Between Two Zones: Balancing the Maritime Security Zone and Emergency Planning Zone for Floating Nuclear Power Plants
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EmergenCy management personnel at federal, stale, and local levels can benefit from the increased situational awareness and operational efficiency afforded by simulation and modeling for emergency preparedness, including planning, training and exercises. To support this goal, the Department of Homeland Security's Science & Technology Directorate is funding the Integrated Modeling, Mapping, and Simulation (IMMS) program to create an integrating framework that brings together diverse models for use by the emergency response community. SUMMIT, one piece of the IMMS program, is the initial software framework that connects users such as emergency planners and exercise developers with modeling resources, bridging the gap in expertise and technical skills between these two communities. SUMMIT was recently deployed to support exercise planning for National Level Exercise 2010. Threat, casualty. infrastructure, and medical surge models were combined within SUMMIT to estimate health care resource requirements for the exercise ground truth.
To assist in emergency preparedness for a biological agent terrorist attack or accidental pathogen release, potential contaminant levels and migration pathways of spores spread by urban stormwater were evaluated using a Storm Water Management Model (SWMM) of U.S. Coast Guard Base Elizabeth City, North Carolina. The high temporal-spatial resolution SWMM model was built using spore concentrations in stormwater runoff from asphalt, grass, and concrete collected from a point-scale field study. The subsequent modeled contamination scenarios included a notional plume release and point releases mimicking the field study under three rainfall conditions. The rainfall scenarios included a 6-hour natural rainfall event on Dec. 8, 2021 and two design storms (2-year and 100-year events). The observed spore concentrations from asphalt and concrete from the actual field experiment were applied to calibrate the washoff parameters in the SWMM model, using an exponential washoff function. The calibrated washoff coefficient (c 1 ) and exponent (c 2 ) were 0.01 and 1.00 for asphalt, 0.05 and 1.45 for grass, and 2.45 and 1.00 for concrete, respectively. The calibrated SWMM model simulated spore concentrations in runoff at times and magnitudes similar to the field study data. In the point release modeled scenario, the concrete surface generated 55.6% higher average spore concentrations than asphalt. Similarly, in the field experiment, a 175% (p < 0.05) higher average spore concentration in surface runoff was observed from concrete than from asphalt. Here, this study demonstrates how SWMM may be used to evaluate spore washoff from urban surfaces under different precipitation amounts, intensities, and durations, and how visualized spatial migration pathways in stormwater runoff may be used for emergency planning and remediation.
Microreactors are compact reactors capable of producing less than 50 megawatts of electrical energy. Typically, these reactors are factory-fabricated and designed to be easily transportable by truck, rail, vessel, or air. Microreactor designs often assume that the unit can be transported containing either unirradiated or irradiated fuel. The interest in microreactors is driven by several factors, including the need to generate power on at remote locations, at military installations, at facilities such as data centers, and in areas recovering from natural disasters. The U.S. Department of Defense is actively pursuing the microreactor concept to meet the increasing energy demands of military operations that require portable and dense power sources. Commercial vendors are also exploring microreactor concepts. The report Microreactor Transportation Emergency Planning Challenges (Maheras et al. 2024) outlined the emergency planning challenges associated with the transportation of microreactors by road, rail, and by barge/ship. The successful commercial deployment and redeployment of microreactors will also require the development of microreactor transportation safety programs. The elements in these safety programs are not specific to microreactors; however, the transport of microreactors may pose unique challenges in these areas. This report builds on the report Microreactor Transportation Emergency Planning Challenges (Maheras et al. 2024) and develops the elements of a prototype microreactor transportation safety program that describes the elements that should be contained vendor-developed microreactor transportation safety programs, identifying the unique elements associated with microreactor transport. This will provide vendors and their transportation contractors a basis for their transportation planning and will accelerate the commercial deployment and redeployment of microreactors by identifying those issues unique to microreactor transport. The emphasis of this report is on highway transport of microreactors. This is based on a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission transportation package approval strategy of crawl-walk-run, where transport by highway is evaluated first (Coles et al. 2021, 2024, Maheras et al. 2021), then other surface modes (rail and barge/ship), and finally air transport. Evaluation of maritime transport of microreactors was recently initiated (Rigato et al. 2024, Maheras et al. 2025). The report first discusses microreactors in general and microreactor transportation safety program planning assumptions. The report then provides a description of the transportation safety planning process and provides an extensive discussion of the elements of transportation safety programs. Specific elements examined included transportation roles and responsibilities, transportation planning, transportation mode and route selection, carrier selection, transportation packaging, advance notification of shipments, public information and communications, emergency response plans and procedures, inspections, security, safe parking, shipment tracking, weather and road conditions, medical preparedness, training and exercises, and program evaluation. The report then identifies the unique elements of a transportation safety program associated with microreactor transport. These unique elements were in the areas of: the unusual nature of microreactor designs, compensatory measures, increased radiation dose rates in the vicinity of microreactors, transportation package approval versus 10 CFR 50.59, and the use of a risk-informed transportation package approval process.
