SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
On Jan 21, 2016, a NAC LWT was unloaded at ORNL. This is a firsthand, moment by moment time record of the movements necessary for unloading (NAC-LWT SARP). This is a legal weight truck cask, conveyed within a shipping container that can be disassembled.
The HFIR Activity WorkbooK generator (HAWK) is a Python code that automates and streamlines the activity calculation of samples after irradiation in the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR). HAWK’s results provide estimates of the activity and nuclide inventory of irradiated specimens before they are moved to hot cell facilities, where they undergo post-irradiation examination. The samples’ activity results guide the packing of shipping containers and inform the accountable inventories for the hot cell facilities. The toolkit was originally developed by Charles Daily, a former R&D staff member at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). As of May 2025, HAWK is developed by the Radiation Transport & HPC Methods Group (Nuclear Energy and Fuel Cycle Division) at ORNL. Figure 1 presents HAWK’s workflow. To use HAWK, users need to: 1. Develop an Excel input workbook (i.e., XLSX extension) containing data from the experiment’s materials, irradiation history (cycles), and irradiation positions. 2. Make minor edits to an existing template JSON file (i.e., auxiliary_data.JSON) and to the Python driver. The driver sets the necessary environment variables, defines the material compositions, and ultimately calls HAWK. Once configured, HAWK runs the Oak Ridge Isotope Generation code (ORIGEN) to calculate the masses, activities, and heat load at the end of irradiation for each isotope in the specimen. ORIGEN is part of SCALE, ORNL’s in-house computational tool for performing nuclear safety and design calculations. Following this step, HAWK postprocesses the results and generates three output workbooks summarizing the activity calculations.
Micro-scaled high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (micro-HTGRs) offer a promising option for reliable power in remote or off-grid locations. While the safety characteristics of modular HTGRs have been widely studied, a micro-HTGR configuration alters several key thermal-fluid phenomena that govern both normal operation and passive decay-heat removal. In many proposed concepts, the reactor vessel is oriented horizontally and integrated into an ISO shipping container to enhance transportability and modular deployment. This report documents a Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT) exercise focused on the thermal hydraulic safety phenomena relevant to all micro-HTGRs. The objective is to systematically identify, describe, and rank the importance, uncertainty, and modeling complexity of the key phenomena that control core and vessel temperatures during normal operation, pressurized conduction cooldown (PCC), and depressurized conduction cooldown (with air ingress) conditions.
The PIP-II project's LB650 cavities could potentially be vulnerable to mechanical deformation because of the geometric shape of the cavity due to reduced beta. The mechanical property of the niobium half-cell was measured following various heat treatments. The 5-cell cavities were tested in a controlled drop test fashion and the real-world road test. The result showed that the 900 $\deg$C heat treatment was compatible with cavity handling and transportation during production. The test provides the bases of the transportation specification and shipping container design guidelines.
The TRACER-Iso project took place from June 1 to September 30, 2022 as part of the intensive observation period (IOP) of the Tracking Aerosol Convection Interactions (TRACER) project at the main project site at the La Porte, Texas, municipal airport. The project sought to use measurements of the stable isotopic composition of water vapor to better understand cloud-aerosol interactions in deep convection in a polluted urban setting. Water vapor isotopologue and humidity measurements were determined using a Picarro L2130 Water Vapor Isotope Analyzer. The instrument was deployed in the guest van and consists of three main components: a water vapor isotope analyzer, and a Los Gatos Research Water Vapor Isotope Standard Source (WVISS), and a Los Gatos Research Dry Air Source. Ambient air samples were collected through an inlet located about one meter above roof of the shipping container. Samples were then delivered to the analyzer through teflon tubing by use of an external pump to minimize the transport time between the inlet and analyzer. The inlet tubing was surrounded by a Briskheat heat trace and insulating material to ensure ambient air samples did not fall below the dew point and result in condensation. The analyzer uses cavity ringdown spectroscopy to report isotopic ratios of ambient air samples at a frequency of 1 Hz. The calibration unit of the instrument was used in conjunction with the dry air source to periodically measure the δ values of standard waters. It uses a nebulizer to push small water droplets into a hot chamber that vaporizes the water without fractionation. This vapor was then transported to the analyzer using a built-in compressor and the dry air source, which allows each standard with known δ values to be measured at a wide range of humidity values for post-measurement calibration of ambient air samples. There are multiple sources of uncertainty introduced at different stages during the data collection and processing. These include (1) instrument precision, (2) uncertainty in the secondary standards, (3) humidity-correction uncertainty, and (4) VSMOW-SLAP calibration uncertainty. Uncertainty from each step is propagated in quadrature to calculate a total uncertainty of each isotopologue. Uncertainty was determined to be 2.3‰ for δD and 0.4‰ for δ18O.
