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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2016

Infrared spectroscopy of water clusters isolated in methane matrices: Effects of isotope substitution and annealing

Using infrared-active solvents of CH{sub 4} and CD{sub 4} for matrix isolation, we measured infrared spectra of H{sub 2}O and D{sub 2}O clusters at 7 K. The solute-concentration dependence of the spectrum of H{sub 2}O clusters in a CH{sub 4} matrix was investigated and was used for the peak assignment. Annealing procedures were found to promote the size growth of water clusters in methane matrices for all the combinations of (H{sub 2}O, CH{sub 4}), (H{sub 2}O, CD{sub 4}), (D{sub 2}O, CH{sub 4}), and (D{sub 2}O, CD{sub 4}). We also monitored the ν{sub 3} absorption due to methane to find the annealing-induced structural change only of solid CH{sub 4}. The matrix effects on the vibrations of the clusters are discussed on the basis of “T{sub c} plots”, where their frequencies are plotted as a function of the square root of the matrix critical temperature, T{sub c}. The obtained plots assure the validity of the assignment of the cluster peaks.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗
DOE OSTI2021

A functional modeling approach for quality assurance in metal additive manufacturing

Purpose: Due to the complexity of and variations in additive manufacturing (AM) processes, there is a level of uncertainty that creates critical issues in quality assurance (QA), which must be addressed by time-consuming and cost-intensive tasks. This deteriorates the process repeatability, reliability and part reproducibility. So far, many AM efforts have been performed in an isolated and scattered way over several decades. Here, a systematically integrated holistic view is proposed to achieve QA for AM. Design/methodology/approach: A systematically integrated view is presented to ensure the predefined part properties before/during/after the AM process. It consists of four stages, namely, QA plan, prospective validation, concurrent validation and retrospective validation. As a foundation for QA planning, a functional workflow and the required information flows are proposed by using functional design models: Icam DEFinition for Function Modeling. Findings: The functional design model of the QA plan provides the systematically integrated view that can be the basis for inspection of AM processes for the repeatability and qualification of AM parts for reproducibility. Research limitations/implications: A powder bed fusion process was used to validate the feasibility of this QA plan. Feasibility was demonstrated under many assumptions; real validation is not included in this study. Social implications: This study provides an innovative and transformative methodology that can lead to greater productivity and improved quality of AM parts across industries. Furthermore, the QA guidelines and functional design models provide the foundation for the development of a QA architecture and management system. Originality/value: This systematically integrated view and the corresponding QA plan can pose fundamental questions to the AM community and initiate new research efforts in the in-situ digital inspection of AM processes and parts.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - the Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.

Helen Vaccaro↗
NASA NTRS2007

Organization, Management and Function of International Space Station (ISS) Multilateral Medical Operations

Long duration crews have inhabited the ISS since November of 2000. The favorable medical outcomes of its missions can be largely attributed to sustained collective efforts of all ISS Partners medical organizations. In-flight medical monitoring and support, although crucial, is just a component of the ISS system of Joint Medical Operations. The goal of this work is to review the principles, design, and function of the multilateral medical support of the ISS Program. The governing documents, which describe the relationships among all ISS partner medical organizations, were evaluated, followed by analysis of the roles, responsibilities, and decision-making processes of the ISS medical boards, panels, and working groups. The degree of integration of the medical support system was evaluated by reviewing the multiple levels of the status reviews and mission assurance activities carried out throughout the last six years. The Integrated Medical Group, consisting of physicians and other essential personnel in the mission control centers represents the front-line medical support of the ISS. Data from their day-to-day activities are presented weekly at the Space Medicine Operations Team (SMOT), where known or potential concerns are addressed by an international group of physicians. A broader status review is conducted monthly to project the state of crew health and medical support for the following month, and to determine measures to return to nominal state. Finally, a comprehensive readiness review is conducted during preparations for each ISS mission. The Multilateral Medical Policy Board (MMPB) issues medical policy decisions and oversees all health and medical matters. The Multilateral Space Medicine Board (MSMB) certifies crewmembers and visitors for training and space flight to the Station, and physicians to practice space medicine for the ISS. The Multilateral Medical Operations Panel (MMOP) develops medical requirements, defines and supervises implementation of operational countermeasures, environmental monitoring, medical care, and emergency medical services. MMOP assures the medical readiness of the Station for each subsequent mission or critical event. All boards and panels have functioned effectively and without interruptions even in various challenging circumstances. Based on the experience of the authors, consensus has prevailed as the primary nature of decisions made by all ISS medical groups, at all levels. The six first years of piloted operation have demonstrated the ability of the ISS medical authority groups and the medical infrastructure to implement medical policies and requirements, effectively interface with non-medical groups, and maintain the health and productivity of the crew in an integrated, multilaterally coordinated fashion. The medical support system appears to be mature and ready for further expansion of all Partners roles, and for the anticipated increase in the size of ISS crews.