Purpose: To evaluate and develop the feasibility of on-line cone beam CT based planning for emergency and palliative radiotherapy treatments. Methods: Subsequent to phantom studies, a case library of 28 clinical megavoltage cone beam CT (MVCBCT) was built to assess dose-planning accuracies on MVCBCT for all anatomical sites. A simple emergency treatment plan was created on the MVCBCT and copied to its reference CT. The agreement between the dose distributions of each image pair was evaluated by the mean dose difference of the dose volume and the gamma index of the central 2D axial plane. An array of popular urgent and palliative cases was also evaluated for imaging component clearance and field-of-view. Results: The treatment cases were categorized into four groups (head and neck, thorax/spine, pelvis and extremities). Dose distributions for head and neck treatments were predicted accurately in all cases with a gamma index of >95% for 2% and 2 mm criteria. Thoracic spine treatments had a gamma index as low as 60% indicating a need for better uniformity correction and tissue density calibration. Small anatomy changes between CT and MVCBCT could contribute to local errors. Pelvis and sacral spine treatment cases had a gamma index between 90% and 98% for 3%/3 mm criteria. The limited FOV became an issue for large pelvis patients. Imaging clearance was difficult for cases where the tumor was positioned far off midline. Conclusion: The MVCBCT based dose planning and delivery approach is feasible in many treatment cases. Dose distributions for head and neck patients are unrestrictedly predictable. Some FOV restrictions apply to other treatment sites. Lung tissue is most challenging for accurate dose calculations given the current imaging filters and corrections. Additional clinical cases for extremities need to be included in the study to assess the full range of site-specific planning accuracies. This work is supported by Siemens.
The economic potential of micro-reactors is vast and underestimated. Commonly-emphasized applications include niche markets such as remote communities, mines and military bases. However, micro-reactors could be used as flexible energy generators also for larger markets, such as mobile and containerized agriculture and manufacturing facilities, district heating, micro-grids for data centers, sea ports, airports and hospitals. The implication is that micro-reactors may have to be deployed also in non-remote locations. Successful implementation of micro-reactors needs a navigable and predictable licensing process, technology-appropriate siting restrictions, risk-informed emergency and safety requirements, and practical operating and maintenance requirements. The primary goal of this project was to develop siting criteria that are tailored to micro-reactors deployable in densely-populated areas, e.g., urban environments. To achieve that goal, we compared the characteristics of the MIT research reactor (MITR) with those of leading micro-reactor concepts (e.g., eVinci, USNC, Aurora), and evaluated whether and how the MITR design basis (e.g., inherent safety features, engineered safety systems, source term, emergency planning and emergency operating procedures) and associated regulations may be applicable to these new micro-reactors as well. What makes MITR a unique analogue in this context is its small power rating (6 MWt) and physical size, mode of operations (24/7 with a somewhat more commercial flavor than typical university reactors), and especially its urban location. Of course significant differences exist, such as mission (power production vs. research) and the reactor design itself. Leveraging the MITR experience, this project was able to generate criteria that will allow micro-reactors to realize their full economic potential as flexible heat and electricity generators for a diverse portfolio of applications in non-remote locations. As such, the outcome of this project might encourage investment in and use of micro-reactors. A second goal of the project was to conceptualize a model of operations for micro-reactors that would minimize the staffing requirements, and thus reduce the cost of electricity and heat generated by these systems. Here too our approach was to systematically review the MITR experience and requirements, as well as survey the innovations in autonomous control technologies and monitoring (e.g., advanced sensors, drones, robotics, AI) that would permit a dramatic reduction in staffing at future micro-reactor installations. The scope of work was expanded after the start date to include also an evaluation of micro-reactor security, using the so-called consequence-based analysis, and the development of a methodology to perform dynamic risk assessment for micro-reactors, using system theory and modeling and simulation.
