SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Results for “Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU)”
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Design and Certification of the Extravehicular Activity Mobility Unit (EMU) Water Processing Jumper
The Extravehicular Mobility Units (EMUs) onboard the International Space Station (ISS) experienced a failure due to cooling water contamination from biomass and corrosion byproducts forming solids around the EMU pump rotor. The coolant had no biocide and a low pH which induced biofilm growth and corrosion precipitates, respectively. NASA JSC was tasked with building hardware to clean the ionic, organic, and particulate load from the EMU coolant loop before and after Extravehicular Activity (EVAs). Based on a return sample of the EMU coolant loop, the chemical load was well understood, but there was not sufficient volume of the returned sample to analyze particulates. Through work with EMU specialists, chemists, (EVA) Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) representation, safety and mission assurance, astronaut crew, and team engineers, requirements were developed for the EMU Water Processing hardware (sometimes referred to as the Airlock Coolant Loop Recovery [A/L CLR] system). Those requirements ranged from the operable level of ionic, organic, and particulate load, interfaces to the EMU, maximum cycle time, operating pressure drop, flow rate, and temperature, leakage rates, and biocide levels for storage. Design work began in February 2005 and certification was completed in April 2005 to support a return to flight launch date of May 12, 2005. This paper will discuss the details of the design and certification of the EMU Water Processing hardware and its components
Development of the Self-Powered Extravehicular Mobility Unit Extravehicular Activity Data Recorder
The Self-Powered Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Data Recorder (SPEEDR) is a field-programmable gate array (FPGA)-based device designed to collect high-rate EMU Primary Life Support Subsystem (PLSS) data for download at a later time. During EVA, the existing EMU PLSS data downlink capability is one data packet every 2 minutes and is subject to bad packets or loss of signal. Higher-rate PLSS data is generated by the Enhanced Caution and Warning System but is not normally captured or distributed. Access to higher-rate data will increase the capability of EMU anomaly resolution team to pinpoint issues remotely, saving crew time by reducing required call-down Q&A and on-orbit diagnostic activities. With no Space Shuttle flights post Fiscal Year 2011 (FY11), and potentially limited down-mass capability, the ISS crew and ground support personnel will have to be capable of on-orbit operations to maintain, diagnose, repair, and return to service EMU hardware, possibly through 2028. Collecting high-rate EMU PLSS data during both intravehicular activity (IVA) and EVA operations will provide trending analysis for life extension and/or predictive performance. The SPEEDR concept has generated interest as a tool/technology that could be used for other International Space Station subsystems or future exploration-class space suits where hardware reliability/availability is critical and low/variable bandwidth may require store then forward methodology. Preliminary work in FY11 produced a functional prototype consisting of an FPGA evaluation board, custom memory/interface circuit board, and custom software. The SPEEDR concept includes a stand-alone battery that is recharged by a computer Universal Serial Bus (USB) port while data are being downloaded.
EMU evolution
Evolution of Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) technology is necessary to support the Extravehicular Activity (EVA) requirements of the Space Station Freedom Program and those of the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI). Key qualities supporting long-duration missions include technologies that are highly reliable, durable, minimize logistics requirements, and are in-flight maintainable and serviceable. While these qualities are common to SSF and SEI EVA, development paths will differ where specific mission requirements impose different constraints. Development of reusable, regenerative technologies is necessary to minimize the logistics penalties. Increased battery discharge/recharge cycle life and usable wet life, compact high current density fuel cells, reusable CO2 absorbing media, and thermal radiation coupled with venting heat rejection technologies are just some methods of reducing consumables. Development must strive for durable, reliable systems that are in-flight serviceable and maintainable, which are vital for missions where logistics capabilities are extremely constrained. Key areas include suit components (e.g., gloves, boots, and cooling garments), and life support hardware such as fans, pumps, instrumentation, and emergency O2 systems. Higher pressure suits will reduce EVA prebreathe requirements and pre-EVA operations overall. Many challenges of higher pressure suits have been addressed by on-going development. Emphasis on glove development is necessary to provide low fatigue, dexterous glove mobility at higher suit pressures. Minimum impact hooks and scars which support an advanced SSF EMU have been identified. These accommodations permit upgrades that support servicing of low volume, high pressure oxygen systems, and hydrogen technologies such as fuel cell, and venting hydrogen heat rejection systems.
