Results for “DOE Standard Canister” — Page 2

DOE OSTI2025

FLAW STABILITY ANALYSIS OF SURFACE CRACKS IN DOE STANDARD CANISTERS UNDER OPERATION LOADS AND WELDING RESIDUAL STRESSES

There are over 3000 commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage canisters that are made of stainless steel and planned for multi-purpose functions of SNF handling: interim storage, transportation, and ultimate disposal at a future SNF disposition location. To date, many multi-purpose canisters (MPC) are located in coastal regions for long-term storage. The canisters are fabricated by welding, and post-welding heat treatment is not required for relieving welding residual stresses (WRS). As a result, these canisters may be susceptible to chloride induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC) due to the chloride-bearing marine salts. The flaw stability analysis of MPC canisters was performed at SRNL (i.e., PVP2016-4935 and PVP2016-63887) for through-wall flaws and for surface flaws respectively, where WRS was considered, and the failure assessment diagram (FAD)-based fracture mechanics method codified by API 579-1/ASME FFS-1-2007 Edition was adopted.

DOE standard canister↗

DOE OSTI2020

Modeling of SRS Aluminum-clad Spent Nuclear Fuel in Standard DOE Sealed Canisters

At the Savannah River Site (SRS), approximately 7 MTHM of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel is currently in wet storage at L-basin. A significant portion of this fuel is slated to be dried and sealed in DOE standard canisters for long-term storage. This report will focus on a few fuel types, which should bound all other fuel stored at SRS. These consist of the reference fuel assembly, the MURR fuel and the HFIR fuel. These bound a hypothetical maximum scenario for MTR box fuel, a maximum for decay heat in an assembly, and a maximum for the aluminum surface area, respectively. The geometry for the packages were created from DOE specifications for storage of each of the fuels. As long as the minimum time from reactor discharge to sealed storage is 3 years, then the highest temperatures which occur within the sealed canisters do not exceed 100° C for all scenarios considered here. In the geometry considered, while the HFIR fuel has a large surface area, the packaging configuration leaves large void areas, such that the aluminum surface to free volume ratio is about 30% less than an ATR or MURR packaging configuration.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Codisposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW PPT

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties, resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and conditions of SNF, a robust DOE Standard Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard Canister had four variations: 3.05-meter (10-foot) or 4.57-meter (15-foot) length, and 45.7-cm (18-inch) or 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository, these canisters were to be grouped with 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter high level waste (HLW) canisters in a 2.13-meter (84-inch) diameter co-disposal waste package. The smaller 45.7-cm (18-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The larger 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister would take the place of one of the five HLW canisters on the outer ring in the co-disposal waste package. No DOE Standard Canisters have been loaded. A preliminary evaluation has estimated the number of elements of a fuel type that can fit into the different sizes of the DOE Standard Canister, but no definitive loading configuration has been selected. Changing the loading configuration could impact the number of loadable DOE Standard Canisters and the number of co-disposal waste packages needed for eventual disposition. This paper conveys the ranges of DOE Standard Canisters and HLW canisters that may be produced under certain conditions. It also examines the differences in the estimated number of co-disposal waste packages produced for eventual disposal when using different loading strategies in the DOE Standard Canister for Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Peach Bottom, and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) SNF. Changing the loading configurations of ATR, Peach Bottom, and HFIR SNF slightly impacted the number of co-disposal waste packages that may be needed for ultimate disposal. The change in loading configuration was more impactful when a different canister was used, as opposed to varying the number of elements that could fit inside the same size canister. In one case, a reduction of co-disposal waste packages could be achieved by allowing mixing of short HLW canisters with long DOE Standard Canisters. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the ratio between HLW canisters and DOE Standard Canisters will drive the total number of co-disposal waste packages. If too many HLW canisters (i.e., more than five times the number of 18-inch DOE standard canisters) or DOE Standard Canisters are produced, some co-disposal waste packages may not have all positions filled. A co-disposal waste package may be filled with all HLW with no DOE Standard Canister, or a co-disposal waste package could be filled with a single DOE Standard Canister. A ratio that does not closely align to optimum could allow for the design of waste packages that hold just HLW canisters or just DOE SNF canisters.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Co-Disposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW - 20331

