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OSI Passive Seismic Experiment at the Former Nevada Test Site

On-site inspection (OSI) is one of the four verification provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Under the provisions of the CTBT, once the Treaty has entered into force, any signatory party can request an on-site inspection, which can then be carried out after approval (by majority voting) of the Executive Council. Once an OSI is approved, a team of 40 inspectors will be assembled to carry out an inspection to ''clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of Article I''. One challenging aspect of carrying out an on-site inspection (OSI) in the case of a purported underground nuclear explosion is to detect and locate the underground effects of an explosion, which may include an explosion cavity, a zone of damaged rock, and/or a rubble zone associated with an underground collapsed cavity. The CTBT (Protocol, Section II part D, paragraph 69) prescribes several types of geophysical investigations that can be carried out for this purpose. One of the methods allowed by the CTBT for geophysical investigation is referred to in the Treaty Protocol as ''resonance seismometry''. This method, which was proposed and strongly promoted by Russia during the Treaty negotiations, is not described in the Treaty. Some clarification about the nature of the resonance method can be gained from OSI workshop presentations by Russian experts in the late 1990s. Our understanding is that resonance seismometry is a passive method that relies on seismic reverberations set up in an underground cavity by the passage of waves from regional and teleseismic sources. Only a few examples of the use of this method for detection of underground cavities have been presented, and those were done in cases where the existence and precise location of an underground cavity was known. As is the case with many of the geophysical methods allowed during an OSI under the Treaty, how resonance seismology really works and its effectiveness for OSI purposes has yet to be determined. For this experiment, we took a broad approach to the definition of ''resonance seismometry''; stretching it to include any means that employs passive seismic methods to infer the character of underground materials. In recent years there have been a number of advances in the use of correlation and noise analysis methods in seismology to obtain information about the subsurface. Our objective in this experiment was to use noise analysis and correlation analysis to evaluate these techniques for detecting and characterizing the underground damage zone from a nuclear explosion. The site that was chosen for the experiment was the Mackerel test in Area 4 of the former Nevada Test Site (now named the Nevada National Security Site, or NNSS). Mackerel was an underground nuclear test of less than 20 kT conducted in February of 1964 (DOENV-209-REV 15). The reason we chose this site is because there was a known apical cavity occurring at about 50 m depth above a rubble zone, and that the site had been investigated by the US Geological Survey with active seismic methods in 1965 (Watkins et al., 1967). Note that the time delay between detonation of the explosion (1964) and the time of the present survey (2010) is nearly 46 years - this would not be typical of an expected OSI under the CTBT.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Extreme Scale Computing to Secure the Nation

Since the dawn of modern electronic computing in the mid 1940's, U.S. national security programs have been dominant users of every new generation of high-performance computer. Indeed, the first general-purpose electronic computer, ENIAC (the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer), was used to calculate the expected explosive yield of early thermonuclear weapons designs. Even the U. S. numerical weather prediction program, another early application for high-performance computing, was initially funded jointly by sponsors that included the U.S. Air Force and Navy, agencies interested in accurate weather predictions to support U.S. military operations. For the decades of the cold war, national security requirements continued to drive the development of high performance computing (HPC), including advancement of the computing hardware and development of sophisticated simulation codes to support weapons and military aircraft design, numerical weather prediction as well as data-intensive applications such as cryptography and cybersecurity U.S. national security concerns continue to drive the development of high-performance computers and software in the U.S. and in fact, events following the end of the cold war have driven an increase in the growth rate of computer performance at the high-end of the market. This mainly derives from our nation's observance of a moratorium on underground nuclear testing beginning in 1992, followed by our voluntary adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) beginning in 1995. The CTBT prohibits further underground nuclear tests, which in the past had been a key component of the nation's science-based program for assuring the reliability, performance and safety of U.S. nuclear weapons. In response to this change, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) initiated the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS) program in response to the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act, which requires, 'in the absence of nuclear testing, a progam to: (1) Support a focused, multifaceted program to increase the understanding of the enduring stockpile; (2) Predict, detect, and evaluate potential problems of the aging of the stockpile; (3) Refurbish and re-manufacture weapons and components, as required; and (4) Maintain the science and engineering institutions needed to support the nation's nuclear deterrent, now and in the future'. This program continues to fulfill its national security mission by adding significant new capabilities for producing scientific results through large-scale computational simulation coupled with careful experimentation, including sub-critical nuclear experiments permitted under the CTBT. To develop the computational science and the computational horsepower needed to support its mission, SBSS initiated the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative, later renamed the Advanced Simulation & Computing (ASC) program (sidebar: 'History of ASC Computing Program Computing Capability'). The modern 3D computational simulation capability of the ASC program supports the assessment and certification of the current nuclear stockpile through calibration with past underground test (UGT) data. While an impressive accomplishment, continued evolution of national security mission requirements will demand computing resources at a significantly greater scale than we have today. In particular, continued observance and potential Senate confirmation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) together with the U.S administration's promise for a significant reduction in the size of the stockpile and the inexorable aging and consequent refurbishment of the stockpile all demand increasing refinement of our computational simulation capabilities. Assessment of the present and future stockpile with increased confidence of the safety and reliability without reliance upon calibration with past or future test data is a long-term goal of the ASC program. This will be accomplished through significant increases in the scientific bases that underlie the computational tools. Computer codes must be developed that replace phenomenology with increased levels of scientific understanding together with an accompanying quantification of uncertainty. These advanced codes will place significantly higher demands on the computing infrastructure than do the current 3D ASC codes. This article discusses not only the need for a future computing capability at the exascale for the SBSS program, but also considers high performance computing requirements for broader national security questions. For example, the increasing concern over potential nuclear terrorist threats demands a capability to assess threats and potential disablement technologies as well as a rapid forensic capability for determining a nuclear weapons design from post-detonation evidence (nuclear counterterrorism).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