Existing and actively planned mobile satellite systems are competing for a viable share of the spectrum allocated by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to the satellite based mobile services in the 1.5/1.6 GHz range. The limited amount of spectrum available worldwide and the sheer number of existing and planned mobile satellite systems dictate the adoption of an architecture which will maximize sharing possibilities. A viable sharing architecture must recognize the operational needs and limitations of the existing systems. Furthermore, recognizing the right of access of the future systems as they will emerge in time, the adopted architecture must allow for additional growth and be amenable to orderly introduction of future systems. An attempt to devise such a sharing architecture is described. A specific example of the application of the basic concept to the existing and planned mobile satellite systems is also discussed.
Monsanto's emergency response plan in dealing with hazardous materials at their facilities is presented. Topics discussed include the following: CPR training; emergency medial training; incident reports; contractor injuries; hazardous materials transport; evacuation; and other industrial safety concerns.
Experimental studies were conducted with pilots to investigate the attributes of automation that would be appropriate for aiding pilots in emergencies. The specific focus of this year was on methods of mitigating automation brittleness. Brittleness occurs when the automatic system is used in circumstances it was not designed for, causing it to choose an incorrect action or make an inaccurate decision for the situation. Brittleness is impossible to avoid since it is impossible to predict every potential situation the automatic system will be exposed to over its life. However, operators are always ultimately responsible for the actions and decisions of the automation they are monitoring or using, which means they must evaluate the automation's decisions and actions for accuracy. As has been pointed out, this is a difficult thing for human operators to do. There have been various suggestions as to how to aid operators with this evaluation. In the study described in this report we studied how presentation of contextual information about an automatic system's decision might impact the ability of the human operators to evaluate that decision. This study focused on the planning of emergency descents. Fortunately, emergencies (e.g., mechanical or electrical malfunction, on-board fire, and medical emergency) happen quite rarely. However, they can be catastrophic when they do. For all predictable or conceivable emergencies, pilots have emergency procedures that they are trained on, but those procedures often end with 'determine suitable airport and land as quickly as possible.' Planning an emergency descent to an unplanned airport is a difficult task, particularly under the time pressures of an emergency. Automatic decision aids could be very efficient at the task of determining an appropriate airport and calculating an optimal trajectory to that airport. This information could be conveyed to the pilot through an emergency descent procedure listing all of the actions necessary to safely land the plane. However, there is still the potential problem of brittleness. This study examined the impact of contextual information in presentations of emergency descent procedures to see if they might impact the pilot's evaluation of the feasibility of the presented procedure. The study and its results are described in detail.
