SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “ESCAPE CAPSULE”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 37 records · Page 2

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS1973

Behavioral regulation of gravity - Schedule effects under escape-avoidance procedures

Squirrel monkeys were restrained in a centrifuge capsule and trained to escape and avoid increases in artificial gravity. During escape-avoidance, lever responses reduced centrifugally simulated gravity or postponed scheduled increases. The effect of variation in the interval of postponement (equal to the duration of decrease produced by escape responses) was studied under a multiple schedule of four components. Three components were gravity escape-avoidance with postponement times of 20, 40, and 60 sec. The fourth component was extinction. Each component was associated with a different auditory stimulus. Rate of responding decreased with increasing postponement time and higher mean g-levels occurred at shorter intervals of postponement. Effects of the schedule parameter on response rate and mean g-level were similar to effects of the schedule on free-operant avoidance and on titration behavior maintained by shock.

Clark, F. C.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger disaster was caused by an Apollo decision

Harry W Jones↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.

Harry W. Jones↗

NASA NTRS1966

Spacecraft development

Flight sequence, capsule design, pyrotechnic applications, escape modes, and safety features for Gemini spacecraft

SAFETY DEVICE↗

NASA NTRS1963

Launch Vehicle Flight Report - Nasa Project Apollo Little Joe 2 Qualification Test Vehicle 12-50-1

The Little Joe II Qualification Test Vehicle, Model 12-50-1, was launched from Army Launch Area 3 {ALA-3) at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, on 28 August 1963. This was the first launch of this class of boosters. The Little Joe II Launch Vehicle was designed as a test vehicle for boosting payloads into flight. For the Apollo Program, its mission is to serve as a launch vehicle for flight testing of the Apollo spacecraft. Accomplishment of this mission requires that the vehicle be capable of boosting the Apollo payload to parameters ranging from high dynamic pressures at low altitude to very high altitude flight. The fixed-fin 12-50 version was designed to accomplish the low-altitude parameter. The 12-51 version incorporates an attitude control system to accomplish the high altitude mission. This launch was designed to demonstrate the Little Joe II capability of meeting the high dynamic pressure parameter for the Apollo Program. For this test, a boiler-plate version of the Apollo capsule, service module and escape tower were attached to the launch vehicle to simulate weight, center of gravity and aerodynamic shape of the Apollo configuration. No attempt was made to separate the payload in flight. The test was conducted in compliance with Project Apollo Flight Mission Directive for QTV-1, NASA-MSC, dated 3 June 1963, under authority of NASA Contract NAS 9-492,

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2009

Launch Order, Launch Separation, and Loiter in the Constellation 1 1/2-Launch Solution

The NASA Constellation Program (CxP) is developing a two-element Earth-to-Orbit launch system to enable human exploration of the Moon. The first element, Ares I, is a human-rated system that consists of a first stage based on the Space Shuttle Program's solid rocket booster (SRB) and an upper stage that consists of a four-crew Orion capsule, a service module, and a Launch Escape System. The second element, Ares V, is a Saturn V-plus category launch system that consists of the core stage with a cluster of six RS-68B engines and augmented with two 5.5-segment SRBs, a Saturn-derived J-2X engine powering an Earth Departure Stage (EDS), and the lunar-lander vehicle payload, Altair. Initial plans called for the Ares V to be launched first, followed the next day by the Ares I. After the EDS performs the final portion of ascent and subsequent orbit circularization, the Orion spacecraft then performs a rendezvous and docks with the EDS and its Altair payload. Following checkout, the integrated stack loiters in low Earth orbit (LEO) until the appropriate Trans-Lunar Injection (TLI) window opportunity opens, at which time the EDS propels the integrated Orion Altair to the Moon. Successful completion of this 1 1/2-launch solution carries risks related to both the orbital lifetime of the assets and the probability of achieving the launch of the second vehicle within the orbital lifetime of the first. These risks, which are significant in terms of overall system design choices and probability of mission success, dictated a thorough reevaluation of the launch strategy, including the order of vehicle launch and the planned time period between launches. The goal of the effort described in this paper was to select a launch strategy that would result in the greatest possible expected system performance, while accounting for launch risks and the cost of increased orbital lifetime. Discrete Event Simulation (DES) model of the launch strategies was created to determine the probability of a second launch not occurring in a timely fashion (i.e., before the assets waiting in LEO expire). An overview of the launch strategy evaluation process is presented, along with results of specific cases that were analyzed. A high-level comparison of options is then presented, along with the conclusion derived from the analysis.

