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NASA NTRS2014

Toughened Thermal Blanket for MMOD Protection

Thermal blankets are used extensively on spacecraft to provide passive thermal control of spacecraft hardware from thermal extremes encountered in space. Toughened thermal blankets have been developed that greatly improve protection from hypervelocity micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts. These blankets can be outfitted if so desired with a reliable means to determine the location, depth and extent of MMOD impact damage by incorporating an impact sensitive piezoelectric film. Improved MMOD protection of thermal blankets was obtained by adding selective materials at various locations within the thermal blanket. As given in Figure 1, three types of materials were added to the thermal blanket to enhance its MMOD performance: (1) disrupter layers, near the outside of the blanket to improve breakup of the projectile, (2) standoff layers, in the middle of the blanket to provide an area or gap that the broken-up projectile can expand, and (3) stopper layers, near the back of the blanket where the projectile debris is captured and stopped. The best suited materials for these different layers vary. Density and thickness is important for the disrupter layer (higher densities generally result in better projectile breakup), whereas a highstrength to weight ratio is useful for the stopper layer, to improve the slowing and capture of debris particles.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Heat-Cleaned Nextel in MMOD Shielding

Meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) shielding can include NextelTM ceramic cloth in the outer layers of the shielding to enhance MMOD breakup. The Nextel fabric can contain size (or sizing) which aids in manufacture of the fabric. Sizing is a starch, oil or waxy material that is added to the rovings and yarns to protect the fibers from being cut or broken during the fabric manufacturing process and by later handling. For spacecraft applications, sizing is removed by heat-cleaning to reduce/eliminate off-gassing during vacuum operations. After the sizing is removed, the fibers in the woven fabric are prone to breakage during handling which reduces fabric strength. Because heat-cleaned Nextel tends to shed fibers that can be irritating to workers, the usual practice for hypervelocity impact tests is to use Nextel with sizing. The reduced strength of heat-cleaned Nextel does not typically effect the performance of MMOD shields with Nextel used in outer layers of the shield, because the density and areal density of the ceramic fibers in the fabric control MMOD breakup (not fabric strength). This paper provides data demonstrating that hypervelocity impact protection performance is not adversely altered for shields containing heat-cleaned Nextel compared to Nextel with sizing.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗

NASA NTRS2007

STS-114 Micrometeoroid/Orbital Debris (MMOD) Post-Flight Assessment

NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel assisted Kennedy Space Center (KSC) inspection teams in the identification of 41 micrometeoroid/orbital debris (MMOD) impact sites on the OV-103 vehicle (Discovery) during STS-114 postflight inspections. There were 14 MMOD impacts reported on the crew module windows (Figure 1). The largest impact feature, a 6.6 mm x 5.8 mm crater on window #4, was caused by a particle with an estimated diameter of 0.22 mm (Figure 2). This impact was among the largest ever recorded on a crew module window. The window was removed and replaced. Scanning Electron Microscope/Energy Dispersive X-ray (SEM/EDX) analysis of dental mold samples from the impact site to determine particle origin was inconclusive, possibly due to contamination picked up on the ferry flight from Edwards Air Force Base to KSC. The radiators on the inside of the payload bay doors sustained 19 impacts (Figure 3) with one of the impacts causing a face sheet perforation. The 0.61 mm diameter hole was produced by a particle with an estimated diameter of 0.4 mm, which approaches the 0.5-mm critical particle diameter of the wing leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) panel high-temperature regions (Zone 3, Figure 4) that was established during Return to Flight testing of the RCC panels. An inspection of the payload bay door exterior insulation (FRSI) revealed a 5.8 mm x 4.5 mm defect that was caused by an MMOD particle with unknown composition, as the sample obtained was contaminated. Figure 5 provides a summary of the exterior surface survey that was conducted following the STS-114 mission. Two windows were removed and replaced due to hypervelocity impact. Nineteen impacts were recorded on the payload bay door radiators, with one face sheet penetration. Three impact sites were identified on the FRSI. There were four hypervelocity impact sites detected on the wing leading edge RCC panels. One impact was detected on the top cover of the TPS sample box (TSB) payload that was mounted on a carrier in the aft portion of the payload bay.

