.

Nonlinear analysis↗
NASA NTRS2015

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 15-01: Preventing Incorrect Installation of Polarized Capacitors

Even though NASA’s Lessons Learned Information System has an entry on the reverse installation of polarized capacitors, this error keeps reoccurring and is a “lesson not learned.” The purpose of this bulletin is to discuss some of the reasons this keeps happening as well as offer best practices to prevent this error in the future.

Preventing Incorrect Installation of Polarized Cap↗
NASA NTRS2019

Update: Evaluation of Additively Manufactured Metals for Use in Oxygen Systems

Evaluation of Additively Manufactured Metals for Use in Oxygen Systems. Oxygen Compatibility: Additive Manufacturing (AM) is currently and will continue to be, used in oxygen systems; Compatibility studies are a necessity; Risks if not pursued - Equipment Damage, Loss of Mission, Loss of Life; NASA Centers of Excellence leading efforts -White Sands Test Facility (WSTF), Oxygen Compatibility Testing -Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Additive Manufacturing -Glenn Research Center, Metals characterization -NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC), Statistical Design of Experiments.

Tylka, Jonathan↗
NASA NTRS2021

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 21-03-1: Best Practices for the Elemental Profiling of High-Purity Hydrazine

Trace contaminants in high-purity hydrazine (HPH) propellant impact a wide variety of commercial, Department of Defense (DoD), and NASA missions. Depending on thruster design, elemental contaminants must be kept at extremely low levels and are verified as such by routine analysis. A number of these contaminants have recently undergone an assessment to shed light on their quantities present following changes in the HPH supply chain. A round robin analysis utilizing four separate laboratories resulted in unacceptably high variability in the quantification of these contaminants. The principal objective of this technical bulletin is to signal the availability of a new analysis methodology which yields accurate and repeatable quantification by providing best practices for both quantitation methodology and strategies for avoiding sample contamination during analysis.

High-Purity Hydrazine↗
NASA NTRS2023

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 23-01: Including Key Design Features in Safety-Critical Pyrotechnic Firing Circuits

Pyrotechnic systems often fall into a unique category in that inadvertent activation of these systems resulting from a fault and/or lack of safe margins can lead directly to loss of crew. For example, untimely activation of pyrotechnics used for a flight termination system could override an abort capability. Over the years, NASA and the military have learned lessons about safe pyrotechnic circuit design and test, many of which are codified. However, with NASA’s recent efforts to move toward a development model than leans more heavily on Commercial Partners these requirements have not always been directly levied on projects and in some cases been misinterpreted. This bulletin describes key safety features of pyrotechnic firing circuit design and provides rationale for inclusion of each feature.

Pyrotechnic Firing Curcuits↗
NASA NTRS2008

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) GN and C Technical Discipline Team (TDT): Its Purpose, Practices and Experiences

This paper will briefly define the vision, mission, and purpose of the NESC organization. The role of the GN&C TDT will then be described in detail along with an overview of how this team operates and engages in its objective engineering and safety assessments of critical NASA projects. This paper will then describe key issues and findings from several of the recent GN&C-related independent assessments and consultations performed and/or supported by the NESC GN&C TDT. Among the examples of the GN&C TDT s work that will be addressed in this paper are the following: the Space Shuttle Orbiter Repair Maneuver (ORM) assessment, the ISS CMG failure root cause assessment, the Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technologies (DART) spacecraft mishap consultation, the Phoenix Mars lander thruster-based controllability consultation, the NASA in-house Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Smart Buyer assessment and the assessment of key engineering considerations for the Design, Development, Test & Evaluation (DDT&E) of robust and reliable GN&C systems for human-rated spacecraft.

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗
NASA NTRS2024

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 24-04: 6DOF Check Cases

In 2015, the NESC released benchmark Earth-based check-cases for well specified, rigid-body, six-degree-of-freedom (6DOF) aero/spacecraft models to promote consistent and accurate flight simulations across multiple Agency tools and facilities. Recently, the NESC expanded upon that effort to add Lunar-based check-cases to support new lunar exploration initiatives. This study produced a smaller, focused set of cases that exercise new and unique features of missions in the lunar environment in comparison with 8 high-fidelity NASA simulation tools and provides a measure of validation for simulations supporting Human Landing Systems.

Flight Mechanics↗
NASA NTRS2020

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 20-06: Material Compatibility Assessment of Spacecraft Oxidizer Systems

Recently designed oxidizer systems used in spacecraft propulsion are pushing the limits of materials and operating conditions. As a result, nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) oxidizer systems are exhibiting failures driven by ignition mechanisms similar to oxygen systems. Oxidizer systems (e.g., O 2 , N 2 O 4 , N 2 O H 2 O 2 ) have generally been designed and operated within industry experience for material corrosion concerns without a complete understanding or regard for the concerns regarding potential material ignition and burning. To compound the problem, the effects of varying parameters on ignition and the kindling chain have not been studied, and there is a very limited amount of published data to help with the understanding. NASA-sponsored testing is actively researching ignition mechanisms, determining thresholds, and defining operating envelopes to inform the aerospace community.

