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Uranium Metal Reaction Behavior in Water, Sludge, and Grout Matrices

This report summarizes information and data on the reaction behavior of uranium metal in water, in water-saturated simulated and genuine K Basin sludge, and in grout matrices. This information and data are used to establish the technical basis for metallic uranium reaction behavior for the K Basin Sludge Treatment Project (STP). The specific objective of this report is to consolidate the various sources of information into a concise document to serve as a high-level reference and road map for customers, regulators, and interested parties outside the STP (e.g., external reviewers, other DOE sites) to clearly understand the current basis for the corrosion of uranium metal in water, sludge, and grout.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

SLUDGE TREATMENT PROJECT KOP DISPOSITION - THERMAL AND GAS ANALYSIS FOR THE COLD VACUUM DRYING FACILITY

The purpose of this document is to present conceptual design phase thermal process calculations that support the process design and process safety basis for the cold vacuum drying of K Basin KOP material. This document is intended to demonstrate that the conceptual approach: (1) Represents a workable process design that is suitable for development in preliminary design; and (2) Will support formal safety documentation to be prepared during the definitive design phase to establish an acceptable safety basis. The Sludge Treatment Project (STP) is responsible for the disposition of Knock Out Pot (KOP) sludge within the 105-K West (KW) Basin. KOP sludge consists of size segregated material (primarily canister particulate) from the fuel and scrap cleaning process used in the Spent Nuclear Fuel process at K Basin. The KOP sludge will be pre-treated to remove fines and some of the constituents containing chemically bound water, after which it is referred to as KOP material. The KOP material will then be loaded into a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO), dried at the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) and stored in the Canister Storage Building (CSB). This process is patterned after the successful drying of 2100 metric tons of spent fuel, and uses the same facilities and much of the same equipment that was used for drying fuel and scrap. Table ES-l present similarities and differences between KOP material and fuel and between MCOs loaded with these materials. The potential content of bound water bearing constituents limits the mass ofKOP material in an MCO load to a fraction of that in an MCO containing fuel and scrap; however, the small particle size of the KOP material causes the surface area to be significantly higher. This relatively large reactive surface area represents an input to the KOP thermal calculations that is significantly different from the calculations for fuel MCOs. The conceptual design provides for a copper insert block that limits the volume available to receive KOP material, enhances heat conduction, and functions as a heat source and sink during drying operations. This use of the copper insert represents a significant change to the thermal model compared to that used for the fuel calculations. A number of cases were run representing a spectrum of normal and upset conditions for the drying process. Dozens of cases have been run on cold vacuum drying of fuel MCOs. Analysis of these previous calculations identified four cases that provide a solid basis for judgments on the behavior of MCO in drying operations. These four cases are: (1) Normal Process; (2) Degraded vacuum pumping; (3) Open MCO with loss of annulus water; and (4) Cool down after vacuum drying. The four cases were run for two sets of input parameters for KOP MCOs: (1) a set of parameters drawn from safety basis values from the technical data book and (2) a sensitivity set using parameters selected to evaluate the impact of lower void volume and smaller particle size on MCO behavior. Results of the calculations for the drying phase cases are shown in Table ES-2. Cases using data book safety basis values showed dry out in 9.7 hours and heat rejection sufficient to hold temperature rise to less than 25 C. Sensitivity cases which included unrealistically small particle sizes and corresponding high reactive surface area showed higher temperature increases that were limited by water consumption. In this document and in the attachment (Apthorpe, R. and M.G. Plys, 2010) cases using Technical Databook safety basis values are referred to as nominal cases. In future calculations such cases will be called safety basis cases. Also in these documents cases using parameters that are less favorable to acceptable performance than databook safety values are referred to as safety cases. In future calculations such cases will be called sensitivity cases or sensitivity evaluations Calculations to be performed in support of the detailed design and formal safety basis documentation will expand the calculations presented in this document to include: additional features of the drying cycle, more realistic treatment of uranium metal consumption during oxidation, larger water inventory, longer time scales, and graphing of results of hydrogen gas concentration.