Hyde, J.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Space Shuttle MMOD Threat Mitigation Techniques

Prior to each shuttle mission, threat assessments are performed to determine the risk of critical penetration, payload bay door radiator tube leak and crew module window replacement from Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD). Mission parameters, such as vehicle attitude, exposure time and altitude are used as inputs for the analysis. Ballistic limit equations, based on hypervelocity impact testing of shuttle materials are used to estimate the critical particle diameters of the outer surfaces of the vehicle. The assessments are performed using the BUMPER computer code at the NASA/JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology Facility (HITF). The most critical involves the calculation of Loss of Crew and Vehicle (LOCV) risk. In recent years, NASA has implemented several techniques to reduce the risk to the Shuttle from MMOD impacts. This paper will describe on-orbit inspection of the reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) regions and the methods used discern hypervelocity impact damage. Impact damage contingency plans and on-orbit repair techniques will also be discussed. The wing leading edge impact detection system (WLEIDS) and it's role in the reduction of on-orbit risk reduction will be presented. Finally, an analysis of the effectivity of alternative shuttle flight attitudes on MMOD risk will be demonstrated.

Hyde, Justin L.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Investigation of MMOD Impact on STS-115 Shuttle Payload Bay Door Radiator

The Orbiter radiator system consists of eight individual 4.6 m x 3.2 m panels located with four on each payload bay door. Forward panels #1 and #2 are 2.3 cm thick while the aft panels #3 and #4 have a smaller overall thickness of 1.3 cm. The honeycomb radiator panels consist of 0.028 cm thick Aluminum 2024-T81 facesheets and Al5056-H39 cores. The face-sheets are topped with 0.005 in. (0.127 mm) silver-Teflon tape. The radiators are located on the inside of the shuttle payload bay doors, which are closed during ascent and reentry, limiting damage to the on-orbit portion of the mission. Post-flight inspections at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) following the STS-115 mission revealed a large micrometeoroid/orbital debris (MMOD) impact near the hinge line on the #4 starboard payload bay door radiator panel. The features of this impact make it the largest ever recorded on an orbiter payload bay door radiator. The general location of the damage site and the adjacent radiator panels can be seen in Figure 2. Initial measurements of the defect indicated that the hole in the facesheet was 0.108 in. (2.74 mm) in diameter. Figure 3 shows an image of the front side damage. Subsequent observations revealed exit damage on the rear facesheet. Impact damage features on the rear facesheet included a 0.03 in. diameter hole (0.76 mm), a approx.0.05 in. tall bulge (approx.1.3 mm), and a larger approx.0.2 in. tall bulge (approx.5.1 mm) that exhibited a crack over 0.27 in. (6.8 mm) long. A large approx.1 in. (25 mm) diameter region of the honeycomb core was also damaged. Refer to Figure 4 for an image of the backside damage to the panel. No damage was found on thermal blankets or payload bay door structure under the radiator panel. Figure 5 shows the front facesheet with the thermal tape removed. Ultrasound examination indicated a maximum facesheet debond extent of approximately 1 in. (25 mm) from the entry hole. X-ray examinations revealed damage to an estimated 31 honeycomb cells with an extent of 0.85 in. x 1.1 in. (21.6 x 27.9 mm). Pieces of the radiator at and surrounding the impact site were recovered during the repair procedures at KSC. They included the thermal tape, front facesheet, honeycomb core, and rear facesheet. These articles were examined at JSC using a scanning electron microscope (SEM) with an energy dispersive x-ray spectrometer (EDS). Figure 6 shows SEM images of the entry hole in the facesheet. The asymmetric height of the lip may be attributed to projectile shape and impact angle. Numerous instances of a glass-fiber organic matrix composite were observed in the facesheet tape sample. The fibers were approximately 10 micrometers in diameter and variable lengths. EDS analysis indicated a composition of Mg, Ca, Al, Si, and O. Figures 7 and 8 present images of the fiber bundles, which were believed to be circuit board material based on similarity in fiber diameter, orientation, consistency, and composition. A test program was initiated in an attempt to simulate the observed damage to the radiator facesheet and honeycomb. Twelve test shots were performed using projectiles cut from a 1.6 mm thick fiberglass circuit board substrate panel. Results from test HITF07017, shown in figures 9 and 10, correlates with the observed impact features reasonably well. The test was performed at 4.14 km/sec with an impact angle of 45 degrees using a cylindrical projectile with a diameter and length of 1.25 mm. The fiberglass circuit board material had a density of 1.65 g/cu cm, giving a projectile mass of 2.53 mg. An analysis was performed using the Bumper code to estimate the probability of impact to the shuttle from a 1.25 mm diameter particle. Table 1 shows a 1.6% chance (impact odds = 1 in 62) of a 1.25 mm or larger MMOD impact on the radiators of the vehicle during a typical ISS mission. There is a 0.4% chance (impact odds = 1 in 260) that a 1.25 mm or larger MMOD particle would impact the RCC wing leading edge and nose cap during a typical miion. Figure 11 illustrates the vulnerable areas of the wing leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC), an area of the vehicle that is very sensitive to impact damage. The highlighted red, orange, yellow, and light green areas would be expected to experience critical damage if impacted by an OD particle such as the one that hit the RH4 radiator panel on STS-115.

