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Architectural Framework for Addressing Legacy Waste from the Cold War - 13611

We present an architectural framework for the use of a hybrid simulation model of enterprise-wide operations used to develop system-level insight into the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) environmental cleanup of legacy nuclear waste at the Savannah River Site. We use this framework for quickly exploring policy and architectural options, analyzing plans, addressing management challenges and developing mitigation strategies for DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM). The socio-technical complexity of EM's mission compels the use of a qualitative approach to complement a more a quantitative discrete event modeling effort. We use this model-based analysis to pinpoint pressure and leverage points and develop a shared conceptual understanding of the problem space and platform for communication among stakeholders across the enterprise in a timely manner. This approach affords the opportunity to discuss problems using a unified conceptual perspective and is also general enough that it applies to a broad range of capital investment/production operations problems. (authors)

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Change vs. Transformation, Hard Edges to Soft - The Role of Integrated Land Use Planning in the Adaptive Reuse of Contaminated Sites - 16431

Between the bookends of World War II and the Cold War, numerous cycles of up-sizing, down-sizing, and right sizing resulted in changing needs for federal real property to support government missions. The end of the Cold War has yielded many opportunities for reuse of federal facilities as defense-related property needs have been lessened. These federal facilities have both a historic and an environmental legacy, from radionuclides to unexploded ordnance to landfills and everything in between. Private-sector manufacturing sites have been especially affected by changing market demands. Obsolescence and advancing technologies have made the 'have to have it' product into the 'what was that for?' The result has been thousands of hectares (acres) of contaminated land throughout the country. While site histories go back in time, it is the environmental cleanup contaminants that have the ability to go forward in time and influence the future use of a site. Demonstrating that property conditions are protective of human health and the environment facilitates reuse options for these properties. Site reuse creates land for communities to attract businesses, grow their tax bases, add open space, and implement sustainability efforts, such as renewables, or set the property aside for future possibilities. A broad range of sites have been made available across the country as a result of federal mission changes and changed economic market conditions affecting private industry. This broad range of properties should have similarly broad recipes for reuse. Even with the constraints of zoning, topographic/natural conditions and use restrictions necessitated by past operations, the pathways to creative, adaptive, and sustainable reuse can be taken by integrating the planning with the remediation or, in a more community-sensitive approach, by integrating the remediation with the planning. Situations do exist where a like-kind use is an ideal reuse option, but a redevelopment of sameness need not be a foregone conclusion. Unlike the operational and imposed environments from which these sites came, with their engineered features often developed in a systematic manner with straight lines and hard edges, they can indeed be transformed into functional, relaxed, and engaging places and be productive again. A site's transformation can begin with how the remediation incorporates sustainable techniques that consider the future use of a site, and how the sustainable remediation can dovetail with the community's reuse plans. Rather than building on Greenfields and extending infrastructure and services to more distant locations, many communities are looking within their already developed footprints for growth possibilities. For some communities this is their only source of growth. Stigmatized and challenged as they may be to reuse, the nation's excess, under-utilized, surplus, and abandoned industrial past presents opportunities well worth considering for improvement to local and regional economies. Communities that are engaged in remediation and reuse planning efforts at these sites have the opportunity to shape their futures, transform their identities and incorporate sustainable practices throughout the process. Unlike the simple name change of a facility, transformative change takes time. Transformative change relies on working partnerships, dedication to achieving something better, open communication, and cooperative planning. It is this type of change that tends to be lasting and tailored to a place. (authors)

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Nuclear history, politics, and futures from (A)toms-to(Z)oom: Design and deployment of a remote-learning special-topics course for nuclear engineering education

