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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1980

Cycles till failure of silver-zinc cells with completing failures modes: Preliminary data analysis

One hundred and twenty nine cells were run through charge-discharge cycles until failure. The experiment design was a variant of a central composite factorial in five factors. Preliminary data analysis consisted of response surface estimation of life. Batteries fail under two basic modes; a low voltage condition and an internal shorting condition. A competing failure modes analysis using maximum likelihood estimation for the extreme value life distribution was performed. Extensive diagnostics such as residual plotting and probability plotting were employed to verify data quality and choice of model.

Sidik, S. M.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Failure of the ERBE scanner instrument aboard NOAA 10 spacecraft and results of failure analysis

The Earth Radiation Budget Experiment (ERBE) scanner instrument on the NOAA 10 spacecraft malfunctioned on May 22, 1989, after more than 4 years of in-flight operation. After the failure, all instrument operational mode commands were tested and the resulting data analyzed. Details of the tests and analysis of output data are discussed therein. The radiometric and housekeeping data appear to be valid. However, the instrument will not correctly execute operational scan mode commands or the preprogrammed calibration sequences. The data indicate the problem is the result of a failure in the internal address decoding circuity in one of the ROM (read only memory) chips of the instrument computer.

Miller, J. B.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Synthetic Failure Mode Generation for Resilience Analysis and Failure Mechanism Discovery

Traditional risk-based design processes seek to mitigate operational hazards by manually identifying possible faults and corresponding mitigation strategies—a tedious process which critically relies on the designer’s limited knowledge. Resilience-based design, on the other hand, seeks to embody generic hazard-mitigating properties in the system to mitigate unknown hazards, often by modelling the system's response to potential hazardous events. This work adapts this approach to the traditional risk-based design process to synthetically generate hazardous modes, by representing them as a unique combination of internal component health-states which can then be injected and simulated in a model of the system failure dynamics. The design process may then reduce the risk of unknown internal hazards by iteratively mitigating the effects of these modes. The performance of this approach is evaluated in a model of an autonomous rover, where cluster analysis shows that elaborating the space of synthetic faults in the drive system using this approach uncovers a wider range of possible hazardous trajectories and failure consequences within each trajectory. However, this increase in hazard information comes at a high computational expense, highlighting the need for advanced, efficient methods to search and sample the hazard space.

Simulation↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Synthetic Failure Mode Generation for Resilience Analysis and Failure Mechanism Discovery

Traditional risk-based design processes seek to mitigate operational hazards by manually identifying possible faults and corresponding mitigation strategies—a tedious process which critically relies on the designer’s limited knowledge. Resilience-based design, on the other hand, seeks to embody generic hazard-mitigating properties in the system to mitigate unknown hazards, often by modelling the system's response to potential hazardous events. This work adapts this approach to the traditional risk-based design process to synthetically generate hazardous modes, by representing them as a unique combination of internal component health-states which can then be injected and simulated in a model of the system failure dynamics. The design process may then reduce the risk of unknown internal hazards by iteratively mitigating the effects of these modes. The performance of this approach is evaluated in a model of an autonomous rover, where cluster analysis shows that elaborating the space of synthetic faults in the drive system using this approach uncovers a wider range of possible hazardous trajectories and failure consequences within each trajectory. However, this increase in hazard information comes at a high computational expense, highlighting the need for advanced, efficient methods to search and sample the hazard space.

Simulation↗
NASA NTRS2004

Genesis failure investigation report : JPL Failure Review Board, Avionics Sub-Team

