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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human Factors Research Needs for In-Time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS) Design: Enabling the NASA “Sky for All” Future Airspace Vision

Integrated safety management will be paramount for safely enabling the envisioned transformations of the future National Airspace System. Addressing the increasing need for advanced data analytics and fusion of aviation safety data, managed by human decision-makers, is essential for realizing the vision. The proposal, if accepted, will discuss safety management system challenges and how the concept of In-time Aviation Safety Management Systems addresses the need. It will also discuss human factors challenges involved in future integrated safety management, including trust, over-reliance, human-optimized data visualization, human-autonomy teaming, training, communication and dissemination of data, situation awareness, task load, and accountability.

Lawrence J Prinzel III↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

IASMS Overview

Explore the source record for details and available documents.

Deborah Kirkman↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Informing New Concepts for UAS and Autonomous System Safety Management using Disaster Management and First Responder Scenarios

As emerging flight operations become more prevalent and increasingly automated and distributed, the capabilities for managing safety of vehicles and operations will also need to evolve. To address this challenge, the National Academies has envisioned an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) capability for a wide range of aviation operations including current commercial operations as well as new entrants envisioned with advanced air mobility (AAM). The suite of IASMS services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) would be implemented in a federated approach and would address trends as well as individual operations. Through predictive modeling and data analysis, IASMS is envisioned to identify arising risks so that they can be mitigated, in-time, before a safety incident occurs. IASMS and its requisite set of SFCs must leverage a wide range of information to perform. To better understand these new needs, FSF worked with the aviation and humanitarian communities to develop and validate scenarios that include traditional aviation operations and UAS operations intermingled as they are deployed for disaster management and first responder (DMFR) situations. The three scenarios developed include: • Post Natural disaster response, such as a hurricane, involving multiple parties utilizing traditional aviation and UAS to support rescue operations, surveil damage, and locate survivors needing assistance. • Wildfire fighting in remote locations with traditional aircraft for transport and fire-retardant delivery combined with UAS for surveillance of fire locations as well as to track individual firefighter locations. • Medical Operations and AAM in Urban Environments including passenger-carrying helicopters and AAM vehicles, medical missions (such as transport of radio-pharmaceuticals), and other UAS delivery operations (such as the delivery of defibrillators). Each scenario was developed and validated by representatives with expertise in humanitarian operations, urban and rural emergency response, air traffic management, UAS operations, and traditional flight operations. The scenario definitions address roles and responsibilities of individual actors, the appropriate utilization of UAS, and the actions taken by those actors to appropriately manage risks associated with the mission and environment. The risks to aviation traffic and to people on the ground explored included potential risks arising from incompatibilities in calculating reference altitudes (eg, differing uses of AGL, MSL, barometric, or GPS-derived values), loss of command and control (C2) communications, rapid changes in weather and winds, and physical interference. For each risk, IASMS SFCs were postulated in the context of monitoring services, risk assessment capabilities, and identifying appropriate mitigation strategies. The identified SFC capabilities were envisioned from known services postulated for IASMS and for UTM. For these unique environments, IASMS SFCs are needed to address conditions such as hazardous payloads, micro-climates and urban canyons, and the need to keep uninvolved air traffic out of the area where DMFR operations are being conducted. The second phase of analysis focused on inferring the specific information needs and the SFCs for IASMS, utilizing a structure of 16 information classes to organize requirements. For each of the risks identified in the workshops, it was postulated what data sources would be necessary to monitor critical aspects of the risk (eg, surrounding air traffic, ground population, terrain, etc). to be directly measured as well as data that would be derived, which implies additional SFCs for different actors to understand what information would likely be exchanged between parties. For an IASMS to be effective, additional research is needed to develop the advanced algorithms that can address the increasingly autonomous and complex operations in differing environments and to develop means of identifying unknown risks. Looking at these scenarios highlighted a number of research issues. These include the ability to quickly "cordon off" airspace thru temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) or other means, developing clear definitions to enable automation-based algorithms for prioritizing operations, defining airspace density metrics, standardization of altitude reporting, and establishing a basis for safety data metrics definition and collection. This paper seeks to outline the development of an IASMS in the context of the DMFR scenarios and resulting demonstrations. Utilizing this contextual approach, NASA will generate recommendations for an assured safety framework for AAM operations that enables AAM operations to safely access the NAS.

In Time Aviation Safety Management System↗
NASA NTRS2024

Workshop on the Role of Design Assurance in System-Wide Safety’s Safety Demonstrator Series

This report summarizes a three-hour hybrid in-person/online workshop on June 7, 2024 on the topic of design assurance and the Safety Demonstrator Series (SDS), which was held at NASA Ames Research Center. The SDS provides an operational demonstration of, and recommendations for, requirements and standards necessary to monitor, assess, and mitigate risks to assure safety in disaster-oriented operations. Over sixty NASA personnel participated in the workshop. Four main topics were discussed: (1) assurance needs for the Safety Demonstrator Series, (2) assurance and the In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS), (3) in-time assurance: existing efforts and future opportunities, and (4) demonstrating assurance tools in the Safety Demonstrators. Key takeaways are as follows: 1. Design assurance tools can be used to assure an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System, the systems that comprise it, and other systems or missions. Assurance must consider both systems and components and include the interactions between elements in both a systems/aircraft context and a systems-of-systems/airspace context. 2. Design-time assurance activities can support the identification of monitors needed for operational assurance activities (i.e., the “monitor” function in the monitor-assess-mitigate paradigm at the heart of the IASMS concept). 3. A major opportunity for design-time assurance tools to contribute to the IASMS concept is to support rapid re-validation of systems. This will be particularly important for (1) supporting novel operations in the IASMS, where operational data may disprove design-time assumptions (motivating re-analysis of system safety) and (2) adapting technologies (e.g., AI/ML for autonomous operations) to new operational domains, where there may be new or different safety considerations not included in the initial scope of operations. 4. There are several design assurance tools under development in the System-Wide Safety project that can support assurance of Services, Functions, and Capabilities (SFCs) in the Safety Demonstrators. Transitioning these tools from one-off research projects into a functioning part of IASMS assurance will require closer integration between these tools. 5. It is not clear whether the role of design assurance tools is primarily as a part of IASMS architecture or as an external check on IASMS. The workshop consisted of four discussion topics initiated via four lightning talks by System-Wide Safety researchers. Discussions utilized Mural to engage both in-person and online participants in the hybrid format. Polls and surveys were also utilized to gather participant input. The workshop closed with a reflection activity for participants, as well as new ideas for collaboration and coordination of ongoing System-Wide Safety research.