The modern supply chain is a global enterprise and little drove this home more than the global COVID-19 pandemic which sent economic shockwaves throughout the world. Many goods became scarce, as products were delayed, in limited supply, or simply not available. The suddenly diminished supply collided with still high demand and led to greatly increased costs. This was particularly true for the radioactive source supply chain. The pandemic introduced extensive delays for construction projects, slowed the transport of radiological materials to facilities, interrupted treatment deliveries, and impaired the mobility of contractors across the industry. All of these concerns not only adversely affected the economy, but also impacted the safety and security of radiological material, potentially raising national security concerns. The vulnerability of the supply chain, a critical element in an increasingly interconnected world, was exposed. One example that challenged the adaptive capacity of the overall supply chain is the Ever Given container ship, which became stuck in the Suez Canal in 2020. This accident immediately shut down shipments that accounted for 12% of global trade, with long-term impacts estimated to be much larger. Developing the ability to anticipate and react in real-time to sudden changes has quickly become a necessity, particularly in industries that deal with the transport of hazardous material. The reaction to these dramatic incidents was to largely focus attention and resources on protecting the supply chain from external threats. However, the threat to the radioactive material supply chain from insiders intimately involved in the process may be even greater and remains a blind spot that requires increased attention. Recent events revealed the blueprint for targeting and disrupting that supply chain, so the potential for a malicious insider—or a manipulated, unwitting insider—to take advantage of this vulnerability is elevated, creating security concerns for radiological industries. This paper examines and analyzes the potential insider threat to the radioactive source supply chain and recommends steps to take to counter this possibility.
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has supported the production of Pu-238 for future NASA deep space missions since 2017. Over this time, INL has worked to improve the qualification process of Pu-238 production targets as well as improve processes related to the shipping, storage, irradiation, and storage of Pu-238 production targets. Qualification of Pu-238 production targets began with flux measurements and scoping analysis to provide fundamental data to confirm the impacts on the operation of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Fig1. Later, initial production targets were irradiated in ATR’s I-7 position, and then the South Flux Trap (SFT). A modified target design was then implemented which would use the full length of the ATR core and increase Pu-238 production. While working to improve and streamline the qualification of the Pu-238 production targets, INL worked to improve multiple operational aspects of the Pu-238 production process. These changes include updating procedures to streamline operations, supporting modification of shipping containers to contain five rather than one production target, reviewing target receipt procedures and changing work flow to provide flexibility in target receipt, and designing and fabricating support equipment for the storage and internal transfer of production targets
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has supported the production of Pu-238 for future NASA deep space missions since 2017. Over this time, INL has worked to improve the qualification process of Pu-238 production targets as well as improve processes related to the shipping, storage, irradiation, and storage of Pu-238 production targets. Qualification of Pu-238 production targets began with flux measurements and scoping analysis to provide fundamental data to confirm the impacts on the operation of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Fig1. Later, initial production targets were irradiated in ATR’s I-7 position, and then the South Flux Trap (SFT). A modified target design was then implemented which would use the full length of the ATR core and increase Pu-238 production. While working to improve and streamline the qualification of the Pu-238 production targets, INL worked to improve multiple operational aspects of the Pu-238 production process. These changes include updating procedures to streamline operations, supporting modification of shipping containers to contain five rather than one production target, reviewing target receipt procedures and changing work flow to provide flexibility in target receipt, and designing and fabricating support equipment for the storage and internal transfer of production targets.