NESC↗
NASA NTRS2024

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Lunar Rover Design Concepts Assessments

Mass is a significant risk to programs and projects as they transition from formulation to implementation, especially in larger human space systems where delivery mass or volume can be a constrained commodity. • Concepts developed without an adequate systems-engineering basis, including design and operations experience, may miss significant functionality and subsequent mass required for integration or operations. • Further uncertainty can be associated with not fully understanding design best practices and standards that drive mass, such as design for minimum risk or fault tolerance.1 • Finally, the appropriate systems engineering mass properties management rigor and technical discipline insight are required to set the mass baseline, including appropriate mass growth allowance (MGA) to ensure program success. Mass is a key quantity that should be constantly monitored by the systems engineer and the program/project management stakeholder to ensure mission compatibility throughout the project life cycle. In addition, mass is a key programmatic performance metric monitored by the NASA Chief Financial Officer for current and future program cost estimating. NASA Exploration Systems sought an assessment of reasonableness with respect to different potential rover concepts that balances mass needs and human-class cargo lander capabilities. Appropriate systems engineering mass properties management rigor and technical discipline insight were used, and are required to set the mass baseline, including appropriate MGA to ensure program success. Two independent Lunar rover concepts were evaluated, with a goal to understand concept credibility and the Lunar rover designs potential extensibility for Mars surface operations. A notional generic rover concept is shown in Figure 1.

Systems Engineering↗
NASA NTRS2020

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 20-07: Evaluating and Mitigating Liner Strain Spikes in COPV's

Unexpected cracking and leaking in bonded composite overwrapped pressure vessel (COPV) liners occurring in recent test programs have been attributed to liner strain spikes observed through measurement and predicted by analysis. Diminished load transfer between the liner and composite overwrap can lead to localized excessive liner yielding in the dome section. This diminished constraint can occur due to yielding of the adhesive or a manufacturing unbond defect. COPVs should be assessed for susceptibility to this new failure mode.

Evaluating↗
NASA NTRS2020

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 20-08: Assessment of Ketazine Derived High Purity Hydrazine for Spacecraft Propellant Systems

Hydrazine and its derivatives have dominated the class of hypergolic liquid propellants for bipropellant propulsion systems in rockets such as the Titan, MX Missile, and Ariane; it has also been widely utilized as a monopropellant in auxiliary power units and in thrusters for altitude and in-orbit control of satellites and spacecraft. With continued use of hydrazine in current and future spacecraft and payloads, it is necessary to understand the historical and current states of synthesis for the commodity and possible implications that may arise from changes in production processes for the United States stock.

Ketazine↗
NASA NTRS2024

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletins 2007-2023

An NESC Technical Bulletin captures critical knowledge in the form of new engineering information or best practices in a one-page format that have resulted from NESC independent testing, analysis, and assessments. This document contains all NESC Technical Bulletins from 2007 through 2023.

additive manufacturing, battery, braycote, capacit↗
NASA NTRS2021

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 21-01: Experimental and Computational Study of Cavitation in Hydrogen Peroxide

Cavitation in liquid propulsion systems can lead to performance degradation and hardware failures. The NESC sponsored an investigation to measure and model cavitation in pressurized hydrogen peroxide fl ow. The experimentally measured and computationally predicted cavitation lengths were compared as a function of cavitation number. The measured and predicted data exhibited close agreement over the range of pressures and temperatures studied, and no calibration of the cavitation model coefficients was needed.

NESC Technical Bulletin No. 21-01↗
NASA NTRS2021

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 21-04: Evaluating Appropriateness of LEFM Tools for COPV and Metal Pressure Vessel Damage Tolerance Life Verification

Human spaceflight composite overwrapped pressure vessels (COPVs) and metal pressure vessels can use linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) analysis to demonstrate damage tolerance life per ANSI/AIAA-S-081 for COPVs and ANSI/AIAA-S-080 for metal pressure vessels. LEFM analysis assumptions require that the crack tip plastic zone is small relative to the crack size and is completely surrounded by elastically responding material. Test and analysis have shown that LEFM tools (i.e., NASGRO*) can provide unconservative crack growth predictions for cracks in COPV liners that violate LEFM assumptions. COPV and metal pressure vessel designers should evaluate and address the violation of LEFM plasticity assumptions before using LEFM analysis tools for damage tolerance life verification.

COPV↗
NASA NTRS2021

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 21-05: Industry Recommendations from Arecibo Observatory Zinc Spelter Socket Joint Failure Analysis

A structural analysis and forensic investigation concluded that the Arecibo Observatory M4N socket joint failure in August 2020 was primarily due to cumulative damage caused by initially low structural design margins and a high percentage of sustained load, resulting in zinc creep deformation, progressive internal socket wire damage, and eventual loss of joint capacity. Open spelter sockets of this type are used throughout industry in stay cables. Recommendations are proposed to prevent failures of similar socket joints, including verification of positive stress margins in socket joint wires for all failure modes, periodic visual inspections with pass/fail criteria for zinc extrusion that are tied to structural qualification, and revisiting codes/ industry standards to capture lessons learned.

Arecibo Observatory↗
NASA NTRS2021

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 19-01-1: Mitigating Risks of Single-Event Effects in Space Applications

Since most Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts are intended for terrestrial applications, they are susceptible to a range of radiation threats in the space environment if the resulting effects are not properly characterized and mitigated. Even specially designed radiation-hardened parts may not be tolerant to all types of radiation effects. Radiation hardness is a multi-dimensional property of any part that describes intrinsic abilities to tolerate various radiation environments [1,2]. Effects to be concerned with include total ionizing dose, total non-ionizing dose, and single-event effects (SEE) – all of which depend on the mission, environment, application, and lifetime. Radiation effects concerns may be the same whether a EEE part is Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS), MIL-SPEC, or some other variant, all of which are susceptible to the same radiation threats [3]. SEE consequences range from recoverable faults to catastrophic failure. Like other random faults, SEE can be mitigated with informed circuit design practices at the device, card, and/or system level.

Single-event effects↗