Hyde, J.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Orion Spacecraft MMOD Protection Design and Assessment

The Orion spacecraft will replace the Space Shuttle Orbiter for American and international partner access to the International Space Station by 2015 and, afterwards, for access to the moon for initial sorties and later for extend outpost visits as part of the Constellation Exploration Initiative. This work describes some of the efforts being undertaken to ensure that Orion design will meet or exceed the stringent MicroMeteoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) requirements set out by NASA when exposed to the environments encountered with these missions. This paper will provide a brief overview of the approaches being used to provide MMOD protection to the Orion vehicle and to assess the spacecraft for compliance to the Constellation Program s MMOD requirements.

Bohl, William↗

NASA NTRS2009

Recent Shuttle Post Flight MMOD Inspection Highlights

Post flight inspections on the Space Shuttle Atlantis conducted after the STS-11.5 mission revealed a 0.11 inch (2.8 mm) hole in the outer face sheet of the starboard payload bay door radiator panel #4. The payload bay door radiators in this region are 0.5 inch (12.7 mm) thick aluminum honeycomb with 0.011 in (0.279 mm) thick aluminum face sheets topped with 0.005 in (0.127 mm) silver-Teflon tape. Inner face sheet damage included a 0.267 in (6.78 mm) long through crack with measureable deformation in the area of 0.2 in (5.1 mm). There was also a 0.031 in (0.787 nun) diameter hole in the rear face sheet. A large approximately l in (25 mm) diameter region of honeycomb was also destroyed. Since the radiators are located on the inside of the shuttle payload bay doors which are closed during ascent and reentry, the damage could only have occurred during the on-orbit portion of the mission. During the August 2007 STS-118 mission to the International Space Station, a micro-meteoroid or orbital debris (MMOD) particle impacted and completely penetrated one of shuttle Endeavour's radiator panels and the underlying thermal control system (TCS) blanket, leaving deposits on (but no damage to) the payload bay door. While it is not unusual for shuttle orbiters to be impacted by small MMOD particles, the damage from this impact is larger than any previously seen on the shuttle radiator panels. One of the largest impacts ever observed on a crew module window occurred during the November 2008 STS-126 mission to the International Space Station. Damage to the window was documented by the crew on orbit. Post flight inspection revealed a 0.4 in (10.8 mm) crater in the window pane, with a depth of 0.03 in (0.76 mm). The window pane was replaced due to the damage caused by this impact. Analysis performed on residue contained in dental mold impressions taken of the site indicated that a meteoroid particle produced this large damage site. The post flight inspection after the subsequent mission, STS-119 in March of 2009, produced a large MMOD impact feature in a wing leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon panel. The crater measured 0.18 in (4.5 nun) in diameter and was nearly 0.037 in (0.93 nun) deep. The thickness of the silicon carbide coating that protects the carbon substrate is nominally 0.02 in (0.5 nun) to 0.04 in (1 mm), making this a significant impact into the RCC. The damage occurred on the upper surface of the panel, which experiences lower heat loads on re-entry. This poster will document the data collected from the impact sites and will include results of the Scanning Electron Microscope/Energy Dispersive X-ray (SEM/EDX) analysis. Evidence will be presented that suggests a source of the impacts.

