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Statistical methods for the forensic analysis of striated tool marks

In forensics, fingerprints can be used to uniquely identify suspects in a crime. Similarly, a tool mark left at a crime scene can be used to identify the tool that was used. However, the current practice of identifying matching tool marks involves visual inspection of marks by forensic experts which can be a very subjective process. As a result, declared matches are often successfully challenged in court, so law enforcement agencies are particularly interested in encouraging research in more objective approaches. Our analysis is based on comparisons of profilometry data, essentially depth contours of a tool mark surface taken along a linear path. In current practice, for stronger support of a match or non-match, multiple marks are made in the lab under the same conditions by the suspect tool. We propose the use of a likelihood ratio test to analyze the difference between a sample of comparisons of lab tool marks to a field tool mark, against a sample of comparisons of two lab tool marks. Chumbley et al. (2010) point out that the angle of incidence between the tool and the marked surface can have a substantial impact on the tool mark and on the effectiveness of both manual and algorithmic matching procedures. To better address this problem, we describe how the analysis can be enhanced to model the effect of tool angle and allow for angle estimation for a tool mark left at a crime scene. With sufficient development, such methods may lead to more defensible forensic analyses.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

The Office of Inspector General (OIG)

The NASA Office of Inspector General is the Federal Law Enforcement Agency at NASA which conducts criminal and regulatory investigations in which NASA is a victim. The OIG prevents and detects crime, fiaud, waste and abuse and assists NASA management in promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in its programs and operations. Investigations (OI) and the Office of Audits (OA). The investigations side deals with criminal Investigations, administrative investigations, and civil investigations. The Audits side deals with inspections and assessments as well as the Auditing of NASA Programs and Activities. Our mission at the OIG is to conduct and supervise independent and objective audits and investigations relating to agency programs and operations; to promote economy, effectiveness and efficiency within the agency; to prevent and detect crime, fraud, waste and abuse in agency programs and operations; to review and make recommendations regarding existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to agency programs and operations. We are also responsible for keeping the agency head and the Congress fully and currently informed of problems in agency programs and operations. deal with False Claims, False Statements, Conspiracy, Theft, Computer Crime, Mail Fraud, the Procurement Integrity Act, the Anti-Kickback Act, as well as noncompliance with NASA Management Instructions, the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), and the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Most of the casework that is dealt with in our office is generated through gum shoe work or cases that we generate on our own. These cases can come from Law Enforcement Referrals, GIDEP Reports, EPlMS (NASA Quality System), Defense Contract Audit Agency, Newspaper Articles, and Confidential Information. In many cases, confidentiality is the biggest factor to informants coming forward. We are able to maintain confidentiality because the 01 is independent of NASA Management and doesn t report to the Center Directors, therefore the informant s mangers and supervisors are unaware of the informants actions. The only time when an informant s confidentiality may be compromised is when it is needed in a Court of Law and is released through a Judicial Court Order. During my tenure here at the NASA OIG/OI at Glenn Research Center, I have been involved in many different tasks. They have ranged from updating Suspected Unapproved Parts case files to independently interviewing NASA employees to turn up general background information. The 01 has the duty of informing NASA aeronautical safety managers of potential Nonconforming products. My mission is to compile a database of Nonconformance reports for distribution. The background information that I turn up from my interviews is then used to determine NASA s susceptibility to acceptance of unapproved parts. The IG organization is divided up into two separate disciplines, the Office of 01 investigations primarily focus on violations of Federal laws. Some of these violations

Macisco, Christopher A.↗

True Story of the Moon Rock Heist

In 2002, three NASA Co-op students along with a colleague from the University of Utah stole lunar samples from the Johnson Space Center. Three members of the "gang" removed a 600 pound safe containing lunar, meteorite and Martian samples from Dr. Gibson s laboratory. The thieves offered the samples for sale using the internet. They were arrested by undercover FBI and OIG agents. Three guilty pleas along with a conviction yielded sentences as long as 90 months in federal prison. Two of the thieves went to federal prison and have now been released. One of the thieves told his story to the popular author Ben Mezrich who released the book "Sex on the Moon" in July. Hollywood has "picked-up" the rights to their caper. The stolen lunar samples were not "trash". The loss of 30 years of Dr. Gibson s research records occurred along with contaminating and breaking the chain-of-custody for the lunar samples. The ring-leader has displayed no remorse for his crimes and is currently on the motivational speaker s lecture circuit. Investigators commented "they were the gang, who may have had the highest IQ but the least common sense in history." Previous unreleased information about the crime will be discussed by Dr. Gibson along with information about the forthcoming National Geographic Society s television special on the crime.

