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DOE OSTI2024

Engineering in Cyber Resilience with Cyber-Informed Engineering

Engineers have super powers to provide cybersecurity resilience with deterministic engineering solutions and to protect systems from the most catastrophic consequences that a cyber saboteur could cause. Come to this session to learn how to use engineering risk management skills to harden your engineered systems from cyberattacks. Objective 1 Identify what system functions could be digitally induced to cause undesired high-impact consequences. Objective 2 Analyze how loss or instability of digital controls in a subsystem could lead to high-impact consequences. Objective 3 Analyze how loss or instability in the digital connectivity between systems could lead to high-impact consequences. Objective 4 Identify engineering controls which could build resilience by eliminating digital loss or instability pathways or reduce the impact of digital loss or instability. This presentation will introduce Cyber-Informed Engineering, described below, and walk participants through specific engineering use cases to show how engineers can consider the potential for cyber sabotage in their existing system designs and enact deterministic engineering-based controls which eliminate pathways for attack or mitigate specific consequences. A wide variety of application use cases will be considered so that audience members can align the material with familiar engineering applications. CIE is an engineering approach that integrates cyber resilience into the conception, design, build, and operation of any physical system that has digital connectivity, sensors, monitoring, or control. CIE offers the opportunity to use engineering to eliminate or mitigate avenues for cyber attack—starting from the earliest stage of design and continuing throughout the system’s lifecycle. Today, engineers and industrial control system (ICS) technicians build engineered systems with specific goals for safety, reliability, and functionality. While systems engineering includes considerable safety and failure mode analysis, cybersecurity risks are often not specifically addressed—particularly the risks of intentional cyber compromise, exploitation, and misuse. Cyber-Informed Engineering pairs well with traditional cyber defenses and offers an extra designed-in protection to eliminate the most catastrophic consequences which can be realized by an adversary should traditional cyber defenses fail.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Implementation of an ICS Ransomware Testbed: Scenarios, Variants, and Evaluation Methods

Ransomware attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have emerged as a formidable threat to the United States’ critical infrastructure, eliciting grave concerns regarding national security. In March 2023, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) unveiled its 2022 Internet Crime Report, highlighting a concerning 870 complaints related to ransomware impacting U.S. critical infrastructure. Of the country's 16 critical infrastructure sectors, 14 encountered at least one ransomware attack. Notably, while the Healthcare and Public Health sector suffered the most, reporting 210 attacks, sectors pivotal to ICS networks and governmental organizations were also targeted: the Defense Industrial Base reported 1 attack, Water and Wastewater Systems 3, Chemical 19, Energy 15, Government Facilities 115, and Critical Manufacturing 157. For instance, a ransomware attack on a major chemical company could jeopardize not only its production but also pose environmental risks should systems controlling hazardous materials be compromised. In 2022, three ransomware variants predominantly targeted U.S. critical infrastructure: HIVE, with 87 attacks; ALPHV/BlackCat, with 114; and LOCKBIT, with 149. Several cyber-attacks, such as the MOVEit data breach in May 2023 and the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack in May 2021, have been so impactful that they commanded national attention. The DarkSide hacking group's assault on the Colonial Pipeline, initiated on May 6th, 2021, stands as one of the most substantial and publicly acknowledged cyber-attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. The group exploited an exposed Virtual Private Network (VPN) password, paving the way for initial intrusion and subsequent data theft. A mere day later, DarkSide unleashed a ransomware attack that compromised vital accounting and billing systems, prompting an immediate shutdown of the pipeline to mitigate further ransomware proliferation across its network. This crisis spurred a robust response from the U.S. president and regulators, culminating in a national emergency declaration related to the pipeline shutdown on May 9th, 2021. This incident mirrors the 2017 NotPetya ransomware attack that significantly impacted the shipping giant Maersk, highlighting an urgent need for fortified cybersecurity across various industries. Future incidents, akin to the Colonial Pipeline attack, could potentially be mitigated—or entirely averted—should government agencies and private entities scrutinize system vulnerabilities, exploring various ransomware types and entry points. Proactive measures, such as conducting experiments on VPN accounts or auditing passwords to pinpoint duplicate usage across diverse systems and software, might illuminate feasible entry points and vulnerability zones within an organization's systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