To address the lack of familiarity with nuclear history common among nuclear engineers and physicists, we outline the design and deployment of a special-topics course entitled “NE290: Nuclear History, Politics, and Futures” throughout which we contextualize the importance of the field at its inception, in current affairs, and in future endeavors. We argue that understanding this history is paramount in internalizing a sense of respect for the scientific, technical, and sociological ramifications of an unlocked atom—as well as its perils. We begin by outlining the gaps in secondary educational offerings for nuclear history and their importance in consideration with nontechnical engineering guidelines. We then outline a number of ABET specifications as pedagogical goals for NE290 from which we derive a list of target student learning objectives. Next, we outline the NE290 syllabus in terms of assignments and an overview of course content in the form of a class timeline. We provide an extensive description of the materials and teaching methodologies for the four units of NE290: Twentieth-Century Physics, Physics in WWII, the Early Cold War, and the Late Cold War and Modern Era. We detail the sequence of lectures across the course and historical timelines leading up to a showcasing of NE290 final projects which mirror in creativity the novelty of course offering. Because NE290 was first offered during Spring 2021 during the COVID-19 pandemic, additional measures in the form of new tools were used to augment the mandate of remote learning. In particular, we leveraged the newfound ubiquity of videoconferencing technology to recruit geographically diverse guest lecturers and used the MIRO tool for virtual whiteboarding. Lastly, we provide an accounting of course outcomes drawn from student feedback which—in tandem with the complete distribution of course material—facilitates the integration of nuclear history into the curriculum for the wider nuclear engineering and physics communities.

Berliner, Aaron J.↗

Reevaluation of Three Cold War-Era Buildings at Technical Area 22

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Los Alamos Field Office (Field Office) reevaluated three magazines (buildings 7, 8, and 10) at Technical Area (TA) 22, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) (Map 1). This reevaluation was conducted because the magazines have been identified as candidates for preservation due to their association with the almost 40 years of Cold War-era detonator research conducted at adjacent building TA-22-1 (Maps 2–4), a property that is eligible for inclusion in the Manhattan Project National Historical Park (MAPR) for its role in the assembly of the wartime Fat Man bomb. Cold War-era magazines, TA-22-7, -8, and -10, were originally determined not eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (Register) in DX Division’s Facility Strategic Plan: Consolidation and Revitalization at Technical Areas 6, 8, 9, 14, 15, 22, 36, 39, 40, 60, and 69 (McGehee et al. 2005) in consultation with the State Historic Preservation Officer on April 18, 2006. Many of the magazines at TA-22 are of identical construction, and at the time of the initial evaluation, other magazines were selected as the best examples of type for the purpose of architectural documentation. The reevaluation is being conducted because the status of TA-22-1 and its immediate area have changed since the MAPR was authorized in December 2014. The three magazines, along with a magazine that was previously determined eligible in 2006 (TA-22- 9), are within one of the proposed boundaries for the MAPR at LANL and are also now considered candidates for preservation. These magazines were constructed in 1949 to support detonator research, development, and testing, and have served as reinforced storage facilities for high explosives since their construction.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Managing the Transition from Ally to Adversary: Reflections on an Earlier Era of U.S.-Russian Relations

At the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union transformed from allies into adversaries and the Cold War began—a grim confrontation that lasted nearly half a century. After the Cold War, the U.S.–Russian relationship was by no means an alliance, but was relatively cooperative until the past few years. Under Russian president Vladimir Putin, a new chill has descended, and today there is talk that we are entering another Cold War. This essay examines an earlier era in U.S.–Russian affairs, when presidents Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman managed America’s relationship with the Soviet Union, which essentially meant dealing with the Soviet premier, Joseph Stalin. The contents of that relationship—how it evolved, how it disintegrated, and how American leaders—reacted is the subject of this essay. Given the unsettled state of U.S.–Russian relations today and the many subplots that shape current policy, this paper makes no attempt to apply historical lessons to the management of contemporary problems; these are left for the reader to infer. Rather, we examine an earlier, though not necessarily simpler, era in which the U.S.– Russian relationship underwent dramatic change.