OSIRIS Validation and Verification Report

The On-Site Inspection RadioIsotopic Spectroscopy (OSIRIS) system is a gamma-ray spectroscopy instrument for on-site inspections conducted under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The OSIRIS software filters spectral analysis data, revealing information to users on only 17 CTBT-relevant fission-product isotopes. In this report, we review the CTBT requirements for on-site inspection radionuclide identifiers, plus additional requirements imposed by the design team. Then a series of validation tests conducted during OSIRIS development are described. The validation tests were designed to gauge if the nascent OSIRIS system met those requirements. We conclude with a set of recommended verification tests to ensure that newly-manufactured OSIRIS systems also will meet the requirements.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Examining the potential for detecting simultaneous noble gas and aerosol samples in the international monitoring system radionuclide network

The purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is to establish a legally binding ban on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) is developing the International Monitoring System (IMS) that includes a global network of 80 stations to monitor for airborne radionuclides upon entry into force of the CTBT. All 80 radionuclide stations will monitor for particulate radionuclides and at least half of the stations will monitor for radioxenon. The airborne radionuclide monitoring is an important verification technology both for the detection of a radionuclide release and in the determination of whether the release event originates from a nuclear explosion as opposed to an industrial use of nuclear materials. Nuclear power plants and many medical isotope production facilities release radioxenon into the atmosphere. Low levels of a few particulate isotopes, such as iodine, may also be released. Detections of multiple isotopes are useful for screening the radionuclide samples for relevance to the Treaty. This paper examines the anticipated joint detections in the IMS of noble gas and particulate isotopes from underground nuclear explosions where breaches in the underground containment vents from low levels to up to 1% of the radionuclide inventory of the resulting fission products to the atmosphere. Detection probabilities are based on 844 simulated release events spaced out at 17 release locations and one year in time. Six different release (venting) scenarios, including two fractionated scenarios, were analyzed. When ranked by detection probability, 11 particulate isotopes and one noble gas isotope ( 133 Xe) appear in the top 20 isotopes for all six release scenarios. Using the 11 particulate isotopes and the one noble gas isotope, the IMS has nearly the same detection probability as when 45 particulate and 4 noble gas isotopes are used. Thus, a limited list of relevant radionuclides may be sufficient for treaty verification purposes. The probability that at least one particulate and at least one radioxenon isotope would be detected in the IMS from the release events ranged from 0.15 to 0.86 depending on the release scenario.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Short-Term Precipitation Forecast Based on the PERSIANN System and LSTM Recurrent Neural Networks

Short-term Quantitative Precipitation Forecasting is important for flood forecasting, early flood warning, and natural hazard management. This study proposes a precipitation forecast model by extrapolating Cloud-Top Brightness Temperature (CTBT) using advanced Deep Neural Networks, and applying the forecasted CTBT into an effective rainfall retrieval algorithm to obtain the Short-term Quantitative Precipitation Forecasting (0–6 hr). To achieve such tasks, we propose a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and the Precipitation Estimation from Remotely Sensed Information using Artificial Neural Networks (PERSIANN), respectively. The precipitation forecasts obtained from our proposed framework, (i.e., LSTM combined with PERSIANN) are compared with a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN), Persistency method, and Farneback optical flow each combined with PERSIANN algorithm and the numerical model results from the first version of Rapid Refresh (RAPv1.0) over three regions in the United States, including the states of Oregon, Oklahoma, and Florida. We report our experiments indicate better statistics, such as correlation coefficient and root-mean-square error, for the CTBT forecasts from the proposed LSTM compared to the RNN, Persistency, and the Farneback method. The precipitation forecasts from the proposed LSTM and PERSIANN framework has demonstrated better statistics compared to the RAPv1.0 numerical forecasts and PERSIANN estimations from RNN, Persistency, and Farneback projections in terms of Probability of Detection, False Alarm Ratio, Critical Success Index, correlation coefficient, and root-mean-square error, especially in predicting the convective rainfalls. The proposed method shows superior capabilities in short-term forecasting over compared methods, and has the potential to be implemented globally as an alternative short-term forecast product.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

