Results for “Fault mitigation strategy” — Page 2

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Assessing Impact of Joint Actuator Failure on Lunar Rover Mobility

Wheeled rovers are critical to exploration of the lunar surface, and loss of mobility actuators can have mission-ending consequences. NASA’s upcoming Volatiles Investigating Polar Exploration Rover (VIPER) has a four-wheeled active suspension, which gives it flexible extreme terrain mobility at the cost of an increased number of mobility actuators and potentially a higher mobility cost due to actuator loss than might occur on a similar six-wheeled rover. Impact varies greatly by both the affected joint and its failure state, and that in some cases modification of driving strategy may be able to partially mitigate mobility impact.

rover↗

NASA NTRS2022

Electrical Ground Support Equipment for the Sampling Caching System of the Mars 2020 Rover

In this work we describe in detail the architecture, design, testing and operation of the Electrical Ground Support Equipment (EGSE) “Blue Box” used to test and validate the Sampling Caching System (SCS) of the Mars 2020 Perseverance rover. The Blue Box architecture is centered around COTS motor controllers and COTS input-output modules communicating over an EtherCAT bus. A custom, low-level safety subsystem ensures no harm can be done to the flight articles. The modular architecture of the EGSE reduces cost and complexity while expediting assembly time. The Blue Box drives the 19 actuators of the SCS which span the main robotic arm, the corer system, the internal sample handling arm, the sample tube sealing system and the gas dust removal tool; mimicking the Rover Motor Control Assembly (RMCA). Due to the limited availability of RMCA’s, the EGSE enabled and performed the bulk of testing activities for SCS. The majority of the SCS actuators are composed of a 3-phase DC brushless motors, hall sensors for commutation, dual resolvers for output angular measurement, brakes, heaters and platinum thermistors. Additionally, the EGSE read 12 strain gauges forming part of a force torque sensor, and switches used for external positioning references. Over the 3-year span of the V&V campaign for the SCS, over 32 EGSE systems were built, tested and deployed to test venues at JPL and externally. The EGSE tested several families of the SCS subsystem, ranging from engineering units, life test units and two flight units. Test venues that this EGSE supported included lab benches, ultra-clean cleanrooms, ATLO facilities, and thermal vacuum chambers. Together with the test software systems, SSDEV and SSDEV-ECAT, the Blue Box EGSE enabled the team to efficiently test flight hardware and flight software together. We go over the safety features and fault management techniques employed to protect flight hardware. The effects of the long, 50-feet, EGSE harnesses on motor performance, EMI, electrical noise, and motor control performance are explained. Mitigations to these unwanted effects, including shielding strategy and inductance compensation, are summarized. We go over an excerpt of notable anomalies that this EGSE suffered through its operation, along with investigations and resolutions. Lessons learned, areas of improvement as part of future work, and recommendations for future implementations for similar EGSE’s, are shared.

Levine, Dan↗

NASA NTRS2010

Risk Mitigation for Managing On-Orbit Anomalies

This slide presentation reviews strategies for managing risk mitigation that occur with anomalies in on-orbit spacecraft. It reviews the risks associated with mission operations, a diagram of the method used to manage undesirable events that occur which is a closed loop fault analysis and until corrective action is successful. It also reviews the fish bone diagram which is used if greater detail is required and aids in eliminating possible failure factors.

La, Jim↗

NASA NTRS2022

Building a lifeboat: MSL’s uplink and installation campaign to restore a failing backup computer

Flight software updates are among the hardest andmost dangerous activities for the Mars Science Laboratory(MSL) Curiosity team. While danger is often mitigated bybackups, fallback strategies, and incremental installation withground-in-the-loop cycles which provide a safety net for theinstallation process, the software update described in this paperwas unable to use many of the common practices due to thenature of the fault addressed by the update. The MSL rover(landed August 2012) encountered a problem with one of itscomputer’s non-volatile storage chips in 2019, requiring a swapto its backup computer and an urgent software upgrade calledR-Hope. R-Hope, a lifeboat to be used in the event of primarycomputer issues, was written, tested, and sent to the rover inlightning speed of just 19 months. Multi-mission and teamcoordination allowed the 49 flight software image files to beuplinked to the rover over a 6-week period, using multiple pathsand backup options for speedy delivery. In the end, the RHopesoftware upgrade returned the computer to operation asa backup flight computer. The flight software transition wasdesigned to impact science return as little as possible, and installationplans included science activities for the majority of MSLinstruments. This paper describes the uplink and installationcampaigns for R-Hope, and discusses the notable lessons learnedby the operations team.