Gibson, Everett↗

Taxonomies of Cyber Adversaries and Attacks: A Survey of Incidents and Approaches

In this paper we construct taxonomies of cyber adversaries and methods of attack, drawing from a survey of the literature in the area of cyber crime. We begin by addressing the scope of cyber crime, noting its prevalence and effects on the US economy. We then survey the literature on cyber adversaries, presenting a taxonomy of the different types of adversaries and their corresponding methods, motivations, maliciousness, and skill levels. Subsequently we survey the literature on cyber attacks, giving a taxonomy of the different classes of attacks, subtypes, and threat descriptions. The goal of this paper is to inform future studies of cyber security on the shape and characteristics of the risk space and its associated adversaries.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Museum security and the Thomas Crown Affair.

Over the years, I've daydreamed about stealing a Vermeer, a Picasso, or Rembrandt. It tickles me, as much as watching the reboot of The Thomas Crown Affair. Why is it, do you suppose, so much fun to think about stealing a world renowned piece off the wall of a major metropolitan museum? Is it the romantic thoughts of getting away with it, walking past infrared detectors, and pressure sensors ala Indiana Jones with the sack of sand to remove the idol without triggering the security system? Is it the idea of snatching items with such fantastic prices, where the romance of possessing an item of such value is less intoxicating than selling it to a private collector for it to never be seen again? I suspect others share my daydreams as they watch theater or hear of a brazen daylight heist at museums around the world, or from private collections. Though when reality sets in, the mind of the security professional kicks in. How could one do it, why would one do it, what should you do once it's done? The main issue a thief confronts when acquiring unique goods is how to process or fence them. They become very difficult to sell because they are one-of-a-kind, easy to identify, and could lead to the people involved with the theft. The whole issue of museum security takes up an ironic twist when one considers the secretive British street artist 'Banksy'. Banksy has made a name for himself by brazenly putting up interesting pieces of art in broad daylight (though many critics don't consider his work to be art) on building walls, rooftops, or even museums. I bring him up for a interesting take on what may become a trend in museum security. In March of 2005, Banksy snuck a piece of his called 'Vandalized Oil Painting' into the Brooklyn Museum's Great Historical Painting Wing, plus 3 other pieces into major museums in New York. Within several days, 2 paintings had been torn down, but 2 stayed up much longer. In his home country of the UK, a unauthorized piece he created and placed in the British Museum known as 'Early Man Goes to Market' received different treatment when placed inside the walls. It was adopted into the permanent collection! I like his story because it's so counter-intuitive. Who would have thought that modern museum security might involve preventing people not just from stealing art, but from sneaking 'unauthorized' art into museums? What is next, tampering with the archive records in order to make it look like the piece in question has always been there? To learn more about museum security, I interviewed multiple experts in the field. It turns out that the glamorous lifestyle of Thomas Crown is not particularly relevant. In fact, usually nobody can point to a Mr. Big of the underworld coordinating thefts, though some organized crime families have been known to use stolen art as black market chips to trade. The common consensus among experts in the field of art theft is that, instead of most high-value pieces being stolen by outsiders with a blue print in hand and rappelling from a ceiling skylight, in reality, 80 percent of art thefts involve insiders or accomplices that execute the crime over a period of time while working or volunteering in the museum. Indeed, according to FBI statistics, between 70 and 80 percent of all solved art theft cases involve insider participation of some kind, yet according to Tom Cremers of the Musuem Security Network, 'Having been involved in risk assessments in over hundreds of museums over the past ten years, it is quite astonishing how rarely the risk of insider participation is discussed.' In regards to the insider threat, a museum is not much different from any corporation or other organization. There are directors, employees, interns, and cleaning staff (very often outsourced), security guards (again outsourced, typically with very high turnover rates). Unlike corporations, most museums also have volunteer staff, docents, and authorized visiting scholars. All these people can potentially take advantage of their position, or to be exploited by a clever attacker on the outside or inside using social engineering. After discussing where museum security is headed with several people involved in the field, the consensus seems to be that it is going to be completely digital at the behest of companies designing new security products. By this I mean that nearly every security sensor and alarm is being designed so that it is compatible or adaptable to Cat 5/6 Ethernet cable. Museum security sensors are usually connected to the network infrastructure, which then gets tied back to a server monitoring the security sensors. This approach should make us feel uneasy. This is security that rides on top of technology that time and time again has proven to be highly vulnerable, and very often implemented by closed source vendors who do not release details of their code or hardware because of it being proprietary. Being proprietary is not consistent with having good security.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Uniformly 15N-Labeled Recombinant Ricin A-chain as an Internal Retention Time Standard for Increased Confidence in Forensic Identification of Ricin by Untargeted Nanoflow Liquid Chromatography-Tandem Mass Spectrometry