National Security Programs - Cyber: MMAREJBLIGE – Modular Multi Agent Grid Emulation for Joined Breakdowns in Linked Generative Emulations - 23-0644

Modular Multi Agent Grid Emulations for Joined Breakdowns in Linked Generative Emulations (MMAREJBLIGE) introduces an agent-based modeling framework into real-time cyber-physical emulation to achieve a context-aware environment that introduces operator/attacker/external-condition variability to improve emulation fidelity and testing rigor. We detail our agent framework design, internal communication via message passing, and time synchronization, as well as the individual components of the system. We include a brief analysis of several scenarios run on a real-time, hardware-in-the-loop, Industrial Control Systems (ICS) test-bed which include normal operation, physical disruption, disruption with mitigation, and disruption with mitigation during a cyber denial-of-service (DOS) attack.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Securing Vehicle Charging Infrastructure

As the US electrifies the transportation sector, cyber attacks targeting vehicle charging could bring consequences to electrical system infrastructure. This is a growing area of concern as charging stations increase power delivery and must communicate to a range of entities to authorize charging, sequence the charging process, and manage load (grid operators, vehicles, OEM vendors, charging network operators, etc.). The research challenges are numerous and are complicated because there are many end users, stakeholders, and software and equipment vendors interests involved. Poorly implemented electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), electric vehicle (EV), or grid communication system cybersecurity could be a significant risk to EV adoption because the political, social, and financial impact of cyberattacks - or public perception of such - ripples across the industry and has lasting and devastating effects. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive EVSE cybersecurity approach and limited best practices have been adopted by the EV/EVSE industry. There is an incomplete industry understanding of the attack surface, interconnected assets, and unsecured interfaces. Thus, comprehensive cybersecurity recommendations founded on sound research are necessary to secure EV charging infrastructure. This project is providing the power, security, and automotive industry with a strong technical basis for securing this infrastructure by developing threat models, determining technology gaps, and identifying or developing effective countermeasures. Specifically, the team is creating a cybersecurity threat model and performing a technical risk assessment of EVSE assets, so that automotive, charging, and utility stakeholders can better protect customers, vehicles, and power systems in the face of new cyber threats.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Pillars of Innovation Across Southeast Idaho & the Interstate-15 Corridor

Since 1949, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has been home to developing civilian and defense nuclear reactor technologies and managing spent nuclear fuel. Today, INL is the nation’s nuclear energy research laboratory, sustaining the safe and efficient operation of existing reactors, powering science in space, and breaking ground on the future fleet of advanced nuclear reactors. INL is only one of many rising technology resources in the region, however. Along the Interstate 15 (I-15) corridor, technology and cybersecurity industries and intellectual assets are rapidly expanding. Creating an innovation hub in this region would unite capabilities to solve current and future challenges in nuclear reactor sustainment and expanded deployment, integrated fuel cycle solutions, integrated energy systems, advanced materials and manufacturing for extreme environments, and secure and resilient cyber-physical systems.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Enabling Cybersecurity, Situational Awareness and Resilience in Distribution Grids with High Penetration of Photovoltaics (CARE-PV) (Final Report)

Since legacy distribution systems have very limited visibility beyond the substation, high penetration of PV at the grid edge presents some unique operational challenges. One approach to address these challenges is to use information from advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and µPMUs. However, exploiting this information is impacted by a number of factors, including multi-timescale measurements, volume of data generated, communication network impairments (e.g., information loss and latency) and susceptibility to cyber-attacks. Therefore, one of the critical tasks involved in the management of a distribution grid is to develop complete situational awareness by integrating cyber-security mechanisms with state estimation strategies and leveraging this situational awareness to assure energy services at strategic locations while exploiting AMI/PV inverter/ µPMU data. This CARE-PV project addresses the fundamental challenges in situational awareness and resilience to cyber and physical vectors by exploiting the synergy between innovative modeling, estimation, data analytics, testing and validation using smart PV inverters designed at K-State and facilities at NREL. Specifically, the project involved the development, testing and validation of the following novel enabling technologies: (Thrust 1) Resilience to cyber vectors that impact data integrity was addressed via a two-level defense strategy that combines cyber intrusion detection using self-learning, cooperative smart PV inverters, and a novel moving target defense framework to combat data integrity attacks. (Thrust 2) Resilience to cyber-physical vectors that impact situational awareness by limiting data availability was addressed via novel centralized and decentralized, sparsity-based static and dynamic state estimation approaches that enhance observability even when the underlying system is unobservable. (Thrust 3) Leveraging a unique probabilistic sensitivity analysis approach accompanied by one-of-a-kind dominant influencer set computation, the vulnerability of critical infrastructure at strategic locations was evaluated so that proactive PV-based control strategies can be used to support operations under normal/outage scenarios. These CARE-PV project innovations were demonstrated on both small-scale IEEE and larger utility-scale testbeds (Thrust 4). Feedback from Industry Advisory Board members was used to formulate a commercialization pathway for a subset of CARE-PV technologies. These CARE-PV technologies will ultimately lead to reliable and secure, large-scale integration of renewable energy and mitigate the risk of energy disruption resulting from cyber incidents and other emerging threats within the energy environment.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Securing Inverter Communication: Proactive Intrusion Detection and Mitigation System to Tap, Analyze, and Act

