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Critical Experiments at Sandia National Laboratories: Technical Meeting on Low-Power Critical Facilities and Small Reactors

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has conducted radiation effects testing for the Department of Energy (DOE) and other contractors supporting the DOE since the 1960's. Over this period, the research reactor facilities at Sandia have had a primary mission to provide appropriate nuclear radiation environments for radiation testing and qualification of electronic components and other devices. The current generation of reactors includes the Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR), a water-moderated pool-type reactor, fueled by elements constructed from UO2-BeO ceramic fuel pellets, and the Sandia Pulse Reactor III (SPR-III), a bare metal fast burst reactor utilizing a uranium-molybdenum alloy fuel. The SPR-III is currently defueled. The SPR Facility (SPRF) has hosted a series of critical experiments. A purpose-built critical experiment was first operated at the SPRF in the late 1980's. This experiment, called the Space Nuclear Thermal Propulsion Critical Experiment (CX), was designed to explore the reactor physics of a nuclear thermal rocket motor. This experiment was fueled with highly-enriched uranium carbide fuel in annular water-moderated fuel elements. The experiment program was completed and the fuel for the experiment was moved off-site. A second critical experiment, the Burnup Credit Critical Experiment (BUCCX) was operated at Sandia in 2002. The critical assembly for this experiment was based on the assembly used in the CX modified to accommodate low-enriched pin-type fuel in water moderator. This experiment was designed as a platform in which the reactivity effects of specific fission product poisons could be measured. Experiments were carried out on rhodium, an important fission product poison. The fuel and assembly hardware for the BUCCX remains at Sandia and is available for future experimentation. The critical experiment currently in operation at the SPRF is the Seven Percent Critical Experiment (7uPCX). This experiment is designed to provide benchmark reactor physics data to support validation of the reactor physics codes used to design commercial reactor fuel elements in an enrichment range above the current 5% enrichment cap. A first set of critical experiments in the 7uPCX has been completed. More experiments are planned in the 7uPCX series. The critical experiments at Sandia National Laboratories are currently funded by the US Department of Energy Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP). The NCSP has committed to maintain the critical experiment capability at Sandia and to support the development of a critical experiments training course at the facility. The training course is intended to provide hands-on experiment experience for the training of new and re-training of practicing Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineers. The current plans are for the development of the course to continue through the first part of fiscal year 2011 with the development culminating is the delivery of a prototype of the course in the latter part of the fiscal year. The course will be available in fiscal year 2012.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

'Criticality events' database for fuel cycle facilities in support of the IRSN nuclear criticality safety guide - 14384

IRSN has developed a database gathering the events which have affected the safety of French fuel cycle facilities (from conversion to waste storage, laboratories and experimental facilities, facilities under dismantling and decommissioning). Among all the recorded events, it is possible to extract in particular those impacting the criticality safety. In order to extend the analysis of these events, the IRSN criticality safety department has developed a specific database dedicated to criticality risks. The 'criticality events' database is continuously updated on the basis of the declared events and their analysis by engineers from the criticality safety department. At this time, about 380 events (on 540 identified since 1980) are described in details in this database. Thus, the number of events in facilities can be between 1 and 75. It is possible to establish a link, as a feedback, between the 'criticality events' database and the sequences of events identified in the IRSN nuclear criticality safety guide. Indeed, the purpose of this guide is to be a support for criticality safety analysis or assessment. The guide is in the form of diagrams and gives advice to perform an assessment of criticality risks for each criticality control mode and for the reference fissile medium. Thus, the guide presents the parameters to be considered in the analysis and the typical sequences (written in the form of questions) related to the most current failures to be investigated. With the objective of being able to illustrate the nuclear criticality safety guide, it was decided to select the events of the database which are representative of the sequences. Thus, 70 sequences have been illustrated up to now by one or several events analyzed in the 'criticality events' database. Furthermore, this action allows 'extending' the nuclear criticality safety guide with sequences which had not yet been identified (when an event cannot illustrate a failure listed in the diagrams). This paper will describe the approach used to build the 'criticality events' database, the criteria used to classify events and the link with the IRSN nuclear criticality safety guide. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The Development, Content, Design, and Conduct of the 2011 Piloted US DOE Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Criticality Safety Engineering Training and Education Project