Byrne, DJ↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned from Astrobee Operations on the International Space Station

Since its launch in 2019, NASA has been operating three Astrobee free-flying robots providing an autonomous and adaptable research platform aboard the International Space Station (ISS). These robots have not only facilitated a myriad of national and international research endeavors in microgravity but have also served as a STEM outreach platform for student competitions aboard the ISS. Amidst its extensive operational tenure, spanning over five years and exceeding 1200 hours of cumulative free-flyer operation as of April 2024, the Astrobee robots have encountered software and hardware anomalies. Despite its inherent design for on-orbit repair or replacement, certain anomalies have proven to be complex, necessitating remote resolution via software and firmware updates or, in extreme cases, hardware replacements or the return of faulty units to NASA's ground facilities for repair. Such challenges underscore the delicate balance between the autonomous functionality of Astrobee and the occasional need for human intervention to maintain optimal performance. One recurring point of failure identified during Astrobee's operational lifespan has been the SD card, a critical component utilized by the different Astrobee processors and the Dock Station. The occurrence of SD card anomalies, both on orbit and within ground units, has provided invaluable insights into the improvement of Astrobee's systems and mitigation to future faults. This presentation will focus on four key areas: 1. Overview of Faults and Anomalies: A comprehensive examination of the diverse array of faults and anomalies encountered by Astrobee and its associated systems both in orbit and on the ground. From software glitches to hardware malfunctions, this section provides insights into the challenges faced during Astrobee's operational tenure. 2. Resolution Processes and Procedures: An in-depth discussion of the methodologies and procedures implemented to resolve the encountered anomalies. This includes remote troubleshooting, software patches, firmware updates, and, when necessary, the logistics involved in hardware replacements or down-massing for repair. 3. Implementation of Software Updates and Hardware Upgrades: A detailed exploration of the strategies employed to mitigate the risk of recurring anomalies through the implementation of software updates and hardware upgrades. This section highlights the iterative nature of Astrobee's development, emphasizing the continuous pursuit of robustness and reliability. 4. Lessons Learned and Future Directions: Reflecting on the insights gained from addressing anomalies, this section examines the lessons learned and outlines future directions for enhancing Astrobee's robustness and resilience. It underscores the iterative nature of space exploration and the importance of adaptability and continuous improvement in the pursuit of scientific discovery. Through a nuanced examination of Astrobee's operational challenges and the strategies employed to overcome them, this presentation sheds light on the complexities of operating autonomous robotic systems in the ISS environment. It underscores NASA's commitment to pushing the boundaries of exploration and innovation while navigating the inherent challenges of space exploration.

Astrobee↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned from Astrobee Operations on the International Space Station