Stromgren, Chel↗

NASA NTRS2016

A Proposed Ascent Abort Flight Test for the Max Launch Abort System

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center initiated the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) Project to investigate alternate crew escape system concepts that eliminate the conventional launch escape tower by integrating the escape system into an aerodynamic fairing that fully encapsulates the crew capsule and smoothly integrates with the launch vehicle. This paper proposes an ascent abort flight test for an all-propulsive towerless escape system concept that is actively controlled and sized to accommodate the Orion Crew Module. The goal of the flight test is to demonstrate a high dynamic pressure escape and to characterize jet interaction effects during operation of the attitude control thrusters at transonic and supersonic conditions. The flight-test vehicle is delivered to the required test conditions by a booster configuration selected to meet cost, manufacturability, and operability objectives. Data return is augmented through judicious design of the boost trajectory, which is optimized to obtain data at a range of relevant points, rather than just a single flight condition. Secondary flight objectives are included after the escape to obtain aerodynamic damping data for the crew module and to perform a high-altitude contingency deployment of the drogue parachutes. Both 3- and 6-degree-of-freedom trajectory simulation results are presented that establish concept feasibility, and a Monte Carlo uncertainty assessment is performed to provide confidence that test objectives can be met.

Tartabini, Paul V.↗

NASA NTRS1958

Development of X-15 escape system

The content of this paper is concerned primarily with testing and determining the suitability of such factors as cockpit mobility, escape potential, mechanical reliability, post-separation performance, and airframe compatibility. Integrating the results of the various studies led to the conclusion that the pressure suit in combination with the open ejection seat would best satisfy the X-15 emergency-escape requirements by virtue of elimination of capsule-imposed penalties on aircraft performance and significant reduction in development time.

Hegenwald, J F↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Comet Astrobiology Exploration Sample Return (CAESAR) Mission

The Comet Astrobiology Exploration Sample Return (CAESAR) mission will acquire and return to Earth for laboratory analysis a minimum of 80 grams of surface material from the nucleus of comet 67P/Chur-yumov-Gerasimenko (67P). CAESAR will characterize the surface region sampled, preserve the collected sample in a pristine state, and return evolved volatiles by capturing them in a separate gas reservoir. NASA Goddard Space Flight Center provides project management, systems engineering, safety and mission assurance, contamination control, mission operations, and many other important functions. Northrop Grumman Space Systems will build the spacecraft, based on Dawn mission heritage, which like CAESAR, uses solar electric propulsion. CAESAR was selected by for Phase A study in the New Frontiers 4 Competition and will be proposed to New Frontiers 5.Collection of a sample from the surface of comet 67P is facilitated by a set of cameras that together provide images to support sample site selection, perform optical navigation, and document the sample before, during, and after col-lection. The sample is collected at the end of an arm during a 5-second touch-and-go (TAG) maneuver with the Sample Acquisition System (SAS)designed by Honeybee Robotics for the surface properties of comet 67P observed by the Rosetta mission. After sample collection, and while the sample is still cold (< -80°C), the TAG Arm inserts the sample container into the Sample Containment System (SCS) mounted inside the Sample Return Capsule (SRC). The SCS is sealed, preventing the sample from escaping into space. The sample is slowly warmed inside the SCS to enable sublimation of volatiles, which are collected in the Gas Containment System (GCS), a passively cooled gas reservoir. Separating the volatiles from the solid sample protects the solid sample from alteration. Once all sublimated H2O is transferred to the GCS, the GCS is sealed to capture the volatile sit contains, and the SCS is vented to space to maintain the solid sample under vacuum. The SCS vent is closed before Earth entry to prevent atmospheric contamination. Detailed laboratory analyses of the sample from 67P will trace the history of volatile reservoirs, delineate the chemical pathways that led from simple interstellar species to complex molecules, constrain the evolution of the comet, and evaluate the role of comets in delivering water and prebiotic organics to the early Earth. CAESAR will achieve these goals by carrying out coordinated sample analyses that will link macroscopic properties of the comet with microscale mineralogy, chemistry, and isotopic studies of volatiles and solids. Most of the sample (≥75%) will be set aside for analyses by generations of scientists using continually advancing tools and methods, yielding an enduring scientific treasure that only sample return can provide. This presentation will review development conducted during NF4 Phase A and discuss the NF5 mission concept.