Mitigation of EMU Glove Cut Hazard by MMOD Impact Craters on Exposed ISS Handrails
Recent cut damages to crewmember extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) gloves during extravehicular activity (EVA) onboard the International Space Station (ISS) has been found to result from contact with sharp edges or pinch points rather than general wear or abrasion. One possible source of cut-hazards are protruding sharp edged crater lips from impact of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles on external metallic handrails along EVA translation paths. During impact of MMOD particles at hypervelocity an evacuation flow develops behind the shock wave, resulting in the formation of crater lips that can protrude above the target surface. In this study, two methods were evaluated to limit EMU glove cut-hazards due to MMOD impact craters. In the first phase, four flexible overwrap configurations are evaluated: a felt-reusable surface insulation (FRSI), polyurethane polyether foam with beta-cloth cover, double-layer polyurethane polyether foam with beta-cloth cover, and multi-layer beta-cloth with intermediate Dacron netting spacers. These overwraps are suitable for retrofitting ground equipment that has yet to be flown, and are not intended to protect the handrail from impact of MMOD particles, rather to act as a spacer between hazardous impact profiles and crewmember gloves. At the impact conditions considered, all four overwrap configurations evaluated were effective in limiting contact between EMU gloves and impact crater profiles. The multi-layer beta-cloth configuration was the most effective in reducing the height of potentially hazardous profiles in handrail-representative targets. In the second phase of the study, four material alternatives to current aluminum and stainless steel alloys were evaluated: a metal matrix composite, carbon fiber reinforced plastic (CFRP), fiberglass, and a fiber metal laminate. Alternative material handrails are intended to prevent the formation of hazardous damage profiles during MMOD impact and are suitable for flight hardware yet to be constructed. Of the four materials evaluated, only the fiberglass formed a less hazardous damage profile than the baseline metallic target. Although the CFRP laminate did not form any noticeable crater lip, brittle protruding fibers are considered a puncture risk. In parallel with EMU glove redesign efforts, modifications to metallic ISS handrails such as those evaluated in this study provide the means to significantly reduce cut-hazards from MMOD impact craters.
Failure Analysis Results and Corrective Actions Implemented for the Extravehicular Mobility Unit 3011 Water in the Helmet Mishap
Water entered the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) helmet during extravehicular activity (EVA) no. 23 aboard the International Space Station on July 16, 2013, resulting in the termination of the EVA approximately 1 hour after it began. It was estimated that 1.5 liters of water had migrated up the ventilation loop into the helmet, adversely impacting the astronaut's hearing, vision, and verbal communication. Subsequent on-board testing and ground-based test, tear-down, and evaluation of the affected EMU hardware components determined that the proximate cause of the mishap was blockage of all water separator drum holes with a mixture of silica and silicates. The blockages caused a failure of the water separator degassing function, which resulted in EMU cooling water spilling into the ventilation loop, migrating around the circulating fan, and ultimately pushing into the helmet. The root cause of the failure was determined to be ground-processing shortcomings of the Airlock Cooling Loop Recovery (ALCLR) Ion Filter Beds, which led to various levels of contaminants being introduced into the filters before they left the ground. Those contaminants were thereafter introduced into the EMU hardware on-orbit during ALCLR scrubbing operations. This paper summarizes the failure analysis results along with identified process, hardware, and operational corrective actions that were implemented as a result of findings from this investigation.
Challenges in the development of the shuttle extravehicular mobility unit
The development of the Shuttle extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) has required significant technology advances in the design of the astronaut life support system and space-suit assembly. The life support system and space-suit assemblies are integrated into a single system and optimized for the primary function of supporting astronaut extravehicular operations. Rather than accommodating a limited, male-only astronaut population, the EMU must satisfy size requirements for both males and females with a minimum of sized parts. In addition, the Shuttle EMU has been designed to implement Space Shuttle Program philosophy of long operating life and mission reuse capability to minimize program lifetime cost. The advancement in life support system and space-suit technology achieved by the development of the Shuttle extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) is illustrated by comparison with the requirements for and the design features of the Apollo EMU.
Computer Analysis of Electromagnetic Field Exposure Hazard for Space Station Astronauts during Extravehicular Activity
In order to estimate the RF radiation hazards to astronauts and electronics equipment due to various Space Station transmitters, the electric fields around the various Space Station antennas are computed using the rigorous Computational Electromagnetics (CEM) techniques. The Method of Moments (MoM) was applied to the UHF and S-band low gain antennas. The Aperture Integration (AI) method and the Geometrical Theory of Diffraction (GTD) method were used to compute the electric field intensities for the S- and Ku-band high gain antennas. As a result of this study, The regions in which the electric fields exceed the specified exposure levels for the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) electronics equipment and Extravehicular Activity (EVA) astronaut are identified for various Space Station transmitters.
