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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2017

A Game Theoretic Model of Thermonuclear Cyberwar

In this paper we propose a formal game theoretic model of thermonuclear cyberwar based on ideas found in [1] and [2]. Our intention is that such a game will act as a first step toward building more complete formal models of Cross-Domain Deterrence (CDD). We believe the proposed thermonuclear cyberwar game is an ideal place to start on such an endeavor because the game can be fashioned in a way that is closely related to the classical models of nuclear deterrence [4–6], but with obvious modifications that will help to elucidate the complexities introduced by a second domain. We start with the classical bimatrix nuclear deterrence game based on the game of chicken, but introduce uncertainty via a left-of-launch cyber capability that one or both players may possess.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Exploring Multilayer Network Models to Build a Scientific Basis for Integrated Deterrence: Final Report

The emerging multipolar international security environment represents a fundamental restructuring of global nuclear balance of power to include two nuclear peer competitors, growing non-peer nuclear threats, and concerns of nuclear latency from both allies and adversaries. Conflicts in the grey zone, cyber operations, mis- and disinformation campaigns, and emerging disruptive technologies like drones, and hypersonic missiles are becoming more prevalent. These present a risk of cross-domain and multi-domain conflicts that may not follow known escalatory patterns. In order to prepare for the new deterrence environment, it is critical to have quantitative and qualitative understandings of these cross-domain conflicts, their potential for escalation, and which systems they may impact. To that end, our team created a Multi-Layer Network (MLN) model of ‘integrated deterrence’ where instruments of national power are modeled as individual network graph layers that include efforts from all domains. We then evaluate the potential for escalation against escalation scenarios. Analysis of the escalation scenarios is then used to identify insights of potential risk and escalation within integrated deterrence.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2019

GPLADD: Quantifying Trust in Government and Commercial Systems A Game-Theoretic Approach

Trust in a microelectronics-based system can be characterized as the level of confidence that a system is free of subversive alterations made during system development, or that the development process of a system has not been manipulated by a malicious adversary. Trust in systems has become an increasing concern over the past decade. This report introduces a novel game-theoretic framework, called GPLADD (Graph-based Probabilistic Learning Attacker and Dynamic Defender), for analyzing and quantifying system trustworthiness at the end of the development process, through the analysis of risk of development-time system manipulation. GPLADD represents attacks and attacker-defender contests over time. Here, time is an explicit constraint and allows incorporating the informational asymmetries between the attacker and defender into analysis. GPLADD includes an explicit representation of attack steps via multi-step attack graphs, attacker and defender strategies, and player actions at different times. GPLADD allows quantifying the attack success probability over time and the attacker and defender costs based on their capabilities and strategies. This ability to quantify different attacks provides an input for evaluation of trust in the development process. We demonstrate GPLADD on an example attack and its variants. We develop a method for representing success probability for arbitrary attacks and derive an explicit analytic characterization of success probability for a specific attack. We present a numeric Monte Carlo study of a small set of attacks, quantify attack success probabilities, attacker and defender costs, and illustrate the options the defender has for limiting the attack success and improving trust in the development process.

37 attack↗
DOE OSTI2017

Towards Integrated Strategic Deterrence - 3rd Annual Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar, 2016

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted the 3rd Annual Cross-Domain Deterrence (CDD) Seminar on November 15-17, 2016 in Livermore, CA. The seminar was sponsored by LLNL’s National Security Office (NSO) and Center for Global Security Research (CGSR). The primary purpose of the seminar was to utilize the crossdomain framework to work toward an approach for comprehensive and integrated strategic deterrence. The seminar focused on a tabletop exercise (TTX) to explore the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation in cyber space, outer space, and the nuclear domain. The TTX explored a scenario involving a NATO Article V defense of a Baltic ally. To help inform game “play,” the exercise was preceded by expert panel discussions about the CDD strategies of Russia and NATO. The exercise was followed by two panels on lessons learned and next steps, to help derive lessons from the TTX.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Method for Assessing Effectiveness and Technical Capabilities Required for Integrated Deterrence (NSLP-Final Report-Draft2022)