International Radiological Assistance Program Training for Emergency Response course in Rabat, Morocco Feb 19-23, 2018 for DOE/NNSA/NA-81
Effective and safe control of an aircraft may be difficult or nearly impossible for a pilot following an unexpected system failure. Without prior training, the pilot must ascertain on the fly those changes in both manual control technique and procedures that will lead to a safe landing of the aircraft. Sophisticated techniques for determining the required control techniques are now available. Likewise, a body of literature on pilot decision making provides formalisms for examining how pilots approach discrete decisions framed as the selection between options. However, other aspects of behavior, such as the task of route planning and guidance, are not as well studied. Not only is the pilot faced with possible performance changes to the aircraft dynamics, but he or she is also tasked to create a plan of actions that will effectively take the aircraft down to a safe landing. In this plan, the many actions that the pilot can perform are closely intertwined with the trajectory of the aircraft, making it difficult to accurately predict the final outcome. Coupled with the vast number of potential actions to be taken, this problem may seem intractable. This is reflected in the lack of a pre-specified procedure capable of giving pilots the ability to find a resolution for this task. This report summarizes a multi-year effort to examine methods to aid pilots in planning an approach and arrival to an airport following an aircraft systems failure. Ultimately, we hypothesize that automatic assistance to pilots can be provided in real-time in the form of improving pilot control of a damaged aircraft and providing pilots with procedural directives suitable for critical flight conditions; such systems may also benefit pilot training and procedure design. To achieve this result, a systematic, comprehensive research program was followed, building on prior research. This approach included a pencil-and-paper study with airline pilots examining methods of representing a flight route in an immediately understandable manner, and in a manner that would allow the pilot to modify an automatically-generated route and/or detect any inappropriate elements in an automatically-generated route. Likewise, a flight simulator study examined different cockpit systems for the relative merits of providing pilots with any of a variety of automated functions for emergency flight planning. The results provide specific guidance for the design of such systems.
Various advanced reactor developers are exploring the potential for reductions in the size of physical security forces and emergency planning zones. These reductions are based on robust fuel forms and inherently safe reactor designs. However, such reductions in physical protection measures could increase the risk of sabotage. To assess the possibility of reducing these measures, sabotage-induced radiological consequence analyses were carried out. These analyses considered accident scenarios that were beyond design basis accidents and overly conservative (Shah, 2025a; Shah, 2025b; Shah and Hartanto, 2026), yielding very large release fractions. These fractions, which can be used to evaluate physical protection and emergency planning requirements, have been crudely determined and applied as demonstrations for a sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) (Shah and Hartanto, 2025a), a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) (Shah and Hartanto, 2025b), a heat pipe–cooled reactor (HPR) (Shah and Hartanto, 2025c), and a molten salt–cooled reactor (MSR) (Shah et al., 2026). A Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) team used MELCOR—a fully integrated severe accident analysis code—to demonstrate the code’s capability to analyze advanced (i.e., not light water–cooled) reactors (including a fluoride salt–cooled high-temperature reactor [FHR]) and calculate radiological releases to the environment during severe accidents (Wagner et al., 2022a, 2022b, 2022c, 2023a, and 2023b). Although the analyses were carried out to demonstrate MELCOR’s growing capability, the release source terms were estimated for advanced reactors, providing valuable insights into the accident progression and radiological releases. These findings from prior SNL studies, including estimated source terms and related sensitivity studies, were leveraged to derive source terms for postulated sabotage-induced accidents. Insights from these sensitivity studies informed the scaling of SNL’s estimated source terms for the defined accident scenarios. The derived release fractions for the severe accident scenarios for the respective reactor designs can be used to perform more nuanced dose consequence analyses to evaluate the reactors’ physical protection and emergency planning zone requirements. These analyses are in accordance with the risk-informed, performance-based approach proposed under 10 CFR Part 53. This study builds on the prior source term analyses and associated sensitivity studies by SNL to derive time-dependent and design-informed release fractions. Section 2 describes the diverse advanced reactor designs analyzed by the SNL team. Section 3 discusses the severe accident analyses, the release fractions calculated, and the limitations and assumptions of the demonstration project. Section 4 presents the release percentages derived for the hypothetical sabotage-induced severe accidents at the advanced reactors. Section 5 summarizes the study’s findings and conclusions.