08 HYDROGEN↗

The Disruption of Vessel-Spanning Bubbles with Sloped Fins in Flat-Bottom and 2:1 Elliptical-Bottom Vessels

Radioactive sludge was generated in the K-East Basin and K-West Basin fuel storage pools at the Hanford Site while irradiated uranium metal fuel elements from the N Reactor were being stored and packaged. The fuel has been removed from the K Basins, and currently, the sludge resides in the KW Basin in large underwater Engineered Containers. The first phase to the Sludge Treatment Project being led by CH2MHILL Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) is to retrieve and load the sludge into sludge transport and storage containers (STSCs) and transport the sludge to T Plant for interim storage. The STSCs will be stored inside T Plant cells that are equipped with secondary containment and leak-detection systems. The sludge is composed of a variety of particulate materials and water, including a fraction of reactive uranium metal particles that are a source of hydrogen gas. If a situation occurs where the reactive uranium metal particles settle out at the bottom of a container, previous studies have shown that a vessel-spanning gas layer above the uranium metal particles can develop and can push the overlying layer of sludge upward. The major concern, in addition to the general concern associated with the retention and release of a flammable gas such as hydrogen, is that if a vessel-spanning bubble (VSB) forms in an STSC, it may drive the overlying sludge material to the vents at the top of the container. Then it may be released from the container into the cell’s secondary containment system at T Plant. A previous study demonstrated that sloped walls on vessels, both cylindrical coned-shaped vessels and rectangular vessels with rounded ends, provided an effective approach for disrupting a VSB by creating a release path for gas as a VSB began to rise. Based on the success of sloped-wall vessels, a similar concept is investigated here where a sloped fin is placed inside the vessel to create a release path for gas. A key potential advantage of using a sloped fin compared to a vessel with a sloped wall is that a small fin decreases the volume of a vessel available for sludge storage by a very small fraction compared to a cone-shaped vessel. The purpose of this study is to quantify the capability of sloped fins to disrupt VSBs and to conduct sufficient tests to estimate the performance of fins in full-scale STSCs. Experiments were conducted with a range of fin shapes to determine what slope and width were sufficient to disrupt VSBs. Additional tests were conducted to demonstrate how the fin performance scales with the sludge layer thickness and the sludge strength, density, and vessel diameter based on the gravity yield parameter, which is a dimensionless ratio of the force necessary to yield the sludge to its weight.( ) Further experiments evaluated the difference between vessels with flat and 2:1 elliptical bottoms and a number of different simulants, including the KW container sludge simulant (complete), which was developed to match actual K-Basin sludge. Testing was conducted in 5-in., 10-in., and 23-in.-diameter vessels to quantify how fin performance is impacted by the size of the test vessel. The most significant results for these scale-up tests are the trend in how behavior changes with vessel size and the results from the 23-in. vessel. The key objective in evaluating fin performance is to determine the conditions that minimize the volume of a VSB when disruption occurs because this reduces the potential for material inside the STSC from being released through vents.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Radioactive waste immobilization of Hanford sludge in magnesium potassium phosphate ceramic forms

Here, this paper evaluates immobilization of Hanford K-Basin tank sludge in magnesium potassium phosphate ceramic forms. The waste forms were produced using two simulated non-radioactive sludge streams, each with distinct characteristics and composition. Ceramicrete with wollastonite as filler was used as the matrix for this purpose. The resulting waste forms were tested for their mechanical properties, radiation stability, and leaching resistance. In another series of tests, the samples were vitrified in borosilicate glass and glass waste forms were produced. The Product Consistency Test, the American Nuclear Society's ANS 16.1 test, and the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure, which are used to develop waste acceptance criteria in the United States for permanent storage of treated waste, were used for evaluation of the leaching resistance of all waste forms.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Warm Water Oxidation Verification – Scoping and Stirred Reactor Tests

