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In Silico Versus In Situ: The Challenging Landscape of Nuclear Criticality Safety Training

Nuclear criticality safety grew out of the ranks of experimentalists studying the physics of chain-reacting systems at critical experiment facilities. Consequently, critical experiment facilities provide the best forum for conducting training in nuclear criticality safety. As the nuclear renaissance gains traction, there is an increased demand to train personnel in nuclear criticality safety (NCS). Strides have been made in both on-line and virtual reality based NCS training. While these are perhaps a necessary component of NCS training, hands-on training at critical experiments facilities remains the most effective means of developing competency for fissionable material handlers, managers of fissionable material operations, criticality safety analysts, and experimentalists. This paper explores the challenges of developing and maintaining workforce competency in nuclear criticality safety to support safe and efficient fissionable material operations.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Neutron Cross Section Covariances for Structural Materials and Fission Products

We describe neutron cross section covariances for 78 structural materials and fission products produced for the new US evaluated nuclear reaction library ENDF/B-VII.1. Neutron incident energies cover full range from 10{sup -5} eV to 20 MeV and covariances are primarily provided for capture, elastic and inelastic scattering as well as (n,2n). The list of materials follows priorities defined by the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative, the major application being data adjustment for advanced fast reactor systems. Thus, in addition to 28 structural materials and 49 fission products, the list includes also {sup 23}Na which is important fast reactor coolant. Due to extensive amount of materials, we adopted a variety of methodologies depending on the priority of a specific material. In the resolved resonance region we primarily used resonance parameter uncertainties given in Atlas of Neutron Resonances and either applied the kernel approximation to propagate these uncertainties into cross section uncertainties or resorted to simplified estimates based on integral quantities. For several priority materials we adopted MF32 covariances produced by SAMMY at ORNL, modified by us by adding MF33 covariances to account for systematic uncertainties. In the fast neutron region we resorted to three methods. The most sophisticated was EMPIRE-KALMAN method which combines experimental data from EXFOR library with nuclear reaction modeling and least-squares fitting. The two other methods used simplified estimates, either based on the propagation of nuclear reaction model parameter uncertainties or on a dispersion analysis of central cross section values in recent evaluated data files. All covariances were subject to quality assurance procedures adopted recently by CSEWG. In addition, tools were developed to allow inspection of processed covariances and computed integral quantities, and for comparing these values to data from the Atlas and the astrophysics database KADoNiS.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE/EM Criticality Safety Needs Assessment

The issue of nuclear criticality safety (NCS) in Department of Energy Environmental Management (DOE/EM) fissionable material operations presents challenges because of the large quantities of material present in the facilities and equipment that are committed to storage and/or material conditioning and dispositioning processes. Given the uncertainty associated with the material and conditions for many DOE/EM fissionable material operations, ensuring safety while maintaining operational efficiency requires the application of the most-effective criticality safety practices. In turn, more-efficient implementation of these practices can be achieved if the best NCS technologies are utilized. In 2002, DOE/EM-1 commissioned a survey of criticality safety technical needs at the major EM sites. These needs were documented in the report Analysis of Nuclear Criticality Safety Technology Supporting the Environmental Management Program, issued May 2002. Subsequent to this study, EM safety management personnel made a commitment to applying the best and latest criticality safety technology, as described by the DOE Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP). Over the past 7 years, this commitment has enabled the transfer of several new technologies to EM operations. In 2008, it was decided to broaden the basis of the EM NCS needs assessment to include not only current needs for technologies but also NCS operational areas with potential for improvements in controls, analysis, and regulations. A series of NCS workshops has been conducted over the past years, and needs have been identified and addressed by EM staff and contractor personnel. These workshops were organized and conducted by the EM Criticality Safety Program Manager with administrative and technical support by staff at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). This report records the progress made in identifying the needs, determining the approaches for addressing these needs, and assimilating new NCS technologies into EM fissionable material operations. In addition, the report includes projections of future EM needs and associted recommendations.