Ricin, a toxic protein from the castor plant, is of forensic and biosecurity interest because of its high toxicity and common occurrence in crimes and attempted crimes. Qualitative methods to detect ricin are therefore needed. Untargeted liquid chromatography-tandem mass spectrometry (LC-MS/MS) proteomics methods are well-suited because of their high speci-ficity. Specificity in LC-MS/MS comes from both the LC and MS components. However, modern untargeted proteomics methods often use nanoflow LC, which has less reproducible retention times than standard-flow LC, making it challenging to use retention time as a point of identification in a forensic assay. We address this challenge by using retention times rela-tive to a standard, namely uniformly 15N–labeled ricin A-chain produced recombinantly in a bacterial expression system. This material, added as an internal standard prior to trypsin digestion, produces a stable isotope labeled standard for every ricin tryptic peptide in the sample. We show that the MS signals for 15N and natural isotopic abundance ricin peptides are distinct, with mass shifts that correspond to the numbers of nitrogen atoms in each peptide or fragment. We also show that, as expected, labeled and unlabeled peptides coelute, with relative retention time differences of less than 0.2%.

ricin, mass spectrometry, isotope, nitrogen-15, re↗

Joint IAEA/NNSA International Workshop Nuclear Forensics Methodologies for Practitioners 2013 Scenario Based Exercise – Version 4.0 Instructor’s Manual

[Participants will serve as border guards for Reimerland. They will be given brief instruction on the operation of hand-held RadioIsotope DetectorS (RIDS) and be provided an intelligence briefing that tells them to be on the lookout for suspicious activity at their post. Their instruction will include directing suspicious vehicles to a location for secondary screening. If, after secondary screening, suspicions of a criminal act involving nuclear and or radioactive materials remain, participants have been instructed to request assistance from the NLEA, who will then setup and manage a radiological crime scene. Participants will watch a demonstration of two vehicles containing radioactive materials driving through and setting off a portal monitor. The first vehicle, a semi-tractor trailer, sets off only a gamma alarm. After the driver provides a shipping manifest of fertilizer, participants, posing as border guards, are expected to waive this vehicle through inspection. The second vehicle, an SUV, set off both gamma and 2 neutron alarms. The alarming of the neutron monitor should prompt participants to set up a secondary inspection of the vehicle immediately. The driver of the vehicle indicates he is in legal possession of an industrial instrument containing an old 133Ba source that has decayed to a level no longer requiring official paperwork according to the IAEA and internationally accepted transportation regulations. Authorities have verified that the industrial source does fit the description of one that is sold commercially. However, upon setting up a secondary screening, participants will use hand-held detectors to locate several other radioactive sources emanating from a black duffle bag in the rear of the vehicle (Figure 1). Hand held detectors detect the presence of 133Ba, and Pu. Upon questioning, the driver only commits to having the 133Ba industrial source and cannot account for the detection of neutrons within his vehicle. Since neutron alarms also sounded, participants should indicate that a neutron alarm would be inconsistent with a 133Ba source alone and should therefore conclude further investigation is warranted. This will prompt participants to call in a response team from the NLEA to set up a radiological crime scene around the vehicle in question. The response team is able to shoot a 3-D X-ray radiograph of the duffle bag without moving it to ensure it is rendered safe and moveable without disturbing the contents in the field (Figure 2). At this point, the duffle bag is entered into inventory as evidence and a chain of custody form is initiated. Swipes are taken from the outer bag to confirm there is no dispersible contamination. The bag and its contents are considered valuable for the investigation by the lead investigator. He determines the duffle bag is safe to transport to RRL for evidence inventory and analysis. The duffle bag and its contents are packaged and sent off to the RRL.]