Hyed, James L.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Orion Spacecraft MMOD Protection Design and Assessment

The Orion spacecraft will replace the Space Shuttle Orbiter for American and international partner access to the International Space Station by 2015 and, afterwards, for access to the moon for initial sorties and later for extended outpost visits as part of the Constellation Exploration Initiative. This work describes some of the efforts being undertaken to ensure that the Constellation Program, Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle design will meet or exceed the stringent micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) requirements set out by NASA when exposed to the environments encountered with these missions. This paper will provide a brief overview of the approaches being used to provide MMOD protection to the Orion vehicle and to assess the spacecraft for compliance to the Constellation Program s MMOD requirements.

Bohl, W.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Exploration of COTS Ultrasonic NDE Methods for ISS MMOD Impact Analysis

The high orbital speed of the International Space Station (ISS) has created a concern about Micro-Meteorite and Orbital Debris (MMOD). The possibility exists that such an impact could cause significant damage to the ISS pressure wall, and possibly lead to a pressure leak. This paper explores the potential of using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) Ultrasonic Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) techniques in order to inspect and analyze MMOD impact damage if such an event would happen to occur. Different types of intra vehicular activity (IVA) Ultrasonic NDE equipment were evaluated, including the Olympus Omniscan MX and the General Electric Phasor XS. The equipment was tested by inspecting various aluminum standards and impact damage test plates in order to determine technological limitations of the equipment as well as the ease of use and availability of features. This study allowed for the design of scanning procedures in order to evaluate the extent of damage caused by an MMOD impact. Lastly, comparisons were drawn between the different pieces of COTS software and a recommendation is made based on each device s capability.

Violette, Daniel P.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Shield Ballistic Limit Analysis Program

This software implements penetration limit equations for common micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) shield configurations, windows, and thermal protection systems. Allowable MMOD risk is formulated in terms of the probability of penetration (PNP) of the spacecraft pressure hull. For calculating the risk, spacecraft geometry models, mission profiles, debris environment models, and penetration limit equations for installed shielding configurations are required. Risk assessment software such as NASA's BUMPERII is used to calculate mission PNP; however, they are unsuitable for use in shield design and preliminary analysis studies. The software defines a single equation for the design and performance evaluation of common MMOD shielding configurations, windows, and thermal protection systems, along with a description of their validity range and guidelines for their application. Recommendations are based on preliminary reviews of fundamental assumptions, and accuracy in predicting experimental impact test results. The software is programmed in Visual Basic for Applications for installation as a simple add-in for Microsoft Excel. The user is directed to a graphical user interface (GUI) that requires user inputs and provides solutions directly in Microsoft Excel workbooks.

Ryan, Shannon↗

NASA NTRS2015

Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Assessment

The Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) Project requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) conduct an independent evaluation of the Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) models used in the latest JPSS MMOD risk assessment. The principal focus of the assessment was to compare Orbital Debris Engineering Model version 3 (ORDEM 3.0) with the Meteoroid and Space Debris Terrestrial Environment Reference version 2009 (MASTER-2009) and Aerospace Debris Environment Projection Tool (ADEPT) and provide recommendations to the JPSS Project regarding MMOD protection. The outcome of the NESC assessment is contained in this report.

