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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Enhancing Cloud Cybersecurity: Prescriptive Controls for Operational Technology

This whitepaper provides strategic insights and recommendations into security cloud-based solutions for electric utilities, encompassing operational technology (OT), virtual power plants (VPP), distributed energy resources (DERs), applications, networks, and data storage as they transition to and leverage cloud infrastructure through managed service providers (MSPs) and cloud service providers (CSPs). Principles derived from established frameworks serve as a foundation for best practices across cybersecurity projects and remove the constraints of settling on a single framework. For organizations that prefer not to integrate a specific framework altogether, elements of the proposed approach could be adopted or tailored to best fit defined requirements and expected functionalities. The Cirrus assessment, a utility cloud feasibility tool, and the roadmap it provides serve as a precursor to this paper, which seeks to be a valuable resource for defining next steps following cloud technology integration feasibility appraisal. With its comprehensive approach to adoption, the Cirrus framework offers strategic guidance on responsibly preparing for or deploying a utility cloud solution. The previously published whitepaper, “Use Case-Informed Framework for Utility Cloud Migration,” details the guiding strategy, research, and deployment of cloud solutions within electric and interconnected grid systems. Before implementing the controls suggested in this document, it is recommended that stakeholders complete Cirrus's cloud integration assessment and pair the results with their unique cybersecurity controls to form a comprehensive cloud-based utility cybersecurity plan. The Cirrus outcome will consider a series of future architectures for the grid before and after the energy transition and evaluate the arguments for and against cloud applications for each electric and interconnected grid layer. This document is a companion to the original whitepaper, "Use Case-Informed Framework for Utility Cloud Migration" to further identify and recommend security controls based on Cirrus’s cloud integration assessment output. The following whitepaper outlines the cybersecurity controls that secure cloud-service models pertinent to the electric sector using the predefined categories identify, protect, detect, and respond and recover. The objective is to outline prescriptive security controls based on the type of architecture and data stored in the cloud. The focus includes dissecting the shared responsibility model and elucidating what on-premises Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS) entail. A pivotal consideration in this context is allocating responsibility for foundational cybersecurity aspects—having used Cirrus for the cloud integration assessment. The ensuing controls detailed herein also represent a checklist of controls necessary for a secure cloud transition, equipping utilities with the knowledge to navigate this digital transformation with confidence and strategic foresight in a safe and responsible manner.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Cyber-Resilience Risk Management Architecture for Distributed Wind

Distributed wind is an electric energy resource segment with strong potential to be deployed in many applications, but special consideration of resilience and cybersecurity is needed to address the unique conditions associated with distributed wind. Distributed wind is a strong candidate to help meet renewable energy and carbon-free energy goals. However, care must be taken as more systems are installed to ensure that the systems are reliable, resilient, and secure. The physical and communications requirements for distributed wind mean that there are unique cybersecurity considerations, but there is little to no existing guidance on best practices for cybersecurity risk management for distributed wind systems specifically. This research develops an architecture for the consideration of cyber risks associated with distributed wind systems. The architecture takes into account the configurations, challenges, and standards for distributed wind to create a risk-focused perspective that considers of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, with special emphasis on what sets distributed wind systems apart from other distributed energy resources (DER). We discuss common distributed wind architectures and how they are interconnected to larger power systems. Because cybersecurity cannot exist independently, the cyber-resilience architecture must consider the system holistically. Finally, we discuss the implementation of a risk assessment process that uses the cyber-resilience framework to address challenges specific to distributed wind.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Threat Hunt Guide for BESS Environments

The rapid digitalization of the electric grid - driven by the integration of inverter-based resources (IBRs), battery energy storage systems (BESS), and advanced grid control platforms - has significantly enhanced grid efficiency, visibility, and flexibility. However, this evolution also introduces new cybersecurity risks, particularly through supply chain dependencies and operational blind spots at the grid edge. To address these challenges, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), through the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) Rapid Risk initiative, conducted a series of rapid risk assessment engagements with energy organizations across the United States. Drawing on lessons learned from these engagements, INL developed the following threat hunting guide for asset owners and operators (AOOs) to enhance their cybersecurity visibility within BESS and IBR systems. The guide demonstrates how to use passive network monitoring to baseline device behavior, detect adversarial activity, and investigate anomalies without disrupting operations. By implementing these practices, energy sector stakeholders can improve coordination between cybersecurity and operations teams and strengthen the resilience of distributed energy resources (DERs) within the modern power grid. Prior to implementing any network monitoring, packet capture, or threat hunting activity described in this guide, AOOs are strongly advised to review applicable governance frameworks, legal requirements, and organizational policies. This guide is intended for informational and educational purposes only. It does not replace compliance with any federal, state, or local cybersecurity mandates or industry standards. Implementation of described configurations, technologies, or analytic workflows is performed at the discretion and responsibility of the asset owner and operator.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Guide for States

The Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Guide for States provides state energy offices, public utility commissions, and partner organizations with a structured framework for integrating cyber-resilient engineering practices into energy planning, grantmaking, interconnection processes, and workforce development. As grid digitalization and the adoption of distributed energy resources accelerate, states face expanding cyber-physical risks that traditional cybersecurity measures alone cannot fully address. CIE offers a proactive, consequence-focused engineering methodology that emphasizes eliminating or mitigating high-impact failure modes through design, physical controls, and operational safeguards. The guide outlines the 12 core CIE principles, demonstrates their application through state-focused use cases—including grant evaluation rubrics, interconnection reviews, allow-list development, and training programs—and provides practical tools such as scoring frameworks, impact assessment methods, and implementation checklists. It also highlights pathways for state–utility collaboration and opportunities for technical assistance from national laboratories. By adopting CIE, states can enhance grid reliability, reduce lifecycle costs, strengthen supply-chain assurance, and foster a security-aware engineering culture that aligns with broader resilience and modernization goals. November 2025

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Guide for States

The Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Guide for States provides state energy offices, public utility commissions, and partner organizations with a structured framework for integrating cyber-resilient engineering practices into energy planning, grantmaking, interconnection processes, and workforce development. As grid digitalization and the adoption of distributed energy resources accelerate, states face expanding cyber-physical risks that traditional cybersecurity measures alone cannot fully address. CIE offers a proactive, consequence-focused engineering methodology that emphasizes eliminating or mitigating high-impact failure modes through design, physical controls, and operational safeguards. The guide outlines the 12 core CIE principles, demonstrates their application through state-focused use cases—including grant evaluation rubrics, interconnection reviews, allow-list development, and training programs—and provides practical tools such as scoring frameworks, impact assessment methods, and implementation checklists. It also highlights pathways for state–utility collaboration and opportunities for technical assistance from national laboratories. By adopting CIE, states can enhance grid reliability, reduce lifecycle costs, strengthen supply-chain assurance, and foster a security-aware engineering culture that aligns with broader resilience and modernization goals. November 2025

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Demonstrating the Transient System Impact of Cyber-Physical Events Through Scalable Transmission and Distribution (T&D) Co-Simulation

Modern power systems become more vulnerable to cyber threats due to their growing interconnectivity, interdependence, and complexity. Widespread deployment of distributed energy resources (DERs) further expands the threat landscape to the grid edge, where fewer cybersecurity protections exist. In this article, a systematic cyber-physical events demonstration, enabled by an integrated transmission, distribution, and communication co-simulation framework, is performed. It analyzes cyber risks to power grid under DER-enabled automatic generation control from different angles. Unlike existing works, the simulation captures millisecond-to-minutes frequency and voltage transient dynamics at a cross-region system scale.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Planning Roadmap for DER Integration in India: Industry Best Practices and Resource Guide

Ensuring safe, reliable, cost-effective DER integration at scale requires holistic planning, broad stakeholder engagement, and should address key development areas such as standards adoption, equipment testing and certification, interoperability and cybersecurity, interconnection procedures, and advanced forecasting and DER management. Each of these areas currently represent significant challenges for utilities, regulators, OEMs, developers, and even consumers worldwide. India has already seen significant growth of DERs and has announced targets for substantial growth yet to come, with the potential for DERs to make up a non-negligible portion of the country's overall generation capacity. As such, it is of critical importance that Indian stakeholders consider the potential impacts of wide-spread adoption of DERs and take preemptive action related to the five development areas listed here, among others. India should consider strategies including the adoption of key DER standards related to interconnection, testing, and cybersecurity; enabling effective and secure communication channels for DER interoperability; testing and certifying DER equipment in accredited testing laboratories; building robust, streamlined interconnection procedures; and revamping legacy system planning structures to incorporate DERs in a holistic planning framework.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Navigating United States Standards and Regulation for Digital Energy Systems

This report provides an analysis of the U.S. standards and regulatory landscape for digital energy systems, focusing on cybersecurity, safety, and reliability requirements. It examines the interplay between federal mandates, state regulations, voluntary industry standards, and utility-specific policies, highlighting critical gaps between compliance and real-world risk mitigation. While NERC CIP standards enforce cybersecurity for Bulk Electric System assets, distribution-level infrastructure and emerging technologies often fall outside mandatory oversight, creating vulnerabilities. The report identifies systemic challenges such as reliance on self-attestation, uneven state adoption of safety codes, and lagging standards for advanced technologies like battery energy storage and inverter-based resources. Through a detailed gap analysis, it underscores the urgency of proactive risk-based approaches, independent verification, and strategic engagement with state and federal entities. Recommendations include adopting tiered security frameworks, strengthening procurement practices, and addressing emerging technology risks to ensure resilient and secure digital energy infrastructure. This guidance is intended for utilities, regulators, and stakeholders navigating compliance obligations and seeking to enhance cybersecurity and safety beyond minimum standards.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Cybersecurity Standards, Certification, and Best Practices for DERs

