Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) June 2025
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11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
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Recommendations for a Fundamental Nuclear Material Control (FNMC) Plan for TRISO Fuel Fabrication Facilities Under NRC Regulations
A fundamental nuclear material control (FNMC) plan, which is required for all fuel fabrication facilities that are authorized to possess more than 1 effective kg of special nuclear material, describes how material control and accounting (MC&A) requirements will be met to comply with US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations. Tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fuel fabrication facilities are likely to have issues in meeting MC&A requirements because of the new processes and fuel types their work involves. This report provides recommendations for an FNMC plan specifically for a TRISO fuel fabrication facility under NRC regulations and includes a draft outline of an FNMC plan. This report was produced for the Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program under the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Technologies programs within the US Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
An In Situ Feed Monitoring System for Molten Salt Reactors with Fast Neutron Energy Spectrum Molten Salt Reactor Applications
Molten salt reactors (MSRs) are one of the six promising advanced reactor technologies selected for further research and development by the Generation IV International Forum. More than twenty MSR designs are actively being developed around the world. Several of these designs are liquid-fueled and intended for operation within the fast neutron energy spectrum.1 National regulations will require liquid-fueled MSRs to control and account for nuclear material within licensed facilities. Additionally, states with comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are obligated to declare nuclear material quantities within facilities. In return, the IAEA Department of Safeguards independently verifies these quantities and provides assurance that the nuclear material and facility are being used only for peaceful purposes. One key distinction of liquid-fueled MSRs compared with other types of reactors is that in portions of the facility, the nuclear material is in bulk form rather than discrete items. Traditional nuclear material accounting techniques such as physical item counting and verification of serial numbers on fresh fuel assemblies do not translate directly to all process streams within liquid-fueled reactors. Liquid-fueled MSRs are typically designed with low excess reactivity. This feature provides safety benefits but also means that most MSRs require the addition of makeup fuel salt while a reactor is operational. The nuclear material in the initial fuel salt and in any makeup fuel salt must be quantified. Additionally, distinct nuclear material diversion and reactor misuse scenarios form the basis of the detection methods and monitoring systems developed for liquid-fueled MSRs. For example, the IAEA provides assurance that fuel salt containing nuclear material is not being diverted from the system, that the feed salt matches the reported actinide concentrations and uranium enrichment, and that no additional fertile material is being introduced into the system. Measurement systems currently used for nuclear material control and accounting are not directly applicable to achieving MSR safeguards goals. This paper concerns a system being designed to account for the nuclear material added to liquid-fueled MSRs and monitor for diversion and misuse scenarios related to MSR feed systems.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Technical Basis for Proposed Changes to DOE-STD-1194-2019, Nuclear Material Attractiveness Determination and Categorization
The Department of Energy (DOE)’s Technical Standard DOE-STD-1194-2019 (dated September 2019), Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability, provides key guidance for the determination of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) attractiveness levels. Attractiveness levels are a key component in the security categorization of SNM processed, used, and stored at DOE facilities. Upon review, the writing team identified specific components relating to the determination of attractiveness levels that could be modified to improve clarity, reduce burden on sites, and/or better align with the graded safeguards principle that is central to the DOE’s nuclear security program. The report outlines the original verbiage, issues with implementation of that verbiage, proposed new verbiage, and the expected benefits thus serving as the technical basis for the proposed changes.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
Detector Response and Battery Reliability
The Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) measurements team performs confirmation measurements of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) at different locations around Sandia. The measurement team has access to two High purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors, the AEGIS (Model: AEGIS-BEGE5030), and the ORTEC (Model: trans-SPEC-DX-100). These two can operate purely on battery power, but the response of the detectors while on battery power is not well documented. To enhance our knowledge with these detectors the team wants to investigate the detectors response to changes in battery range, wall charging, and mid operation battery swaps (Hot Swaps).