Duncan, James M.↗
DOE OSTI2017

Optically-based Sensor System for Critical Nuclear Facilities Post-Event Seismic Structural Assessment

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has ownership and operational responsibility for a large enterprise of nuclear facilities that provide essential functions to DOE missions ranging from national security to discovery science and energy research. These facilities support a number of DOE programs and offices including the National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Science, and Office of Environmental Management. With many unique and “one of a kind” functions, these facilities represent a tremendous national investment, and assuring their safety and integrity is fundamental to the success of a breadth of DOE programs. Many DOE critical facilities are located in regions with significant natural phenomenon hazards including major earthquakes and DOE has been a leader in developing standards for the seismic analysis of nuclear facilities. Attaining and sustaining excellence in nuclear facility design and management must be a core competency of the DOE. An important part of nuclear facility management is the ability to monitor facilities and rapidly assess the response and integrity of the facilities after any major upset event. Experience in the western U.S. has shown that understanding facility integrity after a major earthquake is a significant challenge which, lacking key data, can require extensive effort and significant time. In the work described in the attached report, a transformational approach to earthquake monitoring of facilities is described and demonstrated. An entirely new type of optically-based sensor that can directly and accurately measure the earthquake-induced deformations of a critical facility has been developed and tested. This report summarizes large-scale shake table testing of the sensor concept on a representative steel frame building structure, and provides quantitative data on the accuracy of the sensor measurements.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
NASA NTRS2003

Improving the Agency's Software Acquisition Capability

External development of software has oftc n led to unsatisfactory results and great frustration for the assurE 7ce community. Contracts frequently omit critical assuranc 4 processes or the right to oversee software development activitie: At a time when NASA depends more and more on software to in plement critical system functions, combination of three factors ex; cerbate this problem: I ) the ever-increasing trend to acquire rather than develop software in-house, 2) the trend toward performance based contracts, and 3) acquisition vehicles that only state softwar 2 requirements while leaving development standards and assur! ince methodologies up to the contractor. We propose to identify specific methods at d tools that NASA projects can use to mitigate the adverse el ects of the three problems. TWO broad classes of methoddt ~ols will be explored. The first will be those that provide NASA p ojects with insight and oversight into contractors' activities. The st cond will be those that help projects objectively assess, and thus i nprwe, their software acquisition capability. Of particular interest is the Software Engineering Institute's (SEI) Software Acqt isition Capability Maturity Model (SA-CMMO).

Hankinson, Allen↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Guiding Integration of Formal Verification in Assurance Cases

Assurance cases are being increasingly acknowledged as away to build trust in complex systems with autonomous capabilities. An assurance case is a comprehensive, defensible, and valid justification that a system will function as intended for a specific mission and operating environment. Formal verification is often reserved for the most critical components of such systems. However, formal verification tools are often complex, and their usage is subject to many constraints and contextual dependencies. This can raise challenges both for performing the verification as well as reflecting the verification results appropriately in the assurance case, especially for non-expert users of the verification tool. To address these challenges, we present a tool-supported methodology for integrating formal verification results in an assurance case by capturing key verification method information in a rigorously constructed assurance case. In particular, we capture the tool specification in terms of its inputs, outputs, and assurance constraints as assumptions over inputs and guarantees provided over its outputs. The tool specification is parametrized over the inputs and outputs to both guide the intended application of the tool, as well as to check that the tool has been applied following the stated assumptions and that the guarantees hold. We define a generic tool assurance argument pattern that enables integration of the verification results in the assurance case by allowing custom refinement and automated instantiation for each tool use. We demonstrate our methodology on two formal verification tools and their applications to the verification of neural network properties for the aircraft domain.

Assurance Cases↗
NASA NTRS2012

Mission Operations Assurance

Integrate the mission operations assurance function into the flight team providing: (1) value added support in identifying, mitigating, and communicating the project's risks and, (2) being an essential member of the team during the test activities, training exercises and critical flight operations.

project tracking↗
NASA NTRS2015

Cascade Distillation System Design for Safety and Mission Assurance

Per the NASA Human Health, Life Support and Habitation System Technology Area 06 report "crewed missions venturing beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) will require technologies with improved reliability, reduced mass, self-sufficiency, and minimal logistical needs as an emergency or quick-return option will not be feasible." To meet this need, the development team of the second generation Cascade Distillation System (CDS 2.0) opted a development approach that explicitely incorporate consideration of safety, mission assurance, and autonomy. The CDS 2.0 prelimnary design focused on establishing a functional baseline that meets the CDS core capabilities and performance. The critical design phase is now focused on incorporating features through a deliberative process of establishing the systems failure modes and effects, identifying mitigative strategies, and evaluating the merit of the proposed actions through analysis and test. This paper details results of this effort on the CDS 2.0 design.