Distributed energy resources (DERs) are becoming increasingly important to the electric grid, including solar energy systems. However, DERs also introduce new cybersecurity risks, including those posed by cloud computing. Standards harmonization is essential for ensuring that DERs are secure and can be safely integrated into the grid. This panel will discuss cyber standards harmonization for solar security. The panel will feature experts from the S2G Program, National Labs and Industry who will discuss the following topics: the cybersecurity risks and future benefits posed by ubiquitous solar energy systems, the development and implementation of cloud-based security solutions for DERs, including solar energy systems, the challenges and opportunities for harmonizing DER cybersecurity standards, and Cyber Informed Engineering and the solar security implementations The panel will also discuss the following specific initiatives: the S2G Program's DER Cybersecurity Framework, UL's DER Cybersecurity Certification Program, and IEEE 1547 Updates. The panel will conclude with a discussion of the future of standards harmonization for DER cybersecurity.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

DEReliction: A Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for Distributed Energy Resources

With the increasing integration of Distributed Energy Resources (DER) into the electric grid, maintaining grid reliability and resilience requires that these devices remain secure. This paper discusses a cybersecurity vulnerability assessment methodology that incorporates best practices from Sandia National Laboratories, SANS Institute, OWASP Foundation, and other web and Internet of Things (IoT) penetration testing (“pen testing”) programs, courses, and frameworks for assessing the security posture of devices. The methodology involves five sequential steps: (1) Collect Public Information, (2) Extract Hardware Details, (3) Inventory Software Components, (4) Identify Vulnerabilities, and (5) Test Vulnerabilities. Each step uncovers potential weaknesses in both hardware and software components of DER devices, considering adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and potential attack vectors along the way. The results from the execution of this method on multiple residential- and small commercial-scale photovoltaic (PV) inverters reveled hardware and software vulnerabilities, which highlight the benefit of taking a methodical approach to discover vulnerabilities. While the specific vulnerability details are not shared here, a generalized overview of findings underscore the importance of robust security assessments for DER devices. Adoption of an assessment framework of this kind will identify and mitigate cybersecurity threats and bolster the resilience of DER-integrated electric grids.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber Resilient Design and Controls for Energy Systems

As the grid of today is evolving into a highly distributed and autonomous cyber-physical system with higher penetration of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) and autonomous controls that are dependent on the cyber infrastructure, there are novel and increasing challenges to cyber-resilient operation of the grid. While the traditional mechanisms take a "bolt on" approach to cybersecurity and resiliency, this talk presents two novel technologies developed at NREL that "bake in" security and resilience into the design and control of the grid. An Adaptive Resilience Metrics framework is a novel mechanism for system owners and operators to understand the impact of cyber and physical system design and topology on the resilient operation, while also helping determine optimal policies in response to adverse cyber events. Along with that a zero-knowledge proof-based technique helps incorporate security into the controls layer by focusing on computational integrity rather than data integrity. By leveraging design and control properties unique to Operational Technology systems these technologies will not only help enhance cyber-resilience for the grid of today, but a highly distributed and autonomous grid of tomorrow.

cyber resilience↗
DOE OSTI2021

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices Version 2.0

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2021

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices Version 2.0

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2021

Standardization of the Distributed Ledger Technology cybersecurity stack for power and energy applications

The global trend towards the integration of distributed energy resources is opening the doors to advanced, complex, and distributedmarketplaces. Such advanced ecosystems, where utility-owned and non utility-owned assets can contribute towards grid operations,generally require distributed communication and grid architectures, which can be supported by Distributed Ledger Technologies(DLTs). However, the potential of DLTs for long-term scalable solutions in operational technology applications has not been fullyutilized, partly due to the lack of standardization across and between different DLTs, as well as other supporting building blocks(e.g., communication protocols). This paper attempts to address this gap by proposing a DLT cybersecurity stack specificallydesigned for researchers, DLT technology developers, and end users (such as utilities). The DLT cybersecurity stack has beennotionally mapped to related cybersecurity components, namely: the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model, the TransmissionControl Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite, and existing Smart Grid architecture frameworks. In addition, the paper discussesseveral cybersecurity implications, and demonstrates the potential uses of the DLT stack through multiple power and energy usecases. It is important to note that the stack can be also applied to the DLT use cases that are outside the power and energy domain.This work has been performed by the Cybersecurity Task Force under the IEEE P2418.5 Blockchain for Energy Standard workinggroup that is stationed under the IEEE Power and Energy Society’s Smart Buildings, Loads, and Customer Systems (SBLC)technical committee.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