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties, resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and conditions of SNF, a robust DOE Standard Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard Canister had four variations: 3.05-meter (10-foot) or 4.57-meter (15-foot) length, and 45.7-cm (18-inch) or 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository, these canisters were to be grouped with 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter high level waste (HLW) canisters in a 2.13-meter (84-inch) diameter co-disposal waste package. The smaller 45.7-cm (18-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The larger 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister would take the place of one of the five HLW canisters on the outer ring in the co-disposal waste package. No DOE Standard Canisters have been loaded. A preliminary evaluation has estimated the number of elements of a fuel type that can fit into the different sizes of the DOE Standard Canister, but no definitive loading configuration has been selected. Changing the loading configuration could impact the number of loadable DOE Standard Canisters and the number of co-disposal waste packages needed for eventual disposition. This paper conveys the ranges of DOE Standard Canisters and HLW canisters that may be produced under certain conditions. It also examines the differences in the estimated number of co-disposal waste packages produced for eventual disposal when using different loading strategies in the DOE Standard Canister for Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Peach Bottom, and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) SNF. Changing the loading configurations of ATR, Peach Bottom, and HFIR SNF slightly impacted the number of co-disposal waste packages that may be needed for ultimate disposal. The change in loading configuration was more impactful when a different canister was used, as opposed to varying the number of elements that could fit inside the same size canister. In one case, a reduction of co-disposal waste packages could be achieved by allowing mixing of short HLW canisters with long DOE Standard Canisters. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the ratio between HLW canisters and DOE Standard Canisters will drive the total number of co-disposal waste packages. If too many HLW canisters (i.e., more than five times the number of 18-inch DOE standard canisters) or DOE Standard Canisters are produced, some co-disposal waste packages may not have all positions filled. A co-disposal waste package may be filled with all HLW with no DOE Standard Canister, or a co-disposal waste package could be filled with a single DOE Standard Canister. A ratio that does not closely align to optimum could allow for the design of waste packages that hold just HLW canisters or just DOE SNF canisters. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2024

Bounding Pressure and Flammability Evaluations of Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel Department of Energy Standard Canisters

This paper presents bounding pressure and flammability evaluations for DOE Standard Canister loaded with DOE-managed aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF). The objective of these evaluations is to gain confidence in the safety and feasibility of possible loading configurations for extended (>50 years) periods of dry storage, with particular focus on the dry storage canister pressures and potential for formation of a flammable atmosphere. The primary concern about the extended dry storage of ASNF is radiolytic gas generation. The aluminum cladding of these materials tends to corrode, and these corrosion products—typically aluminum oxides, such as boehmite, bayerite, or gibbsite—could carry water. This makes ASNF dry storage canisters difficult to dry. The gamma radiation field in dry storage environments could cause a radiolytic breakdown of residual water, forming chemical species such as molecular hydrogen (H2). The release of these species could increase the canister pressure and lead to the generation of a flammable canister atmosphere. The bounding evaluations presented within this study surmise conservative, but credible, conditions and processes. This includes the assumption of a full breakdown of a large quantity of free, physisorbed, and chemisorbed water (bound in a trihydrate, i.e., Al2O3 • 3H2O, layer). The considered dry storage configurations include a ~3 m (10 ft) long, ~46 cm (18 in) diameter (10 x 18) DOE Standard Canister loaded with 32 Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) ASNF elements, and a ~3 m (10 ft) long, ~61 cm (24 in) (10 x 24) diameter DOE Standard Canister loaded with 40 ATR ASNF elements. While the results of this study indicate the possibility of atmospheric hydrogen concentrations above the lower flammability limit, insufficient concentrations of oxygen will prevent the formation of flammable atmospheres. The maximum credible pressures remain well within the structural limits of the DOE Standard Canister.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Drop Analysis of a Department of Energy Standard Canister Containing Fort Saint Vrain SNF