The electric grid has undergone rapid, revolutionary changes in recent years; from the addition of advanced smart technologies to the growing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) to increased interconnectivity and communications. However, these added communications, access interfaces, and third-party software to enable autonomous control schemes and interconnectivity also expand the attack surface of the grid. To address the gap of DER cybersecurity and secure the grid-edge to motivate a holistic, defense-in-depth approach, a proactive intrusion detection and mitigation system (PIDMS) device was developed to secure PV smart inverter communications. The PIDMS was developed as a distributed, flexible bump-in-the-wire (BITW) solution for protecting PV smart inverter communications. Both cyber (network traffic) and physical (power system measurements) are processed using network intrusion monitoring tools and custom machinelearning algorithms for deep packet analysis and cyber-physical event correlation. The PIDMS not only detects abnormal events but also deploys mitigations to limit or eliminate system impact; the PIDMS communicates with peer PIDMSs at different locations using the MQTT protocol for increased situational awareness and alerting. The details of the PIDMS methodology and prototype development are detailed in this report as well as the evaluation results within a cyber-physical emulation environment and subsequent industry feedback.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2021

BioSecure Digital Twin: Manufacturing Innovation and Cybersecurity Resilience

U.S. national security, prosperity, economy, and well-being require secure, flexible, and resilient Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing. The COVID-19 pandemic reaffirmed that the biomedical production value-chain is vulnerable to disruption and has been under attack from sophisticated nation-state adversaries. Current cyber defenses are inadequate, and the integrity of critical production systems and processes are inherently vulnerable to cyber-attacks, human error, and supply chain disruptions. The following chapter explores how a BioSecure Digital Twin will improve U.S. manufacturing resilience and preparedness to respond to these hazards by significantly improving monitoring, integrity, security, and agility of our manufacturing infrastructure and systems. The BioSecure Digital Twin combines a scalable manufacturing framework with a robust platform for monitoring and control to increase U.S. biopharma manufacturing resilience. Then, the chapter discusses some of the inherent vulnerabilities and challenges at the nexus of health and advanced manufacturing. Next, the chapter highlights that as the Pandemic evolves, we need agility and resilience to overcome significant obstacles. This section highlights an innovative application of Cyber Informed Engineering to developing and deploying a BioSecure Digital Twin to improve the resilience and security of the biopharma industrial supply chain and production processes. Finally, the chapter concludes with a process framework to complement the Digital Twin platform, called the Biopharma (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) OODA Loop Framework (BOLF), a four-step approach to decision-making outputs from the Digital Twin. The BOLF will help end users leverage twin technology by distilling the available information, focusing the data on context, and rapidly making the best decision while remaining cognizant of changes that can be made as more data becomes available.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment (ARCADE) for System-Level Design Analysis