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Rescue of Unique Liquid IP-2 Portable Tanks at Savannah River Site – 25078

Westinghouse Savannah River Company, the SRS Management and Operations Contractor at the time, procured six large IP-2 portable tanks capable of transporting liquids in 2003 to support the layup of the F Canyon at SRS. F Canyon was one of two full-scale hardened radiochemical separations facilities built at SRS in the 1950s as part of the initial construction of the Site. F Canyon and H Canyon provided actinide separations capabilities for SRS through the end of the Cold War. Following the end of the Cold War era, the decision was eventually made that only one of these radiochemical separations facilities at SRS would still be needed moving forward. As H Canyon was considered better suited for ongoing SRS missions, F Canyon was placed into a layup state in the first decade of the 21st Century, with F Area deactivation completing in 2006. This process resulted in the creation of excess, radioactively contaminated solutions, which required disposition. These solutions included contaminated organic solutions as well as DU-bearing aqueous solutions. The six portable tanks were procured to support the transportation of these solutions.

Fee, Nathaniel C. [Savannah River Nuclear Solution↗

The strategic offense initiative? The Soviets and Star Wars

Historians of the Cold War have paid too little attention to Soviet fears of 'space-strike weapons' - that is, possible offensive uses of President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. In fifteen years or so, soldiers will no longer shoot rifles but will use some kind of lightning, some sort of a machine emitting a holocaustal electrical beam. Tell me, what can we invent in this line so as to surprise our neighbors?... Alas, we are only capable of imitating and purchasing weapons from others, and we do well if we manage to repair them ourselves. --Fyodor Dostoevsky, A Writer's Diary, 1873. [Khlinov, a physicist]: 'I know that he has made an important discovery concerning the transmission of infra-red rays over a distance.... Heat waves at a temperature of a thousand degrees centigrade transmitted parallel to each other constitute a monstrous weapon of destruction and defense in time of war. The whole secret lies in the transmission of a ray that does not disperse. So far nobody has been able to do this. Judging by your story, Garin has constructed a machine that will do it. If so it is an extremely important discovery.' 'I've been thinking for a long time that this invention smells of higher politics,' said Shelga. --Aleksei Tolstoy, The Garin Death Ray, 1927 (translated by George Hanna)

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Sodium silicate treatment for uranium (vi) bearing groundwater systems at f/h area at savannah river site - 15709

The Savannah River Site (SRS) was one of the most significant manufacturing facilities during the Cold War era for producing nuclear materials. At the end of the Cold War, the Site's mission changed to support the environmental restoration of the Site due to over six decades of research, development, and production of nuclear weapons. Currently SRS is a major hazardous waste management facility responsible for nuclear materials storage, and remediation of contaminated soil and groundwater from radionuclides. This research focuses on controlling the mobilization of the contaminants, specifically uranium (VI) located in groundwater plumes at the Site's F/H Area Seepage Basin, where approximately 1.8 billion gallons of hazardous waste were deposited. Objective: To evaluate the potential use of sodium silicate for uranium removal from the aqueous phase, as well as to restore the pH of the treatment zone. Adding sodium silicate increases the pH of the treatment zone and uranium precipitation is achieved, therefore immobilizing the contaminant. Through a series of experiments the optimal concentration of sodium silicate was investigated. Part 1: An experiment was conducted in order to determine the effect of sodium silicate on the pH of a solution containing Savannah River Site soil and synthetic groundwater replicated after the Site's natural groundwater composition. Each sample was spiked with the appropriate volume from the sodium silicate stock solution in order to achieve final desired sodium silicate concentrations of 10, 20, 40,50,60,70, and 80 parts per million. The samples were placed on a platform shaker for three days during which pH readings were collected in regular intervals to determine which silicate concentration produced a pH in the neutral range (6 > pH < 8). Part 2: A sequential experiment was conducted specifically using 40 and 50 ppm of sodium silicate with Savannah River Site soil, synthetic groundwater, and 0.5 ppm of uranium (VI), in order to investigate the removal of uranium in the aqueous phase via precipitation. Samples were extracted and categorized into a filtered and non-filtered control group. Each sample was diluted 1:20 with 1% nitric acid and analyzed using the Kinetic Phosphorescence Analyzer (KPA) in order to measure uranium concentrations in the supernatant. By measuring the concentration of uranium in the supernatant the percent removal is obtained for the comparison between the filtered and non-filtered samples, revealing the amount of uranium precipitation that occurred for each silicate concentration. Results: A sodium silicate concentration of between 40-50 ppm proved ideal for achieving uranium precipitation and creating a circum-neutral pH environment in the aqueous phase. 50 ppm achieved the larger percent of uranium precipitation with a range of 30-50% removal for the filtered samples and between 60-95% removal for the non-filtered samples. A large difference between the removal of filtered and non- filtered samples from the same day was observed for both sodium silicate concentrations tested, indicating that there is a considerable amount of uranium species retained in the filter. The addition of sodium silicate proved effective in the removal of uranium precipitation from the aqueous phase. Future work: Determine potential re-solubilization of uranium concentrations; Examine mineralogy and surface morphology of dried precipitate using XRD and SEM/EDS.