In May 1973 the University of New Mexico conducted the first nationwide criticality safety training and education week-long short course for nuclear criticality safety engineers. Subsequent to that course, the Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility (LACEF) developed very successful 'hands-on' subcritical and critical training programs for operators, supervisors, and engineering staff. Since the inception of the US Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Criticality Technology and Safety Project (NCT&SP) in 1983, the DOE has stimulated contractor facilities and laboratories to collaborate in the furthering of nuclear criticality as a discipline. That effort included the education and training of nuclear criticality safety engineers (NCSEs). In 1985 a textbook was written that established a path toward formalizing education and training for NCSEs. Though the NCT&SP went through a brief hiatus from 1990 to 1992, other DOE-supported programs were evolving to the benefit of NCSE training and education. In 1993 the DOE established a Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) and undertook a comprehensive development effort to expand the extant LACEF 'hands-on' course specifically for the education and training of NCSEs. That successful education and training was interrupted in 2006 for the closing of the LACEF and the accompanying movement of materials and critical experiment machines to the Nevada Test Site. Prior to that closing, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) was commissioned by the US DOE NCSP to establish an independent hands-on NCSE subcritical education and training course. The course provided an interim transition for the establishment of a reinvigorated and expanded two-week NCSE education and training program in 2011. The 2011 piloted two-week course was coordinated by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and jointly conducted by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) classroom education and facility training, the Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) hands-on criticality experiments training, and the US DOE National Criticality Experiment Research Center (NCERC) hands-on criticality experiments training that is jointly supported by LLNL and LANL and located at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) This paper provides the description of the bases, content, and conduct of the piloted, and future US DOE NCSP Criticality Safety Engineer Training and Education Project.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

ENDF/B-VII.1 Neutron Cross Section Data Testing with Critical Assembly Benchmarks and Reactor Experiments

The ENDF/B-VII.1 library is the latest revision to the United States Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF). The ENDF library is currently in its seventh generation, with ENDF/B-VII.0 being released in 2006. This revision expands upon that library, including the addition of new evaluated files (was 393 neutron files previously, now 423 including replacement of elemental vanadium and zinc evaluations with isotopic evaluations) and extension or updating of many existing neutron data files. Complete details are provided in the companion paper [M. B. Chadwick et al., 'ENDF/B-VII.1 Nuclear Data for Science and Technology: Cross Sections, Covariances, Fission Product Yields and Decay Data,' Nuclear Data Sheets, 112, 2887 (2011)]. This paper focuses on how accurately application libraries may be expected to perform in criticality calculations with these data. Continuous energy cross section libraries, suitable for use with the MCNP Monte Carlo transport code, have been generated and applied to a suite of nearly one thousand critical benchmark assemblies defined in the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project's International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments. This suite covers uranium and plutonium fuel systems in a variety of forms such as metallic, oxide or solution, and under a variety of spectral conditions, including unmoderated (i.e., bare), metal reflected and water or other light element reflected. Assembly eigenvalues that were accurately predicted with ENDF/B-VII.0 cross sections such as unmoderated and uranium reflected {sup 235}U and {sup 239}Pu assemblies, HEU solution systems and LEU oxide lattice systems that mimic commercial PWR configurations continue to be accurately calculated with ENDF/B-VII.1 cross sections, and deficiencies in predicted eigenvalues for assemblies containing selected materials, including titanium, manganese, cadmium and tungsten are greatly reduced. Improvements are also confirmed for selected actinide reaction rates such as {sup 236}U, {sup 238,242}Pu and {sup 241,243}Am capture in fast systems. Other deficiencies, such as the overprediction of Pu solution system critical eigenvalues and a decreasing trend in calculated eigenvalue for {sup 233}U fueled systems as a function of Above-Thermal Fission Fraction remain. The comprehensive nature of this critical benchmark suite and the generally accurate calculated eigenvalues obtained with ENDF/B-VII.1 neutron cross sections support the conclusion that this is the most accurate general purpose ENDF/B cross section library yet released to the technical community.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Criticality Accident Alarm System Shielding Benchmark: Integral Experiment Request 498, Critical Engineering Decision 1 Report

