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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS1984

Crew Escape System

To calculate mass properties of rocket motors and gas generators for escape systems, Talley Industries of Arizona, Inc. engineers use a computer program developed by Langley Research Center. Called MASPROP, the program performs calculations needed to determine the center of gravity for a particular thruster, a determination essential to accurate positioning of the motor or generator in the aircrew escape system. Talley's use of MASPROP replaced hand calculations that sometimes involved several weeks of effort; the computer program reduces the time for each calculation to four hours or less.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2013

NanoTHOR: Low-Cost Launch of Nanosatellites to Deep Space

The rapid development of high-performance nanosatellite platforms is enabling NASA and commercial ventures to consider performing missions to the asteroids, the Moon, and Mars at lower cost and on shorter timelines than traditional large spacecraft platforms. Currently, however, opportunities to launch secondary payloads to Earth escape are rare, and using chemical rockets to propel secondary payloads from LEO rideshares to escape is problematic due to the risks posed to primary payloads. The NanoTHOR effort has explored the technical feasibility and value proposition for using a simple momentum-exchange tether system to scavenge orbital energy from an upper stage in geostationary transfer orbit in order to boost nanosatellites to Earth escape. A NanoTHOR module will accomplish rapid transfer of a nanosatellite to an escape trajectory by deploying the nanosat at the end of a long, slender, high-strength tether and then using winching in the Earth's gravity!gradient to convert orbital angular momentum into rotational angular momentum. In the Phase I effort, we developed and simulated methods for controlling tether deployment and retraction to spin up a tether system, and these simulations demonstrated the feasibility of providing delta-Vs on the order of 800 m/s with a simple, low-mass tether system. Moreover, the NanoTHOR tether can act as a reusable in-space upper stage, boosting multiple nanosatellites on a single launch and doing so with a mass requirement lower than that of conventional rocket technologies. Serving as an escape-injection stage, NanoTHOR can enable a 6U CubeSat to deliver small payloads to Mars orbit, lunar orbit, and rendezvous with at least 110 of the known near-Earth asteroids. Evaluation of the technology readiness of the component technologies required for NanoTHOR indicate that the hardware required is all mid-TRL, and the lower-TRL controls and integration components can be advanced to mid-TRL with modest investment. By scavenging orbital energy from upper stages without any stored energy or propellant requirements, NanoTHOR permits deep-space nanosat missions to launch on rideshare opportunities, enabling NASA and commercial ventures to conduct affordable and frequent missions to explore deep space destinations.

Hoyt, Robert↗

NASA NTRS2002

Life Cycle Systems Engineering Approach to NASA's 2nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle

The overall goal of the 2nd Generation RLV Program is to substantially reduce technical and business risks associated with developing a new class of reusable launch vehicles. NASA's specific goals are to improve the safety of a 2nd- generation system by 2 orders of magnitude - equivalent to a crew risk of 1 -in- 10,000 missions - and decrease the cost tenfold, to approximately $1,000 per pound of payload launched. Architecture definition is being conducted in parallel with the maturating of key technologies specifically identified to improve safety and reliability, while reducing operational costs. An architecture broadly includes an Earth-to-orbit reusable launch vehicle, on-orbit transfer vehicles and upper stages, mission planning, ground and flight operations, and support infrastructure, both on the ground and in orbit. The systems engineering approach ensures that the technologies developed - such as lightweight structures, long-life rocket engines, reliable crew escape, and robust thermal protection systems - will synergistically integrate into the optimum vehicle. Given a candidate architecture that possesses credible physical processes and realistic technology assumptions, the next set of analyses address the system's functionality across the spread of operational scenarios characterized by the design reference missions. The safety/reliability and cost/economics associated with operating the system will also be modeled and analyzed to answer the questions "How safe is it?" and "How much will it cost to acquire and operate?" The systems engineering review process factors in comprehensive budget estimates, detailed project schedules, and business and performance plans, against the goals of safety, reliability, and cost, in addition to overall technical feasibility. This approach forms the basis for investment decisions in the 2nd Generation RLV Program's risk-reduction activities. Through this process, NASA will continually refine its specialized needs and identify where Defense and commercial requirements overlap those of civil missions.