Cybersecurity is a persistent concern to the safety and security of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs), but has lacked data-driven, evidence-based research. Rigorous cybersecurity analysis is critical for the licensing of advanced reactors using a performance-based approach. One tool that enables cybersecurity analysis is modeling and simulation. The nuclear industry makes extensive use of modeling and simulation throughout the decision process but lacks a method to incorporate cybersecurity analysis with existing models. To meet this need, the Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment (ARCADE) was developed. ARCADE is a suite of publicly available tools that can be used to develop emulations of industrial control system devices and networks and integrate those emulations with physics simulators. This integration of cyber emulations and physics models enables rigorous cyber-physical analysis of cyber-attacks on NPP systems. This report provides an overview of key considerations for using ARCADE with existing physics models and demonstrates ARCADE’s capabilities for cybersecurity analysis. Using a model of the Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR), ARCADE was able to determine the sensitivity of the primary heat exchangers (PHX) to coordinated cyber-attacks. The analysis determined that while the PHX’s failures cause disruption to the reactor, they did not cause any safety limits to be exceeded because of the plant design, including passive safety features. Further development of ARCADE will enable rigorous, repeatable, and automated cyber-physical analysis of advanced reactor control systems. These efforts will also help reduce regulatory uncertainty by presenting similar types of cybersecurity analyses in a common format, driving standard approaches and reporting.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Capability Building Progression of an Insider Threat Mitigation Program at an International Research Reactor

The nuclear industry recognizes the difficulties involved in developing effective managerial and leadership skills in a highly technical and proficient workforce such as that found in nuclear facilities. Implementing an insider threat mitigation program (ITMP) within the nuclear industry is a complex and ongoing process that demands a comprehensive understanding of human behavior, an organization’s security culture, and rigorous regulatory requirements yet also accounts for facility characteristics, physical security, material flow, and activities involving nuclear material. Given the high-consequence nature of research reactor operations, even minor lapses can lead to safety, security, and reputational risks. An effective ITMP requires a defense-in-depth approach that incorporates behavioral analysis, robust vetting procedures, continuous monitoring, and cross-disciplinary coordination. It must also promote a culture of vigilance and accountability at all levels up to and including executive leadership but be flexible enough to adapt to evolving global threats and technological advances. Insider threat mitigation is not a one-time effort but rather a sustained commitment to excellence in safety and security. Establishing a culture in which personnel proactively report incidents and issues that could affect nuclear safety and security is vital to maintaining a safe and secure operational environment. This document was developed to guide senior management and research reactor organizations in creating comprehensive programs to effectively manage and mitigate insider threat behaviors and actions. It focuses on the key pillars of an effective ITMP, including the national legal framework, security culture, preventive and protective measures, cyber security, and performance evaluation. By using a systematic approach during implementation, facilities can foster environments conducive to insider threat detection and support long-term program sustainability. The document also provides strategies for improving communication across all levels of an organization, helping to eliminate barriers that hinder the development of robust ITMPs and enhance overall security culture. In today’s organizations, the concept of leveraging safety and security culture lessons to facilitate knowledge transfer is rapidly evolving to expedite insider threat management and security culture improvements. This document outlines the rationale for evaluating an ITMP based on national customs, culture, and stakeholders. The elements are all germane to reliability and trustworthiness and relate to security concerns that states may encounter. The document focuses not only on individual perceptions regarding security issues and capability building but also on team building and how to resolve concerns. The implementers of a facility’s ITMP may zero in on indicators of insider threats within their enterprise. This material will benefit organizations when it is applied using a systematic and structured approach as demonstrated throughout the document.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity Considerations for Grid-Connected Batteries with Hardware Demonstrations

The share of renewable and distributed energy resources (DERs), like wind turbines, solar photovoltaics and grid-connected batteries, interconnected to the electric grid is rapidly increasing due to reduced costs, rising efficiency, and regulatory requirements aimed at incentivizing a lower-carbon electricity system. These distributed energy resources differ from traditional generation in many ways including the use of many smaller devices connected primarily (but not exclusively) to the distribution network, rather than few larger devices connected to the transmission network. DERs being installed today often include modern communication hardware like cellular modems and WiFi connectivity and, in addition, the inverters used to connect these resources to the grid are gaining increasingly complex capabilities, like providing voltage and frequency support or supporting microgrids. To perform these new functions safely, communications to the device and more complex controls are required. The distributed nature of DER devices combined with their network connectivity and complex controls interfaces present a larger potential attack surface for adversaries looking to create instability in power systems. To address this area of concern, the steps of a cyberattack on DERs have been studied, including the security of industrial protocols, the misuse of the DER interface, and the physical impacts. These different steps have not previously been tied together in practice and not specifically studied for grid-connected storage devices. In this work, we focus on grid-connected batteries. We explore the potential impacts of a cyberattack on a battery to power system stability, to the battery hardware, and on economics for various stakeholders. We then use real hardware to demonstrate end-to-end attack paths exist when security features are disabled or misconfigured. Our experimental focus is on control interface security and protocol security, with the initial assumption that an adversary has gained access to the network to which the device is connected. We provide real examples of the effectiveness of certain defenses. This work can be used to help utilities and other grid-connected battery owners and operators evaluate the severity of different threats and the effectiveness of defense strategies so they can effectively deploy and protect grid-connected storage devices.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: JBS Foods Ransomware Attack 2021