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Post-Invasion Damage Assessment: Ukraine’s Crop Storage Infrastructure

The Yale School of Public Health's (YSPH) Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL), working in collaboration with Oak Ridge National Labs (ORNL), concludes with high confidence that approximately 21.5% of Ukraine’s estimated 57 million tonnes of crop storage capacity has been impacted by conflict since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Intentional and indiscriminate targeting of crop storage infrastructure can constitute a war crime and a crime against humanity under international law.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Implementation of an ICS Ransomware Testbed: Scenarios, Variants, and Evaluation Methods

Ransomware attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have emerged as a formidable threat to the United States’ critical infrastructure, eliciting grave concerns regarding national security. In March 2023, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) unveiled its 2022 Internet Crime Report, highlighting a concerning 870 complaints related to ransomware impacting U.S. critical infrastructure. Of the country's 16 critical infrastructure sectors, 14 encountered at least one ransomware attack. Notably, while the Healthcare and Public Health sector suffered the most, reporting 210 attacks, sectors pivotal to ICS networks and governmental organizations were also targeted: the Defense Industrial Base reported 1 attack, Water and Wastewater Systems 3, Chemical 19, Energy 15, Government Facilities 115, and Critical Manufacturing 157. For instance, a ransomware attack on a major chemical company could jeopardize not only its production but also pose environmental risks should systems controlling hazardous materials be compromised. In 2022, three ransomware variants predominantly targeted U.S. critical infrastructure: HIVE, with 87 attacks; ALPHV/BlackCat, with 114; and LOCKBIT, with 149. Several cyber-attacks, such as the MOVEit data breach in May 2023 and the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack in May 2021, have been so impactful that they commanded national attention. The DarkSide hacking group's assault on the Colonial Pipeline, initiated on May 6th, 2021, stands as one of the most substantial and publicly acknowledged cyber-attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. The group exploited an exposed Virtual Private Network (VPN) password, paving the way for initial intrusion and subsequent data theft. A mere day later, DarkSide unleashed a ransomware attack that compromised vital accounting and billing systems, prompting an immediate shutdown of the pipeline to mitigate further ransomware proliferation across its network. This crisis spurred a robust response from the U.S. president and regulators, culminating in a national emergency declaration related to the pipeline shutdown on May 9th, 2021. This incident mirrors the 2017 NotPetya ransomware attack that significantly impacted the shipping giant Maersk, highlighting an urgent need for fortified cybersecurity across various industries. Future incidents, akin to the Colonial Pipeline attack, could potentially be mitigated—or entirely averted—should government agencies and private entities scrutinize system vulnerabilities, exploring various ransomware types and entry points. Proactive measures, such as conducting experiments on VPN accounts or auditing passwords to pinpoint duplicate usage across diverse systems and software, might illuminate feasible entry points and vulnerability zones within an organization's systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Psychosocial Modeling of Insider Threat Risk Based on Behavioral and Word Use Analysis

