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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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28 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Effects of Communication Delay on Human Spaceflight Missions

Missions onboard the International Space Station rely on the real-time availability of a large ground team of system experts to command the vehicle, solve safety-critical problems, and guide the crew during complex operations. Also, in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), supplies can be sent and crews evacuated quite quickly if needed. Future missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (BLEO) will not have this 24/7, real-time safety net as communication latency increases, resupply difficulty increases, and evacuation opportunities diminish. There are few, if any, terrestrial analogs for human spaceflight missions BLEO that reflect the conditions—including extreme environments, long mission durations, and small crew sizes – that make these missions so high risk. Studies on specific conditions, such as communication delays and asynchronous interactions, have been performed in NASA Earth-based analog missions and have found that communication delays can disrupt ground-crew interactions and adversely impact team performance. However, there are gaps and limitations in studies conducted to date, notably on human spacecraft system failure response and recovery, the impacts of shorter lunar-relevant communication delays on complex operations, and the effectiveness of countermeasures. The work presented here breaks down real anomalies that occurred on ISS and Apollo missions and creates example scenarios fort Lunar Surface and Mars missions to explore the impact of communication delays of varying length on onboard operations and mission outcomes. Our analyses indicate that short communication delays (e.g., seconds to a minute) adversely impact the ability for ground to provide real-time oversight and guidance and to catch quickly emerging problems in time. Longer communication delays (e.g., up to 40 minutes on Mars missions) call for a shift of responsibility for tactical operations from ground to crew; crew must make time-critical decisions independently and respond to time-critical vehicle anomalies to prevent consequences.

human-systems integration↗
NASA NTRS1993

An assessment of space shuttle flight software development processes

In early 1991, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) Office of Space Flight commissioned the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB) of the National Research Council (NRC) to investigate the adequacy of the current process by which NASA develops and verifies changes and updates to the Space Shuttle flight software. The Committee for Review of Oversight Mechanisms for Space Shuttle Flight Software Processes was convened in Jan. 1992 to accomplish the following tasks: (1) review the entire flight software development process from the initial requirements definition phase to final implementation, including object code build and final machine loading; (2) review and critique NASA's independent verification and validation process and mechanisms, including NASA's established software development and testing standards; (3) determine the acceptability and adequacy of the complete flight software development process, including the embedded validation and verification processes through comparison with (1) generally accepted industry practices, and (2) generally accepted Department of Defense and/or other government practices (comparing NASA's program with organizations and projects having similar volumes of software development, software maturity, complexity, criticality, lines of code, and national standards); (4) consider whether independent verification and validation should continue. An overview of the study, independent verification and validation of critical software, and the Space Shuttle flight software development process are addressed. Findings and recommendations are presented.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2026

Navigating United States Standards and Regulation for Digital Energy Systems

This report provides an analysis of the U.S. standards and regulatory landscape for digital energy systems, focusing on cybersecurity, safety, and reliability requirements. It examines the interplay between federal mandates, state regulations, voluntary industry standards, and utility-specific policies, highlighting critical gaps between compliance and real-world risk mitigation. While NERC CIP standards enforce cybersecurity for Bulk Electric System assets, distribution-level infrastructure and emerging technologies often fall outside mandatory oversight, creating vulnerabilities. The report identifies systemic challenges such as reliance on self-attestation, uneven state adoption of safety codes, and lagging standards for advanced technologies like battery energy storage and inverter-based resources. Through a detailed gap analysis, it underscores the urgency of proactive risk-based approaches, independent verification, and strategic engagement with state and federal entities. Recommendations include adopting tiered security frameworks, strengthening procurement practices, and addressing emerging technology risks to ensure resilient and secure digital energy infrastructure. This guidance is intended for utilities, regulators, and stakeholders navigating compliance obligations and seeking to enhance cybersecurity and safety beyond minimum standards.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2008

ePORT, NASA's Computer Database Program for System Safety Risk Management Oversight (Electronic Project Online Risk Tool)

ePORT (electronic Project Online Risk Tool) provides a systematic approach to using an electronic database program to manage a program/project risk management processes. This presentation will briefly cover the standard risk management procedures, then thoroughly cover NASA's Risk Management tool called ePORT. This electronic Project Online Risk Tool (ePORT) is a web-based risk management program that provides a common framework to capture and manage risks, independent of a programs/projects size and budget. It is used to thoroughly cover the risk management paradigm providing standardized evaluation criterion for common management reporting, ePORT improves Product Line, Center and Corporate Management insight, simplifies program/project manager reporting, and maintains an archive of data for historical reference.