This report supports Critical/Subcritical Experiment Decision 1 (CED-1) for Integral Experiment Request (IER) 498, a shielding benchmark produced using the Godiva IV critical assembly at the National Critical Experiments Research Center (NCERC). Shielding benchmarks are datasets collected to provide a comparison for computer models that simulate the effect of shielding on radiation transmission from a source to a detector. The purpose of a CED-1 report is to produce a conceptual design for an integral experiment and to identify the long lead-time items. The design presented in this report favors certain detailed design options such as material selections. However, alternative options can be selected as the project evolves. Dimensions are specified only as needed to evaluate feasibility and performance. Development of Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) shielding benchmarks supports two main programmatic needs. The first need is to improve confidence in models of facilities that house nuclear material handling operations. Better models can support effective CAAS detector placement when criticality may result in dose, and it enables more accurate analysis of criticality accident impacts at various locations in a facility. A key quantity that can be verified is the secondary gamma production caused by neutron interactions with various materials. The second programmatic need supported by shielding benchmarks is the ongoing development of methods being integrated into nuclear simulation codes such as the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) transport code and the SCALE code system used in efforts funded by the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP). Previous work performed under the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Experimental Program (ICSBEP) to produce shielding benchmark data is primarily limited to a set of measurements at the SILENE critical assembly at the Valduc facility in France. The experiment used an open configuration and a burst mode operation, which limited detector options to thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and activation foils. Because TLDs do not record gamma spectra, it was difficult to verify the gamma energy spectrum from the experiment. In this work, the Godiva IV assembly will be used because it is a fast system capable of producing a wide range of source strengths, including super-prompt critical bursts. The room return for the facility is expected to be substantial and challenging to characterize, so a more closed, shielded experimental configuration is considered. Furthermore, because the physics of radiation transport outside the assembly does not change between the burst mode and the delayed critical mode, it is anticipated that most measurements will be made with the Godiva IV assembly in delayed critical mode, operating within a range that will allow electronic counters to collect accurate data. Scoping calculations concluded that a workable room return shield is comprised of 40 cm of 5% borated polyethylene backed by 7 cm of lead. This configuration was shown to produce a ratio of signal–to–room return of over 100 for up to 2 mean free paths of shield sample material, and over 10 for up to 4 mean free paths of shield sample material, ensuring that useful results can be obtained. With no shielding sample in the room return shield, it was shown that the neutron and gamma spectra do not appreciably change with a change in room size. This scoping calculation does not preclude the use of tungsten powder in a binder, some other effective gamma shielding material, or a hybrid design. Dose rates for various source intensities at an unshielded detector are listed herein to inform detector selection during CED-2, and calibration chains are identified. Preliminary estimates of costs and schedules are outlined but remain to be verified. Values could double or triple as estimates become more accurate and are principally included here to demonstrate feasibility. Preliminary estimates indicate that the apparatus can be installed within a feasible schedule and budget. Two measurements per day are assumed. Producing a shielding benchmark at NCERC using the Godiva IV assembly has been shown to be feasible, with manageable uncertainties and risks. A clear, continuing need for shielding benchmark data remains present, and this report identifies and evaluates a method for creating integrated shielding benchmark datasets.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Certification Processes for Safety-Critical and Mission-Critical Aerospace Software

This document is a quick reference guide with an overview of the processes required to certify safety-critical and mission-critical flight software at selected NASA centers and the FAA. Researchers and software developers can use this guide to jumpstart their understanding of how to get new or enhanced software onboard an aircraft or spacecraft. The introduction contains aerospace industry definitions of safety and safety-critical software, as well as, the current rationale for certification of safety-critical software. The Standards for Safety-Critical Aerospace Software section lists and describes current standards including NASA standards and RTCA DO-178B. The Mission-Critical versus Safety-Critical software section explains the difference between two important classes of software: safety-critical software involving the potential for loss of life due to software failure and mission-critical software involving the potential for aborting a mission due to software failure. The DO-178B Safety-critical Certification Requirements section describes special processes and methods required to obtain a safety-critical certification for aerospace software flying on vehicles under auspices of the FAA. The final two sections give an overview of the certification process used at Dryden Flight Research Center and the approval process at the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL).