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Risk to ecological resources following remediation can be due mainly to increased resource value of successful restoration: A case study from the Department of Energy's Hanford Site

Several nations are faced with the need to remediate large contaminated sites following World War II, the Cold War, and abandoned industrial sites, and to return them to productive land uses. In the United States, the Department of Energy (DOE) has the largest cleanup challenge, and its Hanford Site in the state of Washington has the most extensive and most expensive cleanup task. Ideally, the risk to ecological resources on remediation sites is evaluated before, during, and after remediation, and the risk from, or damage to, ecological resources from contaminants should be lower following remediation. In this paper, we report the risk to ecological resources before, during, and as a consequence of remediation on contaminated units requiring cleanup, and then examine the causes for changes in risk by evaluating 56 cleanup evaluation units (EUs) at the Hanford Site. In this case, remediation includes a restoration phase. In general, the risk to ecological and eco-cultural resources is currently not discernible or low at most contaminated units, increases during remediation, and decreases thereafter. Remediation often causes physical disruption to ecosystems as it reduces the risk from exposure to contaminants. Most new remediation projects at the Hanford Site include ecological restoration. Ecological restoration results in the potential for the presence of higher quality resources after remediation than currently exists on these contaminated lands and facilities. Although counter-intuitive, our evaluation of the risk to ecological resources following remediation indicated that a significant percentage of units (61%) will be at increased risk in the post-remediation period. This increased risk is due to DOE's successful remediation and restoration that results in a higher percent of native vegetation and higher ecological value on the sites in the post-remediation period than before. These newly-created resources can then be at risk from post-remediation activities. Risks to these new higher quality resources include the potential for spread of invasive species and of noxious grasses used in previous cleanup actions, disruption of ecosystems (including those with state or federally listed species and unique ecosystems), compaction of soil, use of pesticides to control invasive species, and the eventual need for continued monitoring activities. Thus, by greatly improving the existing habitat and health of eco-receptors, and maintaining habitat corridors between high quality habitats, the ecological resources in the post-remediated units are at risk unless care is taken to protect them. Many of the negative effects of both remediation and future monitoring (or other future land uses) can be avoided by planning and management early in the remediation process. We suggest DOE and other agencies convene a panel of managers, remediation scientists, regulators, environmental and ecological scientists, Native Americans, economists, and the public to develop a generic list of performance metrics for the restoration phase of remediation, including evaluation of success, which could be applied across the DOE complex.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Section 106 Recordation, Interpretation, and Documentation for the Demolition of Buildings 9201-5 and 9204-4, Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

In 2019 and 2020, Cultural Resource Analysts, Inc. (CRA), began preparing recordation packages for 18 World War II and Cold War Era buildings slated for demolition at the request of Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS), on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The recordations for these 18 buildings, which are located within what is now known as the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, were prepared and submitted in two separate packages. The first report (EC-NP-004) was prepared as a mitigation measure to address adverse effects that will result from the proposed demolition of 16 support and ancillary buildings. The current report is the second of the two packages and addresses the last two of the 18 buildings slated for demolition (9201-5 and 9204-4), which are two of the large process buildings located at Y-12. All 18 of these buildings have previously been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). The two buildings, Building 9201-5 and Building 9204-4, are located south of Bear Creek Road and west of the main Y-12 entrance gate. Both buildings were constructed as uranium enrichment facilities in support of the Manhattan Project, a top-secret World War II mission to develop the world’s first nuclear weapons. Building 9201-5, completed in October 1944, is the Alpha-5 process facility and Building 9204-4, completed in Fall 1945, is the Beta-4 process facility. Over the years, these facilities were repurposed for a number of different functions.