Westfall, Robert Michael↗

Criticality Safety Evaluation for 700 and 350 Gram Moderated Fissionable Equivalent (MFE) Criticality Control Areas (CCAs)

This evaluation is intended to generically apply to facilities and/or areas designated as CCAs that store and/or handle greater than 15 grams of fissionable material but no more than 700 grams of MFE. This evaluation includes facilities and/or areas designated as CCAs limited to no more than 350 grams of MFE. Activities performed in these CCAs may include general laboratory activities to include work in radiological areas, chemical procurement, material handling, sampling, imaging, non-destructive analysis, and disposing of nuclear and radiological materials. Materials included in these activities may include radioactive-contaminated oil, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and/or equipment. Fissionable materials may consist of transuranic (TRU) waste, sources containing fissionable material, uranium in various forms such as metal, oxide and silicide, however other forms of uranium and plutonium may be present. Fissionable materials may consist of fines from cutting, be solid forms mounted on a ring and embedded in epoxy or be in small volumes of dilute solutions resulting from cleaning or other processes. Major equipment located in these CCAs may include inert gas environment gloveboxes, fume hoods, ultrasonic testing equipment, hot presses, rolling mills, furnaces, gamma irradiators, autoclaves, machining equipment, tensile testing equipment, shears, forklifts and cranes.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Testing The High-Energy Prompt Neutron Signature At Low Beam Energies

Prompt fission neutrons continue to be examined as a signature for detecting the presence of fissionable material. This technique exploits the neutron energy limitations inherent with photonuclear emissions from non-fissionable material, allowing prompt fission neutrons to be identified and engaged for detecting nuclear material. Prompt neutron signal measurements were acquired with bremsstrahlung endpoint energies of 6 MeV for 18 targets comprised of both fissionable and non-fissionable material; delayed neutron measurements were also collected as a reference. The {sup 238}U target was also shielded with increasing thicknesses of lead or borated polyethylene to compare the resulting detection rates of the prompt and delayed fission neutron signals.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Comparison between the United States and United Kingdom Criticality Safety Personnel Training Program Guidance

The discipline of criticality safety (CS) has been developed in order to maintain safety in operations where significant amounts of fissionable material are to be manipulated. The operation is assessed by an individual or team of CS practitioners and an operational safety envelope is developed. The envelope can consist of limits on materials (i.e. fissionable mass, reflectors, moderators etc.), geometry (i.e. spacing, volume, etc.), and/or proscribed operating procedures which uphold a level of safety margin for personnel and equipment involved. The following paper is an overview of the similarities and differences in guidance on training programs for CS personnel at United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) laboratories. This work was performed under the auspices of Joint Working Group 30 of the Mutual Defence Agreement between the United States and United Kingdom.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Hydrogen and its detection in fusion and fission nuclear materials – a review

We report fusion and fission reactions are profoundly dependent on hydrogen for sustained reactions. Fusion is fueled by the isotopes of hydrogen, and predominantly hydrogen-based moderators slow fission neutrons to propagate chain reactions. Intentional tritium production in fusion and concomitant tritium production in fission reactors introduce challenges. The technology to efficiently extract, harvest, and quantify tritium in and from advanced fission molten salt coolants and fusion molten tritium breeder materials will require more pronounced research and development. Measuring and quantifying hydrogen is necessary in all areas of nuclear materials. Although many characterization techniques cannot directly detect hydrogen, numerous techniques provide the necessary information to understand the behavior of hydrogen in nuclear materials.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Status and Value of International Standards for Nuclear Criticality Safety

This presentation provides an update to the author's standards report provided at the ICNC-2007 meeting. It includes a discussion about the difference between, and the value of participating in, the development of international 'consensus' standards as opposed to nonconsensus standards. Standards are developed for a myriad of reasons. Generally, standards represent an agreed upon, repeatable way of doing something as defined by an individual or group of people. They come in various types. Examples include personal, family, business, industrial, commercial, and regulatory such as military, community, state, federal, and international standards. Typically, national and international 'consensus' standards are developed by individuals and organizations of diverse backgrounds representing the subject matter users and developers of a service or product and other interested parties or organizations. Within the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Technical Committee 85 (TC85) on nuclear energy, Subcommittee 5 (SC5) on nuclear fuel technology, there is a Working Group 8 (WG8) on standardization of calculations, procedures, and practices related to criticality safety. WG8 has developed, and is developing, ISO standards within the category of nuclear criticality safety of fissionable materials outside of reactors (i.e., nonreactor fissionable material nuclear fuel cycle facilities). Since the presentation of the ICNC-2007 report, WG8 has issued three new finalized international standards and is developing two more new standards. Nearly all elements of the published WG8 ISO standards have been incorporated into IAEA nonconsensus guides and standards. The progression of consensus standards development among international partners in a collegial environment establishes a synergy of different concepts that broadens the perspectives of the members. This breadth of perspectives benefits the working group members in their considerations of consensus standards developments in their own countries. A testament to the value of the international standards efforts is that nearly all elements of the published WG8 ISO standards have been incorporated into IAEA nonconsensus guides and standards and are mainly consistent with international ISO member domestic standards.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