In many insider crimes, managers and other coworkers observed that the offenders had exhibited signs of stress, disgruntlement, or other issues, but no alarms were raised. Barriers to using such psychosocial indicators include the inability to recognize the signs and the failure to record the behaviors so that they can be assessed. A psychosocial model was developed to assess an employee’s behavior associated with an increased risk of insider abuse. The model is based on case studies and research literature on factors/correlates associated with precursor behavioral manifestations of individuals committing insider crimes. A complementary Personality Factor modeling approach was developed based on analysis to derive relevant personality characteristics from word use. Several implementations of the psychosocial model were evaluated by comparing their agreement with judgments of human resources and management professionals; the personality factor modeling approach was examined using email samples. If implemented in an operational setting, these models should be part of a set of management tools for employee assessment to identify employees who pose a greater insider threat.

behavioral modeling↗

Protecting drinking water utilities from cyberthreats

Cyber-security challenges have the potential for becoming one of the defining issues of our time. Cyber-attacks have become an ever-increasing threat and the United States (US) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) now ranks cyber-crime as one of its most important law enforcement activities. In addition to the general problems associated with cyber-crime, critical infrastructure (CI) related to energy production, manufacturing, water supply and other systems have come under attack. For example, drinking water utilities are increasingly incorporating computer technology into their routine operations and are therefore increasingly vulnerable to cyber- threats. Systems control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems used to manage automated physical processes essential to water treatment and distribution systems have become standard in medium to large drinking water utilities and in many small water systems. However, even with the application of standard information technology cybersecurity best practices these types of systems have proven to be vulnerable to cyber-attacks. In 2015, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responded to 25 cybersecurity incidents in the Water Sector and to 46 incidents in the Energy Sector. Comparatively, between 2014 and 2015, the reported number of Water Sector incidents actually increased by 78.6% (from 14 to 25). The DHS is in a collaborative partnership with the US Environmental Protection Agency to ensure cybersecurity in the Water Sector. As a result of this partnership a number of guidance documents and techniques have been developed to counter cyber-attacks and minimize cyber vulnerability. These approaches are documented along with a summary of common vulnerabilities. However, a new approach which has great promise in protecting drinking water systems against hacking and cyber-attacks, based on the concept of unidirectional gateways, is presented and discussed.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Featured Invention: Laser Scaling Device

In September 2003, NASA signed a nonexclusive license agreement with Armor Forensics, a subsidiary of Armor Holdings, Inc., for the laser scaling device under the Innovative Partnerships Program. Coupled with a measuring program, also developed by NASA, the unit provides crime scene investigators with the ability to shoot photographs at scale without having to physically enter the scene, analyzing details such as bloodspatter patterns and graffiti. This ability keeps the scene's components intact and pristine for the collection of information and evidence. The laser scaling device elegantly solved a pressing problem for NASA's shuttle operations team and also provided industry with a useful tool. For NASA, the laser scaling device is still used to measure divots or damage to the shuttle's external tank and other structures around the launchpad. When the invention also met similar needs within industry, the Innovative Partnerships Program provided information to Armor Forensics for licensing and marketing the laser scaling device. Jeff Kohler, technology transfer agent at Kennedy, added, "We also invited a representative from the FBI's special photography unit to Kennedy to meet with Armor Forensics and the innovator. Eventually the FBI ended up purchasing some units. Armor Forensics is also beginning to receive interest from DoD [Department of Defense] for use in military crime scene investigations overseas."

Dunn, Carol Anne↗

CSI comes to nuclear security

Viewers of television cop shows like “CSI” or its many imitators are familiar with the idea of how forensics can be used to track down a culprit. If you watch and listen closely, you will notice that the detectives often refer to a national collection of crime scene DNA “fingerprints” held on file in a US federal database called CODIS, which helps to narrow down suspects. For example, after DNA has been picked up from a crime scene, it is entered into the system, and software then scans the voluminous database for a match to known previous offenders. The benefits of such a system in helping to narrow down and identify a list of likely suspects are obvious.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Age estimation in forensic sciences: Application of combined aspartic acid racemization and radiocarbon analysis