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The Vision of Human Spaceflight

First, we live in a world where change is the norm, not the exception. The scientific revolution springing from quantum mechanics yielded new understanding of solid state physics leading to stunning advances in computation, communication, and transportation. Two World Wars and one Cold War introduced massive governmental investment in research and development. The unusual pragmatic and classless entrepreneurship of U.S. society promoted commercialization and innovative marketing of new technology. As a result, the 20th Century experienced a constantly accelerating culture of change. Those societies that accepted and embraced the new capabilities dominated commercially and militarily; those that did not fell behind. I remember when there was no color television, when there were no personal computers, when there was no email, when there was no World Wide Web, when there were no cell phones. Now many of us cannot live without these things. Change has become the measure of success. Our children anticipate the future and do not expect it to look like the past. Secondly, our elementary school students are fascinated by dinosaurs, ghosts, and space. Astronauts create excitement. None question that humans will be in space in their future. They see it every week, even every day, in stories on television. To be an astronaut is considered a legitimate ambition. They see space travel to be an adventure just as our grandparents saw exploring Africa or the polar regions to be an adventure into the unknown. Third, we live in a time when our understanding of the space environment makes us realize that the existence of our species is one large impact away from extinction. We understand that our population explosion is changing our home planet in fundamental ways and that wars over terrestrial resources may be less than two generations away. We feel more connected to our space neighborhood than ever before. Many nations of the world are looking outward toward our Moon in an unprecedented way. A lunar space mission will be launched from somewhere every year for the next decade, at least.

Mendell, Wendell↗

Comparing Ecological Risk between D and D Facilities and Operating Facilities at the Hanford Site - 19531

Many countries are faced with a large remediation task resulting from World War II, the Cold War, and subsequent industrial development. In the U.S. the Department of Energy (DOE) faces the largest hazardous waste remediation tasks, with a commitment to protect human health and the environment during and following remediation. DoE's biggest challenge is remediation of the many remaining cleanup areas at the Hanford Site, Washington. Some Hanford sites have extensive ecological resources and ecosystems that require protection or restoration. We briefly 1) describe a rapid evaluation method for ecological resources on units slated for cleanup that allows comparison among the different areas at the Hanford Site, 2) examine some D4 (deactivation, decommissioning, decontamination and demolition) facilities and Operating facilities that require remediation, 3) describe potential ecological harm to resources on these sites, and 4) compare how risks from potential harm vary at the Hanford Site. The ecological evaluation includes three phases: 1) general steps (identify resource categories, identify cleanup areas), 2) ecological descriptions (describe resources on the site to be cleaned up), and 3) ecological ratings (rate the value of the resources on a scale that can be applied across remediation sites). After completion of these steps for the sites requiring cleanup, a comparison of potential risks can be made among types of facilities (e.g. D4 facilities, legacy waste sites, operating facilities). D4 facilities are those slated for deactivation, decommissioning, decontamination and demolition, while operating facilities at Hanford include waste treatment plants, sludge basins, waste trenches, Central Waste Complex, storage facilities, and disposal facilities, among others required to support the D4 and other remediation activities, before they too are remediated. Currently the potential harm to ecological (and eco-cultural) resources on the Hanford Site for remediation at D4 facilities is very low, but increases to very high (for reactors) during remediation when there is physical disruption, increased traffic and personnel, and possible increased contamination. Following remediation, the potential harm to ecological resources is low, and the value may increase due to restoration of native vegetation on sites that were largely industrial prior to remediation. In contrast, the potential harm to ecological resources at Operating Facilities was higher currently than for D4 facilities, but was low to medium following cleanup. The higher harm (risk) at D4 facilities partly derives from the location of the reactors near the Columbia River, a resource extremely important to Tribal Nations and to other peoples in the Northwestern United States, as well as for the iconic and threatened salmon populations. Methods described in this paper provide Congress, DOE managers, regulators, Tribes, and the general public with assurance that ecological and eco-cultural resources and the environment are being protected during and following remediation. The analysis of specific sites provides managers, regulators and the public with information to make cost-effective decisions about remediation that continues to enhance ecological value while protecting human health. (authors)

