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The Infrastructure Necessary to Support a Sustainable Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Program in Russia

The NNSA Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program has been engaged for fifteen years in upgrading the security of nuclear materials in Russia. Part of the effort has been to establish the conditions necessary to ensure the long-term sustainability of nuclear security. A sustainable program of nuclear security requires the creation of an indigenous infrastructure, starting with sustained high level government commitment. This includes organizational development, training, maintenance, regulations, inspections, and a strong nuclear security culture. The provision of modern physical protection, control, and accounting equipment to the Russian Federation alone is not sufficient. Comprehensive infrastructure projects support the Russian Federation's ability to maintain the risk reduction achieved through upgrades to the equipment. To illustrate the contributions to security, and challenges of implementation, this paper discusses the history and next steps for an indigenous Tamper Indication Device (TID) program, and a Radiation Portal Monitoring (RPM) program.

Bachner, Katherine M.↗

Developing standard performance testing procedures for material control and accounting components at a site

The condition of a nuclear material control and accountability system (MC&A) and its individual components, as with any system combining technical elements and documentation, may be characterized through an aggregate of values for the various parameters that determine the system's ability to perform. The MC&A system's status may be functioning effectively, marginally or not functioning based on a summary of the values of the individual parameters. This work included a review of the following subsystems, MC&A and Detecting Material Losses, and their respective elements for the material control and accountability system: (a) Elements of the MC&A Subsystem - Information subsystem (Accountancy/Inventory), Measurement subsystem, Nuclear Material Access subsystem, including tamper-indicating device (TID) program, and Automated Information-gathering subsystem; (b) Elements for Detecting Nuclear Material Loses Subsystem - Inventory Differences, Shipper/receiver Differences, Confirmatory Measurements and differences with accounting data, and TID or Seal Violations. In order to detect the absence or loss of nuclear material there must be appropriate interactions among the elements and their respective subsystems from the list above. Additionally this work includes a review of regulatory requirements for the MC&A system component characteristics and criteria that support the evaluation of the performance of the listed components. The listed components had performance testing algorithms and procedures developed that took into consideration the regulatory criteria. The developed MC&A performance-testing procedures were the basis for a Guide for MC&A Performance Testing at the material balance areas (MBAs) of State Scientific Center of the Russian Federation - Institute for Physics and Power Engineering (SSC RF-IPPE).

78↗

Chapter 9. Control of Accountable Sealed Radioactive Sources (ASRSs) and Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs)

This chapter describes the processes that Members of the Workforce (MOW) follow to control Accountable Sealed Radioactive Sources (ASRSs) and Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs). It also describes the Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) program for implementing the ASRS requirements in 10 CFR 835.1202 and the ASRS and RTG requirements in DOE 0 231.1B.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Continuous Efforts to Develop the National System for Material Control and Accounting Training at the George Kuzmycz Training Center

The George Kuzmycz Training Center (GKTC) for Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Materials was established in 1998 at the Kyiv Institute of Nuclear Research of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences through the collaborative efforts of the United States and Ukraine. Later the European Commission (EC) joined the US in assisting with the Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) part of the GKTC training program. The Government of Ukraine designated the GKTC as the National Center responsible for providing training and methodological support for nuclear facilities and nuclear specialists in the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) area. To increase the efficiency of the State MC&A system an essential number of new regulations, norms and rules have been developed; some of them mandate regular and more intensive training of MC&A specialists in the industry - from those working at the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of Ukraine to the personnel of nuclear facilities. To meet such regulations GKTC plans to develop next year a number of training courses under the EC contract; such courses will reflect both the specifics of Ukrainian nuclear facilities and the level of expertise of the facilities’ personnel. The NDA training laboratory, established in 2003 with US DOE financial support and technical and methodological assistance, considerably expanded the GKTC’s training capabilities for MC&A programs. Next year that lab will be supplemented with a new NM Surveillance and Containment laboratory as current plans call for under the EC contract. The US DOE is also providing funding to support that project. Under the EC contract the laboratory will be equipped with state-of-the-art, advanced surveillance and containment equipment which will strengthen and expand even further the GKTC’s training capabilities and potential. This will allow GKTC to train Ukrainian nuclear industry specialists in practically all MC&A topics. Furthermore, GKTC is planning to offer already this year and to continue offering in the future, on a regular basis, the courses that have already been developed, while continuing to develop new ones. This paper briefly describes the work done to upgrade the Ukrainian MC&A system, both at the State and at the facilities’ levels, as well as the results of efforts to develop the National System for training MC&A personnel at the GKTC. It also describes problems encountered and their solution; it includes comments, suggestions and recommendations for future activities to promote and improve the nuclear material management culture in Ukraine.