Nelson, Stacy↗

Certification Processes for Safety-Critical and Mission-Critical Aerospace Software

This document is a quick reference guide with an overview of the processes required to certify safety-critical and mission-critical flight software at selected NASA centers and the FAA. Researchers and software developers can use this guide to jumpstart their understanding of how to get new or enhanced software onboard an aircraft or spacecraft. The introduction contains aerospace industry definitions of safety and safety-critical software, as well as, the current rationale for certification of safety-critical software. The Standards for Safety-Critical Aerospace Software section lists and describes current standards including NASA standards and RTCA DO-178B. The Mission-Critical versus Safety-Critical software section explains the difference between two important classes of software: safety-critical software involving the potential for loss of life due to software failure and mission-critical software involving the potential for aborting a mission due to software failure. The DO-178B Safety-critical Certification Requirements section describes special processes and methods required to obtain a safety-critical certification for aerospace software flying on vehicles under auspices of the FAA. The final two sections give an overview of the certification process used at Dryden Flight Research Center and the approval process at the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL).

Nelson, Stacy↗

Criticality Safety Evaluation Project Development for University of California Berkely Nuclear Criticality Safety Pipeline Course

The Nuclear Criticality Safety Division at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has taken a unique approach to developing criticality safety evaluation topics in support of the University of California Berkeley criticality safety pipeline course. The evaluation topics are designed to go beyond the typical evaluation examples used for many training courses including vault storage and variations on storage arrays. These types of evaluations provide in-depth analysis into the fundamentals of criticality safety and are complex but may be far off from what a new criticality safety engineer may actually be evaluating. To provide more practical examples of criticality safety evaluation topics that are better fit for the knowledge level of a criticality safety engineer in-training, variations of current and future operations and research operations performed at LLNL are used as evaluation topics. Additionally, an emphasis on research is included in all evaluation topics as it allows students to take advantage of the concepts learned in class to apply them for process improvement, engineering equipment that is favorable for criticality safety, and negotiation tactics to work with operations personnel. The process used by LLNL to develop project topics for the pipeline course is provided in this paper. The intent is to provide an alternative technique for training students and potentially younger staff members in criticality safety on developing criticality safety evaluations.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Current Status of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Hands-On Criticality Safety Training

The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) has conducted two-week Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Practitioner courses since 2011 to support the training and qualification of new NCS staff. The course was developed in accordance with the American National Standard Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS) standard for NCS training and qualifications (ANSI/ANS-8.26-2007). In 2013, an NCS Manager’s course was developed for process supervisors, managers, regulators, and other professionals with NCS-related responsibilities. This course was revised in 2019 for Criticality Safety Officers (CSOs) based on an NCSP Criticality Safety Support Group tasking (2018-01). This course was piloted at the Nevada Field Office and the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) in June 2021. These courses consist of the following training components: classroom education, facility training, and hands-on subcritical and critical experiments training. The two-week Practitioner course offers a week of classroom training, with practical workshops and exercises focused on teaching students how to perform an NCS evaluation. The second week of training involves hands-on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. The first week is offered in Las Vegas, Nevada, at the DOE Nevada Field Office or the National Atomic Testing Museum. Depending on the student’s clearance level, the second week is offered at Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) (uncleared and L-cleared students) or at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (Q-cleared students). The one-week Manager’s course is offered at SNL or NCERC, depending on clearance or interest, and includes classroom and hands- on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. This paper provides an overview and status report for the DOE/NNSA NCSP training courses in NCS and to provide information about future course offerings. This paper discusses the challenges associated with executing the training courses during the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2-week Practitioner and 1-week manager courses are currently offered twice per year and adjustments are made based upon demand.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Current Status of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Hands-On Criticality Safety Training [Abstract]