Evolution of Space Station EMU PLSS technology recommendations
Viewgraphs on extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) portable life support system (PLSS) technology recommendations are presented. Topics covered include: oxygen supply storage; oxygen supply regulators; carbon dioxide control; prime movers; crew comfort; heat rejection; power sources; controls; display devices; and sensor technology.
Preparing EMU for Space Station
An enhanced Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) for the Space Shuttle Program is discussed which is capable of meeting new requirements for SSF support. It is concluded that current SSF documents contain meaningful requirements that should be imposed on the SSF EMU to support SSF assembly and maintenance operations. These requirements fall within three broad areas which encompass revised accommodation aboard Shuttle and SSF, including interior environments; extended operating life resulting from the EVA mission model for SSF assembly and support; and operating safely in Station external environments that differ from those of Shuttle.
Lessons Learned From the EMU Fire
In April 1980, a Space Shuttle Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) was destroyed in a flash fire during a functional test in the Johnson Space Center's crew systems laboratory. During this lecture, Mr. Nowetner discussed what happened to cause this failure, what safety message resulted from it, lessons learned from these mistakes, and how to leverage earned knowledge.
Lessons Learned from the EMU Fire
In April 1980, a Space Shuttle Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) was destroyed in a flash fire during a functional test in the Johnson Space Center's crew systems laboratory. During this lecture, retired Exploration Portable Life Support System (xPLSS) Operations Manager Joseph T. Nowetner Jr. discussed what happened to cause this failure, what safety message resulted from it, lessons learned from these mistakes, and how to leverage earned knowledge.
Extravehicular Activity Micormeteoroid and Orbital Debris Risk Assessment Methodology
A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of vehicle failure due to an impact from an micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. Among the vehicles of importance to NASA is the extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuit” used while performing a US extravehicular activity (EVA). An EMU impact is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching the airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. For this reason, a risk assessment is provided to the EVA office at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) prior to certification of readiness for each US EVA. To assess the risk of failure, a detailed finite element model (FEM) of the EMU has been created which has regions for the various shielding configurations. Each shielding configuration is based on the layers and materials over the innermost bladder layer that maintains the acceptable atmospheric environment for the astronaut. Ballistic limit equations (BLE) for each shielding configuration have been determined from hypervelocity impact testing of samples of the EMU layup.
Extravehicular Activity Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk Assessment Methodology
A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of vehicle failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. Among the vehicles of importance to NASA is the extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuit” used while performing a US extravehicular activity (EVA). An EMU impact is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching the airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. For this reason, a risk assessment is provided to the EVA office at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) prior to certification of readiness for each US EVA.
Compatibility Between Exploration EVA System and Exploration Spacecraft
Over the life of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), numerous products detailing “how to build Extravehicular Activity (EVA) System hardware”, “how to interface with EVA System hardware” and “how to design hardware EVA will access and utilize” were generated to provide interoperability between a suited crewmember and the specified vehicle’s EVA task. Since the inception of these products, some have continued to receive updates due to the necessity of an on-going program while others remained unchanged for years and have led to discrepancies between the current accepted values and those considered outdated. For EVA-suited crewmember tasks beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO), new vehicles need a single consolidated location for the best practices and lessons learned from the EVA Community. This paper outlines what common EVA compatibility design requirements are expected of an Exploration spacecraft that has interactions between the vehicle and an EVA suited crewmember for and an approach for standardizing EVA compatibility across various vehicles at various destinations. The approach of standardization allows for flexibility by tailoring the applicability to meet the EVA tasks required for that vehicle’s operation beyond Low Earth Orbit. This paper will also describe the broad difference between microgravity and partial gravity EVA compatibility and how those requirements were identified and will be informed.