There have been 60 highly publicized criticality accidents1 over the last 60 years and the nature of the hazard is unique. Recent studies2 discuss the benefits of knowing what to expect during and immediately following these events. Emergency planning and response standards2 provide an effective tool for establishing an adequate level of readiness to a criticality accident. While these planning requirements cover a broad spectrum of activities to establish readiness, a concise and routinely reviewed criticality accident scenario may be the most valuable tool in developing a cohesive understanding and response to these challenging events. Using a guideline3 for criticality safety evaluations the analytical work and emergency planning to mitigate a criticality accident at the Radiochemical Processing Laboratory at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, was developed. Using a single document the analysis that established the accident characteristics, response scenario based on emergency staffing and planning, and anticipated dose consequences were integrated. This single document approach provides a useful platform to integrate the initial planning and guide the review of proposed changes to emergency response plans.
Many microreactor design developers are planning to reduce on-site physical protection measures and emergency planning zones by relying on robust fuel and reactor designs and leveraging passive safety systems. These reductions raise the risk of sabotage at these microreactors. To evaluate these requirements, this study assessed the radiological consequences of sabotage-induced accidents at microreactors. For the assessment, five diverse designs, each producing 30 MWt, were considered. These designs included pressurized water microreactors (PWMs), sodium-cooled fast microreactors (SFMs), high-temperature helium-cooled prismatic microreactors (HTPMs), heat pipe–cooled microreactors (HPMs), and molten salt–cooled microreactors (MSMs). For each design, two postulated sabotage-induced accidents were defined along with the associated release percentages of fission products. Additionally, consequences from the release of activation products were assessed. With regard to evaluating physical protection and emergency planning requirements, the consequences of sabotage-induced accidents for each design type were found to be comparable. The differences were primarily because of the distinct fuel forms (and associated release mechanisms), burnup, and neutron spectra of the different microreactor types. Future effort will further investigate the release percentages of fission products to perform accurate dose consequence assessment.
This research explores the colocation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) with industrial applications. Three existing industrial sites were considered to demonstrate the siting process and illuminate technological gaps for future work. The three applications demonstrated for colocation here are a petroleum refinery, a methanol production plant, and a pulp and paper plant. This study uses a modified version of the EPRI siting criteria to explore the geological and demographic characteristics of the location of the current industrial site, as well as exploring external hazards from the industrial plant and its surrounding land use. Data was collected from public databases to estimate site characteristics. We then discuss how the site characteristics may impact the ability to colocate an NPP with an industrial application. The application site and 5 additional sites were explored for each application to give a general indication of the siting implications for an NPP in each area. The hazards for each industrial application was also explored to determine how colocation may impact reactor safety. The following gaps have been identified and should be explored in future research on colocation of NPPs with petroleum refineries, methanol plants, and pulp and paper plants: - There is a variety of industrial use, hazards, and pipelines in the surrounding area. A more thorough review of these hazards should be considered for colocation. - In general, the whole region around some applications seems to have softer soil, with implications for large site preparation costs. Further site investigations should prioritize looking into the geotechnical conditions. - Applications along coastlines are susceptible to flooding and hurricanes. The benefits of colocation should be weighed against the potential design implications. - The benefits of natural gas pipeline infrastructure in place should be explored further. If heat supply from the NPP is not required or not feasible due to the distance between the NPP and the application, there may be an opportunity to supply hydrogen to the plant through an existing pipeline. - Because there are several collocated industrial plants in the regions for the refinery and methanol plant, the benefits of sharing resources from the NPP should be explored further. This may open up additional sites for colocation. The following knowledge gaps were identified for the colocation of NPPs with these three industries, and industrial applications in general. These gaps are: - While the STAND tool contains many important characteristics for the reactor siting process, it is not calibrated for the colocation of NPPs with industrial facilities. - There are aspects of both the NPP and industrial application that need to be quantified for a siting analysis. Particularly, we need to understand the water intake requirements for NPPs and