A Review of Global Radioxenon Background Research and Issues

Among the most important problems for the world-wide nuclear explosion monitoring is the interference of naturally occurring and man-made radionuclides. The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) frequently detects these interferences using sensitive radionuclide measurement equipment. We commonly refer to the presence of radionuclides that are relevant to the CTBT but do not originate from a nuclear explosion as “background”. Backgrounds are highest near the sources but are known to have regional and global effects on the IMS. This review paper summarizes much of the relevant work in the area of background and discusses issues of interest for nuclear explosion detection.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Analysis of 125 Xe electron–photon coincidence decay

In this study, as part of the verification component of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), environmental gas samples originating from nuclear fission are analyzed for the presence of 131 mXe, 133 mXe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe. In this work, the non-traditional radioxenon isotope 125 Xe was investigated. The isotope was produced as an isotopically pure sample via neutron activation of 124 Xe at the University of Texas at Austin Nuclear Engineering Teaching Lab’s TRIGA MARK II Reactor. The sample was then measured using a HPGe detector as well as an ARSA-style β–γ coincidence detector. Potential sources and sensitivities for production of 125 Xe are also considered for relevance to the CTBT verification mission.

CTBT↗

Development and validation of a software for simulating γ-γ coincidence emission and detection probabilities

Gamma-gamma coincidence spectrometers have the potential to significantly enhance detection sensitivity for ultra-trace radionuclide measurements. The implementation of these spectrometers, however, is limited by the complexity of acquisition hardware, data processing and quantification. This work reports development of a novel radionuclide quantification software for γ-γ coincidence measurements. For any radionuclide, the software parses the Evaluated Nuclear Structure Data File (ENSDF) database, recursively simulating all possible γ-γ coincidence signatures and their respective emission and detection probabilities. Implemented using Python programming language, the software employs several strategies to boost overall computational performance. Since coincidence-based spectrometers are of notable interest in monitoring compliance for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the software’s execution was tested for 84 CTBT-relevant radionuclides. To date, the software has been experimentally validated for 15 radionuclides using the Advanced Radionuclide Gamma spectrOmeter (ARGO) at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, USA (PNNL). Notably, the software can be operated in convergence mode, whereby coincidence detection efficiency’s convergence behavior can help avoid unreliable radionuclide activity estimates. With growing number of coincidence spectrometers worldwide, this paper aims to assist the radiation metrology community in developing similar software for their system.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

On-Site Inspection RadioIsotopic Spectroscopy (Osiris) System-Integration and Field-Testing Report

We have designed a system for the acquisition and analysis of high-resolution gamma-ray spectra during on-site inspections under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The On-Site Inspection RadioIsotopic Spectroscopy—OSIRIS —gamma-ray spectrometer is a mechanically-cooled, battery-powered ORTEC IDM-200V, chosen to avoid the need for liquid nitrogen during on-site inspections. The spectrometer is controlled and the spectral data analyzed by a Panasonic Toughbook notebook computer. Spectral data analysis is similar to that performed by traditional gamma-ray spectrometers, except the OSIRIS gamma-ray spectral data are filtered to display only radioisotopic information relevant to CTBT on-site inspections, for example, the fission-product isotope Zr-95 and its daughter isotope Nb-95. The OSIRIS software assists the user during operation with software checklists for startup and shutdown, and menu-selected display windows during energy calibration and data acquisition. OSIRIS can be operated in either sample-counting mode or the in-situ mode. In this report, the extensive system-integration tests of the OSIRIS system carried out in 2015-2017 are described, including tests at Idaho National Laboratory, at the Nevada National Security Site (formerly, the Nevada Test Site), and at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in Richland, Washington. We also note recent software enhancements and the steps to our successful commercialization of OSIRIS.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Machine Learning and Data Mining for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Monitoring