Thomas, Dale↗

NASA NTRS2002

Systems Engineering Approach to Technology Integration for NASA's 2nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle

The overall goal of the 2nd Generation RLV Program is to substantially reduce technical and business risks associated with developing a new class of reusable launch vehicles. NASA's specific goals are to improve the safety of a 2nd generation system by 2 orders of magnitude - equivalent to a crew risk of 1-in-10,000 missions - and decrease the cost tenfold, to approximately $1,000 per pound of payload launched. Architecture definition is being conducted in parallel with the maturating of key technologies specifically identified to improve safety and reliability, while reducing operational costs. An architecture broadly includes an Earth-to-orbit reusable launch vehicle, on-orbit transfer vehicles and upper stages, mission planning, ground and flight operations, and support infrastructure, both on the ground and in orbit. The systems engineering approach ensures that the technologies developed - such as lightweight structures, long-life rocket engines, reliable crew escape, and robust thermal protection systems - will synergistically integrate into the optimum vehicle. To best direct technology development decisions, analytical models are employed to accurately predict the benefits of each technology toward potential space transportation architectures as well as the risks associated with each technology. Rigorous systems analysis provides the foundation for assessing progress toward safety and cost goals. The systems engineering review process factors in comprehensive budget estimates, detailed project schedules, and business and performance plans, against the goals of safety, reliability, and cost, in addition to overall technical feasibility. This approach forms the basis for investment decisions in the 2nd Generation RLV Program's risk-reduction activities. Through this process, NASA will continually refine its specialized needs and identify where Defense and commercial requirements overlap those of civil missions.

Thomas, Dale↗

NASA NTRS2002

Systems Engineering Approach to Technology Integration for NASA's 2nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle

The overall goal of the 2nd Generation RLV Program is to substantially reduce technical and business risks associated with developing a new class of reusable launch vehicles. NASA's specific goals are to improve the safety of a 2nd-generation system by 2 orders of magnitude - equivalent to a crew risk of 1-in-10,000 missions - and decrease the cost tenfold, to approximately $1,000 per pound of payload launched. Architecture definition is being conducted in parallel with the maturating of key technologies specifically identified to improve safety and reliability, while reducing operational costs. An architecture broadly includes an Earth-to-orbit reusable launch vehicle, on-orbit transfer vehicles and upper stages, mission planning, ground and flight operations, and support infrastructure, both on the ground and in orbit. The systems engineering approach ensures that the technologies developed - such as lightweight structures, long-life rocket engines, reliable crew escape, and robust thermal protection systems - will synergistically integrate into the optimum vehicle. To best direct technology development decisions, analytical models are employed to accurately predict the benefits of each technology toward potential space transportation architectures as well as the risks associated with each technology. Rigorous systems analysis provides the foundation for assessing progress toward safety and cost goals. The systems engineering review process factors in comprehensive budget estimates, detailed project schedules, and business and performance plans, against the goals of safety, reliability, and cost, in addition to overall technical feasibility. This approach forms the basis for investment decisions in the 2nd Generation RLV Program's risk-reduction activities. Through this process, NASA will continually refine its specialized needs and identify where Defense and commercial requirements overlap those of civil missions.

Thomas, Dale↗

NASA NTRS2009

Apollo Spacecraft and Saturn V Launch Vehicle Pyrotechnics/Explosive Devices

The Apollo Mission employs more than 210 pyrotechnic devices per mission.These devices are either automatic of commanded from the Apollo spacecraft systems. All devices require high reliability and safety and most are classified as either crew safety critical or mission critical. Pyrotechnic devices have a wide variety of applications including: launch escape tower separation, separation rocket ignition, parachute deployment and release and electrical circuit opening and closing. This viewgraph presentation identifies critical performance, design requirements and safety measures used to ensure quality, reliability and performance of Apollo pyrotechnic/explosive devices. The major components and functions of a typical Apollo pyrotechnic/explosive device are listed and described (initiators, cartridge assemblies, detonators, core charges). The presentation also identifies the major locations and uses for the devices on: the Command and Service Module, Lunar Module and all stages of the launch vehicle.