On January 7, 2001, the Genesis spacecraft lifted off from Cape Canaveral. Its mission was to collect solar wind samples and return those samples to Earth for detailed analysis by scientists. The mission proceeded successfully for three-and-a-half years. On September 8, 2004, the spacecraft approached Earth, pointed the Sample Return Capsule (SRC) at its entry target, and then fired pyros that jettisoned the SRC. The SRC carried the valuable samples collected over the prior 29 months. The SRC also contained the requisite hardware (mechanisms, parachutes, and electronics) to manage the process of entry, descent, and landing (EDL). After entering Earthas atmosphere, the SRC was expected to open a drogue parachute. This should have been followed by a pyro event to release the drogue chute, and then by a pyro event to deploy the main parachute at an approximate elevation of 6.7 kilometers. As the SRC descended to the Utah landing site, helicopters were in position to capture the SRC before the capsule touched down. On September 8, 2004, observers of the SRCas triumphant return became concerned as the NASA announcer fell silent, and then became even more alarmed as they watched the spacecraft tumble as it streaked across the sky. Long-distance cameras clearly showed that the drogue parachute had not deployed properly. On September 9, 2004, General Eugene Tattini, Deputy Director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory formed a Failure Review Board (FRB). This board was charged with investigating the cause of the Genesis mishap in close concert with the NASA Mishap Investigation Board (MIB). The JPL-FRB was populated with experts from within and external to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The JPL-FRB participated with the NASA-MIB through all phases of the investigation, working jointly and concurrently as one team to discover the facts of the mishap.

solar wind↗
NASA NTRS2005

Learning from Failures: Archiving and Designing with Failure and Risk

Identifying and mitigating risks during conceptual design remains an ongoing challenge. This work presents the results of collaborative efforts between The University of Missouri-Rolla and NASA Ames Research Center to examine how an early stage mission design team at NASA addresses risk, and, how a computational support tool can assist these designers in their tasks. Results of our observations are given in addition to a brief example of our implementation of a repository based computational tool that allows users to browse and search through archived failure and risk data as related to either physical artifacts or functionality.

VanWie, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2019

Benchmarking Mixed Mode Failure in Progressive Damage and Failure Analysis Methods

The verification and validation of progressive-damage-analysis finite element methods are difficult but critical tasks to undertake during their development. Verification exercises assess whether a predictive analysis tool produces results that are consistent with the fundamental concepts and assumptions of the tool under evaluation. Ideally, closed-form analytical solutions can be derived for which method verification results can be compared. Problems selected for computational tool verification are often simple and isolate individual features of the tool. In the case of progressive damage finite element methods, verifications should be performed to evaluate the ability of the model to predict the initiation of damage and its growth through the finite element mesh under a variety of conditions. Mabson et al. proposed a test case of a unidirectional, fiber-reinforced plate with a center crack subjected to tensile loads to evaluate matrix crack propagation predictions. The problem was modeled using the Abaqus Hashin continuum damage mechanics (CDM) model for fiber-reinforced composites. Different combinations of matrix strengths and element sizes were used in the simulations, and the results were compared to a closed-form solution based on linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM). It was determined that the Abaqus CDM model could predict the LEFM solution of Mode I cracks only when the finite element mesh density met specific requirements based on the material properties. This paper presents closed-form LEFM solutions for a center notch mixed mode (CNMM) verification problem. Parametric finite element analyses were developed using progressive damage analysis methods of both the Discrete Damage Mechanics (DDM) and CDM classes. The progressive damage analysis methods applied in the analyses of the CNMM problem include CompDam and the Floating Node Method. Analyses were conducted with various mode mixities and element sizes to verify that the damage models were working as intended and to identify any limits of applicability.

Leone, Frank↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Common Cause Failures Dominate and Defeat Redundancy

Common cause failures occur when several malfunctions are produced by a single event or process. They are especially damaging when they eliminate an entire set of redundant systems and disable their intended function. Redundancy is used when the individual system failure probability is unacceptably high. Redundancy can improve the overall system failure probability if the failures are independent, but the reliability gain is limited if there are dependent failures having a common cause. No amount of redundancy can reduce the total failure probability below the common cause failure probability. Common cause failures defeat redundancy. Systems with high reliability requirements often use extensive redundancy. These highly redundant systems rarely fail unless all the redundant components providing a particular function fail. Complete failures of such highly redundant systems are then usually common cause failures. Common cause failures are prevalent in highly redundant, high reliability systems. Common cause failures dominate redundancy. Redundant systems may fail due to specification, design, manufacturing, operations, or maintenance problems that disable all the identical redundant systems. Common cause failures typically account for one tenth of all failures. If the failure probability is relatively low and common cause failures are significant, adding more than two or three redundant identical units usually gives little added reliability improvement. Common cause failures can be reduced by using diverse components with different technologies and manufacturers, by separating and shielding subsystems, and by avoiding shared control, power, or location. External events and shared vulnerabilities may still cause common cause failures.