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, many of which are located at the INL site. Managing this large variety of SNF for storage, transportation, and disposal poses a challenge to DOE. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the DOE SNF Road-Ready Demonstration (“Road-Ready Demonstration”), which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF for “road-ready dry storage.” Road-ready dry storage (RRDS) is an SNF management concept in which SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters that are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later transport and disposition. The forward-looking goal of the Road-Ready Demonstration is to establish the foundation for a large-scale RRDS program at the INL site. One critical aspect of RRDS is the ability to certify the DOE Standard Canister and its associated transportation package in accordance with 10 CFR 71 for offsite transportation. Depending on the SNF type and transportation strategy, DOE Standard Canisters may be required to maintain structural integrity under hypothetical accident scenarios (e.g., drop events). The DOE Standard Canisters have been tested and analyzed under various SNF loading configurations and accident drop events in support of the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility and other DOE programs; however, no analysis has yet been completed in support of the recently initiated Road-Ready Demonstration. This paper presents preliminary results from a finite element analysis of the Ø45.7 cm × 4.6 m (Ø18 in. × 15 ft) DOE Standard Canister under the 9 m drop at 80 degrees off-vertical drop scenario considered in previous INL tests and analyses. It considers the Fort St. Vrain spent nuclear fuel loading configuration proposed for the Road-Ready Demonstration, uses updated material properties, and applies the strain-based acceptance criteria established in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code’s Section III, Division 3 rules for storage and transportation spent nuclear fuel containments. This updated analysis is compared to previous DOE Standard Canister drop analyses. Preliminary results from the updated analysis show that certain regions of the containment exceed the allowable limits during the accidental drop event. However, these regions are limited to components performing a non-structural function. While further work on this analysis will be pursued, this analysis serves as the foundation for formal calculations used to support applicable certification efforts of the RRDS system at INL.

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DOE OSTI2021

Modeling Summary of ASNF in DOE Sealed Standard Canisters

A pathway for road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ANSF) fuel dictates storage within helium backfilled sealed DOE standard canisters. The typical packaging configuration for the 15-foot DOE canisters places 10 advance test reactor (ATR) elements within a Type 1a basket, and three baskets are loaded within each DOE canister. During in-reactor operations and cooling pond storage conditions, oxyhydroxide layers form on the surface of the aluminum clad fuel. These layers produce hydrogen gas over time due to the fuel’s radiation field. As part of the packing procedure, the ATR fuel should be dried to remove any residual physio-/chemi- sorbed water bound to the surface. The results of this modeling will include results at fully saturated and fully dried conditions. In addition, fuels that are currently stored at the Savannah River Site were also studied for their potential for hydrogen and pressure build up. These two additional fuels modeled were the Missouri University Research Reactor (MURR) fuel, which is packaged in the same configuration as the ATR, but with a 10-foot-tall DOE standard canister. This was selected due to its relatively high decay heat compared to other DOE-managed ASNF. The second additional fuel studied with the modeling effort was the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) fuel. This fuel is modeled as two separate DOE canisters with the inner and outer annulus split for storage. The HFIR was selected for study due to its high aluminum cladding surface area. In the associated experimental work, Task 2 - Oxyhydroxide Layer Radiolytic Gas Generation Resolution, additional tests were completed in a helium environment, and updated G-values for the radiolytic production of hydrogen from the oxyhydroxide layers were provided. These values were 2.92 ×10 -4 µmol/J at 50% relative humidity and 4.12 ×10 -4 µmol/J at 100% relative humidity. These values are lower than the value for Argon that was used in prior modeling results. In addition, prior modeling results have been completed with the G-value applied to just the mass of the corrosion layer, and this has been updated to apply the G-value for hydrogen generation to the full mass of the fuel. These two effects combine to show much smaller pressure and hydrogen build up for the sealed canister model. For a nominal scenario of stored ATR fuel, after 50 years the model results give a 1.36 atm total pressure, 7% mole percent hydrogen, for the upper decay heat, 1.51 atm total pressure, 16% mole percent hydrogen, and for upper decay heat with undried fuel 2.6 atm total pressure, 15% mole percent hydrogen. For the MURR nominal case, the model results give 1.34 atm and 6% hydrogen, for upper decay heat this gives 1.41 atm total pressure with 10.8 % hydrogen, and for upper decay heat with undried fuel, this gives 2.38 atm total pressure with 9.9% hydrogen. The nominal scenario for HFIR fuel gives 1.39 atm total pressure with 9.9% hydrogen, the upper decay heat case gives 1.43 atm with 12.1% hydrogen, and the upper decay heat with undried fuel gives 2.17 atm total pressure with 11.9% hydrogen. These results confirm the ATR scenario bounds the other intact ASNF modeled here. No case modeled yields significant oxygen, and the lower decay heat cases for all fuels modeled have hydrogen concentrations that are under the 4% flammability limit after 50 years of storage. In addition, the modeled pressures for all cases are all significantly below the 500-psi limit for the DOE standard sealed canister.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2021