Scoping tests to evaluate the effects of agitation and pH adjustment on simulant sludge agglomeration and uranium metal oxidation at ~95°C were performed under Test Instructions(a,b) and as per sections 5.1 and 5.2 of this Test Plan prepared by AREVA. (c) The thermal testing occurred during the week of October 4-9, 2010. The results are reported here. For this testing, two uranium-containing simulant sludge types were evaluated: (1) a full uranium-containing K West (KW) container sludge simulant consisting of nine predominant sludge components; (2) a 50:50 uranium-mole basis mixture of uraninite [U(IV)] and metaschoepite [U(VI)]. This scoping study was conducted in support of the Sludge Treatment Project (STP) Phase 2 technology evaluation for the treatment and packaging of K-Basin sludge. The STP is managed by CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) for the U.S. Department of Energy. Warm water (~95°C) oxidation of sludge, followed by immobilization, has been proposed by AREVA and is one of the alternative flowsheets being considered to convert uranium metal to UO 2 and eliminate H 2 generation during final sludge disposition. Preliminary assessments of warm water oxidation have been conducted, and several issues have been identified that can best be evaluated through laboratory testing. The scoping evaluation documented here was specifically focused on the issue of the potential formation of high strength sludge agglomerates at the proposed 95°C process operating temperature. Prior hydrothermal tests conducted at 185°C produced significant physiochemical changes to genuine sludge, including the formation of monolithic concretions/agglomerates that exhibited shear strengths in excess of 100 kPa (Delegard et al. 2007).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Characterization Data Package for Containerized Sludge Samples Collected from Engineered Container SCS-CON-210

This data package contains the K Basin sludge characterization results obtained by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory during processing and analysis of four sludge core samples collected from Engineered Container SCS-CON-210 in 2010 as requested by CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company. Sample processing requirements, analytes of interest, detection limits, and quality control sample requirements are defined in the KBC-33786, Rev. 2. The core processing scope included reconstitution of a sludge core sample distributed among four to six 4-L polypropylene bottles into a single container. The reconstituted core sample was then mixed and subsampled to support a variety of characterization activities. Additional core sludge subsamples were combined to prepare a container composite. The container composite was fractionated by wet sieving through a 2,000 micron mesh and a 500-micron mesh sieve. Each sieve fraction was sampled to support a suite of analyses. The core composite analysis scope included density determination, radioisotope analysis, and metals analysis, including the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Hazardous Waste Facility Permit metals (with the exception of mercury). The container composite analysis included most of the core composite analysis scope plus particle size distribution, particle density, rheology, and crystalline phase identification. A summary of the received samples, core sample reconstitution and subsampling activities, container composite preparation and subsampling activities, physical properties, and analytical results are presented. Supporting data and documentation are provided in the appendices. There were no cases of sample or data loss and all of the available samples and data are reported as required by the Quality Assurance Project Plan/Sampling and Analysis Plan.

core sampling↗

Advanced Borobond™ Shields for Nuclear Materials Containment and Borobond™ Immobilization of Volatile Fission Products - Final CRADA Report

Borobond is a company-proprietary material developed by the CRADA partner in collaboration with Argonne, and is based on Argonne's Ceramicrete technology. It is being used by DOE for nuclear materials safe storage, and Boron Products, LLC is the manufacturer and supplier of Borobond. The major objective of this project was to produce a more versatile composition of this material and find new applications. Major target applications were use for nuclear radiation shields, such as in dry storage casks; use in immobilization of most difficult waste streams, such as Hanford K-Basin waste; use for soluble and volatile fission products, such as Cs, Tc, Sr, and I; and use for corrosion and fire protection applications in nuclear facilities.