common cause failures↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Common Cause Failures Dominate and Defeat Redundancy

Common cause failures occur when several malfunctions are produced by a single event or process. They are especially damaging when they eliminate an entire set of redundant systems and disable their intended function. Redundancy is used when the individual system failure probability is unacceptably high. Redundancy can improve the overall system failure probability if the failures are independent, but the reliability gain is limited if there are dependent failures having a common cause. No amount of redundancy can reduce the total failure probability below the common cause failure probability. Common cause failures defeat redundancy. Systems with high reliability requirements often use extensive redundancy. These highly redundant systems rarely fail unless all the redundant components providing a particular function fail. Complete failures of such highly redundant systems are then usually common cause failures. Common cause failures are prevalent in highly redundant, high reliability systems. Common cause failures dominate redundancy. Redundant systems may fail due to specification, design, manufacturing, operations, or maintenance problems that disable all the identical redundant systems. Common cause failures typically account for one tenth of all failures. If the failure probability is relatively low and common cause failures are significant, adding more than two or three redundant identical units usually gives little added reliability improvement. Common cause failures can be reduced by using diverse components with different technologies and manufacturers, by separating and shielding subsystems, and by avoiding shared control, power, or location. External events and shared vulnerabilities may still cause common cause failures.

common cause failures↗
NASA NTRS2014

Level of Automation and Failure Frequency Effects on Simulated Lunar Lander Performance

A human-in-the-loop experiment was conducted at the NASA Ames Research Center Vertical Motion Simulator, where instrument-rated pilots completed a simulated terminal descent phase of a lunar landing. Ten pilots participated in a 2 x 2 mixed design experiment, with level of automation as the within-subjects factor and failure frequency as the between subjects factor. The two evaluated levels of automation were high (fully automated landing) and low (manual controlled landing). During test trials, participants were exposed to either a high number of failures (75% failure frequency) or low number of failures (25% failure frequency). In order to investigate the pilots' sensitivity to changes in levels of automation and failure frequency, the dependent measure selected for this experiment was accuracy of failure diagnosis, from which D Prime and Decision Criterion were derived. For each of the dependent measures, no significant difference was found for level of automation and no significant interaction was detected between level of automation and failure frequency. A significant effect was identified for failure frequency suggesting failure frequency has a significant effect on pilots' sensitivity to failure detection and diagnosis. Participants were more likely to correctly identify and diagnose failures if they experienced the higher levels of failures, regardless of level of automation

performance↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Failure Behavior and Control-Based Mitigation for a Parallel Hybrid Propulsion System

NASA is pursuing research to advance Electrified Aircraft Propulsion (EAP) technologies that address fuel burn and emission reduction goals. EAP brings the potential for improved performance over the state of the art. However, for these systems to be practical and certifiable, they need to possess adequate robustness to adverse conditions including a variety of system failures that are not applicable to conventional turbofans today. Numerous EAP concepts interface gas turbine engines with an electrical power system that includes electric machines and sometimes electrical energy storage. The expansion of the powertrain increases the probability of encountering a failure and introduces new failure modes. Failures within the electrical power system may also impact the gas turbine engine(s) to which the electrical powertrain is coupled. This effort investigates failures originating in the electrical power system and their impact on the parallel hybrid propulsion system. Reversionary control strategies are also demonstrated to reduce the impact of the failures. Failure mitigation strategies were devised and employed in simulation. Various failure scenarios were simulated including those occurring during steady state operation, transients, and takeoff and landing scenarios. The timing of the failure and delay in failure identification and activation of mitigation strategies are noteworthy variables in the study. While the system remained stable throughout all failure scenarios, delays in failure identification could result in undesirable conditions such as increased operating temperatures and reduced stall margin. The results demonstrate successful mitigation of failures through reversionary control modes and help to generate confidence in the robustness of the conceptual parallel hybrid propulsion system.