DOE SNF Packaging Demonstration Project: Worktable and Canister Loading Sleeve Design [Slides]

This presentation is a briefing for summer interns and others outside the project, to give them a summary of ongoing design activities. The DOE SNF Packaging Demonstration Project is an effort to develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed spent nuclear fuel (SNF) for road ready dry storage (RRDS). The project is to remotely load and seal two types of DOE-managed SNF from the CPP-603 facility into DOE Standard Canisters, place the sealed DOE Standard Canisters into commercial vendor over-canisters (equivalent to commercial MPCs), seal and place the over-canisters into commercial vendor storage overpacks, and place the storage system (over-canister and storage overpack) onto the CPP-2707 cask pad.

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DOE OSTI2024

Drop Analysis of a Department of Energy Standard Canister Containing Fort Saint Vrain SNF– 24138

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, many of which are located at the INL site. Managing this large variety of SNF for storage, transportation, and disposal poses a challenge to DOE. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the DOE SNF Road-Ready Demonstration (“Road-Ready Demonstration”), which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF for “road-ready dry storage.” Road-ready dry storage (RRDS) is an SNF management concept in which SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters that are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later transport and disposition. The forward-looking goal of the Road-Ready Demonstration is to establish the foundation for a large-scale RRDS program at the INL site. One critical aspect of RRDS is the ability to certify the DOE Standard Canister and its associated transportation package in accordance with 10 CFR 71 for offsite transportation. Depending on the SNF type and transportation strategy, DOE Standard Canisters may be required to maintain structural integrity under hypothetical accident scenarios (e.g., drop events). The DOE Standard Canisters have been tested and analyzed under various SNF loading configurations and accident drop events in support of the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility and other DOE programs; however, no analysis has yet been completed in support of the recently initiated Road-Ready Demonstration. This paper presents preliminary results from a finite element analysis of the Ø45.7 cm × 4.6 m (Ø18 in. × 15 ft) DOE Standard Canister under the 9 m drop at 80 degrees off-vertical drop scenario considered in previous INL tests and analyses. It considers the Fort St. Vrain spent nuclear fuel loading configuration proposed for the Road-Ready Demonstration, uses updated material properties, and applies the strain-based acceptance criteria established in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code’s Section III, Division 3 rules for storage and transportation spent nuclear fuel containments. This updated analysis is compared to previous DOE Standard Canister drop analyses. Preliminary results from the updated analysis show that certain regions of the containment exceed the allowable limits during the accidental drop event. However, these regions are limited to components performing a non-structural function. While further work on this analysis will be pursued, this analysis serves as the foundation for formal calculations used to support applicable certification efforts of the RRDS system at INL.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2026

Flaw Tolerance Assessment for DOE Standard SNF Dry Storage Canisters - 26550

The U.S. DOE has designed four spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage canisters for storing DOE standardized SNFs. The DOE standard canisters are cylindrical shells with a diameter of 24 inches (610 m) or 18 inches (457 m), a wall thickness of 0.5 inches (12.7 m) or 0.375 inches (9.53 m), and a length of 15 feet (4.57 m) or 10 feet (3.05 m). These DOE canister geometries are completely different from commercial canisters. The latter may experience chloride-induced stress cracking corrosion (CI-SCC) because they are stored near coastal regions. The former may not experience CI-SCC but face different challenges because they are stored in the SNF storage facilities. Because of large residual stresses, mechanical flaws may occur in the DOE canisters during long-distance transportation or lifting handling. To date, only limited structural integrity analyses were carried out through drop tests on the DOE canisters, but a more general flaw tolerance assessment has not been performed. Therefore, the failure assessment diagram (FAD)-based fracture mechanics method, as codified by the latest API 579-1/ASME FFS-1-2021 Edition, is adopted in this work to assess surface flaw tolerance for DOE canisters under operation loading and welding residual stresses (WRS), where the new code-recommended WRS distributions are used. To more adequately consider the transverse distribution of WRS, an equivalent WRS distribution is proposed to account for the WRS reduction with distance from the weld centerline. Moreover, the closed-form solutions of stress intensity factor K, which serves as the crack driving force during subcritical crack growth, are developed from the tabular data of the K factors provided in API 579-1/ASME FFS-1 and used to determine more accurate flaw sizes at flaw instability. Subsequently, the Level 2 assessment procedures with 12 assessment steps, as codified and detailed in API 579-1 and ASME FFS-1, are followed to assess the flaw tolerance for the surface flaws in the DOE standard canisters with consideration of normal or accident operation loads combined with WRS. The assessment results show that the four designs of DOE standard canisters can tolerate all surface flaws that meet the code permitted maximum sizes of a flaw length of 8 inches (i.e., 200 mm) and a flaw depth of 80% wall thickness. This demonstrates that all designs of DOE standard canisters are robust and reliable.