Since its launch in 2019, NASA has been operating three Astrobee free-flying robots providing an autonomous and adaptable research platform aboard the International Space Station (ISS). These robots have not only facilitated a myriad of national and international research endeavors in microgravity but have also served as a STEM outreach platform for student competitions aboard the ISS. Amidst its extensive operational tenure, spanning over five years and exceeding 1200 hours of cumulative free-flyer operation as of April 2024, the Astrobee robots have encountered software and hardware anomalies. Despite its inherent design for on-orbit repair or replacement, certain anomalies have proven to be complex, necessitating remote resolution via software and firmware updates or, in extreme cases, hardware replacements or the return of faulty units to NASA's ground facilities for repair. Such challenges underscore the delicate balance between the autonomous functionality of Astrobee and the occasional need for human intervention to maintain optimal performance. One recurring point of failure identified during Astrobee's operational lifespan has been the SD card, a critical component utilized by the different Astrobee processors and the Dock Station. The occurrence of SD card anomalies, both on orbit and within ground units, has provided invaluable insights into the improvement of Astrobee's systems and mitigation to future faults. This presentation will focus on four key areas: 1. Overview of Faults and Anomalies: A comprehensive examination of the diverse array of faults and anomalies encountered by Astrobee and its associated systems both in orbit and on the ground. From software glitches to hardware malfunctions, this section provides insights into the challenges faced during Astrobee's operational tenure. 2. Resolution Processes and Procedures: An in-depth discussion of the methodologies and procedures implemented to resolve the encountered anomalies. This includes remote troubleshooting, software patches, firmware updates, and, when necessary, the logistics involved in hardware replacements or down-massing for repair. 3. Implementation of Software Updates and Hardware Upgrades: A detailed exploration of the strategies employed to mitigate the risk of recurring anomalies through the implementation of software updates and hardware upgrades. This section highlights the iterative nature of Astrobee's development, emphasizing the continuous pursuit of robustness and reliability. 4. Lessons Learned and Future Directions: Reflecting on the insights gained from addressing anomalies, this section examines the lessons learned and outlines future directions for enhancing Astrobee's robustness and resilience. It underscores the iterative nature of space exploration and the importance of adaptability and continuous improvement in the pursuit of scientific discovery. Through a nuanced examination of Astrobee's operational challenges and the strategies employed to overcome them, this presentation sheds light on the complexities of operating autonomous robotic systems in the ISS environment. It underscores NASA's commitment to pushing the boundaries of exploration and innovation while navigating the inherent challenges of space exploration.

Astrobee↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Creating Formal Characterizations ofRoutine Contingency Management inCommercial Aviation

Traditional approaches to safety management focus on collection of data describing unwanted states (i.e., accidents and incidents) and analysis of undesired behaviors (i.e., faults and errors) that precede those states. Thus, in the traditional view of safety, safety is both defined and measured by its absence, namely the lack of safety. In extremely high confidence systems like commercial air transport, however, opportunities to measure the absence of safety are relatively rare. Ironically, a critical barrier to measuring safety and the impact of mitigation strategies in commercial aviation is the lack of opportunities for measurement.

Intelligent Contingency Management,↗

NASA NTRS2021

Electrified Aircraft Propulsion Systems: Gas Turbine Control Considerations for the Mitigation of Potential Failure Modes and Hazards

This paper provides a high-level review of the potential failure modes and hazards to which electrified aircraft propulsion (EAP) systems are susceptible along with potential gas turbine control-based strategies to assist in the mitigation of those failures. To introduce the types of failures that an EAP system may experience, a generic EAP system is considered consisting of gas turbine engines, mechanical drives, electric machines, power electronics and distribution systems, energy storage devices, and motor driven propulsors. The functionality provided by each of these EAP subsystems is discussed along with their potential failure modes and possible strategies for mitigating those failures. To further illustrate the role of gas turbine controls in mitigating EAP failure modes, an example based on a simulated EAP concept aircraft proposed by NASA is given. The effects of failures are discussed, along with turbomachinery control strategies, including reversionary control modes, and control limit logic

Electrified Aircraft Propulsion↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Active Swarm Resiliency in the HelioSwarm Mission

Designed to observe plasma turbulence dynamics in solar wind over a distributed volume of space, the HelioSwarm mission comprises a primary chief spacecraft and eight smaller deputy satellites in uniquely assigned “loops” of periodic relative motion in a P/2 lunar resonant orbit. If one or more deputies fail, this multi-satellite architecture facilitates resiliency for science goals through repositioning of satellites to contingency loops. This strategy of Active Swarm Resiliency mitigates risk by modeling quantitative results ahead of time for mission operators to make informed decisions. Responsive actions meet minimum science objectives based on past and predicted system performance, an approach with applications to future missions with similar architecture and requirements.

Fault Management↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Active Swarm Resiliency in the HelioSwarm Mission

Designed to observe plasma turbulence dynamics in solar wind over a distributed volume of space, the HelioSwarm mission comprises a primary chief spacecraft and eight smaller deputy satellites in uniquely assigned “loops” of periodic relative motion in a P/2 lunar resonant orbit. If one or more deputies fail, this multi-satellite architecture facilitates resiliency for science goals through repositioning of satellites to contingency loops. This strategy of Active Swarm Resiliency mitigates risk by modeling quantitative results ahead of time for mission operators to make informed decisions. Responsive actions meet minimum science objectives based on past and predicted system performance, an approach with applications to future missions with similar architecture and requirements.