Failure behavior↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Failure Behavior and Control Based Mitigation for a Parallel Hybrid Propulsion System

NASA is pursuing research to advance Electrified Aircraft Propulsion (EAP) technologies that address fuel burn and emission reduction goals. EAP brings the potential for improved performance over the state of the art. However, for these systems to be practical and certifiable, they need to possess adequate robustness to adverse conditions including a variety of system failures that are not applicable to conventional turbofans today. Numerous EAP concepts interface gas turbine engines with an electrical power system that includes electric machines and sometimes electrical energy storage. The expansion of the powertrain increases the probability of encountering a failure and introduces new failure modes. Failures within the electrical power system may also impact the gas turbine engine(s) to which the electrical powertrain is coupled. This effort investigates failures originating in the electrical power system and their impact on the parallel hybrid propulsion system. Reversionary control strategies are also demonstrated to reduce the impact of the failures. Failure mitigation strategies were devised and employed in simulation. Various failure scenarios were simulated including those occurring during steady state operation, transients, and takeoff and landing scenarios. The timing of the failure and delay in failure identification and activation of mitigation strategies are noteworthy variables in the study. While the system remained stable throughout all failure scenarios, delays in failure identification could result in undesirable conditions such as increased operating temperatures and reduced stall margin. The results demonstrate successful mitigation of failures through reversionary control modes and help to generate confidence in the robustness of the conceptual parallel hybrid propulsion system.

Failure behavior↗
NASA NTRS2013

Enhanced Schapery Theory Software Development for Modeling Failure of Fiber-Reinforced Laminates

Progressive damage and failure analysis (PDFA) tools are needed to predict the nonlinear response of advanced fiber-reinforced composite structures. Predictive tools should incorporate the underlying physics of the damage and failure mechanisms observed in the composite, and should utilize as few input parameters as possible. The purpose of the Enhanced Schapery Theory (EST) was to create a PDFA tool that operates in conjunction with a commercially available finite element (FE) code (Abaqus). The tool captures the physics of the damage and failure mechanisms that result in the nonlinear behavior of the material, and the failure methodology employed yields numerical results that are relatively insensitive to changes in the FE mesh. The EST code is written in Fortran and compiled into a static library that is linked to Abaqus. A Fortran Abaqus UMAT material subroutine is used to facilitate the communication between Abaqus and EST. A clear distinction between damage and failure is imposed. Damage mechanisms result in pre-peak nonlinearity in the stress strain curve. Four internal state variables (ISVs) are utilized to control the damage and failure degradation. All damage is said to result from matrix microdamage, and a single ISV marks the micro-damage evolution as it is used to degrade the transverse and shear moduli of the lamina using a set of experimentally obtainable matrix microdamage functions. Three separate failure ISVs are used to incorporate failure due to fiber breakage, mode I matrix cracking, and mode II matrix cracking. Failure initiation is determined using a failure criterion, and the evolution of these ISVs is controlled by a set of traction-separation laws. The traction separation laws are postulated such that the area under the curves is equal to the fracture toughness of the material associated with the corresponding failure mechanism. A characteristic finite element length is used to transform the traction-separation laws into stress-strain laws. The ISV evolution equations are derived in a thermodynamically consistent manner by invoking the stationary principle on the total work of the system with respect to each ISV. A novel feature is the inclusion of both pre-peak damage and appropriately scaled, post-peak strain softening failure. Also, the characteristic elements used in the failure degradation scheme are calculated using the element nodal coordinates, rather than simply the square root of the area of the element.

Pineda, Evan J.↗
NASA NTRS1984

Failure analysis of a graphite/epoxy laminate subjected to bolt bearing loads

Quasi-isotropic graphite/epoxy laminates (T300/5208) were tested under bolt bearing loads to study failure modes, strengths, and failure energy. Specimens had a range of configurations to produce failures by the three nominal failure modes: tension, shearout, and bearing. Radiographs were made after damage onset and after ultimate load to examine the failure modes. Also, the laminate stresses near the bolt hole calculated for each test specimen configuration, and then used with a failure criterion to analyze the test data. Failures involving extensive bearing damage were found to dissipate significantly more energy than tension dominated failures. The specimen configuration influenced the failure modes and therefore also influenced the failure energy. In the width-to-diameter ratio range of 4 to 5, which is typical of structural joints, a transition from the tension mode to the bearing mode was shown to cause a large increase in failure energy. The failure modes associated with ultimate strength were usually different from those associated with the damage onset. Typical damage sequences involved bearing damage onset at the hole boundary followed by tension damage progressing from the hole boundary.

Crews, J. H., Jr.↗