Sargusingh, Miriam J.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Cascade Distillation System Design for Safety and Mission Assurance

Per the NASA Human Health, Life Support and Habitation System Technology Area 06 report "crewed missions venturing beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) will require technologies with improved reliability, reduced mass, self-sufficiency, and minimal logistical needs as an emergency or quick-return option will not be feasible".1 To meet this need, the development team of the second generation Cascade Distillation System (CDS 2.0) chose a development approach that explicitly incorporate consideration of safety, mission assurance, and autonomy. The CDS 2.0 preliminary design focused on establishing a functional baseline that meets the CDS core capabilities and performance. The critical design phase is now focused on incorporating features through a deliberative process of establishing the systems failure modes and effects, identifying mitigation strategies, and evaluating the merit of the proposed actions through analysis and test. This paper details results of this effort on the CDS 2.0 design.

Sarguisingh, Miriam↗
DOE OSTI2017

Development of functional requirements specification for digital instrumentation and control systems upgrades used at nuclear power plants (NPPs) - 396

Recent market conditions have driven the nuclear industry to become more innovative at reducing cost in order to remain competitive. Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems used by many NPPs are based on outdated 1960's and 70's technology. Many of the components used in these digital systems are no longer supported by Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and are rapidly becoming obsolete. Coping with the high cost of replacing I and C equipment due to obsolescence adds to this economic challenge. While other industries have migrated from analog to modern digital I and C technology, implementation of digital I and C controls within the nuclear industry has been very slow. This is primarily due to the high capital cost related to implementation of digital I and C upgrades, which is compounded by regulatory uncertainties that present significant licensing risks. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and the industry's Digital I and C Working Group are working to address many of the regulatory barriers that adversely impacts implementation of digital upgrades at NPPs. The NRC has developed an 'Integrated Action Plan to Modernize Digital Instrumentation and Controls Regulatory Infrastructure' (ML16097A182), Reference 1. Once fully implemented, this plan is expected to help reduce regulatory uncertainties that affects project cost. Excluding regulatory uncertainty, most OEM's will concur that one of the most important factors in reducing project cost is assuring that all requirements are well defined and complete prior to starting the project. A detailed and high quality Functional Requirements Specification (FRS) is critical in documenting these requirements. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2012

Rapid Analysis, Self-Calibrating Array for Air Monitoring

Human space missions have critical needs for monitoring and control for life support systems. These systems have monitoring needs that include feedback for closed loop processes and quality control for environmental factors. Sensors and monitoring technologies assure that the air environment and water supply for the astronaut crew habitat fall within acceptable limits, and that the life support system is functioning properly and efficiently. The longer the flight duration and the more distant the destination, the more critical it becomes to have carefully monitored and automated control systems for life support. Past experiments with the JPL ENose have demonstrated a lifetime of the sensor array, with the software, of around 18 months. The lifetime of the calibration, for some analytes, was as long as 24 months. We are working on a sensor array and new algorithms that will include sensor response time in the analysis. The preliminary array analysis for two analytes shows that the analysis time, of an event, can be dropped from 45 minutes to less than10 minutes and array training time can be cut substantially. We will describe the lifetime testing of an array and show lifetime data on individual sensors. This progress will lead to more rapid identification of analytes, and faster training time of the array.

Self Calibrating↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Assurance Issues in Developing AI/ML Components (and their Standards) for Civil Aviation

Standards development activities require a keen and deep understanding of the problem being solved by the standard as well as the technologies being deployed in any reference implementation of the solution. It is important to understand the mechanisms and limits of the fundamental, underlying science of implementation and verification technologies used to realize and assure systems. We need to understand the limits of what current process and metrics can provide with respect to new technologies. US leadership is important in this endeavor, and it is vital that we have a measured approach that yields sound results. We wish to start with simple, well-defined, non-safety critical applications and then progress to functions which have (1) clearly defined requirements, (2) means of checking the answer/output, and (3) means of intervention and mitigation of incorrect answers/outputs.

Aviation Safety↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Formal Methods in the Development of Highly Assured Software for Unmanned Aircraft Systems

In traditional software development methodologies, operational and functional requirements of systems are often specified in structured natural language notations. These restricted notations provide good documentation support, but only provide limited support for semantic analysis. These notations are generally not rich enough to unambiguously specify the requirements of safety-critical systems that, for example, involve complex numerical computations or that interact with the physical environment. Examples of these safety-critical systems are autonomous vehicles such as unmanned aircraft systems. This talk advocates the use of expressive formal logics, such as higher-order logic, to specify the operational and functional requirement of unmanned systems and to prove the correctness of these requirements. Semantic analysis of requirements written in higher-order logic is supported through the use of interactive theorem provers. Formal models serve as ideal reference implementations of functional requirements. Hence, formal logics enable software validation techniques where software implementations can be checked against functional requirements in a mechanical way. The Formal Methods group in the Safety-Critical Avionics Systems Branch at NASA Langley Research Center has conducted research on the development and application of formal verification techniques to safety-critical applications of interest to NASA for more than 30 years. This talk illustrates the use of formal methods in the development of highly-assured autonomous unmanned aircraft systems.