Fault Management↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Failure Behavior and Control Based Mitigation for a Parallel Hybrid Propulsion System

NASA is pursuing research to advance Electrified Aircraft Propulsion (EAP) technologies that address fuel burn and emission reduction goals. EAP brings the potential for improved performance over the state of the art. However, for these systems to be practical and certifiable, they need to possess adequate robustness to adverse conditions including a variety of system failures that are not applicable to conventional turbofans today. Numerous EAP concepts interface gas turbine engines with an electrical power system that includes electric machines and sometimes electrical energy storage. The expansion of the powertrain increases the probability of encountering a failure and introduces new failure modes. Failures within the electrical power system may also impact the gas turbine engine(s) to which the electrical powertrain is coupled. This effort investigates failures originating in the electrical power system and their impact on the parallel hybrid propulsion system. Reversionary control strategies are also demonstrated to reduce the impact of the failures. Failure mitigation strategies were devised and employed in simulation. Various failure scenarios were simulated including those occurring during steady state operation, transients, and takeoff and landing scenarios. The timing of the failure and delay in failure identification and activation of mitigation strategies are noteworthy variables in the study. While the system remained stable throughout all failure scenarios, delays in failure identification could result in undesirable conditions such as increased operating temperatures and reduced stall margin. The results demonstrate successful mitigation of failures through reversionary control modes and help to generate confidence in the robustness of the conceptual parallel hybrid propulsion system.

Failure behavior↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Failure Behavior and Control-Based Mitigation for a Parallel Hybrid Propulsion System

NASA is pursuing research to advance Electrified Aircraft Propulsion (EAP) technologies that address fuel burn and emission reduction goals. EAP brings the potential for improved performance over the state of the art. However, for these systems to be practical and certifiable, they need to possess adequate robustness to adverse conditions including a variety of system failures that are not applicable to conventional turbofans today. Numerous EAP concepts interface gas turbine engines with an electrical power system that includes electric machines and sometimes electrical energy storage. The expansion of the powertrain increases the probability of encountering a failure and introduces new failure modes. Failures within the electrical power system may also impact the gas turbine engine(s) to which the electrical powertrain is coupled. This effort investigates failures originating in the electrical power system and their impact on the parallel hybrid propulsion system. Reversionary control strategies are also demonstrated to reduce the impact of the failures. Failure mitigation strategies were devised and employed in simulation. Various failure scenarios were simulated including those occurring during steady state operation, transients, and takeoff and landing scenarios. The timing of the failure and delay in failure identification and activation of mitigation strategies are noteworthy variables in the study. While the system remained stable throughout all failure scenarios, delays in failure identification could result in undesirable conditions such as increased operating temperatures and reduced stall margin. The results demonstrate successful mitigation of failures through reversionary control modes and help to generate confidence in the robustness of the conceptual parallel hybrid propulsion system.

Failure behavior↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Failure Modes and Mitigation Strategies for a Turboelectric Aircraft Concept with Turbine Electrified Energy Management

The electrification of gas turbine engines represents a major step-change in aircraft propulsion systems commonly known as Electrified Aircraft Propulsion (EAP). EAP involves the integration of electric machines potentially functioning as generators for large scale power extraction, as motors providing electrical augmentation of the engine spools, and even as a means of driving propulsors beyond the immediate scope of the engine. It may also include the use of energy storage. These and other characteristics of hybrid electric propulsion systems are relatively new to aircraft propulsion. The expanded propulsion architecture can be leveraged to improve propulsive efficiency and achieve better vehicle aerodynamics and controllability. It can also allow for additional benefits such as those enabled through Turbine Electrified Energy Management (TEEM). As the propulsion system and its functions expand, new failure modes are introduced. Due to the highly coupled nature of the propulsion system, failures could propagate throughout the system in ways that are unique to the new EAP architectures. To build confidence in the safety and practicality of EAP concepts, these failure modes need to be identified, explored, and addressed through mitigation strategies. This paper seeks to evaluate failure modes and failure mitigation strategies for the EAP concept known as the Single aisle Turboelectric AiRCaft with Aft Boundary Layer propulsor (STARC-ABL). The TEEM control concept is applied to improve transient operability. Several failure modes are considered and control based failure mitigation strategies are proposed with the goal of retaining operability and overall thrust. The results demonstrate the ability to maintain operability and a substantial amount of thrust in the event of various types of failures. Some challenges are also identified and discussed.