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Risk to Ecological Resources on Burial Waste Sites on the Hanford Site, Washington - 20248

The US and other nations have a large nuclear and chemical waste remediation task remaining from World War II, the Cold War, and industrial activities. The US Department of Energy (DOE) has the largest task in the U.S., with Hanford (Washington State) being the most contaminated site, with the longest and most costly cleanup program projected to extend to the end of the century. One of the greatest remediation problems at Hanford are the burial waste facilities, some of which are inside the 200 Areas on the Central Plateau, while others are outside the 200 Areas. These areas are associated with waste sites, pipes, and contaminated trenches, posing technical cleanup challenges to meet DoE's remediation goals, including protection of human health and the environment commensurate with Tri- Party Agreement and current regulatory requirements. In this paper we select one of the legacy waste sites (the BC Cribs and Trenches) as a case study to explore how risk to ecological resources varies during and as a consequence of remediation on sites primarily considered legacy waste sites. We used the risk methodology developed by the Consortium for Risk Evaluation with Stakeholder Participation (CRESP) during the Hanford Site-wide Risk Review. The CRESP methodology included evaluating the risk to receptors, including human health, the Columbia River, groundwater, and ecological and cultural resources. The risk evaluation process for ecological receptors included defining the boundaries of each evaluation unit (EU) to be remediated, definition of a suitable buffer area that might be affected, and consideration of the known resource value based on field work. This information, coupled with known remediation options or strategies, allowed us to develop a risk rating for ecological resources. Site risks were evaluated on a scale of 'not discernible' to 'very high' risk. Consideration of the risks at the buried waste sites was complicated by uncertainties in remediation methods and the degree of restoration that would occur as part of the remediation process. We use the BC Cribs and Trenches as a case study to explore why the risks are low currently but increase during remediation. The current 'not discernible to low' risk rating is due to the lack of high quality ecological resources on the BC Cribs and Trenches EU, except for edge areas (with some state-listed species). During remediation the risks increase to 'medium', mainly due to high quality resources on adjacent buffer lands, which could be disrupted during active remediation. Medium and high quality resources on the edge of the site are continuous with higher quality native shrub-steppe habitat on the buffer. Ecological resources on some of the areas surrounding the 200 East and West Areas are some of the highest quality shrub-steppe areas on the Hanford Site, and risk to these resources could be prevented by planning before and during remediation to minimize disruption. For example, lay down areas for the BC Cribs and Trenches can be minimized by careful planning. Heavy truck and other vehicular traffic can be minimized. Spread of the noxious weeds now on some of the site can be prevented, and the spread of invasive species into the site (particularly near undisturbed shrub-steppe habitat) can be reduced. Further, the areas around and between the 200 East and West Areas have been largely undisturbed and can serve as a source of seeds and propagules for any revegetation that occurs as part of the remediation process. (authors)

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August 5, 1963-President Kennedy's Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed in Moscow, Russia