The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) has conducted two-week Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Practitioner courses since 2011 to support the training and qualification of new NCS staff. The course was developed in accordance with the American National Standard Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS) standard for NCS training and qualifications (ANSI/ANS-8.26-2007). In 2013, an NCS Manager’s course was developed for process supervisors, managers, regulators, and other professionals with NCS-related responsibilities. This course was revised in 2019 for Criticality Safety Officers (CSOs) based on an NCSP Criticality Safety Support Group tasking (2018-01). This course was piloted at the Nevada Field Office and the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) in June 2021. These courses consist of the following training components: classroom education, facility training, and hands-on subcritical and critical experiments training. The two-week Practitioner course offers a week of classroom training, with practical workshops and exercises focused on teaching students how to perform an NCS evaluation. The second week of training involves hands-on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. The first week is offered in Las Vegas, Nevada, at the DOE Nevada Field Office or the National Atomic Testing Museum. Depending on the student’s clearance level, the second week is offered at Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) (uncleared and L-cleared students) or at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (Q-cleared students). The one-week Manager’s course is offered at SNL or NCERC, depending on clearance or interest, and includes classroom and hands-on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. This paper provides an overview and status report for the DOE/NNSA NCSP training courses in NCS and to provide information about future course offerings. This paper will also discuss the challenges associated with executing the training courses during the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2-week Practitioner and 1-week manager courses are currently offered twice per year and adjustments are made based upon demand.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

OVERVIEW AND STATUS OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY

For many years, the United States (US) and international consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS) have provided guidance for those with hands-on operations involving fissionable materials. These consensus standards have been crucial to reducing the number of criticality accidents in process facilities. The last known criticality accident inside the United States was in 1978 (nearly 41 years ago) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, and outside the United States, an accident occurred at Tokai-mura, Japan, in 1999 (20 years ago). The domestic consensus standards for NCS include the American Nuclear Society (ANS) standards. The ANS Standards Board, the NCS Consensus Committee, and the ANS-8 Subcommittee oversee the development and maintenance of these standards. Currently there are 18 standards in the ANS-8 series: 6 are in revision mode and 12 are in maintenance mode. The international consensus standards for NCS calculations, procedures, and practices are maintained and developed within the International Organization for Standardization, Technical Committee 85 on Nuclear Energy, Subcommittee 5 on Nuclear Fuel Technology, and Working Group 8, “Nuclear Criticality Safety.” Eight standards are currently available, three standards are in revision mode, and four proposed standards are at various stages of development. This paper provides the NCS community with an overview and status report on domestic and international NCS consensus standards to stimulate interest and to support their continued development.

Bowen, Douglas G.↗

Multiple Critical Unresolved Region Integral Experiment (MCURIE): A Proposed Integral Critical Experimental Framework for Unresolved Region and Intermediate Energies

The Critical Unresolved Region Integral Experiment (CURIE) critical experiment was performed at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) at the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada Nuclear Security Sites (NNSS) in 2020. The objective of CURIE was to improve the quality of integral nuclear data in the uranium-235 ( 235 U) unresolved resonance region (URR) by performing benchmark integral experiments that were sensitive to the URR energy ranges. The CURIE experiment was evaluated for the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) handbook and the benchmark evaluation was accepted in 2022. The URR is a region within the intermediate neutron energy range (the intermediate energy ranges from 0.7 eV to 100 keV). The observed resonance structure in neutron cross sections is due to discrete energy levels in the nucleus and are characterized by resonance parameters. In the URR region, the resonance parameters are only partially resolved as the resolution of the experiment techniques becomes comparable to the average width of the resonances themselves, and the resonances are so close to one another that the structure cannot be determined empirically. The ENDF/B-VIII.0 and JEFF-3.3 nuclear data libraries define the URR as beginning at 2.25 keV and continuing until 25 keV. There are minimal intermediate neutron energy benchmarks available in the ICSBEP benchmark handbook, and aside from CURIE there are none that are highly sensitive in the URR energy region. There is a current need for additional experiments sensitive to the URR energy region. There is a new proposed subgroup for the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD NEA) Working Party on International Nuclear Data Evaluation Cooperation (WPEC), so any new models or information will need experimental validation and testing. The NEA Working Party on Nuclear Criticality Safety (WPNCS) recent experimental needs and priority list includes intermediate energy 235 U and 238 U experiments, as does the recent Integral Experiments to Address Nuclear Criticality Safety Needs Meeting (May 2023). A variant on the original CURIE experiment called the Multiple Critical Unresolved Region Integral Experiment (MCURIE) is proposed to provide further investigation of the intermediate and URR energy region for uranium. MCURIE will utilize existing fuels at NCERC but use alternative moderators and reflectors to modify the neutron absorption, scattering, and fission spectra of the experiments, allowing for precise targeting of nuclear data sensitivities. The overall goal of MCURIE is to develop a framework for designing and performing integral benchmark experiments with high sensitivities in the intermediate and URR energy regions for nuclear data validation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Critical thickness of atomically ordered III-V alloys