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Hanford Site Near-Facility Environmental Monitoring Data Report for Calendar Year 2007- Appendix 2

Near-facility environmental monitoring is defined as monitoring near facilities that have the potential to discharge or have discharged, stored, or disposed of radioactive or hazardous materials. Monitoring locations are associated with nuclear facilities such as the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), Canister Storage Building (CSB), and the K Basins; inactive nuclear facilities such as N Reactor and the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility; and waste storage or disposal facilities such as burial grounds, cribs, ditches, ponds, tank farms, and trenches. Much of the monitoring consists of collecting and analyzing environmental samples and methodically surveying areas near facilities. The program is also designed to evaluate acquired analytical data, determine the effectiveness of facility effluent monitoring and controls, assess the adequacy of containment at waste disposal units, and detect and monitor unusual conditions.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

SLUDGE TREATMENT PROJECT COST COMPARISON BETWEEN HYDRAULIC LOADING AND SMALL CANISTER LOADING CONCEPTS

The Sludge Treatment Project (STP) is considering two different concepts for the retrieval, loading, transport and interim storage of the K Basin sludge. The two design concepts under consideration are: (1) Hydraulic Loading Concept - In the hydraulic loading concept, the sludge is retrieved from the Engineered Containers directly into the Sludge Transport and Storage Container (STSC) while located in the STS cask in the modified KW Basin Annex. The sludge is loaded via a series of transfer, settle, decant, and filtration return steps until the STSC sludge transportation limits are met. The STSC is then transported to T Plant and placed in storage arrays in the T Plant canyon cells for interim storage. (2) Small Canister Concept - In the small canister concept, the sludge is transferred from the Engineered Containers (ECs) into a settling vessel. After settling and decanting, the sludge is loaded underwater into small canisters. The small canisters are then transferred to the existing Fuel Transport System (FTS) where they are loaded underwater into the FTS Shielded Transfer Cask (STC). The STC is raised from the basin and placed into the Cask Transfer Overpack (CTO), loaded onto the trailer in the KW Basin Annex for transport to T Plant. At T Plant, the CTO is removed from the transport trailer and placed on the canyon deck. The CTO and STC are opened and the small canisters are removed using the canyon crane and placed into an STSC. The STSC is closed, and placed in storage arrays in the T Plant canyon cells for interim storage. The purpose of the cost estimate is to provide a comparison of the two concepts described.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Hanford Site Near-Facility Environmental Monitoring Data Report for Calendar Year 2008

Near-facility environmental monitoring is defined as monitoring near facilities that have the potential to discharge or have discharged, stored, or disposed of radioactive or hazardous materials. Monitoring locations are associated with nuclear facilities such as the Plutonium Finishing Plant, Canister Storage Building, and the K Basins; inactive nuclear facilities such as N Reactor and the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility; and waste storage or disposal facilities such as burial grounds, cribs, ditches, ponds, tank farms, and trenches. Much of the monitoring consists of collecting and analyzing environmental samples and methodically surveying areas near facilities. The program is also designed to evaluate acquired analytical data, determine the effectiveness of facility effluent monitoring and controls, assess the adequacy of containment at waste disposal units, and detect and monitor unusual conditions.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Panel Session 76: US DOE Problematic Waste Streams and Policy Impacts

This panel provided an overview of DOE problematic waste streams including status and path forward. Potential policy implications that exist now and/or in the future were discussed. Topics included, greater-than-Class C low level waste, depleted uranium, and sodium waste. The panel also discussed potential treatment options for these wastes. As part of the introduction, Renee Echols welcomed the audience and went over a quick overview of what would be discussed on the panel. Theresa Kliczewski provided an overview of why this panel is relevant to US Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management: there are problematic waste streams that still exist across the DOE cleanup complex. Theresa noted that the DOE EM Headquarters Office of Waste and Materials Management (EM-4.2), for which she is employed with, continues to work with the DOE cleanup sites on a path forward for these problematic waste streams. Presentations proposed include: 1 - Overview of Greater-Than-Class C Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Path Forward (Theresa Kliczewski, US DOE EM (USA)); 2 - Status of Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for Disposition of Depleted Uranium Oxide Conversion Product Generated from DoE's Inventory of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (Jaffet Ferrer-Torres, US DOE (USA)); 3 - Problematic Waste Streams on the Oak Ridge Reservation (John Wrapp, UCOR (USA)); 4 - K Basin Sludge Removal (Ryan Covert, CH2M Hill PRC (USA)); 5 - Providing Technology Solutions for Treatment of Challenging Waste Streams (Tammy Monday, Perma-Fix Environmental Services (USA)); 6 - Treatment of Problematic Reactive Metal Waste Using the GeoMelt{sup R} In-Container Vitrification (ICV{sup TM}) Process (Ron Mitchell, Veolia Nuclear Solutions (USA))