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
Diversion Path Analysis: A Proposed Methodology to Develop an MC&A Approach for Liquid-Fueled Molten Salt Reactors
Nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) is a critical element of both the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and US Department of Energy (DOE)’s domestic safeguards and security requirements. NRC licensees are required, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 74 to establish and maintain an MC&A program that captures and records the quantities and locations of special nuclear material (SNM) at the facility. Along with physical protection, MC&A is a key element of domestic nuclear material safeguards that enables the NRC to ensure that SNM is controlled and accounted for. SNM, per 10 CFR Part 74, refers to plutonium, 233 U, and uranium enriched in the isotope 233 U or 235 U, but does not include source material. Periodic physical inventories, coupled with material balance evaluations, are effective and demonstrated tools to account for and detect theft or diversion of SNM in facilities containing SNM in bulk material form (i.e., not in discrete, countable items). Historically in the United States, these types of facilities have included fuel fabrication, conversion, and enrichment facilities. In comparison, reactors have relied on item counting of assemblies and control of SNM while in containment (e.g., a sealed reactor pressure vessel) because, to date, reactor fuel has been in item form. In liquid-fueled molten salt reactors (MSRs), unlike traditional light water reactors (LWRs) or bulk facilities, bulk SNM quantities can change significantly during operation as a result of depletion and transmutation. This introduces challenges to the use of traditional periodic physical inventories and material balance evaluations to detect theft or diversion of SNM in reactors that use SNM in bulk material form. Liquid-fueled (i.e., salt-fueled) MSR facilities are MSRs that use SNM within a salt eutectic as the fuel. The SNM is in a bulk material form any time it is outside of fresh or spent fuel storage containers. Some examples of when SNM will be in bulk form in the facility are during addition of fuel to the reactor system, while fuel is circulating in operation, and while fuel is in a drain tank. Periodic physical inventories and material balance evaluations can likely be effectively applied to many portions of an MSR facility, including all areas where depletion and transmutation are not significantly changing the quantities of SNM within the control area. Within an MSR facility, this would include fresh fuel receipt and loading, waste streams that may contain SNM, irradiated fuel storage outside of the reactor core, and any irradiated fuel processing that may happen after SNM has been removed from the reactor. All of these process steps could rely on measurements of SNM quantities compared with documented inventories. Any discrepancies from predicted (i.e., book) inventories and measured inventories could be quantified as inventory differences, consistent with traditional MC&A guidance from the NRC (e.g., in NUREG-1065 Revision 2, NUREG-2159 Revision 1, and RG 5.29 Revision 2). Within the reactor system, additions and removals to the book inventory include depletion of the SNM (e.g., fission of 235 U), which complicates the use of physical inventories. SNM control, however, can also likely be effectively applied to detect theft of SNM throughout a liquid-fueled MSR facility. To complement these approaches, prior technical reports have identified that a diversion path analysis may be a useful, risk-informed, and performance-based tool to determine suitable elements of an MC&A approach for the reactor system within a liquid-fueled MSR facility.
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Study on Application of Distributed Network of Sensors with List Mode for NMAC Literature Review
Nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) for nuclear security detects, deters, and resolves questions related to unauthorized removal (i.e. theft) or misuse of nuclear material. NMAC also serves as a key insider threat mitigation measure and aids in recovery of nuclear material that is missing. Effective nuclear security depends on NMAC for timely and accurate information about nuclear material types, quantities, and locations. Bulk nuclear material processing facilities, however, present unique challenges for effective NMAC due to the presence of large quantities of material in-process and the accumulation of residual material holdup within process equipment. These holdup accumulations can obscure accurate physical inventory taking and complicate efforts to resolve NMAC irregularities at the facility level. Bulk material monitoring systems often rely on material balance calculations and indirect measurement techniques, which may mask protracted theft of smaller amounts of nuclear material. These monitoring limitations have generated increased interest in continuous monitoring technologies, including distributed non-destructive assay (NDA) sensor networks capable of providing real-time or near-real-time measurement of material movement and accumulation within bulk processing environments. Recent advancements in distributed networks of NDA radiation detectors and sensing technologies provide an opportunity to address these limitations. Although such distributed sensor networks have been implemented in select facilities for IAEA Safeguards applications, their potential for supporting NMAC functions specifically tailored to nuclear security objectives remains largely unexplored. Furthermore, emerging list-mode data acquisition technologies have reached high technology readiness levels, enabling time-correlated detection of nuclear events across multiple temporal scales. These capabilities provide enhanced opportunities for accurate holdup measurement, continuous process monitoring, and improved detection of material theft or misuse over time. The increasing global expansion of civil nuclear power and development of related bulk material processing facilities, including those supporting high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) and other advanced reactor fuel fabrication, further increases the need for advanced measurement and monitoring strategies for NMAC.