The United States faces an ever-increasingly multi-polar security environment dominated by great power competition with China and a lingering Russian threat as well as from would-be regional hegemons led by ambitions from Iran and North Korea. Our adversaries are pursuing and expanding the strategic means by-which they have an asymmetric offset (e.g., cyber, space, and other modes below the level of armed conflict). To combat and deter against the widening range of hostile actions, the U.S. must have additional capabilities with-which to deter. All of which drives us towards a more thoughtful integrated approach to deterrence, attempting to best align deterrent tools with the adversary actions in order to maximize the credibility of our deterrent. Such an approach complicates our deterrence strategy and demands a methodology to assess whether the U.S. has the deterrent tools necessary to deter the adversarial actions most costly to the U.S. To address this complexity, we create a framework to comprehensively and systematically assess our deterrent tools as qualitatively measured against the adversarial actions we wish to deter. Deterrence is ultimately an operation in the cognitive domain and at the heart of the framework presented here is the fundamental deterrence calculus which we use as the defining measure of whether a tool will credibly deter a given action. We describe the eight levers of the deterrence calculus and distill these levers to four products that are used to qualitatively assess the overall effectiveness of deterrence tools against adversarial actions. Credibility is determined by two principal variables: the technical credibility of the deterrent tool, and the principle of proportionality. Technical credibility of realized deterrence products is assessed through development of key mission requirements and hardware (e.g., components) that will impose costs, deny benefits, or encourage restraint. The principle of proportionality qualitatively asserts that for a deterrent tool to be cognitively credible, the costs imposed against, or benefits denied by, an action are commensurate to the magnitude of costs received from the adversarial action. By basing this framework on these two fundamentals, it is possible to compare deterrent tools in a systematic approach across the broad spectrum of hostile actions.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Wargames as experiments: The Project on Nuclear Gaming’s SIGNAL framework

What can we learn from the Peloponnesian War that will help us deal with the intersection of cyber and nuclear conflict? What does World War I teach us about the role of nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons in warfare? Here, the short answer to both questions is—probably not much. While extensive scholarship on nuclear warfare and strategy exists, empirical data on the impact of emerging technologies such as cyber weaponry, advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance tools, and precision-guided munitions are lacking. Here, given the importance of policy-relevant research to equip decision-makers with tools to understand nuclear deterrence and reduce the likelihood of nuclear war, the scarcity of data available to analysts remains a critical gap.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2019

Wargames as experiments: The Project on Nuclear Gaming’s SIGNAL framework

What can we learn from the Peloponnesian War that will help us deal with the intersection of cyber and nuclear conflict? What does World War I teach us about the role of nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons in warfare? The short answer to both questions is—probably not much. While extensive scholarship on nuclear warfare and strategy exists, empirical data on the impact of emerging technologies such as cyber weaponry, advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance tools, and precision-guided munitions are lacking. Here, given the importance of policy-relevant research to equip decision-makers with tools to understand nuclear deterrence and reduce the likelihood of nuclear war, the scarcity of data available to analysts remains a critical gap.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Delicate Balance Redux: The Role of Nuclear Forces, Damage Limitation and Uncertainty in Future U.S.-China Crises

What is the impact of damage limitation capabilities like counterforce and missile defenses on deterrence, when their efficacy in stopping an adversary nuclear attack is uncertain? This is a key unanswered question to understand “how much is enough” for the United States to deter China and Russia in future nuclear crises. In this paper we extend an established, single move game theory model to capture the dynamics of two players in a nuclear crisis having varying damage limitation capabilities with uncertain effectiveness. Our model formalizes the logic of the “delicate balance” school of deterrence, which states that leverage in a crisis is driven by the risk each player can take with their combined strategic forces, and that those risks carry uncertainty as nuclear forces are hard to deliver against technologically advanced adversaries. Our model shows that damage limitation capabilities—even those with significant uncertainty around them like cyber or electronic warfare—can drive bargaining outcomes in an array of nuclear crises. We then apply these bargaining outcomes to the expected U.S.-China strategic balance as China builds out its nuclear force through 2035. We apply published force exchange models to determine the expected damage each side will be able to deliver, and we use these values to determine the likelihood that the U.S. can prevail in crises of varying stakes. Last, we show that U.S. policymakers have an array of options to improve future bargaining outcomes, evaluating how additional nuclear forces trade against improvements in damage limitation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2013

A Graph Analytic Metric for Mitigating Advanced Persistent Threat

This paper introduces a novel graph analytic metric that can be used to measure the potential vulnerability of a cyber network to specific types of attacks that use lateral movement and privilege escalation such as the well known Pass The Hash, (PTH). The metric is computed from an oriented subgraph of the underlying cyber network induced by selecting only those edges for which a given property holds between the two vertices of the edge. The metric with respect to a select node on the subgraph is defined as the likelihood that the select node is reachable from another arbitrary node in the graph. This metric can be calculated dynamically from the authorization and auditing layers during the network security authorization phase and will potentially enable predictive deterrence against attacks such as PTH.

cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2019

Russian Multi-Domain Strategy against NATO: information confrontation and U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe

Western philosophical and moral principles incline strategic thinkers in democratic societies to reject the notion that information can be used as a weapon or a domain of warfare instead of a tool of freedom and truth. International law suggests that the vast majority of societies and governments agree that freedom of information and truth are crucial to healthy societies. In practice, however, there are also governments that perceive them as both a form of strategic deception and as a vulnerability that can be exploited through information operations. An increasingly common dimension of Russian strategy against the United States and its NATO allies and partners is information confrontation [informatsionnoe protivoborstvo], or IPb. Russia actively pursues a strategy of exploiting perceived vulnerabilities of these democratic societies by carrying out informational-technical (e.g., cyber) and informational-psychological operations below the threshold of open military conflict in order to exacerbate pre-existing societal, political, and military divisions, thereby degrading NATO cohesion. The literature on IPb suggests that a key element of this strategy is an effort to create confusion and sow doubt in the existence of truth. Russia has also applied these operations alongside traditional military means of armed conflict in NATO partner states, Georgia and Ukraine, in order to slow down the decision-making processes in those countries as well as throughout the international community. In Georgia and Ukraine, Russia has employed both aspects of IPb to challenge the Westphalian international order and achieve a fait accompli with a limited use of military force. The body of literature dedicated to understanding the role of IPb in Russian strategy has yet to explore its relationship to U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. This topic merits study for at least three reasons. First, Russian strategic thinkers and official strategic documents identify NATO as threat and assign an increased role for asymmetric, indirect, and non-military (including informational) measures in conflict resolution. Second, Russia has historically used IPb against the Alliance with mixed success. In this regard, Soviet active measures [aktivnie meropriyatiya] operations targeting societal, political, and military divisions about NATO nuclear posture in the late 1970s and early 1980s are illuminating. Finally, current Russian practice reflects an effort to propagate disinformation about U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons. This study seeks to contribute to the body of literature on IPb by analyzing the evolution of Russian strategic thought on and practice of IPb in relation to U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe. It explores the following questions: How and under which conditions does Russia employ IPb in an effort to achieve preferred strategic outcomes related to NATO nuclear force structure? What insights about contemporary Russian IPb efforts can be gained from studying Soviet active measures campaigns against NATO nuclear force posture?

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2014

SIGNATURES OF ILLICIT NUCLEAR PROCUREMENT NETWORKS: AN OVERVIEW OF PRELIMINARY APPROACHES AND RESULTS

The illicit trafficking of strategic nuclear commodities (defined here as the goods needed for a covert nuclear program excluding special nuclear materials) poses a significant challenge to the international nuclear nonproliferation community. Export control regulations, both domestically and internationally, seek to inhibit the spread of strategic nuclear commodities by restricting their sale to parties that may use them for nefarious purposes. However, export controls alone are not sufficient for preventing the illicit transfer of strategic nuclear goods. There are two major pitfalls to relying solely on export control regulations for the deterrence of proliferation of strategic goods. First, export control enforcement today relies heavily on the honesty and willingness of participants to adhere to the legal framework already in place. Secondly, current practices focus on the evaluation of single records which allow for the necessary goods to be purchased separately and hidden within the thousands of legitimate commerce transactions that occur each day, disregarding strategic information regarding several purchases. Our research presents two preliminary data-centric approaches for investigating procurement networks of strategic nuclear commodities. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been putting significant effort into nonproliferation activities as an institution, both in terms of the classical nuclear material focused approach and in the examination of other strategic goods necessary to implement a nuclear program. In particular, the PNNL Signature Discovery Initiative (SDI) has codified several scientific methodologies for the detection, characterization, and prediction of signatures that are indicative of a phenomenon of interest. The methodologies and tools developed under SDI have already been applied successfully to problems in bio-forensics, cyber security and power grid balancing efforts and they have now made the nonproliferation of strategic goods into a challenge problem for testing their methodology and tools. As a first step towards the detection and characterization of illicit procurement networks, our research examines procurement networks as defined by a system of entities (people or companies) that enter into transactions of specific items with one another. Once we have defined such networks, we are interested in answering questions about the behavior and characterization of such networks. The questions we wish to answer regarding procurement networks are, first, “Can we detect networks within large, noisy datasets?” and second, “To what extent can we compare multiple networks and identify their similarities?” As procurement networks can be naturally viewed as a graph, we have employed several graph analytic tools to aid in these tasks. In particular, Graphscape, an SDI tool, uses a novel method to approximate edit distance, a graph distance measure based on the number of changes needed to transform one graph into another, in order to measure how similar two given graphs are to each other. Given a set of graphs where vertices represent companies and edges represent a shipment from company A to company B, we can calculate an all-for-all comparison of graphs. In this way, we are able to determine which graphs are most similar, and which require more changes to transform one into the other. The set of graphs to be compared can be further specialized to provide more insight, e.g., using different time periods to explore events in a company life cycle.