Gavrilyuk, Victor I.↗

Material Control and Accounting Design Considerations for High-Temperature Gas Reactors

The subject of this report is domestic safeguards and security by design (2SBD) for high-temperature gas reactors, focusing on material control and accountability (MC&A). The motivation for the report is to provide 2SBD support to the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) project, which was launched by Congress in 2005. This introductory section will provide some background on the NGNP project and an overview of the 2SBD concept. The remaining chapters focus specifically on design aspects of the candidate high-temperature gas reactors (HTGRs) relevant to MC&A, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements, and proposed MC&A approaches for the two major HTGR reactor types: pebble bed and prismatic. Of the prismatic type, two candidates are under consideration: (1) GA's GT-MHR (Gas Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor), and (2) the Modular High-Temperature Reactor (M-HTR), a derivative of Areva's Antares reactor. The future of the pebble-bed modular reactor (PBMR) for NGNP is uncertain, as the PBMR consortium partners (Westinghouse, PBMR [Pty] and The Shaw Group) were unable to agree on the path forward for NGNP during 2010. However, during the technology assessment of the conceptual design phase (Phase 1) of the NGNP project, AREVA provided design information and technology assessment of their pebble bed fueled plant design called the HTR-Module concept. AREVA does not intend to pursue this design for NGNP, preferring instead a modular reactor based on the prismatic Antares concept. Since MC&A relevant design information is available for both pebble concepts, the pebble-bed HTGRs considered in this report are: (1) Westinghouse PBMR; and (2) AREVA HTR-Module. The DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) sponsors the Fuel Cycle Research and Development program (FCR&D), which contains an element specifically focused on the domestic (or state) aspects of SBD. This Material Protection, Control and Accountancy Technology (MPACT) program supports the present work summarized in this report, namely the development of guidance to support the consideration of MC&A in the design of both pebble-bed and prismatic-fueled HTGRs. The objective is to identify and incorporate design features into the facility design that will cost effectively aid in making MC&A more effective and efficient, with minimum impact on operations. The theft of nuclear material is addressed through both MC&A and physical protection, while the threat of sabotage is addressed principally through physical protection.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Material Control and Accounting Regulatory and Technical Considerations for Microreactors

New microreactors must comply with the Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) regulations in 10CFR74. The objective of MC&A is to verify that the nuclear material is not stolen or diverted to unauthorized users. Microreactors have unique features which pose new challenges to addressing these regulations. This work considers general approaches and methods for microreactor MC&A based on the reactor life cycles which have been proposed by microreactor vendors. One key aspect of MC&A is measurement of the nuclear material. Measurement of microreactor fuel could be especially important because the cores may be sealed for up to 20 years, preventing direct visual confirmation. Measurements could also be especially challenging due to the thick shielding designed around microreactors. This work evaluates a range of techniques used in medical, industrial, and nuclear fields. The cost, time, and performance of the techniques were estimated. Finally, for a promising technique of using in-core neutron detectors, the feasibility was analyzed in detail.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safeguards Material Control And Accountancy Considerations For Molten Salt Reactors

Molten salt reactors are a class of nuclear reactor designs with features and operational characteristics that vary significantly. Variations in design features include the physical, chemical, and isotopic composition of fresh and irradiated fuel, neutron energy spectrums, breeding ratios, and the design’s plans for chemical processing. Specific designs within these variations affect the material control and accountancy approaches implemented by both domestic and international nuclear safeguards. This paper identifies safeguards-relevant design features for molten salt reactors and describes how each feature might influence both domestic and international nuclear safeguards implementation. Additionally, this paper describes two potential general categories of material control and accountancy approaches that may be appropriate for molten salt reactors: a black box material-balance approach with measurements on the feed and waste streams combined with robust containment and surveillance on the nuclear material within the reactor or an approach that aims to quantify the nuclear material throughout the reactor (i.e., a process monitoring approach). This paper describes the benefits and challenges of these approaches to meet technical safeguards objectives and identifies gaps in current technologies.

Hogue, Karen↗

Chemical Security Principles of Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) using a Chemical Inventory Management System.

