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Cyber-Informed Engineering is a framework which allows engineers to build resiliency to the impacts of cyber attack into engineered systems starting in the early design phases. This article introduces the framework and provides a description of some of its principles and resources for learning more.
The Biden Administration’s efforts to meet 100% clean electricity by 2035 and net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 has created opportunities to rebuild American supply chains create new jobs, strengthen community engagement, and spur U.S. economic growth. DOE’s strategy for success in the transition to a clean energy economy hinges on building and maintaining technology supply chains that are advanced, secure, and resilient to cyber threats. As the energy sector grows increasingly globalized, complex, and digitized, the supply chain for digital components of energy systems – including software, virtual platforms and services, and data – is facing greater threats. Nearly all digital components of U.S. energy sector systems are vulnerable to cyber supply chain instability, stemming from a variety of causes and shared among a broad set of interdependent stakeholders. Overall, supply chain risks for digital components in energy sector systems will continue to evolve and likely increase as these systems are increasingly interconnected, digitized, and remotely operated.
Briefings provided to Duke Energy during their visit to INL on January 25, 2023. This is following the process to release the slides to Duke Energy.
Briefings provided to Duke Energy during their visit to INL on January 25, 2023. This is following the process to release the slides to Duke Energy.
This presentation covers the interaction of the discipline of system operations with the growing body of knowledge around Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). First is discussion of a number of fundamental concepts for system operators - organizational division of responsibilities, human and machine cooperation, goals, and priorities. The next section covers the reasons why CIE was developed, what it is, and the key design and operational, and organizational principles of CIE. Finally, some thoughts on how CIE can be applied to power system operations are offered, along with some examples of how an organization can approach applying CIE principles in their particular circumstances.
The US National Cybersecurity Strategy published March 2, 2023 uses plain language to communicate that the US is calling for a major change in how we prioritize the security of software systems used in critical infrastructure. It acknowledges that our current approach, which is essentially, “let the buyer beware,” leaves entities who are least able to assess or defend vulnerable software responsible for the impacts of designed-in weaknesses while the makers of the technology bear no liability. The strategy recommends a security-by-design approach, recommending that software vendors be held liable to uphold a “duty of care” to consumers and for systems to be designed to “fail safely and recover quickly” . For energy infrastructure, the strategy calls out the need to implement the National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy to achieve higher confidence security for energy infrastructures. The Idaho National Laboratory, a pioneer in cyber-informed engineering concepts, is at the forefront of organizations educating others in industry, academia, and government on how to apply these concepts to real-world challenges. In this brief, we'll outline some of the basic principles of security-by-design and offer examples of how, in a water sector context, they're being put into successful practice.
A proper mental model of the concepts of cyber risk and its components of threat and exploitability and consequence is necessary to allocate limited resources to different security activities, especially when considered alongside reliability and regulatory and economic risks. Understanding the consequence and frequency different risks are realized also helps align the right mitigations to the right risks. Cyber-informed engineering (CIE) is an emerging method to “engineer out” cyber risk across product and system lifecycles, and INL has a portfolio of programs operationalizing CIE’s principles for the energy sector.
This brief presentation provides a status update on three Idaho National Laboratory energy cybersecurity programs of particular interest to NERC Reliability and Security Technical Committee annual in-person Security Groups summit. Public information on the following three programs is included: Cybersecurity for Operational Technology Environments (CyOTE™) program Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Cyber Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems (CyTRICS) program, and associated high-level information on the Energy Software Bill of Materials POC, Executive Order 14017, and the Energy Cyber Sense Act
Few resources exist to address a growing need to secure distributed wind systems. Idaho National Laboratory recently published the Cybersecurity Guide for Distributed Wind, a richly detailed resource outlining a distributed wind system's possible architecture, relevant standards, risk management strategies, and key recommendations for stakeholders. This document highlights key actionable insights from the Guide that integrators can use to execute an effective cybersecurity strategy.
This workbook was prepared for a detailed workshop in Cyber-Informed Engineering. It is designed to provide an audience of electrical cooperative engineering staff with an opportunity to practice leveraging the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering for a hypothetical system upgrade. This workbook contains material describing the fictional project, information about Cyber-Informed Engineering, hands-on exercises, and a copy of the slides presented during the workshop. It can stand alone as a CIE resource.
This presentation will introduce participants to key mental models on how to think about and understand safety and the organizational attributes that support it from three of the leading voices in the discipline – David Marx, Dr. Erik Hollnagel and Dr. Todd Conklin – and from there we ask the simple question of “how can we apply this to cybersecurity?” Opportunities, similarities, and differences from the history of accomplishment applying human and organizational performance principles to safety and reliability can be collectively leveraged to the meet the challenge of cybersecurity for OT/ICS/cyber-physical systems. This is the same intent as the "Cybersecurity Culture" principle of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE).