On August 5, 1963, after more than eight years of negotiations, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs marked the end of World War II and the beginning of the nuclear age. As tensions between East and West settled into a Cold War, scientists in the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union conducted tests and developed more powerful nuclear weapons. In 1959, radioactive deposits were found in wheat and milk in the northern United States. As scientists and the public gradually became aware of the dangers of radioactive fallout, they began to raise their voices against nuclear testing. Leaders and diplomats of several countries sought to address the issue. In May 1955, the United Nations Disarmament Commission brought together the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on ending nuclear weapons testing. Conflict soon arose over inspections to verify underground testing. The Soviet Union feared that on-site inspections could lead to spying that might expose the Soviets' vastly exaggerated claims of the number of deliverable nuclear weapons. As negotiators struggled over differences, the Soviet Union and the United States suspended nuclear tests—a moratorium that lasted from November 1958 to September 1961. John F. Kennedy had supported ban on nuclear weapons testing since 1956. He believed a ban would prevent other countries from obtaining nuclear weapons, and took a strong stand on the issue in the 1960 presidential campaign. Once elected, President Kennedy pledged not to resume testing in the air and promised to pursue all diplomatic efforts for a test ban treaty before resuming underground testing. He envisioned the test ban as a first step to nuclear disarmament. President Kennedy met with Soviet Premier Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961, just five weeks after the humiliating defeat of the US-sponsored invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. Khrushchev took a hard line at the summit. He announced his intention to cut off Western access to Berlin and threatened war if the United States or its allies tried to stop him. Many US diplomats felt that Kennedy had not stood up to the Soviet premier at the summit and left Khrushchev with the impression that he was a weak leader. President Kennedy's political and military advisers feared that the Soviet Union had continued secret underground testing and made gains in nuclear technology. They pressured Kennedy to resume testing. And, according to a Gallup poll in July 1961, the public approved of testing by a margin of two-to-one. In August 1961, the Soviet Union announced its intention to resume atmospheric testing, and over the next three months it conducted 31 nuclear tests. It exploded the largest nuclear bomb in history—58 megatons—4,000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. In his commencement address at American University on June 10, 1963, Kennedy announced a new round of high-level arms negotiations with the Russians. He boldly called for an end to the Cold War. "If we cannot end our differences," he said, "at least we can help make the world a safe place for diversity." The Soviet government broadcast a translation of the entire speech, and allowed it to be reprinted in the controlled Soviet press. The Limited Nuclear Test Ban treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, by US Secretary Dean Rusk, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and British Foreign Secretary Lord Home—one day short of the 18th anniversary of the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Over the next two months, President Kennedy convinced a fearful public and a divided Senate to support the treaty. The Senate approved the treaty on September 23, 1963, by an 80-19 margin. Kennedy signed the ratified treaty on October 7, 1963. The treaty: prohibited nuclear weapons tests or other nuclear explosions under water, in the atmosphere, or in outer space allowed underground nuclear tests as long as no radioactive debris falls outside the boundaries of the nation conducting the test pledged signatories to work towards complete disarmament, an end to the armaments race, and an end to the contamination of the environment by radioactive substances. Thirty-three years later, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Signed by 71 nations, including those possessing nuclear weapons, the treaty prohibited all nuclear test explosions including those conducted underground. Though it was signed by President Bill Clinton, the Senate rejected the treaty by a vote of 51 to 48.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Sandia National Laboratories, Tonopah Test Range Assembly Building 9B (Building 09-54): Photographs and Written Historical and Descriptive Data

Assembly Building 9B (Building 09-54) is a contributing element to the Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Tonopah Test Range (TTR) Historic District. The SNL TTR Historic District played a significant role in U.S. Cold War history in the areas of stockpile surveillance and non-nuclear field testing of nuclear weapons designs. The district covers approximately 179,200 acres and illustrates Cold War development testing of nuclear weapons components and systems. This report includes historical information, architectural information, sources of information, project information, maps, blueprints, and photographs.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Sandia National Laboratories, Tonopah Test Range Fire Control Bunker (Building 09-51): Photographs and Written Historical and Descriptive Data

The Fire Control Bunker (Building 09-51) is a contributing element to the Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Tonopah Test Range (TTR) Historic District. The SNL TTR Historic District played a significant role in U.S. Cold War history in the areas of stockpile surveillance and non-nuclear field testing of nuclear weapons design. The district covers approximately 179,200 acres and illustrates Cold War development testing of nuclear weapons components and systems. This report includes historical information, architectural information, sources of information, project information, maps, blueprints, and photographs.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Modernization of US Nuclear Forces: Costs in Perspective

This short research paper addresses two topics that have emerged in the debate about whether, when, and how to modernize U.S. nuclear forces.1 The first topic relates to the size and scale of the planned nuclear force, with some critics of the modernization plan arguing that the United States is simply replicating the Cold War force for a very different era. The second topic relates to the cost of the modernization effort, with some critics arguing that the cost is unaffordable.2 This paper begins with a review of the changes in the size and scale of U.S. nuclear forces since the Cold War. It then examines the expected costs of modernization in a comparative perspective.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