The calorimeter in the transfer area in Building 7920 at the US Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory is used to measure the amount of 238 Pu in the Plutonium Heat Source Oxide. The calorimetry measurement is taken after the oxide is packaged in an ORISC (Oak Ridge Inner Shipping Capsule)/FSO (Fuel Storage Outer) assembly before loading into the Containment Vessel and shipping container. The equipment is used in three specific configurations: zero measurement (nothing in the sample cup), FSO measurement (actual measurement of 238 Pu), and reference calibration measurement (using the reference FSO as a known heat source). System checks were performed in July 2023 in preparation for scheduled material loadout. During these checks, personnel discovered that the reference FSO had experienced an electrical short in the heater cable and was no longer functional. The calorimeter was in the reference calibration measurement configuration at this time. Facility management was notified when the damage was discovered. The data from the Yokogawa recorder were pulled and analyzed for a span of time between September 2022 and July 2023. An unusual spike was found in the sample cup temperature data that started on October 19, 2022, and ended on October 20, 2022. The sample cup reached a temperature of 191.1°C. The maximum allowable temperature for the calorimeter thermopile to reach is 220°C based on the manufacturer statement provided in Appendix B of this report [1]. The calorimeter thermopile and the sample cup thermocouple are physically close to each other; therefore, the data suggest that the calorimeter itself never saw a temperature in excess of 191.1°C. Physical damage present on the cable, tape, and insulation suggests that the temperature reached a higher value in some locations within the sample cup than the data shows. Because of this discrepancy, testing of the calorimeter was required to confirm that the calorimeter is functioning the same as it was before the electrical short. The intent of this report is to assess the functionality of the calorimeter and determine if it is acceptable to use for 238 Pu loadout material measurement. Testing showed that the calorimeter is functionally equivalent to the initial calibration that was performed in the summer of 2021, and thus, the calorimeter was cleared to be used for its intended purposes.
NetCDF L2 data files from the NOAA SHIP ceilometer contain level 2 (L2) data that have gone through the precalculation service and averaging. The profile is set to 4500 m (14,764 ft).
As part of its periodic re-certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities, the United States Environmental Protection Agency expects a re-evaluation of features, events, and processes, such as post-closure nuclear criticality. Although salt creep beneficially encapsulates the TRU waste in the closed WIPP repository, the spacing between an array of waste packages is disrupted as the salt creep closes disposal rooms and containers lose structural integrity. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality evaluation was updated, however, because of the introduction of criticality control overpack (CCO) containers, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCO containers during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual disposal room closure from salt creep. Geomechanical models of roof fall demonstrate three tiers of CCO containers are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure) were used to predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Models of spheres or cylinders with 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular compacted spacing demonstrate that an array of CCO containers is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the mass of hydrogenous material shipped in CCO containers (usually plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.
Radioactive/nuclear (R/N) materials are integral parts of many business sectors such as medicine, industry, and research. In the United States alone, approximately 3 million packages containing R/N materials are shipped annually via highways, rail, air, and water. These materials are utilized in medical diagnostics and treatments, industrial radiography, and scientific research. The secure and efficient transportation of R/N materials is paramount to public safety and national security. Recent incidents involving the loss of R/N materials during transportation highlight significant security and safety concerns. For instance, in December 2024, a package containing four encapsulated Selenium-75 sources was reported lost in transit from the Czech Republic to Madrid, raising alarms about the security of such shipments. Similarly, a Germanium-68 pin source was reported lost in transit in New Jersey in December 2024, underscoring the risks associated with transporting radioactive materials.
This dataset contains reviewed data from the profiling lidar (Windcube v2.1) deployed on WFIP3's SHIP. The reviewed files herein are based on the lidar's RTD files (i.e., the real-time raw data files at near 1 Hz resolution). The data have been corrected for the motion of the ship.
This dataset contains derived data from the profiling lidar (Windcube v2.1) deployed at WFIP3's SHIP. The derived data files herein are based on the lidar's STA files (i.e., the 10-min average data files). The data have been corrected for the motion of the ship.
This dataset contains raw data from NREL's profiling lidar (Windcube v2.1) at the WFIP3 SHIP site. Two data types are included here: 1) STA files, which have 10-minute average data, and 2) RTD files, which have real time data, at about 1 Hz resolution.
This dataset contains processed NREL thermodynamic profiler (Assist II-12) data from the WFIP3 NOAA ship. The ship's movement is available in a separate channel.
This dataset contains raw NREL Thermodynamic profiler (Assist II-12) data from the WFIP3 NOAA ship. The ship's movement is available in a separate dataset.
This dataset contains reviewed data from the profiling lidar (Windcube v2.1) deployed on WFIP3's NOAA SHIP. The reviewed files herein are based on the lidar's RTD files (i.e., the real-time raw data files at near 1 Hz resolution). The data have been corrected for the motion of the ship.