Squire, Michael D.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Surveys of ISS Returned Hardware for MMOD Impacts

Since February 2001, the Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group at the Johnson Space Center in Houston has performed 26 post-flight inspections on space exposed hardware that have been returned from the International Space Station. Data on 1,024 observations of MMOD damage have been collected from these inspections. Survey documentation typically includes impact feature location and size measurements as well as microscopic photography (25-200x). Sampling of impacts sites for projectile residue was performed for the largest features. Results of Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) analysis to discern impactor source is included in the database. This paper will summarize the post-flight MMOD inspections, and focus on two inspections in particular: (1) Pressurized Mating Adapter-2 (PMA-2) cover returned in 2015 after 1.6 years exposure with 26 observed damages, and (2) Airlock shield panels returned in 2010 after 8.7 years exposure with 58 MMOD damages. Feature sizes from the observed data are compared to predictions using the Bumper risk assessment code.

Hyde, James↗

NASA NTRS2017

Estimating Consequences of MMOD Penetrations on ISS

The threat from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts on space vehicles is often quantified in terms of the probability of no penetration (PNP). However, for large spacecraft, especially those with multiple compartments, a penetration may have a number of possible outcomes. The extent of the damage (diameter of hole, crack length or penetration depth), the location of the damage relative to critical equipment or crew, crew response, and even the time of day of the penetration are among the many factors that can affect the outcome. For the International Space Station (ISS), a Monte-Carlo style software code called Manned Spacecraft Crew Survivability (MSCSurv) is used to predict the probability of several outcomes of an MMOD penetration-broadly classified as loss of crew (LOC), crew evacuation (Evac), loss of escape vehicle (LEV), and nominal end of mission (NEOM). By generating large numbers of MMOD impacts (typically in the billions) and tracking the consequences, MSCSurv allows for the inclusion of a large number of parameters and models as well as enabling the consideration of uncertainties in the models and parameters. MSCSurv builds upon the results from NASA's Bumper software (which provides the probability of penetration and critical input data to MSCSurv) to allow analysts to estimate the probability of LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM. This paper briefly describes the overall methodology used by NASA to quantify LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM with particular emphasis on describing in broad terms how MSCSurv works and its capabilities and most significant models.

Evans, H.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Predicting the Consequences of MMOD Penetrations on the International Space Station

Hyde, James↗

NASA NTRS2018

3D Printed Structural Core with MMOD Protection

Deep space exploration requires large habitats for both orbital and surface missions. The weight of a habitat is driven largely by its structure and future vehicles require lighter weight structures to minimize launch mass and cost. Unlike honeycomb core materials used in the past, a 3D printed core can be analyzed and optimized for specific load environments, further cutting down mass of the vehicle. Multi-functional structures can integrate features into the primary structure that are traditionally added mass. MMOD (Micro Meteor and Orbital Debris) protection, for example, can be integrated directly into the primary structure of a habitat. This minimizes the mass of the structure and eliminates the need for additional MMOD layers and attachment hardware. This project seeks to develop 3D printed structural core that can be optimized for flights loads and provide integrated MMOD protection.