Interbartolo, Michael↗

NASA NTRS1992

Study of basic physical processes in liquid rocket engines

Inconsistencies between analytical results and measurements for liquid rocket thrust chamber performance, which escape suitable explanations, have motivated the examination of the basic phys ical modeling formulations as to their unlimited application. The publication of Prof. D. Straub's book, 'Thermofluid-dynamics of Optimized Rocket Propulsions,' further stimulated the interest of understanding the gas dynamic relationships in chemically reacting mixtures. A review of other concepts proposed by Falk-Ruppel (Gibbsian Thermodynamics), Straub (Alternative Theory, AT), Prigogine (Non-Equilibrium Thermodynamics), Boltzmann (Kinetic Theory), and Truesdell (Rational Mechanism) has been made to obtain a better understanding of the Navier-Stokes equation, which is now used extensively for chemically reacting flow treatment in combustion chambers. In addition to the study of the different concepts, two workshops were conducted to clarify some of the issues. The first workshop centered on Falk-Ruppel's new 'dynamics' concept, while the second one concentrated on Straub's AT. In this report brief summaries of the reviewed philosophies are presented and compared with the classical Navier-Stokes formulation in a tabular arrangement. Also the highlights of both workshops are addressed.

Wu, S. T.↗

NASA NTRS1993

Ascent abort capability for the HL-20

The HL-20 has been designed with the capability for rescue of the crew during all phases of powered ascent from on the launch pad until orbital injection. A launch-escape system, consisting of solid rocket motors located on the adapter between the HL-20 and the launch vehicle, provides the thrust that propels the HL-20 to a safe distance from a malfunctioning launch vehicle. After these launch-escape motors have burned out, the adapter is jettisoned and the HL-20 executes one of four abort modes. In three abort modes - return-to-launch-site, transatlantic-abort-landing, and abort-to-orbit - not only is the crew rescued, but the HL-20 is recovered intact. In the ocean-landing-by-parachute abort mode, which occurs in between the return-to-launch-site and the transatlantic-abort-landing modes, the crew is rescued, but the HL-20 would likely sustain damage from the ocean landing. This paper describes the launch-escape system and the four abort modes for an ascent on a Titan III launch vehicle.

Naftel, J. C.↗

NASA NTRS1973

Apollo experience report: Launch escape propulsion subsystem

The Apollo launch escape propulsion subsystem contained three solid rocket motors. The general design, development, and qualification of the solid-propellant pitch-control, tower-jettison, and launch-escape motors of the Apollo launch escape propulsion subsystem were completed during years 1961 to 1966. The launch escape system components are described in general terms, and the sequence of events through the ground-based test programs and flight-test programs is discussed. The initial ground rules established for this system were that it should use existing technology and designs as much as possible. The practicality of this decision is proved by the minimum number of problems that were encountered during the development and qualification program.

Townsend, N. A.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Electrodynamic Tethers for Novel LEO Missions

The exponential increase of launch system size - and cost - with deltaV makes missions requiring large total impulse cost prohibitive. Northrop Grumman and partners have matured a fundamentally different method for generating propulsion using electrodynamic tethers (EDTs) that escapes the limitations of the rocket equation. With essentially unlimited delta V, we can perform new classes of missions that are currently unaffordable or unfeasible.

Kantner, Michael↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.

Harry W. Jones↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Extremely High Isp Spacecraft Propulsion System

Specific Impulse, Isp, is a measure of a rocket engine’s efficiency. It is calculated relative to the Earth’s gravitational field, where Isp = ve/ go, with go= 9.8 m/s2 and the escape velocity of the propellant, ve, in m/s. Chemical rockets have ve < 4.4x103 m/s and Isp < 450 seconds. As an alternative, the NASA Glenn Research Center developed multiple generations of Solar Electric Propulsion (SEP), high Isp, ion engines using Xe gas as a propellant. Consequently, over 100 SEP Ion Thrusters provide geo-synchronous station keeping along with deep space probes like Deep Space One and Dawn. These have ve » 2.9 x 104 m/s with Isp = 3x103 seconds. These thrusters have continuous operating lifetimes of thousands of hours allowing continuous acceleration making up for the very low thrust. Chang-Diaz’ Variable Specific Impulse Magnetoplasma Rocket (VASIMR) has the potential for four times the propellant escape velocity and four times the specific impulse1. Unfortunately, this comes at a tremendous electrical power cost, estimated at 200 kWe for maintaining the International Space Station in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Although nuclear fission and fusion reactors2 have been suggested for powering nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) it only doubles the Isp over chemical rockets but with comparable thrust. Instead, we propose using Lattice Confinement Fusion (LCF) reactions.