DER Cybersecurity Standards: Assessment and Gap Analysis

The purpose of this report is to share the comprehensive gap analysis of existing cybersecurity standards applicable to Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) within the electric power sector. This analysis aims to identify critical deficiencies in current standards, assess their alignment with industry needs, and provide actionable recommendations for enhancing cybersecurity measures. The scope encompasses various DER technologies, including solar, wind, energy storage, and hydrogen fuel cells, and emphasizes the significance of establishing robust cybersecurity frameworks and standards to safeguard these increasingly integrated systems. The report provides valuable insights for stakeholders in the DER ecosystem, including manufacturers, utilities, and regulators. It underscores the importance of continued development and refinement of cybersecurity standards to keep up with the technical advances in DERs and associated cybersecurity challenges. The analysis evaluated IEC, IEEE, ISA, ISO, and UL standards relevant to DER cybersecurity. Standards were assessed on their coverage of key requirements including data availability, integrity, confidentiality, access control, authentication, encryption, and system hardening. For each standard, the analysis assessed its alignment with current industry practices, regulatory compliance, effectiveness in addressing known risks, coverage of emerging risks, and how it promotes interoperability. The evaluation also considered potential integration challenges and barriers to adoption.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Case Study: Applying the INL Resilience Framework to Iowa Lakes Electric Cooperative Distributed Wind Systems

Traditional metrics and evaluation methods for resiliency are not sufficient to evaluate the effect that distributed wind systems will have, particularly in light of the challenges described above. While the concept of resiliency is not new, its application to the electric grid is neither standardized nor well-defined, and there is little to no guidance on how to evaluate resilience specifically for distributed wind systems. To fill this gap, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), as part of the multi-laboratory Microgrids, Infrastructure Resilience, and Advanced Controls Launchpad (MIRACL) project, has developed a resilience framework for electric energy delivery systems (EEDS). The framework provides detailed steps for evaluating resiliency in the planning, operational, and future stages, and encompasses five core functions of resilience. It allows users to evaluate the resilience of distributed wind, taking into consideration the resilience of the wind systems themselves, as well as the effect they have on the resiliency of any systems they are connected to. In this study, we evaluate the resilience of the distributed wind systems at Iowa Lakes Electric Cooperative to cybersecurity hazards. We show that the wind resource can benefit the overall system resilience during some hazards. We show that the practices in place make the wind subsystems resilient against some cybersecurity hazards but that there are still significant risks associated with other cybersecurity hazards

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Situational Awareness of Grid Anomalies (SAGA)

The modern power industry becomes more vulnerable to cyber events due to the growing interconnectivity, interdependence, and complexity of the electric power grid. High-fidelity modeling and simulation tools that support the preventative risk analysis on potential cyber-relevant events is essential for ensuring the situational awareness of the system operator as it provides an inexpensive and risk-free environment to test the system responses under various cyber-relevant events and hereby can support research on cyber anomaly detection, optimal protective resource allocation, and mitigation measures. In this webinar, we will share NREL's cybersecurity research capabilities by highlighting the development of a scalable cyber-physical event test bed and demonstration with real hardware in the loop. The developed cyber-physical event test bed is backboned by an integrated transmission, distribution, and communication dynamic co-simulation framework and a plug-and-play cyber event generation module. It is designed to be modular and compatible with parallel computing, and thereby supports large-scale system simulations at an affordable computation cost. The test bed can capture millisecond-to-minutes dynamic frequency and voltage responses under cyber events from the bulk transmission system to the active distribution systems and distributed energy resources at the grid edge.

co-simulation↗
DOE OSTI2022

Application of DLT cybersecurity stack to TES applications for a scalable, cybersecure, and interoperable future

Transactive Energy Systems (TES) are expected to improve upon existing grid operations and capabilities by enabling the integration of traditional grid resources with distributed energy resources (DER). Distributed Ledger Technology or DLT (e.g., blockchain) presents itself as a viable instrument to support decentralized, autonomous, and tamper-evident applications, which can be leveraged within TES's ecosystem. DLTs can provide pertinent security controls including access controls, data immutability, and traceability in addition to other well-known advantages such as decentralization and scalability. This work demonstrates the DLT Cybersecurity stack and its applicability to TES-based use-cases/applications. The seven-layer DLT cybersecurity stack is a DLT-agnostic framework that can quickly be used to classify and group the individual needs of an application into the different processing and cybersecurity layers offered by a DLT using a common taxonomy and an architectural mapping framework. This enables application engineers to demystify and strengthen the overall security aspects of their systems while maintaining an open perspective towards features and drawbacks that may hinder their performance in real-world scenarios. The paper leverages the work performed by the IEEE P2418.5 - Blockchain for Energy Standards working group.

Blockchain, blockchain interoperability, Cybersecu↗