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is gaining renewed attention in light of growing worldwide interest in mitigating risks of nuclear weapons proliferation and testing. Since the International Monitoring System (IMS) installed the first suite of sensors in the late 1990's, the IMS network has steadily progressed, providing valuable support for event diagnostics. This progress was highlighted at the recent International Scientific Studies (ISS) Conference in Vienna in June 2009, where scientists and domain experts met with policy makers to assess the current status of the CTBT Verification System. A strategic theme within the ISS Conference centered on exploring opportunities for further enhancing the detection and localization accuracy of low magnitude events by drawing upon modern tools and techniques for machine learning and large-scale data analysis. Several promising approaches for data exploitation were presented at the Conference. These are summarized in a companion report. In this paper, we introduce essential concepts in machine learning and assess techniques which could provide both incremental and comprehensive value for event discrimination by increasing the accuracy of the final data product, refining On-Site-Inspection (OSI) conclusions, and potentially reducing the cost of future network operations.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Make the World Safer from Nuclear Weapons

Senior Nuclear Scientist Ted Bowyer knows firsthand the challenges associated with protecting our nation. Ted and his colleagues help detect the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They developed award-winning technologies that give international treaty verification authorities “eyes and ears” around the globe. The instruments, located in 80 countries, help ensure compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, or CTBT. They are completely automated radionuclide monitoring systems that would detect airborne radioactive particles if a nuclear detonation occurred in the air, underground or at sea. Some samples collected through these technologies are sent to PNNL’s Shallow Underground Laboratory—the only certified U.S. radionuclide laboratory for the CTBT’s International Monitoring System Organization.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

OSIRIS User's Manual, v. 1.0

The On-Site Inspection RadioIsotopic Spectroscopy (OSIRIS) system is a gamma-ray spectroscopy instrument for on-site inspections under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). [1] OSIRIS identifies fission-product isotopes with a high-resolution gamma-ray spectrometer. The spectrometer is controlled by a ruggedized notebook computer running data acquisition and data analysis software customized for CTBT on-site inspections. This manual explains OSIRIS preparation and setup for operation; startup procedures, including energy-calibration of the spectrometer; spectral measurements and spectral analyses; and shutdown procedures.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Supporting the President's Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agenda: Transparency and Verification for Nuclear Arms Reductions

The President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda is still evolving and the details of initiatives supporting it remain undefined. This means that DOE, NNSA, NA-20, NA-24 and the national laboratories can help define the agenda, and the policies and the initiatives to support it. This will require effective internal and interagency coordination. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda is broad and includes the path-breaking goal of creating conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Responsibility for various elements of the agenda will be widely scattered across the interagency. Therefore an interagency mapping exercise should be performed to identify the key points of engagement within NNSA and other agencies for creating effective policy coordination mechanisms. These can include informal networks, working groups, coordinating committees, interagency task forces, etc. It will be important for NA-20 and NA-24 to get a seat at the table and a functional role in many of these coordinating bodies. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda comprises both mature and developing policy initiatives. The more mature elements such as CTBT ratification and a follow-on strategic nuclear arms treaty with Russia have defined milestones. However, recent press reports indicate that even the START follow-on strategic arms pact that is planned to be complete by the end of 2009 may take significantly longer and be more expansive in scope. The Russians called for proposals to count non-deployed as well as deployed warheads. Other elements of the agenda such as FMCT, future bilateral nuclear arms reductions following a START follow-on treaty, nuclear posture changes, preparations for an international nuclear security summit, strengthened international safeguards and multilateral verification are in much earlier stages of development. For this reason any survey of arms control capabilities within the USG should be structured to address potential needs across the near-term (1-4) years and longer-term (5-10) years planning horizons. Some final observations include acknowledging the enduring nature of several key objectives on the Obama Administration's arms control and nonproliferation agenda. The CTBT, FMCT, bilateral nuclear arms reductions and strengthening the NPT have been sought by successive U.S. Administrations for nearly thirty years. Efforts towards negotiated arms control, although de-emphasized by the G.W. Bush Administration, have remained a pillar of U.S. national security strategy for decades and are likely to be of enduring if not increasing importance for decades to come. Therefore revitalization and expansion of USG capabilities in this area can be a positive legacy no matter what near-term arms control goals are achieved over the next four years. This is why it is important to reconstruct integrated bureaucratic, legislative, budgetary and diplomatic strategies to sustain the arms control and nonproliferation agenda. In this endeavor some past lessons must be taken to heart to avoid bureaucratic overkill and keep interagency policy-making and implementation structures lean and effective. On the Technical side a serious, sustained multilateral program to develop, down select and performance test nuclear weapons dismantlement verification technologies and procedures should be immediately initiated. In order to make this happen the United States and Russia should join with the UK and other interested states in creating a sustained, full-scale research and development program for verification at their respective nuc1ear weapons and defense establishments. The goals include development of effective technologies and procedures for: (1) Attribute measurement systems to certify nuclear warheads and military fissile materials; (2) Chain-of-custody methods to track items after they are authenticated and enter accountability; (3) Transportation monitoring; (4) Storage monitoring; (5) Fissile materials conversion verification. The remainder of this paper focuses on transparency and verification for nuclear arms and fissile material reductions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Worldwide measurements of radioxenon background near isotope production facilities, a nuclear power plant and at remote sites: the ‘‘EU/JA-II’’ Project