High Isp Propulsion↗

NASA NTRS2003

Study of a High-Energy Upper Stage for Future Shuttle Missions

Space Shuttle Orbiters are likely to remain in service to 2020 or beyond for servicing the International Space Station and for launching very high value spacecraft. There is a need for a new STS-deployable upper stage that can boost certain Orbiter payloads to higher energy orbits, up to and including Earth-escape trajectories. The inventory of solid rocket motor Inertial Upper Stages has been depleted, and it is unlikely that a LOX/LH2-fueled upper stage can fly on Shuttle due to safety concerns. This paper summarizes the results of a study that investigated a low cost, low risk approach to quickly developing a new large upper stage optimized to fly on the existing Shuttle fleet. Two design reference missions (DRMs) were specified: the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) and the Space Interferometry Mission (SIM). Two categories of upper stage propellants were examined in detail: a storable liquid propellant and a storable gel propellant. Stage subsystems 'other than propulsion were based largely on heritage hardware to minimize cost, risk and development schedule span. The paper presents the ground rules and guidelines for conducting the study, the preliminary conceptual designs margins, assessments of technology readiness/risk, potential synergy with other programs, and preliminary estimates of development and production costs and schedule spans. Although the Orbiter Columbia was baselined for the study, discussion is provided to show how the results apply to the remaining STS Orbiter fleet.

Dressler, Gordon A.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Thermal Insulation Strips Conserve Energy

Launching the space shuttle involves an interesting paradox: While the temperatures inside the shuttle s main engines climb higher than 6,000 F hot enough to boil iron for fuel, the engines use liquid hydrogen, the second coldest liquid on Earth after liquid helium. Maintained below 20 K (-423 F), the liquid hydrogen is contained in the shuttle s rust-colored external tank. The external tank also contains liquid oxygen (kept below a somewhat less chilly 90 K or -297 F) that combines with the hydrogen to create an explosive mixture that along with the shuttle s two, powdered aluminum-fueled solid rocket boosters allows the shuttle to escape Earth s gravity. The cryogenic temperatures of the main engines liquid fuel can cause ice, frost, or liquefied air to build up on the external tank and other parts of the numerous launch fueling systems, posing a possible debris risk when the ice breaks off during launch and causing difficulties in the transfer and control of these cryogenic liquid propellants. Keeping the fuel at the necessary ultra-cold temperatures while minimizing ice buildup and other safety hazards, as well as reducing the operational maintenance costs, has required NASA to explore innovative ways for providing superior thermal insulation systems. To address the challenge, the Agency turned to an insulating technology so effective that, even though it is mostly air, a thin sheet can prevent a blowtorch from igniting a match. Aerogels were invented in 1931 and demonstrate properties that make them the most extraordinary insulating materials known; a 1-inch-thick piece of aerogel provides the same insulation as layering 15 panes of glass with air pockets in between. Derived from silica, aluminum oxide, or carbon gels using a supercritical drying process - resulting in a composition of almost 99-percent air - aerogels are the world s lightest solid (among 15 other titles they hold in the Guinness World Records), can float indefinitely on water if treated to be hydrophobic, and can withstand extremely hot temperatures (from 1,100 F to 3,000 F depending on the type of aerogel) down to cryogenic levels, making this "frozen smoke" ideal for use in space. Because of its low weight and ability to withstand temperature extremes, an aerogel was even used as the space-based catcher s mitt to trap comet particles and space dust for NASA s Stardust mission, launched in 1999. All of this remarkable technology s characteristics were ideal for NASA s purposes except one: The aerogels were extremely brittle. Through a long-term partnership between Kennedy Space Center and Aspen Aerogels Inc., of Northborough, Massachusetts, researchers developed a flexible, durable form of aerogel that NASA has since used as cryogenic insulation for space shuttle launch systems. Through Aspen Aerogels, the technology has made oil pipeline insulation, extreme weather clothing, and infrared shielding for combat helicopters.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2010