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF SYSTEMS FOR THE RETRIEVAL AND PROCESSING OF REMOTE-HANDLED SLUDGE FROM HANFORD K-WEST FUEL STORAGE BASIN

In 2011, significant progress was made in developing and deploying technologies to remove, transport, and interim store remote-handled sludge from the 105-K West Fuel Storage Basin on the Hanford Site in south-central Washington State. The sludge in the 105-K West Basin is an accumulation of degraded spent nuclear fuel and other debris that collected during long-term underwater storage of the spent fuel. In 2010, an innovative, remotely operated retrieval system was used to successfully retrieve over 99.7% of the radioactive sludge from 10 submerged temporary storage containers in the K West Basin. In 2011, a full-scale prototype facility was completed for use in technology development, design qualification testing, and operator training on systems used to retrieve, transport, and store highly radioactive K Basin sludge. In this facility, three separate systems for characterizing, retrieving, pretreating, and processing remote-handled sludge were developed. Two of these systems were successfully deployed in 2011. One of these systems was used to pretreat knockout pot sludge as part of the 105-K West Basin cleanup. Knockout pot sludge contains pieces of degraded uranium fuel ranging in size from 600 {mu}m to 6350 {mu}m mixed with pieces of inert material, such as aluminum wire and graphite, in the same size range. The 2011 pretreatment campaign successfully removed most of the inert material from the sludge stream and significantly reduced the remaining volume of knockout pot product material. Removing the inert material significantly minimized the waste stream and reduced costs by reducing the number of transportation and storage containers. Removing the inert material also improved worker safety by reducing the number of remote-handled shipments. Also in 2011, technology development and final design were completed on the system to remove knockout pot material from the basin and transport the material to an onsite facility for interim storage. This system is scheduled for deployment in 2012. The prototype facility also was used to develop technology for systems to retrieve remote-handled transuranic sludge smaller than 6350 {mu}m being stored in underwater containers. After retrieving the sludge, the system will be used to load and transport the sludge for interim storage. During 2011, full-scale prototype systems were developed and tested to a Technology Readiness Level 6 as defined by U.S. Department of Energy standards. This system is scheduled for deployment in 2013. Operations also are scheduled for completion in 2014.

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SLUDGE TREATMENT PROJECT PHASE 1 SLUDGE STORAGE OPTIONS ASSESSMENT OF T PLANT VERSUS ALTERNATE STORAGE FACILITY

The CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) has recommended to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) a two phase approach for removal and storage (Phase 1) and treatment and packaging for offsite shipment (Phase 2) of the sludge currently stored within the 105-K West Basin. This two phased strategy enables early removal of sludge from the 105-K West Basin by 2015, allowing remediation of historical unplanned releases of waste and closure of the 100-K Area. In Phase 1, the sludge currently stored in the Engineered Containers and Settler Tanks within the 105-K West Basin will be transferred into sludge transport and storage containers (STSCs). The STSCs will be transported to an interim storage facility. In Phase 2, sludge will be processed (treated) to meet shipping and disposal requirements and the sludge will be packaged for final disposal at a geologic repository. The purpose of this study is to evaluate two alternatives for interim Phase 1 storage of K Basin sludge. The cost, schedule, and risks for sludge storage at a newly-constructed Alternate Storage Facility (ASF) are compared to those at T Plant, which has been used previously for sludge storage. Based on the results of the assessment, T Plant is recommended for Phase 1 interim storage of sludge. Key elements that support this recommendation are the following: (1) T Plant has a proven process for storing sludge; (2) T Plant storage can be implemented at a lower incremental cost than the ASF; and (3) T Plant storage has a more favorable schedule profile, which provides more float, than the ASF. Underpinning the recommendation of T Plant for sludge storage is the assumption that T Plant has a durable, extended mission independent of the K Basin sludge interim storage mission. If this assumption cannot be validated and the operating costs of T Plant are borne by the Sludge Treatment Project, the conclusions and recommendations of this study would change. The following decision-making strategy, which is dependent on the confidence that DOE has in the long term mission for T Plant, is proposed: (1) If the confidence level in a durable, extended T Plant mission independent of sludge storage is high, then the Sludge Treatment Project (STP) would continue to implement the path forward previously described in the Alternatives Report (HNF-39744). Risks to the sludge project can be minimized through the establishment of an Interface Control Document (ICD) defining agreed upon responsibilities for both the STP and T Plant Operations regarding the transfer and storage of sludge and ensuring that the T Plant upgrade and operational schedule is well integrated with the sludge storage activities. (2) If the confidence level in a durable, extended T Plant mission independent of sludge storage is uncertain, then the ASF conceptual design should be pursued on a parallel path with preparation of T Plant for sludge storage until those uncertainties are resolved. (3) Finally, if the confidence level in a durable, extended T Plant mission independent of sludge storage is low, then the ASF design should be selected to provide independence from the T Plant mission risk.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Successful Deployment of System for the Storage and Retrieval of Spent/Used Nuclear Fuel from Hanford K-West Fuel Storage Basin-13051

In 2012, a system was deployed to remove, transport, and interim store chemically reactive and highly radioactive sludge material from the Hanford Site's 105-K West Fuel Storage Basin that will be managed as spent/used nuclear fuel. The Knockout Pot (KOP) sludge in the 105-K West Basin was a legacy issue resulting from the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) washing process applied to 2200 metric tons of highly degraded fuel elements following long-term underwater storage. The washing process removed uranium metal and other non-uranium constituents that could pass through a screen with 0.25-inch openings; larger pieces are, by definition, SNF or fuel scrap. When originally retrieved, KOP sludge contained pieces of degraded uranium fuel ranging from 600 microns (μm) to 6350 μm mixed with inert material such as aluminum hydroxide, aluminum wire, and graphite in the same size range. In 2011, a system was developed, tested, successfully deployed and operated to pre-treat KOP sludge as part of 105-K West Basin cleanup. The pretreatment process successfully removed the vast majority of inert material from the KOP sludge stream and reduced the remaining volume of material by approximately 65 percent, down to approximately 50 liters of material requiring management as used fuel. The removal of inert material resulted in significant waste minimization and project cost savings because of the reduced number of transportation/storage containers and improvement in worker safety. The improvement in worker safety is a result of shorter operating times and reduced number of remote handled shipments to the site fuel storage facility. Additionally in 2011, technology development, final design, and cold testing was completed on the system to be used in processing and packaging the remaining KOP material for removal from the basin in much the same manner spent fuel was removed. This system was deployed and successfully operated from June through September 2012, to remove and package the last of the SNF fragments from the 105-K West Basin, ending the long and complex history of the KOP sludge materials. The planning and execution of this project demonstrated how the graded application of DOE O 413.3B, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets[1], DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process[2], and DOE G 413.3-4, U.S. Department of Energy Technology Readiness Assessment Guide[3], can positively affect the outcome of project implementation in the DOE Complex. Provided herein are relevant information, ideas, and tools for use by other projects facing similar issues in managing high risk waste streams in a complex regulatory environment. Positive aspects are also provided of appropriate time spent in detailed planning, design, and testing in non-hazardous environments to reduce project risks in both cost and safety performance, as well as improving confidence in meeting project goals through predictable and reliable performance. (authors)