Chemical Risk Management is a system or process to control safety and security risks associated with hazardous or toxic chemicals. Chemical Risk Management includes the management of both chemical safety and chemical security. There are five pillars that make up chemical security management10 (Figure 1). Each of the five pillars are key components to the implementation of a chemical security risk management system. In this paper, we will review the "Material Control and Accountability" pillar and how an academic institution can implement this principle using a chemical inventory management system.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Material Protection, Accounting and Control Technologies (MPACT) Implementation Plan: Lab-Scale Demonstration of Advanced Safeguard and Security Systems

The Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) campaign is working towards the goal of developing and demonstrating the next generation of nuclear materials management for the peaceful use of civilian nuclear energy. A major milestone of the campaign is the “Lab-scale demonstration of an advanced safeguards and security system,” due in 2020. This implementation plan describes how tools developed in the MPACT campaign will be used to meet this milestone. These tools consist of instrumentation and devices as well as computer software for modelling, simulation and integration of data and information for safeguard and security analysis. The plan is focused on demonstrating an advanced safeguard and security systems for electrochemical processing plants, but also identifies activities needed to address advanced reactor, aqueous processing and other advanced fuel cycle facilities. A key component to achieving the 2020 milestone is the development of a virtual distributed test bed that incorporates the instruments, data, analysis tools, and models currently under development and provides a framework to link and normalize the data in a way that simulates a facility, including uncertainty quantification. This virtual distributed test bed will integrate computer simulated facilities that make up a fuel cycle of interest, with distributed test beds located in actual operating facilities and laboratories. The MPACT campaign recently issued roadmaps for both Modelling & Simulation and Advanced Integration which address this component, and activities necessary to achieve the 2020 milestone. Research, development and testing of specific technologies have been supported by the MPACT campaign in coordination with other DOE-NE and DOE-NNSA programs. These technologies provide the essential data needed by the safeguard and security systems, and feed into the data analysis and facility models. This plan will identify these technologies, their current status and activities needed to demonstrate the technologies at the laboratory scale. Wherever possible, test of technologies in field conditions using suitable nuclear materials will be used to define performance. Where necessary, surrogate materials and/or simulation will be used to provide useful information for the demonstration. When completed, the 2020 milestone will provide a demonstration of advanced safeguard and security technologies, including advanced modelling, simulation and analysis approaches, applied to electrochemical processing. It will also identify applications of the technology and approaches in other advanced fuel cycle and reactor concepts.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Insider Threat - Material Control and Accountability Mitigation (Presentation)

Why is the insider a concern? There are many documented cases of nuclear material available for sale - there are more insider diversions than outsider attacks and more than 18 documented cases of theft or loss of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Insider attributes are: have access, has authority, possesses knowledge, works with absence of timeline, can test system, and may act alone or support a team. Material control and accountability (MC&A) is an essential part of an integrated safeguards system. Objectives of MC&A are: (1) Ongoing confirmation of the presence of special nuclear material (SNM) in assigned locations; (2) Prompt investigation of anomalies that may indicate a loss of SNM; (3) Timely and localized detection of loss, diversion, or theft of a goal quantity; (4) Rapid assessment and response to detection alarms; and (5) Timely generation of information to aid in the recovery of SNM in the event of an actual loss, diversion, or theft from the purview of the MC&A system. Control and accountability of material, equipment, and data are essential to minimizing insider threats.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Update on NEA-TDB Database Development and Database Formatting Tool

This progress report (Level 4 Milestone Number M4SF-21LL010302062) summarizes research conducted at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) within the Crystalline International Collaborations Activity Number SF-21LL01030206. The activity is focused on our long-term commitment of engaging our partners in international nuclear waste repository research. This includes participation in the Nuclear Energy Agency Thermochemical Database (NEA TDB) Project (Cindy Atkins-Duffin) and development of methodologies for integrating US and international thermodynamic databases for use in SFWST Generic Disposal System Assessment (GDSA) efforts. LLNL is supporting the overall objectives of the Disposal Research (DR) Crystalline International Collaborations Research and Development (R&D) control account. The objective of this control account is to advance our understanding of long-term disposal of spent fuel in crystalline rocks (including both granitic and metamorphic rocks) and to develop necessary experimental and computational capabilities to evaluate various disposal concepts in such media.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Creating a Comprehensive, Efficient, and Sustainable Nuclear Regulatory Structure: A Process Report from the U.S. Department of Energy's Material Protection, Control and Accounting Program