Technology Infusion in U.S. Spacesuits - A Comparative System Analysis
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has evolved multiple spacesuit systems for performing extravehicular activity (EVA) or space walks. These spacesuit systems include the Apollo Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) EMU, and Exploration EMU (xEMU). Each spacesuit system is like the other for functionality. However, each spacesuit system is different in configuration based on the technology infused into the system associated with the purpose of the mission. Each spacesuit system is made up of many components and the integrate environment targeted for operations leads to an integrated system that is complex. Since Apollo, NASA has invested in multiple technologies that make up these spacesuit systems in different iterations. The Apollo EMU was designed in the 1960’s with a focus to facilitate the first human to walk on the moon. The Space Shuttle EMU was designed in the 1970’s for reusable microgravity operations that began in the early 1980’s. The Space Shuttle EMU was enhanced to facilitate extended operation on the ISS. Over the last 15 years, NASA has been designing, developing, and testing a new spacesuit system, the xEMU which is considered a design, verification, and test unit. NASA is planning to land the first woman and first person of color on the Moon. NASA recently engaged industry through a new contractual arrangement to provide EVA services needed to return to the Moon and to continue operations on the ISS. Spacesuit systems are complex. Understanding the requirements, operational environment, the necessary technologies, and the integrated spacesuit system are paramount. In addition, understanding the technology infusion process to meet the mission objectives is critical. This paper will review the spacesuit systems for EVA and several component functions within the spacesuits, along with a system comparison of those technologies from Apollo to xEMU.
Spacesuit Soft Upper Torso Sizing Systems
The passive sizing system consists of a series of low-profile pulleys attached to the front and back of the shoulder bearings on a spacesuit soft upper torso (SUT), textile cord or stainless steel cable, and a modified commercial ratchet mechanism. The cord/cable is routed through the pulleys and attached to the ratchet mechanism mounted on the front of the spacesuit within reach of the suited subject. Upon actuating the ratchet mechanism, the shoulder bearing breadth is changed, providing variable upper torso sizing. The active system consists of a series of pressurizable nastic cells embedded into the fabric layers of a spacesuit SUT. These cells are integrated to the front and back of the SUT and are connected to an air source with a variable regulator. When inflated, the nastic cells provide a change in the overall shoulder bearing breadth of the spacesuit and thus, torso sizing. The research focused on the development of a high-performance sizing and actuation system. This technology has application as a suit-sizing mechanism to allow easier suit entry and more accurate suit fit with fewer torso sizes than the existing EMU (Extravehicular Mobility Unit) suit system. This advanced SUT will support NASA s Advanced EMU Evolutionary Concept of a two-sizes-fit-all upper torso for replacement of the current EMU hard upper torso (HUT). Both the passive and nastic sizing system approaches provide astronauts with real-time upper torso sizing, which translates into a more comfortable suit, providing enhanced fit resulting in improved crewmember performance during extravehicular activity. These systems will also benefit NASA by reducing flight logistics as well as overall suit system cost. The nastic sizing system approach provides additional structural redundancy over existing SUT designs by embedding additional coated fabric and uncoated fabric layers. Two sizing systems were selected to build into a prototype SUT: one active and one passive. From manned testing, it was found that both systems offer good solutions to sizing a SUT to fit a crewmember. This new system provided improved suit don/doff over existing spacesuit designs as well as providing better fit at suit operational pressure resulting in improved comfort and mobility. It was found that a SUT with a sizing system may solve several problems that have plagued existing HUT designs, and that a SUT with a sizing system may be a viable option for advanced suit architectures.
Redesign of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit Airlock Cooling Loop Recovery Assembly
During EVA (Extravehicular Activity) 23 aboard the ISS (International Space Station) on 07/16/2013 an episode of water in the EMU (Extravehicular Mobility Unit) helmet occurred, necessitating a termination of the EVA (Extravehicular Activity) shortly after it began. The root cause of the failure was determined to be ground-processing short-comings of the ALCLR (Airlock Cooling Loop Recovery) Ion Beds which led to various levels of contaminants being introduced into the Ion Beds before they left the ground. The Ion Beds were thereafter used to scrub the failed EMU cooling water loop on-orbit during routine scrubbing operations. The root cause investigation identified several areas for improvement of the ALCLR Assembly which have since been initiated. Enhanced washing techniques for the ALCLR Ion Bed have been developed and implemented. On-orbit cooling water conductivity and pH analysis capability to allow the astronauts to monitor proper operation of the ALCLR Ion Bed during scrubbing operation is being investigation. A simplified means to acquire on-orbit EMU cooling water samples have been designed. Finally, an inherently cleaner organic adsorbent to replace the current lignite-based activated carbon, and a non-separable replacement for the separable mixed ion exchange resin are undergoing evaluation. These efforts are undertaken to enhance the performance and reduce the risk associated with operations to ensure the long-term health of the EMU cooling water circuit.