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SLUDGE TREATMENT PROJECT ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS SUMMARY REPORT [VOLUME 1]

Highly radioactive sludge (containing up to 300,000 curies of actinides and fission products) resulting from the storage of degraded spent nuclear fuel is currently stored in temporary containers located in the 105-K West storage basin near the Columbia River. The background, history, and known characteristics of this sludge are discussed in Section 2 of this report. There are many compelling reasons to remove this sludge from the K-Basin. These reasons are discussed in detail in Section1, and they include the following: (1) Reduce the risk to the public (from a potential release of highly radioactive material as fine respirable particles by airborne or waterborn pathways); (2) Reduce the risk overall to the Hanford worker; and (3) Reduce the risk to the environment (the K-Basin is situated above a hazardous chemical contaminant plume and hinders remediation of the plume until the sludge is removed). The DOE-RL has stated that a key DOE objective is to remove the sludge from the K-West Basin and River Corridor as soon as possible, which will reduce risks to the environment, allow for remediation of contaminated areas underlying the basins, and support closure of the 100-KR-4 operable unit. The environmental and nuclear safety risks associated with this sludge have resulted in multiple legal and regulatory remedial action decisions, plans,and commitments that are summarized in Table ES-1 and discussed in more detail in Volume 2, Section 9.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Uranium Metal Analysis via Selective Dissolution

Uranium metal, which is present in sludge held in the Hanford Site K West Basin, can create hazardous hydrogen atmospheres during sludge handling, immobilization, or subsequent transport and storage operations by its oxidation/corrosion in water. A thorough knowledge of the uranium metal concentration in sludge therefore is essential to successful sludge management and waste process design. The goal of this work was to establish a rapid routine analytical method to determine uranium metal concentrations as low as 0.03 wt% in sludge even in the presence of up to 1000-fold higher total uranium concentrations (i.e., up to 30 wt% and more uranium) for samples to be taken during the upcoming sludge characterization campaign and in future analyses for sludge handling and processing. This report describes the experiments and results obtained in developing the selective dissolution technique to determine uranium metal concentration in K Basin sludge.

08 HYDROGEN↗

U-Pb provenance ages of shocked zircons from the K-T boundary, Raton Basin, Colorado

U-Pb isotopic systematics from analyses of single zircons identify at least two provenance ages, approximately 575 Ma and approximately 330 Ma, for zircons from the impact layer of the K-T boundary, Raton Basin, Colorado. These data are a preliminary confirmation of results reported from the same layer. The zircon provenance ages provide a unique signature for identification of the source crater since igneous rocks of these ages (or sedimentary rocks derived from them) must characterize part of the impact stratigraphy.

Premo, W. R.↗

Heat Flow and Gas Hydrates on the Continental Margin of India: Building on Results from NGHP Expedition 01

The Indian National Gas Hydrate Program (NGHP) Expedition 01 presented the unique opportunity to constrain regional heat flow derived from seismic observations by using drilling data in three regions on the continental margin of India. The seismic bottom simulating reflection (BSR) is a well-documented feature in hydrate sediments and and can serve as a proxy for apparent heat flow if data are available to estimate acoustic velocity and density in water and sediments, thermal conductivity, and seafloor temperature. Direct observations of temperature at depth and physical properties of the sediment obtained from drilling can be used to calibrate the seismic observations, decreasing the uncertainty of the seismically-derived estimates. Anomalies in apparent heat flow can result from a variety of sources, including sedimentation, erosion, topographic refraction and fluid flow. We constructed apparent heat flow maps for portions of the Krishna-Godavari (K-G) basin, the Mahanadi basin, and the Andaman basin and modeled anomalies using 1-D conductive thermal models. Apparent heat flow values in the Krishna-Godavari (K-G) basin and Mahanadi basin are generally 0.035 to 0.055 watts per square meter (W/m2).

03 NATURAL GAS↗