Johnson, Paul W.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) provided oversight on the safety aspects of many NASA programs. In addition, ASAP undertook three special studies. At the request of the Administrator, the panel assessed the requirements for an assured crew return vehicle (ACRV) for the space station and reviewed the organization of the safety and mission quality function within NASA. At the behest of Congress, the panel formed an independent, ad hoc working group to examine the safety and reliability of the space shuttle main engine. Section 2 presents findings and recommendations. Section 3 consists of information in support of these findings and recommendations. Appendices A, B, C, and D, respectively, cover the panel membership, the NASA response to the findings and recommendations in the March 1992 report, a chronology of the panel's activities during the reporting period, and the entire ACRV study report.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2005

Backstop: Shuttle Will Fly with Outstanding Waivers; New Oversight Eases Conflicts on Safety

he space shuttle Discovery is carrying some 300 waivers to technical specifications as it enters the home stretch of its planned return to flight next month. There were about 6,000 waivers in place when Columbia crashed. Shuttle managers say they are working to reduce the number of waivers remaining by fixing the problems they highlight, a change prompted by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. In the wake of the accident, NASA has heeded the CAWS recommendation that waivers be the responsibility of an "independent technical authority" (ITA), rather than the shuttle program itself. To carry out the recommendation of the CAIB-which found an inherent conflict of interest in having the same managers make decisions about cost, schedule and safety-then-Administrator Sean O'Keefe designated the agency's chief engineer as the formal ITA. He is responsible for setting, maintaining and granting waivers across the agency. In mid-January, Fred Gregory, then O'Keefe's deputy and now his acting replacement, launched the ITA within NASA under Chief Engineer Rex Geveden, the former program manager on the Gravity Probe B experiment.

Morring, Frank, Jr.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Information Systems for Crew-Led Operations Beyond Low-Earth Orbit

On past and present human space missions, the management of vehicle health and status has primarily been executed from Earth. Missions such as Apollo, Space Shuttle, and ISS have relied on a safety net of ground-based experts with access to real-time telemetry data, broad and deep systems expertise, and powerful analytical and computing capabilities. The ground team monitors and manages the vehicle’s health in real-time and responds quickly to critical situations and malfunctions. Ground operators also provide real-time oversight and verbal guidance to flight crew members, especially during complex procedure execution and high-risk activities like extra-vehicular activities. However, this operational paradigm, in place for 60 years, will not transfer to long duration exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit (LEO). Lunar and deep-space crewed missions will encounter delayed communications that prohibit real-time operational and medical support. Additionally, there will be infrequent resupply and a diminished capacity to evacuate or rescue crew members. A small crew must operate independently, managing the vehicle’s state, responding to time-critical events, and executing complex procedures, all without the safety net of real-time support.

data representation↗
DOE OSTI2026

A Community Guide to Regulatory Barriers Affecting Microgrids (Reports 1-3)

In response to growing risks of power outages from extreme weather and aging infrastructure, communities are increasingly exploring the potential of microgrids to provide reliable energy access. Microgrids offer promising solutions to meet this challenge but face a complex landscape of non-technical barriers, particularly regulations concerning the provision and distribution of energy. Most existing legal and regulatory frameworks were designed for a centralized, one-way power system, and are often poorly suited to handle systems that independently balance distributed energy resources with local load. This three-part report series provides a strategic analysis of existing regulatory and legal factors affecting microgrid deployments to help non-technical community leaders and decision-makers better understand the feasibility of a microgrid in their community. -Report No. 1: Foundational Issues Facing Microgrids details the universal policy barriers all microgrids face, including utility interconnection processes, rate structures, and local permitting. -Report No. 2: Single Property Microgrids outlines how direct asset ownership and operating behind-the-meter can bypass some regulatory oversight, using the Blue Lake Rancheria microgrid as a case study. -Report No. 3: Multi-Property Microgrids tackles the complex challenges of crossing public rights-of-way and navigating utility franchise rights, highlighting the Coventry microgrid project. The series equips decision-makers with phased frameworks to navigate financial and regulatory complexities, engage effectively with local utilities and Authorities Having Jurisdiction (AHJs), and structure successful microgrid projects.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2012