The JBS Foods 2021 Ransomware Attack Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the JBS ransomware cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In late May 2021, one of the world’s largest meat producers, JBS Foods, announced they had fallen victim to a worldwide ransomware attack, later found to be REvil ransomware. In the United States alone, JBS Foods accounts for nearly 25% of beef and roughly 20% of pork production. Adversaries initially launched a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on the company’s Information Technology (IT) networks in Australia, but the attack impacted operations in Brazil, Canada, and the United States, as well. The attack caused plant operations in all four countries to shut down for at least one day. All nine of the U.S. meatpacking plants temporarily shut down because of the attack. The adversaries initially demanded a $\$$22 million ransom for the company’s data, but later negotiated the ransom down to $\$$11 million even after JBS Foods restored most of their systems. JBS Foods eventually paid the $\$$11 Million for reassurance from the adversaries that none of their customers’ data would be compromised in the future. Despite its short duration, the attack still caused large stocks of meat to spoil. The incident also underscored how adversaries can simultaneously compromise and move laterally through global subsidiaries of an organization. Researchers and analysts identified 22 unique techniques (in a sequence of 21 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 361 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Sixteen of the identified techniques used during the JBS Foods cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 308 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 163 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 75 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003

The SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about Davis-Besse’s 2003 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 25 January 2003, the SQL Slammer worm infected more than 90% of vulnerable hosts and crashed the internet in 10 to 15 minutes, making it one of the fastest spreading worms in history. SQL Slammer is a fileless, memory-resident worm that remotely exploits a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability on local hosts to intensively scan and rapidly self-propagate across the internet. The worm infected approximately 300,000 unpatched hosts running Microsoft Structured Query Language (SQL) Server 2000 or Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE) 2000 with SQL Server Resolution Service. The SQL Slammer worm indirectly infected FirstEnergy’s Davis-Besse nuclear power plant by first infecting a consultant’s company network server and then propagating through an external misconfigured connection into Davis-Besse’s site network. The infection caused major network congestion, slow performance, data overloads, and the inability of local hosts to communicate with each other, which eventually caused a loss of availability and a loss of view when the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Plant Process Computer (PPC) crashed. At the time of the infection, the plant was already offline, the digital monitoring systems had redundant analog backups, and the plant control and safety functions were not affected, so there were no concerns of a safety breach. However, this incident resulted in many lessons learned and spawned important discussions about cybersecurity’s role in nuclear safety and electric power reliability regulation, policy, and guidance. Researchers and analysts identified 10 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 640 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Eight of the identified techniques used during Davis-Besse cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 596 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 428 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 331 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

Recommendations for Distributed Energy Resource Access Control

Cybersecurity for internet - connected Distributed Energy Resources (DER) is essential for the safe and reliable operation of the US power system. Many facets of DER cybersecurity are currently being investigated within different standards development organizations, research communities, and industry committees to address this critical need. This report covers DER access control guidance compiled by the Access Controls Subgroup of the SunSpec/Sandia DER Cybersecurity Workgroup. The goal of the group was to create a consensus - based technical framework to minimize the risk of unauthorized access to DER systems. The subgroup set out to define a strict control environment where users are authorized to access DER monitoring and control features through three steps: (a) user is identified using a proof-of-identity, (b) the user is authenticated by a managed database, (c) and the user is authorized for a specific level of access. DER access control also provides accountability and nonrepudiation within the power system control environment that can be used for forensic analysis and attribution in the event of a cyber-attack. This paper covers foundational requirements for a DER access control environment as well as offering a collection of possible policy, model, and mechanism implementation approaches for IEEE 1547-mandated communication protocols.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer2 and Wiper Malware Targeting Ukrainian Energy Provider 2022