The critical thickness model is modified with a general boundary energy that describes the change in bulk energy as a dislocation regularly alters the atomic structure of an ordered material. The model is evaluated for dislocations gliding through CuPt-ordered GaInP and GaInAs, where the boundary energy is negative and the boundary is stable. With ordering present, the critical thickness is significantly lowered and remains finite as the mismatch strain approaches zero. The reduction in critical thickness is most significant when the order parameter is greatest and the amount of misfit energy is low. The modified model is experimentally validated for low-misfit GaInP epilayers with varying order parameters using in situ wafer curvature and ex situ cathodoluminescence. With strong ordering, relaxation begins at a lower thickness and occurs at a greater rate, which is consistent with a lower critical thickness and increased glide force. Thus, atomic ordering is an important consideration for the stability of lattice-mismatched devices.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

DETAILED DESIGN OF AN EPITHERMAL/INTERMEDIATE CRITICAL EXPERIMENT USING THE SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES CRITICAL FACILITY

Nuclear criticality safety evaluations commonly take credit for neutron-absorbing materials. The normal practice for validating the calculational process to develop safety limits and margins of safety is to compare the safety case models with calculations of various critical experiments of a similar composition. Because there is a lack of critical experiments with various relevant neutron-absorbing materials mixed with fissile material, a new approach is being developed. This new approach uses small amounts of these credited materials in a critical assembly and assesses their worth and neutron energy spectral characteristics using absorption reaction rates. This approach is proposed as a new method for nuclear data validation. The assessment will involve measured central reactivity worth in a critical or near-critical assembly and subsequent comparison with calculated values from Monte Carlo computer analyses. Additionally, four configurations are proposed which replace fuel rods in the driver region with absorber rods. These configurations will allow for examination of the effects of the material in a more thermalized spectrum experiment selection in these scenarios. This paper presents some case studies examining the impact of these changes on some hypothetical safety analysis systems.This paper documents the detailed design portion of the critical experiment design process, focusing on development of a capability to test epithermal/ intermediate energy cross sections for materials using the 7uPCX critical experiment facility. Tantalum is specified as the test material to be examined.

Clarity, Justin↗

A new critical experiment in support of the nuclear criticality safety class - 14488

A new critical experiment has been performed on the Planet vertical assembly machine at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC). The purpose of the experiment was to compare the moderator properties of polyethylene versus Lucite and to use the experiment as an instructional tool for criticality safety engineers. The Lucite version of this experiment has been performed many times since the mid-1970's. Similar to the Lucite critical experiment, the polyethylene experiment was designed to emphasize the factors that affect criticality; namely, enrichment, reflection, interaction, moderation, mass, shape, volume, density, concentration, and poisons. The critical mass obtained with the moderating high density polyethylene plates was 997.0 ± 0.65 grams of highly enriched uranium, which is approximately 34% lower than the critical mass obtained using the Lucite moderating plates. This 34% decrease is mostly attributable to the higher hydrogen and carbon atom densities of polyethylene versus Lucite. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