A G Hayes↗

NASA NTRS2013

Dynamic Acquisition and Retrieval Tool (DART) for Comet Sample Return : Session: 2.06.Robotic Mobility and Sample Acquisition Systems

The 2011 Decadal Survey for planetary science released by the National Research Council of the National Academies identified Comet Surface Sample Return (CSSR) as one of five high priority potential New Frontiers-class missions in the next decade. The main objectives of the research described in this publication are: develop a concept for an end-to-end system for collecting and storing a comet sample to be returned to Earth; design, fabricate and test a prototype Dynamic Acquisition and Retrieval Tool (DART) capable of collecting 500 cc sample in a canister and eject the canister with a predetermined speed; identify a set of simulants with physical properties at room temperature that suitably match the physical properties of the comet surface as it would be sampled. We propose the use of a dart that would be launched from the spacecraft to impact and penetrate the comet surface. After collecting the sample, the sample canister would be ejected at a speed greater than the comet's escape velocity and captured by the spacecraft, packaged into a return capsule and returned to Earth. The dart would be composed of an inner tube or sample canister, an outer tube, a decelerator, a means of capturing and retaining the sample, and a mechanism to eject the canister with the sample for later rendezvous with the spacecraft. One of the significant unknowns is the physical properties of the comet surface. Based on new findings from the recent Deep Impact comet encounter mission, we have limited our search of solutions for sampling materials to materials with 10 to 100 kPa shear strength in loose or consolidated form. As the possible range of values for the comet surface temperature is also significantly different than room temperature and testing at conditions other than the room temperature can become resource intensive, we sought sample simulants with physical properties at room temperature similar to the expected physical properties of the comet surface material. The chosen DART configuration, the efforts to identify a test simulant and the properties of these simulants, and the results of the preliminary testing will be described in this paper.

Dynamic Acquisition and Retrieval Tool (DART)↗

NASA NTRS2011

Launch Pad Escape System Design (Human Spaceflight)

A launch pad escape system for human spaceflight is one of those things that everyone hopes they will never need but is critical for every manned space program. Since men were first put into space in the early 1960s, the need for such an Emergency Escape System (EES) has become apparent. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has made use of various types of these EESs over the past 50 years. Early programs, like Mercury and Gemini, did not have an official launch pad escape system. Rather, they relied on a Launch Escape System (LES) of a separate solid rocket motor attached to the manned capsule that could pull the astronauts to safety in the event of an emergency. This could only occur after hatch closure at the launch pad or during the first stage of flight. A version of a LES, now called a Launch Abort System (LAS) is still used today for all manned capsule type launch vehicles. However, this system is very limited in that it can only be used after hatch closure and it is for flight crew only. In addition, the forces necessary for the LES/LAS to get the capsule away from a rocket during the first stage of flight are quite high and can cause injury to the crew. These shortcomings led to the development of a ground based EES for the flight crew and ground support personnel as well. This way, a much less dangerous mode of egress is available for any flight or ground personnel up to a few seconds before launch. The early EESs were fairly simple, gravity-powered systems to use when thing's go bad. And things can go bad very quickly and catastrophically when dealing with a flight vehicle fueled with millions of pounds of hazardous propellant. With this in mind, early EES designers saw such a passive/unpowered system as a must for last minute escapes. This and other design requirements had to be derived for an EES, and this section will take a look at the safety design requirements had to be derived for an EES, and this section will take a look at the safety design aspects for a launch pad escape system.

Maloney, Kelli↗

NASA NTRS1963

Aeroelastic Tests of an Eight Percent Scale Saturn C-1 Block II

Buffet and flutter characteristics of Saturn Apollo mission were studied using a dynamically scaled model. The model was built around a central aluminum tube for scaled stiffness distribution and strength to resist loads imposed during testing. Styrofoam sections attached to the core provided the correct external contours. Lead weights were added for correct mass distribution. An electromagnetic shaker was used to excite the model in its flexible modes of vibration during portions of the test. The model was supported on a sting, mounted by leaf springs, cables and torsion bars. The support system provided for simulating the full scale rigid body pitch frequency with minimum restraint imposed on elastic deflections. Bending moments recorded by sensors on the aluminum tube. Several modified nose configurations were tested: The basic configuration was tested with and without a flow separator disk on the escape rocket motor, tests also were made with the escape tower and rocket motor removed completely. For the final test, the Apollo capsule was replaced with a Jupiter nose cone. The test program consisted of determining model response throughout the transonic speed range at angles of attack up to 6 degrees and measuring the aerodynamic damping over the same range for the basic model and the modified configurations. Signals from the model pickup were recorded on tape for later analysis. The data obtained were used to estimate bending moments that would be produced on the full-scale vehicle by aerodynamic forces due to buffeting.