Hagen, Richard↗

NASA NTRS2019

Consequences of MMOD Penetrations on the International Space Station

Risk from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts on space vehicles is often quantified in terms of the probability of no penetration (PNP). However, for large spacecraft, especially those with multiple compartments, a penetration may have a number of possible outcomes. The extent of the damage (diameter of hole, crack length or penetration depth), the location of the damage relative to critical equipment or crew, crew response, and even the time of day of the penetration are among the many factors that can affect the outcome. For the International Space Station (ISS), a Monte-Carlo style software code called Manned Spacecraft Crew Survivability (MSCSurv) is used to predict the probability of several outcomes of an MMOD penetration—broadly classified as loss of crew (LOC), crew evacuation (Evac), loss of escape vehicle (LEV), and nominal end of mission (NEOM). By generating large numbers of MMOD impacts (typically in the billions) and tracking the consequences, MSCSurv allows for the inclusion of a large number of parameters and models as well as enabling the consideration of uncertainties in the models and parameters. MSCSurv builds upon the results from NASA’s Bumper software (which provides the probability of penetration and critical input data to MSCSurv) to allow analysts to estimate the probability of LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM. This paper provides an overview of the methodology used by NASA to quantify LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM with particular emphasis on describing in broad terms how MSCSurv works and its capabilities and most significant models.

Evans, Hilary J.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Landsat 9 Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Mission Success Approach

Landsat 9* (L9) is the successor mission to Landsat 8 (L8) previously known as Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM). Both missions are large unmanned remote sensing satellites operating in sunsynchronous polar orbits. As opposed to L8/LDCM, systems engineers for L9 incorporated Micrometeoroid/Orbital Debris (MMOD) protection for small object collisions as part of the L9’s mission success criteria. In other words, the NASA Process for Limiting Orbital Debris (NASA-STD-8719.14A) only calls for analyses of the protection of disposal-critical hardware, but L9 opted to also assess and provide small particle penetration protections for all observatory components including instruments that are not part of the spacecraft components needed for controlled reentry. Systems engineers at Goddard developed a design process to protect against MMOD during the life of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) observatories, and in particular the Landsat 9 Mission. Simply stated, this design process enhanced the effectiveness of existing Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI) to provide the needed protection. The end goal of the design process was to establish a necessary blanket areal density for a given electronics box or instrument wall thickness and a separation between the outer MLI blanket and the structure underneath. The trade space was presented as a set of design curves for different combinations of blanket density, box wall thickness, and separation distance between MLI and structure. An advantage of this process was that it is largely independent of MMOD flux data on a surface-by surface basis. Ultimately, cost savings should result from incorporating small object penetration protection early in the design cycle, rather than adding spot shielding blankets later as needed to meet an overall penetration risk standard (the more traditional approach). The approach and implementation to the L9 Observatory design will be addressed in this paper. *L9 is a joint mission being formulated, implemented, and operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of the Interior’s (DOI) United States Geological Survey (USGS).

Approach↗

NASA NTRS2019

A Proposal for Standardized MMOD Shielding for Robotic Spacecraft

NASA robotic spacecraft are required to assess the potential for small debris induced failure for all disposal-critical components. Additional shielding might then be necessary in order to meet the acceptable risk requirement for the overall mission. Traditionally this requirement had been met with little or no additional shielding. Since the introduction of a high density debris population in ORDEM 3.0, some missions, especially those in higher portions of Low Earth Orbit, have needed additional MMOD-specific shielding in order for the mission to meet the requirement. This is a costly design effort when performed late in the project life cycle, which adds unexpected mass to the spacecraft components during the integration phase, and could disrupt thermal management.A proposal is discussed to develop a more cost-effective approach to MMOD-shielding, which can be employed earlier in the hardware design phase. The development and adoption of standardized shielding assemblies allows early tailoring of the shielding around a component, so that the mass is accounted for, as well as the small particle penetration risk, at a point in the design phase when the cost and schedule impact are more manageable. A set of several assemblies can be developed with a range of protection thresholds, in order to control mass where less shielding is needed. Such shielding assemblies would be developed in collaboration with blanket assembly specialists and thermal control engineers to ensure manufacturability and thermal performance challenges are known and acceptable. One clear benefit of such an approach is that hypervelocity testing can be performed on each of the standard shield assemblies to refine and confirm their performance prior to use.The challenges inherent in designing supplemental MMOD shielding will be discussed, including variations in the orbital debris environment and performance prediction. The benefits of a standardized shielding approach and example applications will also be presented.

Hull, Scott M.↗