graph analysis↗
DOE OSTI2015

Evaluating Moving Target Defense with PLADD

This project evaluates the effectiveness of moving target defense (MTD) techniques using a new game we have designed, called PLADD, inspired by the game FlipIt. PLADD extends FlipIt by incorporating what we believe are key MTD concepts. We have analyzed PLADD and proven the existence of a defender strategy that pushes a rational attacker out of the game, demonstrated how limited the strategies available to an attacker are in PLADD, and derived analytic expressions for the expected utility of the game’s players in multiple game variants. We have created an algorithm for finding a defender’s optimal PLADD strategy. We show that in the special case of achieving deterrence in PLADD, MTD is not always cost effective and that its optimal deployment may shift abruptly from not using MTD at all to using it as aggressively as possible. We believe our effort provides basic, fundamental insights into the use of MTD, but conclude that a truly practical analysis requires model selection and calibration based on real scenarios and empirical data. We propose several avenues for further inquiry, including (1) agents with adaptive capabilities more reflective of real world adversaries, (2) the presence of multiple, heterogeneous adversaries, (3) computational game theory-based approaches such as coevolution to allow scaling to the real world beyond the limitations of analytical analysis and classical game theory, (4) mapping the game to real-world scenarios, (5) taking player risk into account when designing a strategy (in addition to expected payoff), (6) improving our understanding of the dynamic nature of MTD-inspired games by using a martingale representation, defensive forecasting, and techniques from signal processing, and (7) using adversarial games to develop inherently resilient cyber systems.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2018

Space in 21st Century Conflict: Calibrating Risks, Tailoring Strategies (Workshop Summary)

U.S. strategic thinking on outer space security has been slow to evolve since the 1990s and the DoD finds itself struggling to develop an adaptive and cohesive strategy for the domain. Russia and China, however, have been thinking about space in a holistic and integrated way for some time. Both countries recognize that U.S. conventional strength relies heavily on technologies and systems enabled by space-based assets. Thus, holding those assets at risk represents an opportunity to asymmetrically counter America’s ability to project power. China and Russia been developing a suite of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities to accomplish this, to include direct-ascent weapons, space-based weapons, jammers, and cyber capabilities; both countries have also incorporated these systems into their respective tactical and strategic planning. This represents a serious threat to U.S. power projection and assurance of our regional allies and partners. Assuring the U.S.’s ability to operate in space is paramount for supporting regional security missions in both Europe and East Asia. Assuring DoD operations and capabilities in outer space, however, remains a challenge for the defense community. One solution offered by strategists is to enhance U.S. resiliency in space to turn the domain from offense dominant to defense dominant. This, they argue, can be achieved by improving space situational awareness (SSA), protecting space assets with active and passive countermeasures, disaggregating assets and leveraging new commercial space capabilities, and integrating allied space capabilities. However, many barriers remain to accomplishing these objectives. For example, some think that the classified nature of many U.S. space activities is an obstacle to deepening cooperation with commercial partners and allies. Others acknowledge the lack of a working model for incorporating cheaper, diverse, and scalable commercial space systems. Identifying where space fits into broader U.S. deterrence strategies is a subject of contention. While discussions over the past few years have focused on the practicability of deterring attacks on space assets via cross-domain threats, this line of thinking has yielded few useful insights. Consequently, defense practitioners have more recently shifted to thinking of space as part of an integrated deterrence concept, one that envisions building resiliency and defenses into our space architecture while simultaneously holding an adversary’s space-based assets at risk to enhance deterrence more broadly. However, both approaches illuminate a larger problem in the discussion of the relationship between space and deterrence: there is a lack of consensus on what it is we are trying to deter, how space fits into broader deterrence and strategic constructs, and the role of space in extended deterrence and assurance of allies. For example, is the United States’ priority to discourage attacks in space, to ensure regional power projection and alliance support capabilities, to deter broader global conflict or all of the above? Answering such questions will be an important step toward integrating space into a comprehensive defense strategy.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