design assurance↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Model-Based Systems Engineering Evaluation of the Evolution to an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System

In 2018, as result of a recommendation from the National Academies, NASA began to prototype an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). The purpose of the IASMS is to enable innovative aviation operations and greater heterogeneity of the overall National Airspace (NAS) by automating much of the safety monitoring, assessment, and risk and hazard mitigation function present in today’s Safety Management Systems (SMS). NASA has worked together with early industry collaborators to understand how such a system might work and has published several early Concepts of Operation (ConOps) and other technical memoranda that illustrate the primary considerations for selected aviation domains. The shift from an SMS to an IASMS is predicated on several assumptions, including: 1.) automating safety functions will decrease the amount of time necessary for risk and hazard identification and analysis, making it more likely that safety concerns are understood ‘in-time’ to mitigate them, and 2.) an IASMS will allow easier tailoring of safety management processes to the particular risks and hazards inherent to that aviation operation. In this paper, we begin to validate these assumptions through the use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE).

IASMS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Model-Based Systems Engineering Evaluation of the Evolution to an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System

In 2018, as result of a recommendation from the National Academies, NASA began to prototype an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System(IASMS). The purpose of the IASMS is to enable innovative aviation operations and greater heterogeneity of the overall National Airspace (NAS) by automating much of the safety monitoring, assessment, and risk and hazard mitigation functionspresent in today’s Safety Management Systems (SMS). NASA has worked together with early industry collaborators to understand how such a system might work and has published several early Concepts of Operation (ConOps) and other technical memoranda that illustrate the primary considerations for selected aviation domains. The shift from an SMS to an IASMS is predicated on several assumptions, including: 1.) automating safety functions will decrease the amount of time necessary for risk and hazard identification and analysis, making it more likely that safety concerns are understood ‘in-time’ to mitigate them, and 2.) an IASMS will allow easier tailoring of safety management processes to the particular risks and hazards inherent to that aviation operation. In this paper, we begin to validate these assumptions through the use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE).

In-time Aviation Safety Management System↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An in-Time Aviation Safety Management System Concept of Operations and Modernization of the National Airspace System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is growing in complexity of aircraft, missions, and operations. In response, many organizations have published papers and concepts of operations (ConOps) for new and enhanced safety systems. The National Academies’ vision for an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) is integral to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) modernization efforts. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) System-Wide Safety (SWS) project is conducting safety research, exploring solutions, and defining the safety needs of future missions, such as Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) and autonomous aircraft operating in a more connected, flexible, and dynamic airspace. IASMS enables and provides a path for bringing FAA’s operational vision to fruition through increasingly automated safety systems that integrate services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs). These SFCs provide the necessary responsiveness to monitor, assess, and mitigate known hazards and emergent risks. This paper describes how safety in today’s air transportation system will need to evolve, identifies key points regarding in-time safety, and explores the criticality of IASMS in the future NAS.

IASMS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An In-time Aviation Safety Management System Concept of Operations and Modernization of the National Airspace System​

The National Airspace System (NAS) is growing in complexity of aircraft, missions, and operations. In response, many organizations have published papers and concepts of operations (ConOps) for new and enhanced safety systems. The National Academies’ vision for an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) is integral to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) modernization efforts. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) System-Wide Safety (SWS) project is conducting safety research, exploring solutions, and defining the safety needs of future missions, such as Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) and autonomous aircraft operating in a more connected, flexible, and dynamic airspace. IASMS enables and provides a path for bringing FAA’s operational vision to fruition through increasingly automated safety systems that integrate services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs). These SFCs provide the necessary responsiveness to monitor, assess, and mitigate known hazards and emergent risks. This paper describes how safety in today’s air transportation system will need to evolve, identifies key points regarding in-time safety, and explores the criticality of IASMS in the future NAS.

Airspace↗
NASA NTRS2023

Research and Technology Challenges for Human Data Analysts in Future Safety Management Systems

Enabling new and novel concepts of operations for Advanced Air Mobility poses an important need to evolve current safety management systems (SMS) and is posited to be realized through advances in Machine Learning (ML) Data Sciences and Artificial Intelligence. The “In-time Aviation Safety Management System” (IASMS) concept of operations supports the need to evolve today’s SMS to become more tailorable, scalable, and interoperable in response to forecasted changes expected for the future airspace system. Key to IASMS is integration of proactive and predictive ML algorithms trained to provide “in time” detection and mitigation of hazards and emergent risks through new methods and novel data types. IASMS research and technology development includes human factors design considerations for these systems to include human-system teaming, innovations in human interfaces and management of complex digital data information, human-system interaction/model-based system engineering, and verification and validation for data assurance and trust.

Chad L Stephens↗