73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
Delayed Neutron Temporal Signatures for Uranium Enrichment Measurement NA-241 SGTech (Final Report)
Nondestructive determination of uranium enrichment is a core capability for nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) and safeguards verification measurements; however, traditional gamma spectroscopy-based techniques for enrichment measurement rely on significant assumptions of material composition and geometry, precluding their use in scenarios where a heterogeneous spatial distribution of enrichments is encountered. As an alternative, we are developing a technique to use delayed neutron temporal signatures for the measurement of uranium enrichment. Each uranium isotope has unique delayed neutron group yields, resulting in a unique delayed neutron decay time profile which can be analyzed to determine enrichment without the need for calibration sources. As part of this effort, we performed a series of measurement campaigns in which we used an active well coincidence counter (AWCC) retrofitted with commercial D-D and D-T generators to evaluate the operational characteristics of this method in response to a set of uranium enrichment and mass standards, as well as representative diversion scenarios in which either “concealed” enriched uranium is shielded by depleted uranium or declared enriched uranium is “hollowed out” and replaced with a central region of depleted uranium. A standard operating procedure and best practices were compiled to facilitate the use of delayed neutron-based enrichment measurements for international safeguards inspections.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
Control Boundary Analysis for Liquid-Fueled Molten Salt Reactors
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will likely require license applicants for liquid-fueled molten salt reactors (MSRs) with circulating fuel to submit a nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) plan or provide a detailed MC&A program description for the facility. In liquid-fueled MSRs with special nuclear material (SNM) in bulk form (i.e., not in discrete items) and with rapidly changing quantities due to fuel transmutation and depletion, a novel MC&A approach is needed because traditional nuclear material accounting methods with material balance evaluations will not be sufficient. This report details the continued efforts carried out at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) during FY 2025 to develop a distinct MC&A approach suitable specifically for domestic safeguards of the first-of-a-kind MSRs. These efforts are built on previous ORNL efforts reported in ORNL/SPR-2023/3181 and ORNL/SPR-2024/3555.
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Application of Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry in Reprocessing Facilities
During reprocessing operations, accurately determining the elemental concentrations of uranium and plutonium is critical for nuclear security. Reprocessing facilities processes hundreds of tons of nuclear material annually, requiring accurate measurements to ensure effective nuclear material control and accountability. Hybrid K-edge densitometry (HKED) system combines K-edge absorption densitometry with x-ray fluorescence to measure actinide elemental concentrations with a low uncertainty. This system uses high-purity germanium gamma-ray detectors and advanced signal processing equipment to detect x-ray accurately. This document provides guidance on how to achieve effective performance from an HKED system for measuring uranium and plutonium concentrations in reprocessing facilities. It includes best practices for the setup and operation of an HKED system, while highlighting factors influencing uncertainties.
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Quantitative Voltammetry Measurements of High-Concentration Actinides in Molten Chloride Fuel Salts
Molten chloride mixtures containing high concentrations of UCl 3 (i.e., >70 wt%) are candidates for next-generation molten salt reactor (MSR) fuel salts that enable new plant optimization and fuel cycle strategies. MSR licensing, however, is contingent on the development of effective material control and accounting (MC&A) practices for these salts. To close this gap, we have developed an electroanalytical approach that enables accurate in situ measurements of uranium concentrations in these highly loaded fuel salts. This methodology uses a multielectrode array voltammetry sensor combined with digital simulations that account for non-idealities such as uncompensated resistance effects. The theory-based numerical simulations of voltammetry responses yielded correction factors that are agnostic of electrochemical cell geometry and produced consistent voltammetry peak current results when correcting for varying amounts of ohmic resistance. In doing so, we have demonstrated accurate concentration measurements for UCl 3 in LiCl-KCl-UCl 3 across a range of mass fractions between 55 and 72.3 wt% at 550 °C.
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Gamma and Neutron Measurement and Modeling of Irradiated TRISO Fuel
Given the unique characteristics of the PBR fuel cycle, both gamma and neutron measurements are expected to play important roles in performing and maintaining nuclear material control and accounting for spent pebbles to safeguard the fuel cycle. Given the lack of irradiated pebbles in the US, a variety of irradiated TRISO fuel samples with wide ranges of burnups and cooling times available at ORNL were used in this work. A large number of gamma and neutron measurements have been performed on these samples to collect data to test the various detectors and to benchmark the computer models to simulate the depletion and decay of the fuel and the measurements themselves. Two neutron detectors, including a custom-made detector and the Very High-Performance Neutron Multiplicity Counting, were used to measure the neutrons emitted by these TRISO samples. Three gamma spectrometry detectors, including an HPGe and the M400 CZT detector, were used to measure gamma-ray emissions from these samples. The M400 was recently adopted by the IAEA for fresh uranium measurements, but it was tested for spent fuel measurements prior to this project. Detailed MCNP models were developed to simulate these neutron and gamma measurements. Some GADRAS models were also developed to cross check the MCNP models for the gamma measurements. It was found challenging to perform neutron measurements in the hot cell due to the high background counts. Close agreements were observed between the simulated and measured neutron count rates in both detectors’ measurements of californium calibration sources. Both the HPGe and M400 detectors were able to measure the 604 and 662 keV peaks from these samples, which are the two most important peaks used to infer fuel burnup. Although the M400 detector did not have nearly good energy resolution and did not detect some of the minor peaks as the HPGe detector, it was found to be capable of handling significantly higher dose rates than HPGe. Given the complexities in the TRISO samples (e.g., different samples sizes) and uncertainties in the alignments between the detector and the TRISO fuel inside the containers, large scatters were found between the peak area rates and the samples’ burnups. However, the 604/662 peak ratios were found to trend well with the samples’ burnups among most samples in both measured and simulated results.