EXPERIMENTS↗

NASA NTRS2011

MLAS and LAS: Project Comparison of Lessons Learned

The development of new and safer manned space vehicles is a top priority at NASA. Recently two different approaches of how to accomplish this mission of keeping astronauts safe was successfully demonstrated. With work already underway on an Apollo-like launch abort system for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), an alternative design concept named the Max Launch Abort System, or MLAS, was developed as a parallel effort. The Orion system, managed by the Constellation office, is based on the design of a single solid launch abort motor in a tower positioned above the capsule. The MLAS design takes a different approach placing the solid launch abort motor underneath the capsule. This effort was led by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). Both escape systems were designed with the Ares I Rocket as the launch vehicle and had the same primary requirement to safely propel a crew module away from any emergency event either on the launch pad or during accent. Beyond these two parameters, there was little else in common between the two projects, except that they both concluded in successful launches that will further promote the development of crew launch abort systems. This presentation will compare both projects from the standpoint of technical requirements; program management and flight test objectives and highlight the synergistic lessons learned by two engineers who worked on each program.

Dittemore, Gary↗

NASA NTRS2011

Comparison of Two Recent Launch Abort Platforms

The development of new and safer manned space vehicles is a top priority at NASA. Recently two different approaches of how to accomplish this mission of keeping astronauts safe was successfully demonstrated. With work already underway on an Apollo-like launch abort system for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), an alternative design concept named the Max Launch Abort System, or MLAS, was developed as a parallel effort. The Orion system, managed by the Constellation office, is based on the design of a single solid launch abort motor in a tower positioned above the capsule. The MLAS design takes a different approach placing the solid launch abort motor underneath the capsule. This effort was led by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). Both escape systems were designed with the Ares I Rocket as the launch vehicle and had the same primary requirement to safely propel a crew module away from any emergency event either on the launch pad or during accent. Beyond these two parameters, there was little else in common between the two projects, except that they both concluded in successful launches that will further promote the development of crew launch abort systems. A comparison of these projects from the standpoint of technical requirements; program management and flight test objectives will be done to highlight the synergistic lessons learned by two engineers who worked on each program. This comparison will demonstrate how the scope of the project architecture and management involvement in innovation should be tailored to meet the specific needs of the system under development.

Dittemore, Gary D.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Multi-Terrain Earth Landing Systems Applicable for Manned Space Capsules

A key element of the President's Vision for Space Exploration is the development of a new space transportation system to replace Shuttle that will enable manned exploration of the moon, Mars, and beyond. NASA has tasked the Constellation Program with the development of this architecture, which includes the Ares launch vehicle and Orion manned spacecraft. The Orion spacecraft must carry six astronauts and its primary structure should be reusable, if practical. These requirements led the Constellation Program to consider a baseline land landing on return to earth. To assess the landing system options for Orion, a review of current operational parachute landing systems such as those used for the F-111 escape module and the Soyuz is performed. In particular, landing systems with airbags and retrorockets that would enable reusability of the Orion capsule are investigated. In addition, Apollo tests and analyses conducted in the 1960's for both water and land landings are reviewed. Finally, tests and dynamic finite element simulations to understand land landings for the Orion spacecraft are also presented.

Fasanella, Edwin L.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Multi-Terrain Earth Landing Systems Applicable for Manned Space Capsules

A key element of the President's Vision for Space Exploration is the development of a new space transportation system to replace the Shuttle that will enable manned exploration of the moon, Mars, and beyond. NASA has tasked the Constellation Program with the development of this architecture, which includes the Ares launch vehicle and Orion manned spacecraft. The Orion spacecraft must carry six astronauts and its primary structure should be reusable, if practical. These requirements led the Constellation Program to consider a baseline land landing on return to earth. To assess the landing system options for Orion, a review of current operational parachute landing systems such as those used for the F-111 escape module and the Soyuz is performed. In particular, landing systems with airbags and retrorockets that would enable reusability of the Orion capsule are investigated. In addition, Apollo tests and analyses conducted in the 1960's for both water and land landings are reviewed. Finally, tests and dynamic finite element simulations to understand land landings for the Orion spacecraft are also presented.

