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Expanded monitoring of the environment, everywhere and at all times, can advance arms control around the world, enhancing transparency among nations. In particular, improved characterization of the atmosphere now offers powerful opportunities for global monitoring, with multiple societal benefits. It may be useful to think of environmental monitoring as a long-term objective of arms-control verification.
Key questions posed for the workshop: 1. Is there an opportunity to renew the bilateral arms control framework in a manner acceptable to both sides and supporting mutually beneficial objectives? If not at present, can one be created? How? 2. What, if anything, does President Putin want out of a re-constructed arms control approach? 3. What new agreements or processes would serve the interests of the United States and its allies and partners? 4. What might be the benefits and risks of a new U.S. proposal for a follow-on to New START? 5. What if traditional arms control collapses? Are there any less formal, other approaches to achieve U.S. objectives? Russian objectives? Center for Global Security Research is hosting eight panels over two days at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The list of readings included provides some overview and background for the topics covered in the workshop. While some references are to books or materials not available online, where possible references include links to accessible versions of articles.
In this context, the first day of the workshop was dedicated to assessing the incentives and disincentives the United States and Russia face in pursuing further arms control agreements as well as the role of arms control in the two countries’ foreign policies and security strategies.On the second day, the workshop participants explored four pathways for a renewal of U.S.-Russian arms control, including:New START extension or a New START follow-on agreement; an agreement which meets Russia at least half way in the strategic space; an agreement addressing challenges to European nuclear stability; and unusual mix-and-match approaches that might be taken. The discussions and their results are summarized here.
There has been considerable discussion within the national security community, including a recent workshop sponsored by the U.S. State Department, about the use of social media for extracting patterns of collective behavior and influencing public perception in areas relevant to arms control and nonproliferation. This paper seeks to explore if, and how, social media can be used to supplement nonproliferation and arms control inspection and monitoring activities on states and sites of greatest proliferation relevance. In this paper, we set the stage for how social media can be applied in this problem space and describe some of the foreseen challenges, including data validation, sources and attributes, verification, and security. Using information analytics and data visualization capabilities available at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), we provide graphical examples of some social media "signatures" of potential relevance for nonproliferation and arms control purposes. We conclude by describing a proposed case study and offering recommendations both for further research and next steps by the policy community.
In this FY19 study, a range of possible measurement systems for confirming a U-235 mass attribute were identified. The systems were reviewed for their applicability in a potential future arms control agreement, and a subset of the eight most plausible systems were selected for further evaluation against the Arms Control Evaluation Criteria (ACEC). The evaluation results were then used to identify a primary and secondary recommended measurement system for confirming a U-235 mass attribute on warheads, nuclear components of warheads, and/or materials as part of a hypothetical arms control agreement.
In this study, eleven possible radiation and other non-destructive measurement systems for confirming U-235 mass attribute were identified. The systems were reviewed for their applicability in a potential future arms control agreement, and a subset of the eight most plausible systems were selected for futher evaluation against the Arms Control Evaluation Criteria (ACEC). The evaluation results were then used to identify a primary and secondary recommended UMAS for confirming a U-235 mass attribute on warheads, nuclear components of warheads, and/or materials as part of a hypothetical arms control agreement.
Building off foundational analyses done previously at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, this paper takes on two daunting tasks - to outline the security policy objectives for future strategic arms control agreements and to provide recommendations on the potential form of such an agreement. This is the proper moment for such an undertaking. Arms control faces a doubtful future as a viable national security tool. Many proposals – either gradual modifications of existing regimes or revolutionary departures into new domains – made over the past decade no longer fit today’s security environment, one shaped by China’s massive force expansion and Russia’s war in Ukraine. With the new complexities of the two-peer environment and the complete rupture in U.S.-Russian relations, people have valid questions about arms control’s forms and functions. New thinking is needed, shaped by guidance from the past, an analysis of the impasse, a spectrum of the possible, and a realistic assessment of the feasible. If progress is to be made, either before the expiration of the New START Treaty in 2026 or during the subsequent interregnum, a concrete proposal must be agreed within the U.S. interagency and put in front of allies and negotiating partners to serve as the basis for future work.