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Conceptual design study of neutron detectors for safeguards measurement of an irradiated pebble
Nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) of pebble-bed reactors (PBRs) is challenging because a PBR utilizes hundreds of thousands of identical, unmarked pebbles that are continuously recirculated through the core. To develop tools that enable the implementation of international safeguards, especially in the context of MC&A of spent pebbles, we designed and simulated three neutron detection concepts to determine fissile content in individual pebbles: a differential die-away (DDA) detector, a californium interrogation prompt neutron (CIPN) detector, and a passive neutron albedo reactivity (PNAR) detector using Monte Carlo calculations. Burnup calculations were performed on the spent pebbles from the PBMR-400 classic PBR. The varying neutron and gamma source terms, and isotopic compositions in the spent pebbles calculated at various burnup levels were used in the neutron detector models. DDA was found to be sensitive to the number of passes a pebble has had through the core and to the fissile content contained in a spent pebble. Optimization in the DDA design further increased the neutron count rates and thus reduced counting uncertainty. Meanwhile, passive neutron counting using the same detector body could distinguish pebbles with different numbers of passes, but its response was dominated by neutron-emitting actinides and was not sensitive to fissile content. On the other hand, the PNAR technique was not viable for a single pebble but performed reasonably for a 27-pebble array, which suggested potential use for verification measurements of containers filled with 27 or more spent pebbles.
CIPN↗
Introduction to LANMAS and LAMCAS, Course #50061 [Slides]
This course is designed to offer a detailed introduction to the LAMCAS program, and the software tools used to support the Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (NMC&A) mission. The course covers the importance of NMC&A in LANL's operations, as well as its significance on a national and global scale. Completion of this course is required before an employee can access the inquiry features of the LAMCAS software.
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security 2024 Program Roadmap
The Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program was established to provide research support addressing near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accounting (MC&A), Physical Protection System (PPS), and Cybersecurity requirements for U.S. construction. The technical work in the program is meant to (1) support nuclear reactor vendors with advanced MC&A, PPS, and Cybersecurity designs for next generation reactors, (2) provide technical bases for the regulator, and (3) promote the integration of Safeguards and Security by Design early in the design process. Existing domestic regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and rule-making efforts are underway to develop regulations more suited to different reactor designs. The ARSS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARSS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Initial Testing of a Small Gamma Detector (GR1+) for Detection of Holdup in HEPA Filters
Measuring and assessing holdup is a key component of proper inventorying of a Material Balance Area (MBA). The Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (NMC&A) group at the Savannah River Site is responsible for ensuring that the methods used to determine holdup in the MBAs are valid for the conditions of that MBA. Holdup can be contained inside processing equipment or inside ventilation systems that that pulls air out of the glovebox through HEPA filters and stainless steel piping.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
Flow Enhanced Electrochemical Sensor Performance in Complex Salt Systems
To advance MSR MC&A practices, Argonne National Laboratory developed and optimized robust flow enhanced electrochemical sensors (FEES) and multielectrode array voltammetry sensors (MAVS) which provide accurate near-real time measurements of actinides in molten salts. Flow-enhanced electrochemical sensors are installed directly into MSR flow conduits for inline salt chemistry measurement, while MAVS are deployed in quiescent salt conditions enabling online species concentration determination in stationary salt vessels. This report summarizes efforts to improve electrochemical sensor technological readiness through (1) sensor testing in complex, high concentration molten salt systems to demonstrate low uncertainty actinide measurements in MSR-representative solutions and (2) demonstrations of sensor performance in challenging real-world conditions in collaboration with partner MSR institutions.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Measurement of AmLi Sources for Active Well Coincidence Counter
To support the use of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) large-volume active well coincidence counter (LV-AWCC) in material control and accountancy (MC&A) measurements, a set of AmLi neutron sources was acquired from Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). These sources were measured to verify their suitability for use in the ORNL LV-AWCC. The sources produce neutrons at a rate that is within 4% of the rate for one set of AmLi sources already in use and 40% higher than the rate for the other set. These measurements indicate that the SRNL sources are suitable for use in the LV-AWCC because their sensitivity and measurement precision will be similar to those of the sets already in use. However, the SRNL sources still need to be evaluated for MC&A use.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