The Industroyer2 and Wiper Malware Targeting Ukrainian Energy Provider 2022 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Industroyer2 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. An adversary attempted to cause a blackout in Ukraine in April 2022 by using the Industroyer2 malware against a regional Ukrainian energy provider. The adversary targeted eight high-voltage electrical substations and utilized the malware in tandem with disk wipers for Windows, Linux, and Solaris operating systems in an attempt to make response and recovery efforts more difficult. The adversary reused a piece of the original Industroyer malware designed to open circuit breakers and de-energize target substations. The adversary gained initial access to the victim’s enterprise network through unknown means in February 2022 and was able to perform reconnaissance, pivot to the operations network, and reside in the system for at least 51 days. This gave the adversary a detailed understanding of the environment and allowed them to customize the Industroyer2 malware to the victim’s operations network. However, defenders detected and stopped the attack before the adversary could achieve their intended impact. Had the Industroyer2 attack been successful, it could have caused a blackout for more than two million people during the early stages of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Researchers and analysts identified 22 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 31 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 297 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-three of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer2 cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 224 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 122 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 51 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016

The Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the December 2016 cyber attack against the Ukrainian Ukrenergo electric transmission utility and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. Industroyer is a modular malware framework designed to deploy several Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol-specific attack payloads to disrupt electricity distribution. Adversaries deployed Industroyer within the target network on a Microsoft Windows endpoint capable of directly manipulating or communicating with ICS. Industroyer abuses the functionality of a targeted ICS’s legitimate control system to achieve its intended impact. Adversaries likely first gained access to Ukrenergo enterprise networks in early 2016 after a successful spearphishing campaign against organizations in the electric power sector. Adversaries then began capturing credentials beginning on 1 December 2016. This allowed access to the ICS environment at the Pivnichna electric transmission substation outside Kyiv through a device dual-homed on the Information Technology (IT) and ICS networks. Adversaries conducted discovery, targeting, and access to this device using information and previously captured credentials from compromised enterprise IT machines. Finally, the adversaries deployed and launched the Industroyer malware just before midnight on 17 December. By midnight, Ukrenergo had lost control of a targeted substation, resulting in electric power outages for over an hour in the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region. Researchers and analysts identified 31 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 33 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 846 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-nine of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 548 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 353 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 300 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: Ryuk Ransomware Attack on Universal Health Services 2020

The Ryuk Ransomware Attack on Universal Health Services (UHS) 2020 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the 2020 UHS cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. UHS manages over 400 hospitals and is one of the largest healthcare providers in the United States with 3.5 million patients each year. On 27 September 2020, UHS suffered a widespread ransomware attack that resulted in a denial of service to critical internet-dependent healthcare systems including workstations, phones, and data centers. Employees resorted to filing patient details with pen and paper, while other facilities had to redirect ambulances and urgent patients to other facilities for adequate care. Adversaries carried out the attack with Ryuk, a ransomware that encrypts data and generates a RyukReadMe.txt ransom note with the ransom fee to decrypt the data, varying from 15 Bitcoin (BTC) to 50 BTC, equivalent to roughly $\$$353,892 to $\$$964,617. UHS did not pay the ransom and was able to recover data through backups, but still reported an impact of $\$$67 million dollars in recovery costs. On 29 October, one month after the attack, UHS made an official statement that their systems had been restored and they were resuming normal operations. Researchers and analysts identified 18 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 19 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fourteen of the identified techniques used during the UHS cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 106 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 82 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 30 days to two hours preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2026

Cyber Halo Innovation Research Program (CHIRP) Handbook: CHIRP Program Document 2026

The Cyber Halo Innovation Research Program (CHIRP) handbook outlines a comprehensive framework designed to advance space cybersecurity education, workforce development, recruitment efforts for United States Space Force (USSF) Space Systems Command (SSC) and the Department of the Airforce, and foster students’ professional growth. It provides an overview of CHIRP's objectives and strategic focus, establishing the foundation for participant engagement through a network of collaborations with academic institutions, contracted industry partners, training and certification organizations, federal agencies, and community organizations. It states a clear participation strategy for SSC and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) for program execution and successful support for student transition to a career in space cybersecurity.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