The 2010 ratification of the New START Treaty has been widely regarded as a noteworthy national security achievement for both the Obama administration and the Medvedev-Putin regime, but deeper cuts are envisioned under future arms control regimes. Future verification needs will include monitoring the storage of warhead components and fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondaries, and other materials. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under future arms control regimes will pose new challenges. Since acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes, non-nuclear non-sensitive signatures may provide a significant verification tool without the use of additional information barriers. The use of electromagnetic signatures to monitor nuclear material storage containers is a promising technology with the potential to fulfill these challenging requirements. Research performed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to confirm the presence of specific components on a “yes/no” basis without revealing classified information. Arms control inspectors might use this technique to verify the presence or absence of monitored items, including both nuclear and non-nuclear materials. Although additional research is needed to study signature aspects such as uniqueness and investigate container-specific scenarios, the technique potentially offers a rapid and cost-effective tool to verify reduction and dismantlement of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons.
An electromechanical exoskeletal arm apparatus has been designed for use in controlling a remote robotic manipulator arm. The apparatus, called a force-feedback exoskeleton arm master (F-EAM) is comfortable to wear and easy to don and doff. It provides control signals from the wearer s arm to a robot arm or a computer simulator (e.g., a virtual-reality system); it also provides force and torque feedback from sensors on the robot arm or from the computer simulator to the wearer s arm. The F-EAM enables the wearer to make the robot arm gently touch objects and finely manipulate them without exerting excessive forces. The F-EAM features a lightweight design in which the motors and gear heads that generate force and torque feedback are made smaller than they ordinarily would be: this is achieved by driving the motors to power levels greater than would ordinarily be used in order to obtain higher torques, and by providing active liquid cooling of the motors to prevent overheating at the high drive levels. The F-EAM (see figure) includes an assembly that resembles a backpack and is worn like a backpack, plus an exoskeletal arm mechanism. The FEAM has five degrees of freedom (DOFs) that correspond to those of the human arm: 1. The first DOF is that of the side-to-side rotation of the upper arm about the shoulder (rotation about axis 1). The reflected torque for this DOF is provided by motor 1 via drum 1 and a planar four-bar linkage. 2. The second DOF is that of the up-and-down rotation of the arm about the shoulder. The reflected torque for this DOF is provided by motor 2 via drum 2. 3. The third DOF is that of twisting of the upper arm about its longitudinal axis. This DOF is implemented in a cable remote-center mechanism (CRCM). The reflected torque for this DOF is provided by motor 3, which drives the upper-arm cuff and the mechanism below it. A bladder inflatable by gas or liquid is placed between the cuff and the wearer s upper arm to compensate for misalignment between the exoskeletal mechanism and the shoulder. 4. The fourth DOF is that of flexion and extension of the elbow. The reflected torque for this DOF is provided by motor 4 and drum 4, which are mounted on a bracket that can slide longitudinally by a pin-and-slot engagement with the upper-arm cuff to compensate for slight variations in the position of the kinematic center of the elbow. Attached to drum 4 is an adapter plate to which is attached a CRCM for the lower arm. 5. The lower-arm CRCM implements the fifth DOF, which is the twist of the forearm about its longitudinal axis. Motor 5 provides the reflected torque for this DOF by driving the lower-arm cuff. A rod transmits twist and torsion between the lower-arm cuff and the hand cuff. With this system, the motion of the wearer s joints and the reflected torques applied to these joints can be measured and controlled in a relatively simple manner. This is because the anthropomorphic design of the mechanism imitates the kinematics of the human arm, eliminating the need for kinematic conversion of joint-torque and joint-angle data.
A world without the New START Treaty (NST) or treaty-based strategic arms control cannot simply be categorised as ‘unacceptable’.1 That world is possible. It has been increasing in likelihood for some time and thus it must be both understood and anticipated. Furthermore, the NST will expire on 5 February 2026 and it could disappear much sooner, depending on the actions of either Russia or the United States. No amount of positive thinking on the value of strategic arms control or talking points about the importance of the treaty can change its status as a hostage in the broader bilateral relationship.
New technologies have been, and are continuing to be, developed for Safeguards, Arms Control, and Physical Protection. Application spaces and technical requirements are evolving - Overlaps are developing. Lessons learned from IAEA's extensive experience could benefit other communities. Technologies developed for other applications may benefit Safeguards - Inherent cost benefits and improvements in procurement security processes.