each application. - Further work may focus on adapting the STAND site comparison methodology to comparison of sites for co-location. This will involve using the data documented in this report as a starting point and performing a comprehensive and quantitative comparison. - Without spending significant resources, it would be impossible to gather data for each site to evaluate all aspects of siting. One approach to finding data and understanding its implications to siting is looking at FSARs for existing plants. For example, most sites considered in this study have small Vs30 values, indicating soft soil. However, there are NPPs located in the vicinity of most of the sites (e.g., Waterford Steam Electric Station near New Orleans) and reviewing available site characteristics and geotechnical data for these NPPs, might provide further information for siting. - The siting analysis in this study indicates that colocation of the NPP with the industrial site could be difficult based on external hazards, cooling requirements, weather, or population. We need to determine the impact of distance between the two facilities on cost and quality of energy transport. - This study did not touch on socioeconomic impacts for NPP colocation with industrial facilities. The input-output analysis methodology could be applied to the communities referenced in this study to determine the socioeconomic impact of these projects. - Similarly, the impacts of colocation on emergency planning was not explored in this study. The impacts on emergency planning infrastructure are somewhat related to the socioeconomic impacts, and could be explored using a similar methodology. - This study also did not address physical and cybersecurity, which will be important aspects of co-location [ref] . Cybersecurity will be important, regardless of the distance, but physical security will be important if the facilities are located very closely. Physical security might also be important for the steam lines between the plants, unless they are determined to be non-safety significant. - In many site l
This research explores the colocation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) with industrial applications. Three existing industrial sites were considered to demonstrate the siting process and illuminate technological gaps for future work. The three applications demonstrated for colocation here are a petroleum refinery, a methanol production plant, and a pulp and paper plant. This study uses a modified version of the EPRI siting criteria to explore the geological and demographic characteristics of the location of the current industrial site, as well as exploring external hazards from the industrial plant and its surrounding land use. Data was collected from public databases to estimate site characteristics. We then discuss how the site characteristics may impact the ability to colocate an NPP with an industrial application. The application site and 5 additional sites were explored for each application to give a general indication of the siting implications for an NPP in each area. The hazards for each industrial application was also explored to determine how colocation may impact reactor safety. The following gaps have been identified and should be explored in future research on colocation of NPPs with petroleum refineries, methanol plants, and pulp and paper plants: - There is a variety of industrial use, hazards, and pipelines in the surrounding area. A more thorough review of these hazards should be considered for colocation. - In general, the whole region around some applications seems to have softer soil, with implications for large site preparation costs. Further site investigations should prioritize looking into the geotechnical conditions. - Applications along coastlines are susceptible to flooding and hurricanes. The benefits of colocation should be weighed against the potential design implications. - The benefits of natural gas pipeline infrastructure in place should be explored further. If heat supply from the NPP is not required or not feasible due to the distance between the NPP and the application, there may be an opportunity to supply hydrogen to the plant through an existing pipeline. - Because there are several collocated industrial plants in the regions for the refinery and methanol plant, the benefits of sharing resources from the NPP should be explored further. This may open up additional sites for colocation. The following knowledge gaps were identified for the colocation of NPPs with these three industries, and industrial applications in general. These gaps are: - While the STAND tool contains many important characteristics for the reactor siting process, it is not calibrated for the colocation of NPPs with industrial facilities. - There are aspects of both the NPP and industrial application that need to be quantified for a siting analysis. Particularly, we need to understand the water intake requirements for NPPs and each application. - Further work may focus on adapting the STAND site comparison methodology to comparison of sites for co-location. This will involve using the data documented in this report as a starting point and performing a comprehensive and quantitative comparison. - Without spending significant resources, it would be impossible to gather data for each site to evaluate all aspects of siting. One approach to finding data and understanding its implications to siting is looking at FSARs for existing plants. For example, most sites considered in this study have small Vs30 values, indicating soft