An Assessment of the Safeguards Implications of Particle and Alloy Formation in MSRs

Molten salt reactors (MSRs) present unique challenges for applying safeguards measures and differ significantly from traditional nuclear reactors. Although the special fissionable materials within MSRs principally exist as dissolved species within the fuel salt, key actinides of interest may also be converted to solid phases including alloys and precipitated oxides via chemical and electrochemical reactions. These solid-phase components will complicate the nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) approaches that have, so far, primarily targeted measurements of the liquid salt itself. For example, most of the proposed monitoring and characterization methods for MSRs are reliant on homogeneity of the salt and the ability to maintain accountable materials in solution. Solid deposits and particulates could invalidate the assumption of homogeneity and necessitate the use of new models and measurement tools to permit a full accounting of all nuclear material in an MSR. To address this, the likelihood of solids formation in MSRs, estimated the rate at which these solids could form, and assessed the monitoring tools that are available to account for the presence of these materials were examined. Specifically, three solid forming mechanisms were investigated, including (1) the accumulation of actinides within the MSR’s structural materials due to alloying, (2) the accumulation of actinides within noble metal fission product particulates, and (3) the generation of actinide oxides from interactions with salt impurities. These modeling-informed studies were completed with considerations to both fluoride- and chloride-containing salts. It was determined that, although measurable amounts of special fissionable material were expected to alloy with the structural elements and fission products, the predicted amounts were below levels considered as significant quantities (SQ) by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, it was determined that sufficiently large oxygen concentrations could potentially lead to significant quantities of special fissionable material being converted to solid oxide phases. As such, a comparative study of technologies that are commercially available to assist in monitoring and accountancy of this material was presented. Policy implications, design recommendations, and suggestions for follow-on experimental work were also presented to further assist reactor vendors in designing and controlling the fuel salt chemistry to address potential safeguards considerations.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Verification of Subcritical Limits in ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014

The first edition of the current American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American Nuclear Society (ANS) standard ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014, “Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors,” was published in 1964 as ASA N6.1-1964, “Safety Standard for Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors.” In 1969, that standard was revised as ANSI N16.1-1969, “Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors.” ANSI N16.1-1969 includes a variety of subcritical limits (SCLs) for uniform aqueous solutions and metals containing fissile nuclides of 233 U, 235 U, and 239 Pu. Furthermore, SCLs are also included for uranium-water lattices. In the 1983 version of ANSI/ANS-8.1 (a revision of ANSI N16.1-1975), the suite of SCLs in the standard was expanded to include 235 U enrichment limits for homogeneous uranium-water mixtures and dry/damp oxides, uniform aqueous solutions of low-enriched uranium, and uniform aqueous mixtures of Pu(NO 3 ) 4 containing 240Pu in addition to the SCLs included in ANSI N16.1-1969. The SCLs have changed little in subsequent revisions (ANSI/ANS-8.1-1998 and ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014). The ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014 standard is currently being revised to include new SCLs (uranium metal and compounds with enrichments up to 20 wt% 235 U) and possible updates to the current SCLs already in the standard, although these new/updated SCLs will not be available to the nuclear criticality safety (NCS) community for a number of years. The original bases for these SCLs were documented in papers in journals such as Nuclear Science and Engineering and in ANS meeting transactions; however, these bases are ambiguous enough that sites and regulators in the United States have not widely endorsed them for safety purposes. Overall, the purpose of this paper is to present the results of a comparison study for the SCLs in the ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014 standard using modern codes (SCALE and MCNP) and cross sections (ENDF/B-VIII.0) to provide some assurance about their quality (bias and bias uncertainty) for use in NCS applications and for consideration by the ANS-8.1 Working Group as a reference for future revisions.