Age determination of unknown human bodies is important in the setting of a crime investigation or a mass disaster, since the age at death, birth date and year of death, as well as gender, can guide investigators to the correct identity among a large number of possible matches. Traditional morphological methods used by anthropologists to determine age are often imprecise, whereas chemical analysis of tooth dentin, such as aspartic acid racemization has shown reproducible and more precise results. In this paper we analyze teeth from Swedish individuals using both aspartic acid racemization and radiocarbon methodologies. The rationale behind using radiocarbon analysis is that above-ground testing of nuclear weapons during the cold war (1955-1963) caused an extreme increase in global levels of carbon-14 ({sup 14}C) which have been carefully recorded over time. Forty-four teeth from 41 individuals were analyzed using aspartic acid racemization analysis of tooth crown dentin or radiocarbon analysis of enamel and ten of these were split and subjected to both radiocarbon and racemization analysis. Combined analysis showed that the two methods correlated well (R2=0.66, p < 0.05). Radiocarbon analysis showed an excellent precision with an overall absolute error of 0.6 {+-} 04 years. Aspartic acid racemization also showed a good precision with an overall absolute error of 5.4 {+-} 4.2 years. Whereas radiocarbon analysis gives an estimated year of birth, racemization analysis indicates the chronological age of the individual at the time of death. We show how these methods in combination can also assist in the estimation of date of death of an unidentified victim. This strategy can be of significant assistance in forensic casework involving dead victim identification.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Influence of school environments on childhood obesity in California

Highlights: • Of the school environment variables, social more than built factors influenced obesity. • Violent crime, language, socioeconomic disadvantage were among the leading social factors. • Distance to the nearest highway and greenness were among the leading built factors. • Having credentialed teachers and participating in PE are modifiable risk factors. • School social environment can be important for public health tracking of childhood obesity. To conduct a state-wide examination of public schools and the school neighborhood as potential targets for environmental public health tracking to address childhood obesity.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Adaptive lighting for streets and residential areas

Adaptive lighting is an approach to lighting application in which the lighting levels are controlled based on the needs of the users of the lighted environment. Such systems are enabled by the instant-on and dimming capabilities of solid-state lighting and have been shown to have the potential to reduce energy consumption by over 50%, both through the use of maintained lighting levels without over-lighting and dimming. This investigation considered the impact of adaptive lighting within Cambridge NA. The impact of adaptive lighting on crashes and crime was considered using both the timing of the installation of the LED system in a before-and-after comparison, as well as a comparison to a neighboring non-dimming city. Industry practitioners and the public were also surveyed. As a follow-on to the first analysis, a human factors experiment was performed to investigate if the lighting levels could be further refined to improve energy performance. Overall, the energy savings from the dimming system range from 55% initially to 36% at the end of the life of the luminaire system

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Recommended Practice: Creating Cyber Forensics Plans for Control Systems

Cyber forensics has been in the popular mainstream for some time, and has matured into an information-technology capability that is very common among modern information security programs. The goal of cyber forensics is to support the elements of troubleshooting, monitoring, recovery, and the protection of sensitive data. Moreover, in the event of a crime being committed, cyber forensics is also the approach to collecting, analyzing, and archiving data as evidence in a court of law. Although scalable to many information technology domains, especially modern corporate architectures, cyber forensics can be challenging when being applied to non-traditional environments, which are not comprised of current information technologies or are designed with technologies that do not provide adequate data storage or audit capabilities. In addition, further complexity is introduced if the environments are designed using proprietary solutions and protocols, thus limiting the ease of which modern forensic methods can be utilized. The legacy nature and somewhat diverse or disparate component aspects of control systems environments can often prohibit the smooth translation of modern forensics analysis into the control systems domain. Compounded by a wide variety of proprietary technologies and protocols, as well as critical system technologies with no capability to store significant amounts of event information, the task of creating a ubiquitous and unified strategy for technical cyber forensics on a control systems device or computing resource is far from trivial. To date, no direction regarding cyber forensics as it relates to control systems has been produced other than what might be privately available from commercial vendors. Current materials have been designed to support event recreation (event-based), and although important, these requirements do not always satisfy the needs associated with incident response or forensics that are driven by cyber incidents. To address these issues and to accommodate for the diversity in both system and architecture types, a framework based in recommended practices to address forensics in the control systems domain is required. This framework must be fully flexible to allow for deployment into any control systems environment regardless of technologies used. Moreover, the framework and practices must provide for direction on the integration of modern network security technologies with traditionally closed systems, the result being a true defense-in-depth strategy for control systems architectures. This document takes the traditional concepts of cyber forensics and forensics engineering and provides direction regarding augmentation for control systems operational environments. The goal is to provide guidance to the reader with specifics relating to the complexity of cyber forensics for control systems, guidance to allow organizations to create a self-sustaining cyber forensics program, and guidance to support the maintenance and evolution of such programs. As the current control systems cyber security community of interest is without any specific direction on how to proceed with forensics in control systems environments, this information product is intended to be a first step.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Bacterial Population Genetics in a Forensic Context