United States and Soviet policies on outer space and arms control
In his 2009 Prague speech and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, President Barack Obama committed the United States to take concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. There is an inherent tension between these two goals that is best addressed through improved integration of nuclear weapons objectives with nuclear arms control objectives. This article reviews historical examples of the interaction between the two sets of objectives, develops a framework for analyzing opportunities for future integration, and suggests specific ideas that could benefit the nuclear weapons enterprise as it undergoes transformation and that could make the future enterprise compatible with a variety of arms control futures.
NPAC R&D focus areas include: Advancing U.S. capabilities to detect and characterize nuclear weapon development activities globally, including material production, the movement of special nuclear materials and nuclear weapons, and the testing or use of nuclear weapons, Supporting the development and testing of policy options and technical capabilities for international nuclear safeguards, arms control / treaty verification, nuclear export controls, and nonproliferation initiatives consistent with U.S. Government goals and objectives to enable monitoring and verification, Utilizing uranium, lithium, and high explosives (HE) materials expertise to support national-level activities in nuclear forensics and nuclear detection technology testing and evaluation, Providing unique training and capacity-building programs, particularly with the Nuclear Detection and Sensor Testing Center (NDSTC), and Engaging internationally to promote nonproliferation and arms control norms and best practices through bilateral and multilateral work.
This short paper is organized around a few discrete questions. How have U.S. perspectives on conventional and nuclear interactions evolved in recent years? How have these changing perspectives shaped U.S. thinking on perceived nuclear escalation risks with Russia, both long standing and newly emerged? And finally, what do these U.S. perceptions of interactions and risks mean for future potential arms control either in the conventional or nuclear arena? The answers to these questions appear to show some promise for future work in this area. Conventional and nuclear interactions are increasing, and thus the two domains cannot be kept as deliberately or artificially separated as in the past. There is a growing mutual recognition regarding the interplay between conventional and nuclear capabilities in the strategic stability equation. There is also an increasingly shared recognition in the United States and Russia that nuclear escalation risks are likely to originate in conventional crises or conflict, placing an imperative on some form of conflict prevention procedures at the lower end of the spectrum. This requirement suggests some potential areas for risk reduction measures outside of those traditionally considered in conventional and nuclear arms control over the past several decades.
The Department of Defense Science Board has stated that the United States is "not prepared to defend againsr cyber-attacks and that the military could lose "trust in the information and ability to control U.S. systems and forces [including nuclear forces]." One potential weak spot in cyber-security is storing encryption keys in computer memory. This paper explores the use of hardware devices (so-called Physical Unclonable Functions, or PUFs) to generate, in the nuclear weapon itself, unique encryption keys each time they are needed. Not only do we find that this has the potential to mitigate a number of cyberthreats, but such hardware has the potential to greatly diminish the total uncertainty associated with radiation-based warhead authentication procedures; a procedure many analysts feel will be key to future arms control regimes. After outline the use of PUFs in nuclear command, control, and communications--and indicating some of the areas that still require further research--we discuss their application to arms control and warhead authentication
To provide a brief overview of key arms control and nonproliferation arrangements for the layperson that may be relevant to the Commission's comprehensive review of policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Primer would be published by the Commission and made publicly available, probably as an appendix to a larger Commission report.
Historically, templates have been considered for use as a treaty accountable item (TAI) authentication tool, alongside item attributes. Because of this, the use of templates has fallen by the wayside due to the perceived intrusiveness of and handling/storage of template data; especially when compared to the negotiability of unclassified attribute threshold values. However, as a chain of custody tool, templates potentially have a large and important role to play in maintaining confidence in the authenticity of the treaty accountable items as they progress through an arms control regime. In general terms, templating is the process of creating a unique, measurable, and repeatable signature which is representative of the TAI. At any point in time, the signature can be re-measured or re-inspected to verify the signature has not changed. Chain of custody is the process by which a controlled boundary is established and maintained around a TAI to both deter and detect unauthorized access to the item. Typically, this is accomplished by putting a tamper indicating device (TID) on the item or container. The TID now acts as a surrogate for the item itself, and is continually checked to ensure the unique identifier and tamper indicating mechanisms have not changed since last inspection. This in and of itself is a form of templating. A stronger template is one that utilizes a signature of the combined item and container. There are many potential signatures which may be exploited, including radiation-, electromagnetic-, and acoustic-based signatures. This paper/presentation will explore the technology and mechanisms in which templating can be applied to create a more robust chain of custody over treaty accountable items as part of a future arms control regime.