DOE standard canister↗

DOE OSTI2024

Drop Analysis of Department of Energy Standard Canister with Fort Saint Vrain SNF

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, most of which are located at the INL site. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the Road-Ready Capability Demonstration Project, which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF at the INL site for ?road-ready dry storage?. ?Road-ready dry storage? is a SNF management concept where SNF is packaged into dry and sealed canisters, which are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later transportation. The forward-looking goal of the Demonstration is establishing the foundation for a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site. The Demonstration will first package Fort Saint Vrain SNF currently stored at INL into several DOE Standard Canisters. These Standard Canisters will then be loaded into another commercial transportation or storage containment system (e.g., storage cask or transportation package). The Standard Canister is a class of standardized canisters designed for containing the large variety of DOE-managed SNF during interim storage, transportation and/or disposal at a geological repository. One critical aspect of road-ready dry storage is the ability to license the DOE Standard Canisters and its associated transportation package to 10 CFR 71. Depending on the SNF and transportation strategy, the Standard Canisters may have to maintain structural integrity under normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident scenarios (i.e., drop events). The Standard Canisters have been tested and analyzed under various SNF loading configurations and accident drop events in support of the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility and other DOE programs. However, no analysis has been completed to support the recent Demonstration. This analysis will consider the Ø0.5 m × 5.1 m Standard Canister under drop scenario(s) considered in previous INL tests and analyses, including the 9 m drop at 80 degree off vertical. However, this analysis will consider the more recent Fort Saint Vrain loading configurations proposed for the Demonstration. This analysis will performed using strain-based acceptance criteria established by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 3. It will be compared to previous analyses and form the foundation of further formal calculations that will be used to support licensing efforts of the road-ready dry storage system at INL.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Codisposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types, such as light- and heavy-water-moderated reactors, graphite-moderated reactors, and breeder reactors, with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and condition of SNF, a robust canister termed the DOE Standardized SNF Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard SNF Canister had four variations consisting of a 10- or 15-foot length and an 18- or 24-inch diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository these canisters were to be grouped with 24-inch diameter HLW canisters in a codisposal waste package. The 18-inch DOE Standardized SNF Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The 24-inch DOE Standardized SNF Canister would take the place of one the five HLW canister on the outer ring in the codisposal waste package. No DOE Standardized SNF Canisters have been loaded, and many fuel types can be loaded in multiple canisters. Depending on the selected diameter of the DOE Standardized SNF Canister for a particular fuel, the number of potential codisposal waste packages could vary. In addition, different types of DOE SNF may be able to be combined in a single canister. This could significantly change the number of DOE SNF canisters that are loaded and result in a decrease of the number of total potential codisposal waste packages. Ultimately, if too many HLW canisters need disposition, then a reduction in the number of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters will change the final total of codisposal waste packages very little. Likewise, if the ratio of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters to HLW canister produced is too high, then DOE Standardized SNF Canisters will not have enough HLW canisters to surround them in the codisposal waste package. This paper examines the results of differing loading strategies for a few DOE SNFs. It also compares the ranges of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters that may be produced to the ranges of HLW canisters that may be produced in order to determine potential scenarios.