This report addresses the recent Department of Homeland Security (DHS) call for a Phase I study to (1) assess gaps in the forensically relevant knowledge about the population genetics of eight bacterial agents of concern, (2) formulate a technical roadmap to address those gaps, and (3) identify new bioinformatics tools that would be necessary to analyze and interpret population genetic data in a forensic context. The eight organisms that were studied are B. anthracis, Y. pestis, F. tularensis, Brucella spp., E. coli O157/H7, Burkholderia mallei, Burkholderia pseudomallei, and C. botulinum. Our study focused on the use of bacterial population genetics by forensic investigators to test hypotheses about the possible provenance of an agent that was used in a crime or act of terrorism. Just as human population genetics underpins the calculations of match probabilities for human DNA evidence, bacterial population genetics determines the level of support that microbial DNA evidence provides for or against certain well-defined hypotheses about the origins of an infecting strain. Our key findings are: (1) Bacterial population genetics is critical for answering certain types of questions in a probabilistic manner, akin (but not identical) to 'match probabilities' in DNA forensics. (2) A basic theoretical framework for calculating likelihood ratios or posterior probabilities for forensic hypotheses based on microbial genetic comparisons has been formulated. This 'inference-on-networks' framework has deep but simple connections to the population genetics of mtDNA and Y-STRs in human DNA forensics. (3) The 'phylogeographic' approach to identifying microbial sources is not an adequate basis for understanding bacterial population genetics in a forensic context, and has limited utility, even for generating 'leads' with respect to strain origin. (4) A collection of genotyped isolates obtained opportunistically from international locations augmented by phylogenetic representations of relatedness will not and enzootic outbreaks noted through international outbreak surveillance systems, and 'representative' genetic sequences from each outbreak. (5) Interpretation of genetic comparisons between an attack strain and reference strains requires a model for the network structure of maintenance foci, enzootic outbreaks, and human outbreaks of that disease, coupled with estimates of mutational rate constants. Validation of the model requires a set of sequences from exemplary outbreaks and laboratory data on mutation rates during animal passage. The necessary number of isolates in each validation set is determined by disease transmission network theory, and is based on the 'network diameter' of the outbreak. (6) The 8 bacteria in this study can be classified into 4 categories based on the complexity of the transmission network structure of their natural maintenance foci and their outbreaks, both enzootic and zoonotic. (7) For B. anthracis, Y. pestis, E. coli O157, and Brucella melitensis, and their primary natural animal hosts, most of the fundamental parameters needed for modeling genetic change within natural host or human transmission networks have been determined or can be estimated from existing field and laboratory studies. (8) For Burkholderia mallei, plausible approaches to transmission network models exist, but much of the fundamental parameterization does not. In addition, a validated high-resolution typing system for characterizing genetic change within outbreaks or foci has not yet been demonstrated, although a candidate system exists. (9) For Francisella tularensis, the increased complexity of the transmission network and unresolved questions about maintenance and transmission suggest that it will be more complex and difficult to develop useful models based on currently available data. (10) For Burkholderia pseudomallei and Clostridium botulinum, the transmission and maintenance networks involve complex soil communities and metapopulations about which very little is known. It is not clear that these pathogens can be brought into the inference-on-networks framework without additional conceptual advances. (11) For all 8 bacteria some combination of field studies, computational modeling, and laboratory experiments are needed to provide a useful forensic capability for bacterial genetic inference.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