Inversion Method for Early Detection of ARES-1 Case Breach Failure

A document describes research into the problem of detecting a case breach formation at an early stage of a rocket flight. An inversion algorithm for case breach allocation is proposed and analyzed. It is shown how the case breach can be allocated at an early stage of its development by using the rocket sensor data and the output data from the control block of the rocket navigation system. The results are simulated with MATLAB/Simulink software. The efficiency of an inversion algorithm for a case breach location is discussed. The research was devoted to the analysis of the ARES-l flight during the first 120 seconds after the launch and early prediction of case breach failure. During this time, the rocket is propelled by its first-stage Solid Rocket Booster (SRB). If a breach appears in SRB case, the gases escaping through it will produce the (side) thrust directed perpendicular to the rocket axis. The side thrust creates torque influencing the rocket attitude. The ARES-l control system will compensate for the side thrust until it reaches some critical value, after which the flight will be uncontrollable. The objective of this work was to obtain the start time of case breach development and its location using the rocket inertial navigation sensors and GNC data. The algorithm was effective for the detection and location of a breach in an SRB field joint at an early stage of its development.

Mackey, Ryan M.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Launch Pad Escape System Design (Human Spaceflight)

A launch pad escape system for human spaceflight is one of those things that everyone hopes they will never need but is critical for every manned space program. Since men were first put into space in the early 1960s, the need for such an Emergency Escape System (EES) has become apparent. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has made use of various types of these EESs over the past 50 years. Early programs, like Mercury and Gemini, did not have an official launch pad escape system. Rather, they relied on a Launch Escape System (LES) of a separate solid rocket motor attached to the manned capsule that could pull the astronauts to safety in the event of an emergency. This could only occur after hatch closure at the launch pad or during the first stage of flight. A version of a LES, now called a Launch Abort System (LAS) is still used today for all manned capsule type launch vehicles. However, this system is very limited in that it can only be used after hatch closure and it is for flight crew only. In addition, the forces necessary for the LES/LAS to get the capsule away from a rocket during the first stage of flight are quite high and can cause injury to the crew. These shortcomings led to the development of a ground based EES for the flight crew and ground support personnel as well. This way, a much less dangerous mode of egress is available for any flight or ground personnel up to a few seconds before launch. The early EESs were fairly simple, gravity-powered systems to use when thing's go bad. And things can go bad very quickly and catastrophically when dealing with a flight vehicle fueled with millions of pounds of hazardous propellant. With this in mind, early EES designers saw such a passive/unpowered system as a must for last minute escapes. This and other design requirements had to be derived for an EES, and this section will take a look at the safety design requirements had to be derived for an EES, and this section will take a look at the safety design aspects for a launch pad escape system.

Maloney, Kelli↗

NASA NTRS1990

Results in orbital evolution of objects in the geosynchronous region

The orbital evolution of objects at or near geosynchronous orbit (GEO) has been simulated to investigate possible hazards to working geosynchronous satellites. Orbits of both large satellites and small particles have been simulated, subject to perturbations by nonspherical geopotential terms, lunar and solar gravity, and solar radiation pressure. Large satellites in initially circular orbits show an expected cycle of inclination change driven by lunar and solar gravity, but very little altitude change. They thus have little chance of colliding with objects at other altitudes. However, if such a satellite is disrupted, debris can reach thousands of kilometers above or below the initial satellite altitude. Small particles in GEO experience two cycles driven by solar radiation: an expected eccentricity cycle and an inclination cycle not expected. Particles generated by GEO insertion stage solid rocket motors typically hit the earth or escape promptly; a small fraction appear to remain in persistent orbits.

Friesen, Larry Jay↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger disaster was caused by an Apollo decision

Harry W Jones↗