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) specifies that radioxenon measurements should be performed at 40 or more stations worldwide within the International Monitoring System (IMS). Measuring radioxenon is one of the principle techniques to detect underground nuclear explosions. Specifically, presence and ratios of different radioxenon isotopes allows determining whether a detection event under consideration originated from a nuclear explosion or a civilian source. However, radioxenon monitoring on a global scale is a novel technology and the global civil background must be characterized sufficiently. This paper lays out a study, based on several unique measurement campaigns, of the worldwide concentrations and sources of verification relevant xenon isotopes. It complements the experience already gathered with radioxenon measurements within the CTBT IMS programme and focuses on locations in Belgium, Germany, Kuwait, Thailand and South Africa where very little information was available on ambient xenon levels or interesting sites offered opportunities to learn more about emissions from known sources. The findings corroborate the hypothesis that a few major radioxenon sources contribute in great part to the global radioxenon background. Additionally, the existence of independent sources of 131mXe (the daughter of 131I) has been demonstrated, which has some potential to bias the isotopic signature of signals from nuclear explosions.

Saey, P. R.J.↗

Comparison of near-background concentrations of Argon-37 and Xenon-133 in the Atmosphere

Radioisotopes of noble gases xenon and argon can be important indicators of underground nuclear explosions. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) includes monitoring capabilities to identify potential nuclear explosions conducted in violation of the CTBT. This monitoring currently focuses on measurement of the xenon isotopes 133Xe, 135Xe, 131mXe and 133mXe. However, it is predicted that within 100 days of an underground nuclear explosion (UNE) 37Ar would be released to the atmosphere at higher concentrations than xenon isotopes (Haas et al. 2010) and with a higher signal to background ratio, depending on the radioxenon background levels. Therefore, inclusion of 37Ar measurement capabilities at atmospheric International Monitoring System (IMS) stations may represent an improvement in the capability to detect a nuclear explosion. At an IMS station, it could be difficult to determine what constitutes an elevated concentration as a result of an UNE without first understanding the expected range of background concentrations. This work describes our analysis of atmospheric samples for 37Ar to evaluate the range of background concentrations. Samples were collected at multiple locations, with approximately half coming from a sampler co-located with an IMS xenon monitoring station (RN75). The range of 37Ar concentrations measured in atmospheric air samples was relatively narrow; for samples considered detectable, the minimum and maximum measured concentrations were 0.56 and 2.3 mBq/m3, respectively. Comparison of 37Ar and 133Xe concentrations measured at the IMS station indicated some correlation between the measured concentrations. The results presented here demonstrate the capability to detect background concentrations of 37Ar in atmospheric air and provide a basis for potential implementation of 37Ar monitoring at IMS stations.

Fritz, Brad G.↗

Calibration of an ultra-low-background proportional counter for measuring {sup 37}Ar

An ultra-low-background proportional counter design has been developed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) using clean materials, primarily electro-chemically-purified copper. This detector, along with an ultra-low-background counting system (ULBCS), was developed to complement a new shallow underground laboratory (30 meters water-equivalent) at PNNL. The ULBCS design includes passive neutron and gamma shielding, along with an active cosmic-veto system. This system provides a capability for making ultra-sensitive measurements to support applications like age-dating soil hydrocarbons with {sup 14}C/{sup 3}H, age-dating of groundwater with {sup 39}Ar, and soil-gas assay for {sup 37}Ar to support On-Site Inspection (OSI). On-Site Inspection is a key component of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Measurements of radionuclides created by an underground nuclear explosion are valuable signatures of a Treaty violation. For OSI, the 35-day half-life of {sup 37}Ar, produced from neutron interactions with calcium in soil, provides both high specific activity and sufficient time for inspection before decay limits sensitivity. This work describes the calibration techniques and analysis methods developed to enable quantitative measurements of {sup 37}Ar samples over a broad range of proportional counter operating pressures. These efforts, along with parallel work in progress on gas chemistry separation, are expected to provide a significant new capability for {sup 37}Ar soil gas background studies.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