The term “Energy Transition” is an attempt to capture an elaborate set of activities related to the modernization and decarbonization of energy grids. Performed concurrently and often in an ad hoc manner across local, state, regional and national boundaries, it is bringing chaos to what should arguably be one of the most conservatively managed of all critical infrastructure sectors. What’s more, with climate change producing an increasing tempo of extreme events, confidence in the intended resilient and redundant structure of the electric grids is likely to ebb. Even without these climate induced stressors, the nation’s electric grid was built for an earlier century. In addition to a drive towards greater efficiency via digitization and a continuing price decline in distributed energy resources (DERs), one could argue that climate change concerns are the primary driver of the energy transition. Non-CO2 emitting generation sources like wind and solar have become an important part of the overall generation fleet, albeit ones that cannot be counted upon to provide dispatchable power. Current projections indicate deployment of even larger percentages of DERs in coming years. Until far better storage capabilities arrive, the variability of wind and solar, inconsistent performance of traditional thermal generation plants, and energy delivery failures associated with natural gas pipelines will reinforce mounting reliability concerns. This pertains to both electric transmission and distribution. The recent shuttering of nuclear power plants in Germany, Japan, the US and elsewhere are also putting more downward pressure on dispatchable generation. Russia’s attack on Ukraine has roiled energy markets worldwide and forced some countries to return to coal as a primary fuel. In view circumstances such as these, it is essential that significant changes be made to policies and planning criteria, and to the standards and code on which they are based. Given the accelerating pace of extreme weather events, this needs to occur as soon as possible.
This document provides guidance on incorporating Cyber Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into the research and development (R&D) of operational technology systems and tools, facilitating the creation and adoption of innovative technologies that are secure and resilient by design. As technological innovation and research are becoming pivotal for economic and national security, cybersecurity has emerged as a paramount concern across industries and sectors. The challenge of integrating robust cybersecurity measures is imperative to safeguard critical infrastructure, protect sensitive data, and preserve national security interests.
Recent advancement in tools has helped with microgrid design, development, planning and operation. Microgrids offer a unique application based on users with different requirements for tools. The process of designing, constructing, commissioning, and assessing a microgrid is not always straightforward due to these distinct requirements. Additionally, metrics are needed for performance evaluation. This panel will offer an overview and description of tools that helps with microgrid design, construction, planning, operation, cyber security, and metrics-driven performance assessment driven by multiple diverse applications and use cases.
Distributed energy resource (DER) systems feature complex, data-driven communications networks that require careful system coordination and constant vigilance to ensure that grid assets are secure. Because DERs are an important component of the decarbonization strategy, agencies need to secure energy data that could implicate issues of national security if compromised. To help federal energy managers assess, monitor, and manage cybersecurity while achieving decarbonization, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's (NREL's) Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) offers a comprehensive, web-based assessment tool focusing on cyber governance or policies, technical management, and physical security. The DER-CF currently presents users with a series of pertinent cybersecurity questions that are used to generate a site-specific report and recommendations. This paper outlines a plan to integrate the DER-CF with another key asset-NREL's cyber range-to visualize cybersecurity resilience and compliance and to enhance the usability and accessibility of the DER-CF for federal facility energy managers and planners. This integration will result in a visualization environment to interpret and interact with compliance data. Its development will include regular conversations with stakeholders to assess the effectiveness of these efforts, refine the visualization capability, and ensure its value to our partners.
The third session of the Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) program, held on November 11, 2025, centered on High Performance Conductors (HPCs) and the formulation of action plans to address digital assurance risks associated with Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs). This session convened experts from utilities, vendors, and government agencies to examine the technical, operational, and cybersecurity aspects of HPC deployment. Discussions highlighted the benefits of HPCs, such as their ability to rapidly increase transmission capacity using existing corridors, improve grid resilience, reduce system losses, and align with FERC Orders 2023 and 1920. Participants evaluated supply chain and digital assurance risks, including reliance on imported materials, limited domestic manufacturing capacity, workforce shortages, and traceability issues. The session also emphasized the importance of digital trust, integration-layer cybersecurity, and unified risk frameworks, introducing tools like intrusion detection systems, encryption, zero trust networking, and firmware integrity. Recaps of earlier workshops on Dynamic Line Ratings (DLRs), Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC), and Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO) underscored institutional barriers and integration challenges. Action plans were proposed to mitigate issues such as inconsistent cybersecurity practices, SBOM usage, supply chain visibility, operator trust, and misaligned incentives. Additionally, INL presented its supply chain risk management tools and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to support secure procurement and system design. The session concluded with a commitment to share key takeaways, incorporate cohort feedback into future policy development, and continue collaborative engagement through upcoming pilot activities. Session 3 of 3.
Considerable efforts are underway to ensure cybersecurity is integrated into the systems engineering lifecycle. Cyber-informed engineering and security-by-design frameworks are intended to identify and engineer out cybersecurity risks throughout the lifecycle. While these approaches are valuable for promoting the need to include cybersecurity considerations in early design phases to create more secure systems, they may not consider the entirety of digital risks. Digital risks in a digital instrumentation and control system include adversarial and unintentional risks from internal and external factors, such as human performance errors, design flaws, environmental conditions, and equipment degradation or failure. This report provides a detailed discussion on digital risk prior to describing the background and concept of operations for a small modular reactor-driven integrated energy system connected to industrial applications. The challenges of competing objectives and competing stakeholder requirements are discussed and the impacts on digital engineering, security considerations, and interdependencies are evaluated for mission-level, facility-level, and system-level decisions.