42 ENGINEERING↗

A scintillating fission detector for neutron flux measurements

Neutron flux monitors are commonly used for a variety of nuclear physics applications. A scintillating neutron detector, consisting of a liquid scintillator loaded with fissionable material, has been developed, characterized, and tested in the beam line at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center, and shows a significant improvement in neutron sensitivity compared with a conventional fission chamber. Recent research on nanocomposite-based scintillators for gamma-ray detection indicates that this approach can be extended to load nanoparticles of fissionable material into a scintillating matrix, with up to three orders of magnitude higher loading than typical fission chambers. This will result in a rugged, cost-efficient detector with high efficiency, a short signal rise time, and the ability to be used in low neutron-flux environments. Initial efforts to utilize the luminescence of uranyl oxide to eliminate the need for wavelength-shifting dyes were unsuccessful. Excitation of uranyl compounds has been reported at wavelengths ranging from 266 nm to 532 nm. However, neither the 300 nm emission of toluene, nor the 350 nm emission of PPO, nor the 410 nm emission of POPOP resulted in significant excitation of and emission by uranyl oxide. As indicated by UV/visible spectroscopy, light emitted at these wavelengths was absorbed by the colored solution. {sup 235}U remains the most attractive candidate for a fissionable scintillator, due to its high fission cross-section and lack of a threshold fission energy, but all solutions containing molecular uranium compounds will be colored, most more highly than the U{sup 6+} compounds used here. Research is therefore continuing toward the fabrication of uranium nanoparticles, in which, due to Rayleigh scattering, the coloration should be less pronounced. The characterization of the thorium-loaded liquid scintillator and the fabrication of the 100 mL detectors for use at LANSCE demonstrated the feasibility of loading fissionable material into a liquid scintillator. Analysis of beam line experiments using the thorium-loaded scintillator is underway to determine the fission event rate in the detector, for comparison with a conventional fission chamber as well as with an unloaded liquid scintillator.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Multiscale Simulation of Thermo-mechanical Processes in Irradiated Fission-reactor Materials

This report contains a summary of progress made on the subtask area on phase field model development for microstructure evolution in irradiated materials, which was a part of the Computational Materials Science Network (CMSN) project entitled: Multiscale Simulation of Thermo-mechanical Processes in Irradiated Fission-reactor Materials. The model problem chosen has been that of void nucleation and growth under irradiation conditions in single component systems.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Detection of Fissile Materials through Primary Cosmic Ray Interactions

Experiments performed by an LLNL team at the White Mountain Research center discovered that primary cosmic ray interactions on high-Z material produced large bursts of correlated neutrons. In fissionable material, these neutrons will start fission chains enhancing the neutron signature with a characteristic time signature. This signature could be a unique method for discovering fissionable material in challenging environments.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Fifty-Five Gallon Drum Standard Study

Fifty-five gallon drums are routinely used within the U.S. for the storage and eventual disposal of fissionable materials as Transuranic or low-level waste. To support these operations, criticality safety evaluations are required. A questionnaire was developed and sent to selected Endusers at Hanford, Idaho National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Oak Ridge and the Savannah River Site to solicit current practices. This questionnaire was used to gather information on the kinds of fissionable materials packaged into drums, the models used in performing criticality safety evaluations in support of operations involving these drums, and the limits and controls established for the handling and storage of these drums. The completed questionnaires were reviewed and clarifications solicited through individual communications with each Enduser to obtain more complete and consistent responses. All five sites have similar drum operations involving thousands to tens of thousands of fissionable material waste drums. The primary sources for these drums are legacy (prior operations) and decontamination and decommissioning wastes at all sites except Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The results from this survey and our review are discussed in this paper.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Establishing no credible risk of inadvertent criticality for the K-25 demolition project - 14310