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DOE OSTI2023

Bounding Pressure and Flammability Evaluations for a Department of Energy Standard Canister Loaded with Aluminum-Clad Spent Fuel

This report presents bounding pressurization and flammability evaluations from the radiolytic gas generation expected during extended (>50 years) dry storage of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) elements in a sealed Department of Energy (DOE) Standard Canister. The primary questions involving extended ASNF dry storage center around the adequacy of dry storage conditioning processes (i.e., drying) and the behavior of residual hydrated aluminum oxides on the cladding—specifically, the radiolytic breakdown of chemically bound water in these corrosion products. The objectives of the presented work include providing a bounding assessment of the pressure with respect to the DOE Standard Canister’s structural integrity limits and identifying the potential for forming flammable or explosive gas mixtures (i.e., exceedance of the lower flammability limit of the molecular hydrogen [H2] and oxygen [O2] concentrations). The evaluation results confirm the findings of previous, more complex M&S work. That is, the structural integrity of the canister remains unchallenged by a wide margin. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the presented pressure calculations consider a full breakdown of the chemisorbed water, including a consequent release of all available H2. In reality, the breakdown of water in these systems will likely remain incomplete, due to competing chemical and radiolytic reactions, thereby attaining an equilibrium in the storage environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Transient Coupled Chemical-Thermal-Fluid Field Simulation for Sealed Aluminum-clad Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Canister

As the first step toward developing three-dimensional (3D) multi-physics computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model for unsealed and vented canister storage system, a 3D CFD model coupled with bulk gas radiolysis reactions was developed first for sealed DOE standard canisters filled with inert gas and trace amount of air and water. The workflow for constructing canister-scale 3D CFD models and coupling with gas phase radiolysis reactions were established, which can be readily extended to unsealed, vented canister storage system. This interim milestone report documents the theory of the model, workflow to establish radiolysis reaction network, and initial simulations of the evolutions of thermal fields and hydrogen gas concentrations within sealed DOE standard canisters over long period of time. In addition, a mesh refinement test was done to show that increasing the models mesh refinement had negligible impact upon the temperature profiles.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2022

Sensitivity study of coupled chemical-CFD simulations for analyzing aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel storage in sealed canisters

We report the United States Department of Energy (DOE) manages over 50 Metric Tons Heavy Metal (MTHM) of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel. One main source for DOE’s Aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) inventory is the advanced test reactor (ATR) at the INL site, which makes this fuel of particular interest for storage scenarios. Road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the ATR fuel dictates storage within helium-backfilled, sealed DOE standard canisters. The conditions within these sealed canisters for extended (greater than50 year dry) storage is of interest. To further this goal, a three-dimensional (3D) multi-physics computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model is developed of the sealed DOE standard canisters. This 3D CFD model is one-way coupled with bulk gas radiolysis reactions considering sealed canisters with inert gas and possible trace amounts of air and water vapor. This study looks at the evolution of the thermal history of the canisters over a 50 year time period with a coupling to the chemical reactions occurring from radiolytic breakdown of residual water. A sensitivity study is then carried out over the parameters of the model including the fuel decay heat, residual water content, sealed pressure, canister external temperature, and canister emissivity. In pure helium, hydrogen generation rates are low, under 10 ppm, but hydrogen generation rates are affected greatly by the presence of even 1% residual air, increasing by 50-plus-fold, and nitric acid generation with residual air also occurs ranging from 500 to 4000 ppm after 50 years. The fuel decay heat and the residual water content show the most importance in the generation of hydrogen gas in pure air, and for nitric acid with a residual air condition. External temperature, canister emissivity and sealed pressure all show minor sensitivity effects to the generation of potentially harmful species.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2024

Oxygen Limit for Flammability of a Gas Mixture of Helium – Hydrogen – Oxygen in the U.S. Department of Energy Standard Canister

The radiolytic breakdown of residual free, physisorbed, and chemisorbed waters is anticipated in the sealed dry storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), releasing H 2 gas into the initial cover gas of helium. For aluminum-clad SNF (ASNF) in particular, the expected total hydrogen in the canister is enough to dominate the cover gas mixture if fully released, and based on experimental rates of H 2 generation, H 2 percentages exceeding the lower flammability limit appear likely. However, no evidence of radiolytic generation of O 2 has been observed to date, so the potential for flammability is averted due to the lack O 2 . Lack of oxygen has been credited for avoiding flammability in some existing storage and transportation approaches for SNF and other waste. This report reviews literature on flammability limits with a focus on the limiting oxygen concentration to provide technical underpinnings to refine a flammability criterion for gas mixtures of helium, hydrogen, and oxygen where the oxygen is expected to be the limiting species. While there is general consensus on H 2 flammability limits at standard temperature and pressure, the decay heat and gas generation within ASNF sealed dry storage canisters could push them to elevated temperatures and pressures, so the goal is to identify an oxygen threshold that will bound the behavior over the temperature and pressure range of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Standard Canister. The information reviewed in this document supports the criterion that the oxygen concentration in a He-H 2 -O 2 mixture should be less than 1.5% to avoid flammability at temperatures and pressures relevant to sealed dry storage of ASNF in the DOE Standard Canister, i.e., up to 343°C (650°F) and 500 psig, respectively. Note that while data covering the full range of temperature at atmospheric pressure and nearly the full range of pressure at room temperature were available, data for the combined effects was available only at moderate temperatures and pressures; the recommended 1.5% O 2 threshold is based on the breadth of available data reported here and apparent trends therein.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Technology Development for Dry Storage of Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel - 20490