Development of Human System Integration at NASA

Human Systems Integration seeks to design systems around the capabilities and limitations of the humans which use and interact with the system, ensuring greater efficiency of use, reduced error rates, and less rework in the design, manufacturing and operational deployment of hardware and software. One of the primary goals of HSI is to get the human factors practitioner involved early in the design process. In doing so, the aim is to reduce future budget costs and resources in redesign and training. By the preliminary design phase of a project nearly 80% of the total cost of the project is locked in. Potential design changes recommended by evaluations past this point will have little effect due to lack of funding or a huge cost in terms of resources to make changes. Three key concepts define an effective HSI program. First, systems are comprised of hardware, software, and the human, all of which operate within an environment. Too often, engineers and developers fail to consider the human capacity or requirements as part of the system. This leads to poor task allocation within the system. To promote ideal task allocation, it is critical that the human element be considered early in system development. Poor design, or designs that do not adequately consider the human component, could negatively affect physical or mental performance, as well as, social behavior. Second, successful HSI depends upon integration and collaboration of all the domains that represent acquisition efforts. Too often, these domains exist as independent disciplines due to the location of expertise within the service structure. Proper implementation of HSI through participation would help to integrate these domains and disciplines to leverage and apply their interdependencies to attain an optimal design. Via this process domain interests can be integrated to perform effective HSI through trade-offs and collaboration. This provides a common basis upon which to make knowledgeable decisions. Finally, HSI must be considered early in the requirements development phase of system design and acquisition. This will provide the best opportunity to maximize return on investment (ROI) and system performance. HSI requirements must be developed in conjunction with capability ]based requirements generation through functional. HSI requirements will drive HSI metrics and embed HSI issues within the system design. After a system is designed, implementation of HSI oversights can be very expensive. An HSI program should be included as an integral part of a total system approach to vehicle and habitat development. This would include, but not limited to, workstation design, D&C development, volumetric analysis, training, operations, and human -robotic interaction. HSI is a necessary process for Human Space Flight programs to meet the Agency Human ]System standards and thus mitigate human risks to acceptable levels. NASA has been involved in HSI planning, procedures development, process, and implementation for many years, and has been building several internal and publicly accessible products to facilitate HSI fs inclusion in the NASA Systems Engineering Lifecycle. Some of these products include: NASA STD 3001 Volumes 1 and 2, Human Integration Design Handbook, NASA HSI Implementation Plan, NASA HSI Implementation Plan Templates, NASA HSI Implementation Handbook, and a 2 ]hour short course on HSI delivered as part of the NASA Space and Life Sciences Directorate Academy. These products have been created leveraging industry best practices and lessons learned from other Federal Government agencies.

Whitmore, Mihriban↗
NASA NTRS1997

The Next Generation Space Telescope: Visiting a Time When Galaxies Were Young

In the spring and summer of 1996, three independent teams studied the feasibility of a large aperture space telescope to follow the Hubble Space Telescope. The scientific goals for the new telescope had been laid out in a report by the HST & Beyond Committee, a group appointed by the Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy to consider the needs of the astronomical community after the nominal end of the HST mission in 2005. The technical capabilities and constraints on the new observatory were daunting: the telescope optics should be at least 4 meters in diameter and passively cooled to achieve optimum sensitivity in the near-infrared portion of the spectrum. Moreover, the costs should be kept within a fraction of those for the HST: approximately $500M for construction and $900M for lifetime costs, not including support for scientific data analysis. In their presentations to NASA on 19-21 August, 1996, the teams led by Lockheed Martin, TRW, and the Goddard Space Flight Center concluded that a Next Generation Space Telescope (NGST) was not only feasible and affordable, but that it could be made more powerful using recent breakthroughs in space technologies. Coming on the heels of breathtaking HST observations of distant galaxies in the process of formation, such an NGST could bridge the gap in our understanding of the earliest origins of stars, galaxies, and the elements that are the foundations of Life. This report presents the findings of the three teams and the technological roadmap which will guide us to the successful development of the NGST over the next decade. We have made liberal use of the written material, tables, and diagrams prepared by the three study teams. We have also taken advantage of the knowledge and ideas of our colleagues in government, industry and academia. In Appendix A, we list the members of the three study groups, the NGST Science Working Group and the NGST Scientific Oversight Committee. We deeply appreciate their assistance, advice, and enthusiasm. The scientific and technological goals of NGST are part of the Origins initiative in the Office of Space Science, NASA Headquarters. We are pleased to acknowledge the support and leadership of Edward Weiler, a steadfast friend of HST, Harley Thronson, a proponent of all things infrared, and Mike Kaplan, a tireless advocate of new technology. John Campbell, Project Manager for HST, initiated the NGST study at GSFC and we deeply appreciate his formative efforts and continued support. We are also grateful for the foresight of Riccardo Giacconi, Director General of the European Southern Observatory (ESO), and the efforts of his staff. We note that European Space Agency (ESA) staff at the Space Telescope Science Institute and ESO played important roles in the NGST scientific and technical studies. We look forward to future collaboration with ESA, ESO, and other international partners.

H.S. Stockman↗