With the congressionally mandated January 1, 2013 deadline for the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program to complete its transition of MPC&A responsibility to the Russian Federation, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) management directed its MPC&A program managers and team leaders to demonstrate that work in ongoing programs would lead to successful and timely achievement of these milestones. In the spirit of planning for successful project completion, the NNSA review of the Russian regulatory development process confirmed the critical importance of an effective regulatory system to a sustainable nuclear protection regime and called for an analysis of the existing Russian regulatory structure and the identification of a plan to ensure a complete MPC&A regulatory foundation. This paper describes the systematic process used by DOE’s MPC&A Regulatory Development Project (RDP) to develop an effective and sustainable MPC&A regulatory structure in the Russian Federation. This nuclear regulatory system will address all non-military Category I and II nuclear materials at State Corporation for Atomic Energy “Rosatom,” the Federal Service for Ecological, Technological, and Nuclear Oversight (Rostechnadzor), the Federal Agency for Marine and River Transport (FAMRT, within the Ministry of Transportation), and the Ministry of Industry and Trade (Minpromtorg). The approach to ensuring a complete and comprehensive nuclear regulatory structure includes five sequential steps. The approach was adopted from DOE’s project management guidelines and was adapted to the regulatory development task by the RDP. The five steps in the Regulatory Development Process are: 1) Define MPC&A Structural Elements; 2) Analyze the existing regulatory documents using the identified Structural Elements; 3) Validate the analysis with Russian colleagues and define the list of documents to be developed; 4) Prioritize and schedule the development of documents; 5) Identify and develop processes to measure effectiveness of regulations. Utilizing this process is resulting in an effective regulatory process that is understood and is being adopted by the four RF organizations. It is anticipated that the current regulatory development process will continue after U.S. support ends. Utilization of the systematic methodology will ensure regulatory development is based on required MPC&A structural elements and will support the continued maintenance and development of an effective regulatory base.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

International Nuclear Security Nuclear Material Accounting and Control Instructions for Use and Supplementary Documentation

This document describes the use of exercise kits (called NMAC Kits) developed to support training and technical engagements sponsored by DOE/NNSA Office of Nuclear Security (INS) in the use of nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) methodologies in support of nuclear security. INS has previously used other similar kits that were originally designed to support NMAC training for international safeguards purposes. These new kits are specifically designed to be used in nuclear security training and emphasis the role NMAC plays in nuclear security as well as security against the insider threat. Planning for the development of these kits is described in LA-UR-24-30063, FY24 NMAC Kits Upgrade and served as the initial framework for the development of the new NMAC Kit material in FY25.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Outline for Feasibility Study on Nuclear Material Accounting and Control Technologies for Pu Fuel Cycle Facilities under Decommissioning at Tokai Site [Slides]

DOE/NNSA and JAEA to conduct a feasibility study on nuclear material accounting and control needs and requirements for non-destructive assay (NDA) measurement of material unaccounted for (MUF) in waste streams at JAEA Tokai fuel cycle facilities during the decommissioning process. Under this study, both sides will exchange information, perform an assessment of needs and requirements, and develop joint recommendations for development of NDA systems at select facilities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Adapting Optimal Velocity Tracking Control to Account for WEC Constraints and Power-Take-Off Efficiencies: Preprint

Wave energy converters (WECs) come in many different forms, from point absorbers, oscillating water columns, to bulge wave devices. This paper focuses on the control of point absorber WECs, which typically have a narrow-banded frequency response and, therefore, control is well placed to improve the energy capture of such WECs. The acausal nature of the control problem means that theoretically optimal control is almost impossible to achieve inpractice; however optimal velocity tracking (OVT) offers a simple and robust approximation to optimal control that can achieve better power capture than passive linear damping methods, albeit with necessarily higher force demands. OVT is a form of impedance matching and the magnitude of the power-take off (PTO) force demand is often not linearly proportional to the WEC velocity, which can lead to PTO force and speed combinations far from the optimalPTO efficiency. The highly non-linear PTO force and speed to efficiency mapping can, without remedial measures, severely diminish the effectiveness of OVT techniques. In this paper, limits to the movement and force of the PTO are demonstrated, allowing OVT to be more easily applied in practice. The effect of PTO efficiency is explored, and a potential solution to the problem of adapting control to account for efficiency is presented. Both aspects of the work presented highlight the requirement for co-design of the WEC, PTO, and controller.

conversion efficiency↗