Demolition of the K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plant required establishing a non-credible risk of inadvertent criticality because a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) could not be reliably maintained operable as the building was being torn down. Preparation for, and demolition of, the facility was a multi-year long effort with significant changes in approach. The most significant change was to demolish the facility with as much of the process gas equipment and piping left in the facility as possible, rather than removing all process gas equipment and piping from the facility prior to demolishing the building structure only. The contractor had to adapt their approach to accommodate these changes. The normal approach to demolition was to remove all process gas equipment and piping prior to demolition, using Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) controls based on the double contingency principle, while CAAS coverage was intact. Then, the building structure was demolished with no requirement for a CAAS. This was the method used to demolish the K-33 Building, for example. In the case of K-25 demolition, all equipment and piping that met the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) disposal cell Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) was left in the building and removed as part of the building demolition process. This resulted in significant quantities of fissionable material remaining in the building and being handled during demolition. The NCS Organization worked closely with several groups during preparation activities. A Data Management organization was established to specifically identify every piece of process gas equipment and piping in the facility so that it could be accounted for and characterized. Deactivation and Decommissioning (D and D) personnel conducted internal visual inspections, by remote camera, of all process gas equipment and piping larger than 3' diameter, to reveal any large deposits that would require removal. Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) of the vast majority of equipment and piping was required to quantify the amount of fissionable material remaining. Finally, all process gas equipment and piping larger than 3'' diameter was internally filled with foam, which was credited by NCS with immobilizing the remaining fissionable material such that large migration and accumulation could not occur during demolition activities. NCS personnel worked closely with all of these groups in order to acquire the data and information needed to establish a non-credible risk of inadvertent criticality during building demolition. Good communication and a close working relationship between NCS, the various D and D/characterization personnel, and the Department of Energy (DOE) ensured the success of the modified approach to building demolition. The same successful approach is currently underway in the K-27 Building as well. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Experimental Fuels Facility Re-categorization Based on Facility Segmentation

The Experimental Fuels Facility (EFF) (MFC-794) at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) located on the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site was originally constructed to provide controlled-access, indoor storage for radiological contaminated equipment. Use of the facility was expanded to provide a controlled environment for repairing contaminated equipment and characterizing, repackaging, and treating waste. The EFF facility is also used for research and development services, including fuel fabrication. EFF was originally categorized as a LTHC-3 radiological facility based on facility operations and facility radiological inventories. Newly planned program activities identified the need to receive quantities of fissionable materials in excess of the single parameter subcritical limit in ANSI/ANS-8.1, “Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors” (identified as “criticality list” quantities in DOE-STD-1027-92, “Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports,” Attachment 1, Table A.1). Since the proposed inventory of fissionable materials inside EFF may be greater than the single parameter sub-critical limit of 700 g of U-235 equivalent, the initial re-categorization is Hazard Category (HC) 2 based upon a potential criticality hazard. This paper details the facility hazard categorization performed for the EFF. The categorization was necessary to determine (a) the need for further safety analysis in accordance with LWP-10802, “INL Facility Categorization,” and (b) compliance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830, Subpart B, “Safety Basis Requirements.” Based on the segmentation argument presented in this paper, the final hazard categorization for the facility is LTHC-3. Department of Energy Idaho (DOE-ID) approval of the final hazard categorization determined by this hazard assessment document (HAD) was required per the DOE-ID Supplemental Guidance for DOE-STD-1027-92 based on the proposed downgrade of the initial facility categorization of Hazard Category 2.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Detection of special nuclear material from delayed neutron emission induced by a dual-particle monoenergetic source

Detection of unique signatures of special nuclear materials is critical for their interdiction in a variety of nuclear security and nonproliferation scenarios. We report on the observation of delayed neutrons from fission of uranium induced in dual-particle active interrogation based on the {sup 11}B(d,n γ){sup 12}C nuclear reaction. Majority of the fissions are attributed to fast fission induced by the incident quasi-monoenergetic neutrons. A Li-doped glass–polymer composite scintillation neutron detector, which displays excellent neutron/γ discrimination at low energies, was used in the measurements, along with a recoil-based liquid scintillation detector. Time-dependent buildup and decay of delayed neutron emission from {sup 238}U were measured between the interrogating beam pulses and after the interrogating beam was turned off, respectively. Characteristic buildup and decay time profiles were compared to the common parametrization into six delayed neutron groups, finding a good agreement between the measurement and nuclear data. This method is promising for detecting fissile and fissionable materials in cargo scanning applications and can be readily integrated with transmission radiography using low-energy nuclear reaction sources.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Multiscale Simulation of Thermo-Mechanical Processes in Irradiated Fission-Reactor Materials

This research characterized, by atomic level molecular dynamics (MD) simulations, the early stage aggregation of the fission product xenon in a model uranium oxide nuclear fuel matrix that contributes to the long term bubble formation mechanisms that compromise the efficiency and lifetime of nuclear fuels. These atomic level computer simulations disclosed a previously unknown pre-coarsening phenomenon in which the clustering of xenon is driven by vacancy diffusion. These key findings are to be included in higher level simulations of nuclear fuel thermo-mechanical processes that model irradiation effects within nuclear fuels. Previous multiscale models did not include these early time pre-coarsened clusters that occur in the nanosecond regime and therefore will lead to a better understanding of bubble formation in nuclear fuels.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