Turbine Electrified Energy Management↗

NASA NTRS2022

Evaluation and Improvement of System-of-Systems Resilience in a Simulation of Wildfire Emergency Response

Because of the increasing threat that wildfires pose, there is interest in leveraging new technologies to improve firefighting. Specifically, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and UAS Traffic Management (UTM) promise to improve firefighters’ situational awareness, coordination, communications, safety, and strategy. While these technologies could be beneficial, there has been little formal investigation into how much benefit would occur and whether these benefits would outweigh hazards introduced by these systems. To better understand the impacts of these technologies, this paper presents a high-level dynamic simulation for evaluating wildfire response performance and resilience incorporating fire propagation, surveillance and communication, response planning, and the resulting mitigation actions. This simulation is then used to study the impact of communications and surveillance improvement, considering (1) the effect on fire containment and ground crew injuries and (2) the effect of introduced and existing disruptive fault scenarios. Simulating this model over a large number of scenarios finds that these changes can improve containment and reduce ground crew injuries. While these improvements generalize over both existing and introduced single-fault scenarios and thus result in a more resilient system, they could be negated if the introduced communications infrastructure is prone to full-scale outages.

modeling↗

NASA NTRS2009

Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Decision Making During Spacecraft Operations

Decisions made during the operational phase of a space mission often have significant and immediate consequences. Without the explicit consideration of the risks involved and their representation in a solid model, it is very likely that these risks are not considered systematically in trade studies. Wrong decisions during the operational phase of a space mission can lead to immediate system failure whereas correct decisions can help recover the system even from faulty conditions. A problem of special interest is the determination of the system fault protection strategies upon the occurrence of faults within the system. Decisions regarding the fault protection strategy also heavily rely on a correct understanding of the state of the system and an integrated risk model that represents the various possible scenarios and their respective likelihoods. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) modeling is applicable to the full lifecycle of a space mission project, from concept development to preliminary design, detailed design, development and operations. The benefits and utilities of the model, however, depend on the phase of the mission for which it is used. This is because of the difference in the key strategic decisions that support each mission phase. The focus of this paper is on describing the particular methods used for PRA modeling during the operational phase of a spacecraft by gleaning insight from recently conducted case studies on two operational Mars orbiters. During operations, the key decisions relate to the commands sent to the spacecraft for any kind of diagnostics, anomaly resolution, trajectory changes, or planning. Often, faults and failures occur in the parts of the spacecraft but are contained or mitigated before they can cause serious damage. The failure behavior of the system during operations provides valuable data for updating and adjusting the related PRA models that are built primarily based on historical failure data. The PRA models, in turn, provide insight into the effect of various faults or failures on the risk and failure drivers of the system and the likelihood of possible end case scenarios, thereby facilitating the decision making process during operations. This paper describes the process of adjusting PRA models based on observed spacecraft data, on one hand, and utilizing the models for insight into the future system behavior on the other hand. While PRA models are typically used as a decision aid during the design phase of a space mission, we advocate adjusting them based on the observed behavior of the spacecraft and utilizing them for decision support during the operations phase.

dynamic fault trees↗

NASA NTRS2017

Cloudy with a Chance of Solar Flares: The Sun as a Natural Hazard

Space weather is a naturally occurring phenomenon that represents a quantifiable risk to space- and ground-based infrastructure as well as society at large. Space weather hazards include permanent and correctable faults in computer systems, Global Positioning System (GPS) and high-frequency communication disturbances, increased airline passenger and astronaut radiation exposure, and electric grid disruption. From the National Space Weather Strategy, published by the Office of Science and Technology Policy in October 2015, space weather refers to the dynamic conditions of the space environment that arise from emissions from the Sun, which include solar flares, solar energetic particles, and coronal mass ejections. These emissions can interact with Earth and its surrounding space, including the Earth's magnetic field, potentially disrupting technologies and infrastructures. Space weather is measured using a range of space- and ground-based platforms that directly monitor the Sun, the Earth's magnetic field, the conditions in interplanetary space and impacts at Earth's surface, like neutron ground-level enhancement. The NASA Goddard Space Flight Center's Space Weather Research Center and their international collaborators in government, industry, and academia are working towards improved techniques for predicting space weather as part of the strategy and action plan to better quantify and mitigate space weather hazards. In addition to accurately measuring and predicting space weather, we also need to continue developing more advanced techniques for evaluating space weather impacts on space- and ground-based infrastructure. Within the Earth's atmosphere, elevated neutron flux driven by atmosphere-particle interactions from space weather is a primary risk source. Ground-based neutron sources form an essential foundation for quantifying space weather impacts in a variety of systems.