soil. However, there are NPPs located in the vicinity of most of the sites (e.g., Waterford Steam Electric Station near New Orleans) and reviewing available site characteristics and geotechnical data for these NPPs, might provide further information for siting. - The siting analysis in this study indicates that colocation of the NPP with the industrial site could be difficult based on external hazards, cooling requirements, weather, or population. We need to determine the impact of distance between the two facilities on cost and quality of energy transport. - This study did not touch on socioeconomic impacts for NPP colocation with industrial facilities. The input-output analysis methodology could be applied to the communities referenced in this study to determine the socioeconomic impact of these projects. - Similarly, the impacts of colocation on emergency planning was not explored in this study. The impacts on emergency planning infrastructure are somewhat related to the socioeconomic impacts, and could be explored using a similar methodology. - This study also did not address physical and cybersecurity, which will be important aspects of co-location [ref] . Cybersecurity will be important, regardless of the distance, but physical security will be important if the facilities are located very closely. Physical security might also be important for the steam lines between the plants, unless they are determined to be non-safety significant. - In many site l
For operations on the Sellafield site involving fissile material a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) has traditionally been installed unless an omission case can be made. An omission case would examine if, in the absence of all controls, a criticality could reasonably be expected or whether the potential dose to an operator would remain below a maximum acceptable dose. It is a UK legal requirement for adequate emergency arrangements to be in place for hazards on a nuclear licensed site. For facilities where criticality is credible there is a regulatory expectation that a -Criticality Warning System- should be in place. A -Criticality Warning System- is not necessarily a full CAAS and alternative means of criticality detection may be part of an adequate emergency plan. The Sellafield site has a Magnox fuel reprocessing facility which has been operated since the 1960's. Evaporation of the Medium Active (MA) liquid waste from this process is undertaken in an associated building. Following extensive review of the plant and process a number of maloperations which can route fissile material to the MA evaporator were identified. Adequate controls to prevent these scenarios were shown to be in place. In the unlikely event of a failure of controls leading to sustained loss of fissile material a criticality incident may occur and hence an emergency plan was determined to be necessary. The novel emergency arrangements which were developed utilized the existing gamma monitor network located across multiple building floors. These gamma monitors are present for radiological safety. This emergency arrangement would require rapid interpretation of the gamma alarms by an operator and the manual triggering of a criticality evacuation alarm. The gamma monitors were demonstrated to be able to detect the minimum incident of concern (10{sup 15} fissions) as well as being able to alarm during the ramp up in power of a large criticality incident (10{sup 18} fissions). It was shown that a criticality accident could readily be distinguished from a radiological event (e.g. loss of containment). To support this work, criticality excursion analysis was used to examine the likely characteristics of a criticality in the MA evaporator. This novel arrangement was justified due to a number of factors including: the limited remaining operational lifetime of this facility (<5 years), the low frequency of maloperation coupled with a failure of controls and the crucial risk reduction provided by the continued reprocessing of Magnox fuel. Furthermore, the time and cost involved with design and installation of a standard CAAS would be substantially greater than a plan based upon existing instrumentation. These arguments were accepted by the UK regulator the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR). (author)
The MELCOR Accident Consequence Calculation System (MACCS), used for safety basis accident analyses at SRS, implements adjustment factors to consider the increased vertical turbulence associated with local surface roughness and the increased lateral turbulence associated with time-based plume meander. The two models used for SRS emergency planning radiological consequence assessment, i.e., Hotspot and Puff/Plume, currently do not have an option to input or apply diffusion adjustments for meander or surface roughness. Adverse meteorology conditions at SRS have been determined as E stability class and 1.3 meters per second wind speed for ground level releases. This is the input used for emergency planning models. Contrastingly safety basis analyses use a different input, representing adverse meteorology values as F stability class and wind speeds of 1.3 meters per second (for a ground level release). This results in an apparent discrepancy between the two approaches. In this report we document the differing modeling assumptions, discuss the logic behind each modeling approach used to represent local roughness and plume meander conditions, and numerically compare dispersion coefficients and concentration estimates obtained from each set of model inputs.