A candidate disposition pathway for the > 13 MTHM of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF), owned and managed by the U.S. Department of Energy, is the drying and placement of the SNF into sealed-canister dry storage, with the ASNF-in- canisters 'road-ready' for transportation to and final direct disposal in a repository waste package. Technical information gaps in fuel drying, and fuel dry storage behavior, have previously challenged the declaration of technology readiness for drying and placement of this fuel into the DOE Standard Canister design for > 50 years of safe dry storage. The principal technical information gaps included: i) characterization and thermal dehydration behavior of aluminum (oxy)hydroxide films attendant on the cladding due to film formation during reactor operation and during post-discharge up to long-term wet storage histories; and ii) G-value data to enable estimation of the radiolytic gas generation from the cladding with its (oxy)hydroxide films. Thus, the oxide films on the ASNF challenged the safety of a sealed storage canister with thermal and radiolytic decomposition of the waters on the films that can lead to corrosion, pressurization, and flammability issues. These gaps in the technical information base have largely been closed. This paper discusses the investigations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and the Savannah River National laboratory (SRNL), and outlines the pending technology development work for input to an engineering design to enable a road-ready dry storage system for ASNF. The ASNF inventory considered for road-ready dry storage is stored at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) at the INL. The ASNF inventory in the SRS L Basin is from foreign and domestic research reactors (FRR and DRR), and is diverse in terms of design, irradiation, and post-reactor-discharge storage conditions; these factors yield a range of characteristics of cladding oxide films on ASNF. Mixed aluminum (oxy)hydroxide (boehmite and bayerite/gibbsite) films, non-uniform in thicknesses up to a maximum local thickness bounded by 25 μm, were observed on ASNF materials removed from wet storage in the L Basin and in non-sealed dry storage at the SRS following reactor service and a long-term (up to 40+ years) interim storage history. The ASNF inventory at INTEC, in both wet and vented dry storage, is predominantly from the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), but it also includes DRR and FRR fuel. To address a profound behavior of these films, radiolysis testing of aluminum specimens with mixed type boehmite/bayerite oxide films was performed to develop basic data on G-values for production of radiolytic hydrogen under dry storage conditions with nominal relative humidity, temperature, and cover gas. Modeling and simulation of canister internal environments with postulated inventories of oxide films provides estimation of the evolution of the conditions of the canister loaded with ASNF. Simultaneous Thermal Analysis (TGA/DSC) of hydrated oxide powders, and laboratory-scale aluminum specimens with a bayerite film (∼10 μm) using TGA methods, inform drying time/temperature conditions to be used for the ASNF. A demonstration project is recommended for Verification and Validation of the drying and storage of the ASNF. Remaining major tasks leading up to the hot demonstration include scale-up radiolysis testing and scale-up drying testing. Engineering design with the information from the technology program will establish the safety basis and enable long-term (> 50 years) dry storage compatibility with ASNF in the DOE Standard Canister pending its transportation to and disposal in a repository. This full capability would show the ASNF-in-canister storage system to be road-ready. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2025

DOESC Remote Canister Closure System UT Inspection Couplant Solutions

The DOE Standard Canister (DOESC) Remote Canister Closure System is a remotely operated welding and inspection mechanism designed for the packaging of DOE-managed spent nuclear fuel into canisters. The ultrasonic testing (UT) inspection, included in the system, requires the use of water tanks that are opened to act as a couplant between the canister and the sensors. With the couplant, the UT inspection can guarantee accurate results determining imperfections in the weld.

12 - MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTE↗