neutron flux↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Dynamical Decoupling of Crosstalk on Superconducting Qubit Devices

Current NISQ devices are prone to errors. In order to be used for practical applications or achieve fault-tolerant thresholds, strategies to suppress error rates will be needed to maximize the potential of noisy devices. Dynamical decoupling (DD) is one such strategy for suppressing — or at least alleviating — the effects of decoherence, in which sequences of pulses are applied to qubits to decouple their interaction with the environment. Through experimental runs performed on several Rigetti quantum computing units (QPUs), we first demonstrate that DD is capable of improving coherence times for isolated qubits, as well as suppressing errors caused by the ZZ coupling between pairs of qubits. Extending this framework to cycles containing2-qubit gates, we show that DD can be inserted to decouple qubits from crosstalk occurring during neighboring 2-qubit gates, and demonstrate the efficacy of this procedure on quantum approximate optimization algorithm (QAOA) circuits. We also explore the usage of tailored DD sequences for the suppression of characterized error channels. We are grateful for support from the NASA Ames Research Center and from the DARPA ONISQ program under interagency agreement IAA 8839,Annex 114. HYH is supported by the USRA Feynman QuantumAcademy funded by the NAMS R&D Student Program and a UCHellman Fellowship. JS, ZGI and ZW are supported by USRA NASAAcademic Mission Service (NNA16BD14C).

Dynamical decoupling↗

NASA NTRS2006

Fault Management Techniques in Human Spaceflight Operations

This paper discusses human spaceflight fault management operations. Fault detection and response capabilities available in current US human spaceflight programs Space Shuttle and International Space Station are described while emphasizing system design impacts on operational techniques and constraints. Preflight and inflight processes along with products used to anticipate, mitigate and respond to failures are introduced. Examples of operational products used to support failure responses are presented. Possible improvements in the state of the art, as well as prioritization and success criteria for their implementation are proposed. This paper describes how the architecture of a command and control system impacts operations in areas such as the required fault response times, automated vs. manual fault responses, use of workarounds, etc. The architecture includes the use of redundancy at the system and software function level, software capabilities, use of intelligent or autonomous systems, number and severity of software defects, etc. This in turn drives which Caution and Warning (C&W) events should be annunciated, C&W event classification, operator display designs, crew training, flight control team training, and procedure development. Other factors impacting operations are the complexity of a system, skills needed to understand and operate a system, and the use of commonality vs. optimized solutions for software and responses. Fault detection, annunciation, safing responses, and recovery capabilities are explored using real examples to uncover underlying philosophies and constraints. These factors directly impact operations in that the crew and flight control team need to understand what happened, why it happened, what the system is doing, and what, if any, corrective actions they need to perform. If a fault results in multiple C&W events, or if several faults occur simultaneously, the root cause(s) of the fault(s), as well as their vehicle-wide impacts, must be determined in order to maintain situational awareness. This allows both automated and manual recovery operations to focus on the real cause of the fault(s). An appropriate balance must be struck between correcting the root cause failure and addressing the impacts of that fault on other vehicle components. Lastly, this paper presents a strategy for using lessons learned to improve the software, displays, and procedures in addition to determining what is a candidate for automation. Enabling technologies and techniques are identified to promote system evolution from one that requires manual fault responses to one that uses automation and autonomy where they are most effective. These considerations include the value in correcting software defects in a timely manner, automation of repetitive tasks, making time critical responses autonomous, etc. The paper recommends the appropriate use of intelligent systems to determine the root causes of faults and correctly identify separate unrelated faults.

O'Hagan, Brian↗