Formal Methods↗
NASA NTRS2020

Leveraging ASTM Industry Standard F3269-17 for Providing Safe Operations of a Highly Autonomous Aircraft

This paper expands upon the ASTM industry standard F3269-17 to outline a run-time assurance (RTA) network architecture for use in ensuring safe flight operations of a highly autonomous aircraft. An RTA network architecture is proposed and critical features discussed to implement functions where automation is primarily responsible for the safety of the aircraft instead of a pilot. This shift in responsibility, made possible by the proposed architecture, is key to highly resilient automation and is a core enabler for future “pilotless” transportation concepts. The findings in this paper stem from the researcher’s experiences with ASTM in the generation of the standard and some seven years of RTA system development on various flight programs leveraging the RTA concepts outlined in the ASTM standard.

autonomous systems↗
NASA NTRS1994

Implementing Software Safety in the NASA Environment

Until recently, NASA did not consider allowing computers total control of flight systems. Human operators, via hardware, have constituted the ultimate safety control. In an attempt to reduce costs, NASA has come to rely more and more heavily on computers and software to control space missions. (For example. software is now planned to control most of the operational functions of the International Space Station.) Thus the need for systematic software safety programs has become crucial for mission success. Concurrent engineering principles dictate that safety should be designed into software up front, not tested into the software after the fact. 'Cost of Quality' studies have statistics and metrics to prove the value of building quality and safety into the development cycle. Unfortunately, most software engineers are not familiar with designing for safety, and most safety engineers are not software experts. Software written to specifications which have not been safety analyzed is a major source of computer related accidents. Safer software is achieved step by step throughout the system and software life cycle. It is a process that includes requirements definition, hazard analyses, formal software inspections, safety analyses, testing, and maintenance. The greatest emphasis is placed on clearly and completely defining system and software requirements, including safety and reliability requirements. Unfortunately, development and review of requirements are the weakest link in the process. While some of the more academic methods, e.g. mathematical models, may help bring about safer software, this paper proposes the use of currently approved software methodologies, and sound software and assurance practices to show how, to a large degree, safety can be designed into software from the start. NASA's approach today is to first conduct a preliminary system hazard analysis (PHA) during the concept and planning phase of a project. This determines the overall hazard potential of the system to be built. Shortly thereafter, as the system requirements are being defined, the second iteration of hazard analyses takes place, the systems hazard analysis (SHA). During the systems requirements phase, decisions are made as to what functions of the system will be the responsibility of software. This is the most critical time to affect the safety of the software. From this point, software safety analyses as well as software engineering practices are the main focus for assuring safe software. While many of the steps proposed in this paper seem like just sound engineering practices, they are the best technical and most cost effective means to assure safe software within a safe system.

Wetherholt, Martha S.↗
NASA NTRS2021

Toward Certification of Machine-Learning Systems for Low Criticality Airborne Applications

The exceptional progress in the field of machine learning (ML) in recent years has attracted a lot of interest in using this technology in aviation. Possible airborne applications of ML include safety-critical functions, which must be developed in compliance with rigorous certification standards of the aviation industry. Current certification standards for the aviation industry were developed prior to the ML renaissance without taking specifics of ML technology into account. There are some fundamental incompatibilities between traditional design assurance approaches and certain aspects of ML-based systems. In this paper, we analyze the current airborne certification standards and show that all objectives of the standards can be achieved for a low-criticality ML-based system if certain assumptions about ML development workflow are applied.

Avionics↗
NASA NTRS2013

Analysis of Traffic Conflicts in a Mixed-Airspace Evaluation of Airborne Separation Assurance

A pair of human-in-the-loop simulation evaluations of a distributed air/ground separation assurance system have been conducted to investigate the function allocation between humans and automation systems as well as ground-based and airborne agents in the Next Generation Air Transportation System and beyond. This paper focuses on an analysis of certain critical conflicts observed between self-separating aircraft and ground-managed traffic in the same airspace. The principal cause of each conflict is identified and potential mitigations are discussed, such as: the sharing of trajectory intent information between the ground and the air; more cautious trajectory planning by the self-separating aircraft; and more equitable rules-of-the-road between the self-separating aircraft and ground-managed aircraft. This analysis will inform the ongoing design of an airborne separation assurance automation tool.

Lewis, Timothy A.↗