Fasanella, Edwin L.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Space Program Advocacy Can Distort Project Management and Damage Systems Engineering

Over-optimistic project advocacy often causes exaggerated performance claims and underestimated costs and schedules. This can distort project management and damage systems engineering. NASA projects such as the space shuttle and Hubble are extreme examples. NASA's spectacular success in the Apollo moon landings seems to have produced overconfidence and carelessness, but also to have gained tolerance for unrealistic claims and forgiveness when they were proven wrong. Apollo risk analysis predicted many astronaut fatalities. This was believed but was potentially damaging to the Apollo program, so risk analysis was discontinued. The moon landings beat bad odds because Apollo obsessively reduced risk. Its success seemed to confirm that risk analysis was unreasonably pessimistic and that risk could be overcome by good engineering. This understanding caused risk to be increased during space shuttle engineering and led to an unnecessarily dangerous approach. The shuttle design placed a fragile spacecraft next to the fuel tanks and failed to provide crew escape or launch abort. These design decisions directly caused the Challenger and Columbia tragedies. After Challenger, risk analysis was re-established. The current rocket and capsule design does consider risk and the result strongly resembles Apollo. Apollo advocacy led NASA to abandon risk analysis and this was ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies. Excessive advocacy that distorts risk, cost, and schedule could be prevented in an ideal organization that used systems engineering to make rational and fair decisions. However, most real organizations accommodate human and group needs using informal methods often described as "the system." Humans have biases, use innate decision making heuristics, instinctively rely on "gut feel," and establish deviant groups through groupthink. Expecting organizations to become totally rational is impractical, but specific problems such as neglecting risk and underestimating cost and schedule can be directly challenged with some hope of success.

Jones, Harry W.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Ejectable Data Recorder: A Lean, Risk-Informed Approach for Hardware Development

NASA is developing the Orion spacecraft to transport crew from the Earth to the Moon as part of the Artemis series of missions. To provide a crew escape capability from pre-launch through ascent, the Orion vehicle is equipped with a Launch Abort System (LAS), built by Lockheed Martin, which pulls the capsule away from the launch vehicle in the event of an abort scenario. The Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2) test flight occurred on July 2, 2019,and tested a production version of the LAS to ensure that it can operate as intended, and to collect a large data set from hundreds of sensors on the vehicle to support Orion flight certification. In the original AA-2 architecture, a single-string set of communications antennas on the LAS would downlink all of the in-flight test data to ground stations. However, that communications architecture was predicted to have data dropouts during abort and jettison of the LAS, and would not support data transmission at all after LAS jettison. As a result, a comprehensive trade study was completed, yielding the addition of antennas on the crew module (CM), a buffer/rebroadcast capability for key portions of the flight, and an ejectable data recorder (EDR) subsystem. This EDR subsystem would serve as a backup to the radio frequency (RF) communications system, and would be non-flight critical, providing a unique capability that enabled management to take a different approach with the hardware and software development. The Crew Module and Separation Ring were developed as “Class 1”Flight Hardware, albeit with some tailoring approaches to enable efficiencies. The Class 1 designation requires full rigor for flight hardware and software, documenting everything that happens to a piece of hardware from procurement through disposal, requiring a full spectrum of acceptance tests, and the highest rigor of quality assurance processes. At the other end of the spectrum, Class 3hardware is controlled, but not intended for flight, and leaves the level of rigor up to the project manager. This classification is often used for research and development projects. Similarly,Class-1E has been recently defined at NASA for ISS payloads and technology development projects that are not flight critical and do not need the full rigor of Class 1 to be successful. The EDR subsystem was challenged at commencement to adopt a skunkworks and agile-like approach to hardware development, allowing for a different risk posture than the rest of the AA-2 hardware. After initially pursuing Class 1 processes, the EDR subsystem design evolved to incorporating numerous commercial components, leading to re-designation as a Class-1E subsystem. The resulting EDR subsystem was fully successful in meeting all flight system requirements, and achieved 100% retrieval of flight test data. This paper will discuss the risk posture of the EDR subsystem and the subsequent tailoring that was enacted as part of its Class-1E status.

EDR↗