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Enhanced HLW glass property-composition models - phase 3

During the present phase (Phase 3) of work to enhance and expand the HLW glass property-composition models, test data for 137 glasses were collected and incorporated into the combined WTP/ORP database. The new data include those collected on glasses from two statistically designed matrices to augment the moderate alumina region (the HLW16-MA matrix covering the region of 9 wt% < Al2O3 < 12 wt% with 16 glasses) and the ultra-high alumina region (the HLW16-UHA matrix covering the region of 26 wt% < Al2O3 < 29 wt% with 29 glasses). The addition of ORP glasses over the different phases of testing has significantly expanded the combined WTP/ORP database. The compiled data include glass compositions, PCT (B, Li and Na) releases, spinel T1%, electrical conductivity, viscosity, TCLP-Cd releases, and nepheline formation upon CCC. With the exception of the CCC spinel formation data – the CCC data will be used to support the further development of nepheline models for Hanford HLW glasses.

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Vitrification of inorganic ion exchange media

The primary objective of these tests outlined in the Test Plan for this work [15] and described herein was to demonstrate the vitrification of ion exchange media for cesium removal, either alone or in combination with a representative Hanford HLW stream. This included one formulation with chabazite as the only waste component and two formulations containing direct-feed fully washed AY-102 HLW solids combined with either CST or chabazite. Feed processing characteristics, glass production rate, melter emissions, and feed carryover were determined for each of the three feed compositions. This was accomplished through VGF and DM100 melter system testing.

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Nepheline constraint for hanford HLW glass

The present work was intended to expand the available HLW glass property-composition data relating to nepheline formation on CCC heat treatment and to develop improved models to predict nepheline formation that would allow processing of high waste loading high-Al HLW glass formulations at the WTP.

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Effect of the form of chromium on HLW vitrification

The primary objective of the work described herein was to determine the effect of two forms of chromium reported to be abundant in the waste (Cr(OH) 3 and chromite) on spinel formation in the glass, feed properties, and feed processing characteristics during the vitrification process. A secondary objective of the work was to evaluate oxidants that influence the redox state of chromium in the glass, which has the potential to reduce spinel crystallization thereby allowing potential increases in waste loadings in HLW glasses with high chromium content. This was accomplished through a combination of crucible-scale and DM100 melter system tests.

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FY24 Status of Engineered Barrier Systems Research

This report describes research and development (R&D) activities conducted during Fiscal Year 2024 (FY24) specifically related to the Engineered Barrier System (EBS) R&D Work Package in the Spent Fuel and High-Level Waste Disposition Campaign supported by the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE). The R&D activities focus on understanding EBS component evolution and interactions within the EBS, as well as interactions between the host media and the EBS. The R&D team represented in this report consists of individuals from Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and Vanderbilt University. EBS R&D work also leverages international collaborations to ensure that the DOE program is active and abreast of the latest advances in nuclear waste disposal.

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Corrosion Testing of Refractory in Contact with Molten Glasses Designed for Waste Vitrification – APPS1 Matrix Glasses (Revision 3)

Preface or Acknowledgements This document serves to convey the refractory loss measurement results from corrosion testing of Monofrax® K-3 refractory by molten glass to support the enhanced waste glass program being led by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Any discussion or conclusions to be drawn from the data are not presented in this report. The refractory corrosion data is intended to be used in the development, validation, and implementation of enhanced property/composition models for waste glass vitrification at Hanford. Funding for this work by the U.S. Department of Energy, Hanford Field Office, Waste Treatment & Immobilization Plant Project through Department of Energy Work Authorization M0SRV00101 managed by Albert A. Kruger is gratefully acknowledged.

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Direct vitrification of HLW: evaluation of candidate source tanks

The initial objective of the present work was to review Hanford HLW compositions to identify HLW streams that are good candidates for the HLW direct feed vitrification option. Another objective was to develop and identify HLW glass compositions and glass forming additive blends for vitrification of two HLW streams identified from the review that could be treated with little or no washing or other pretreatment and would be, therefore, good direct feed candidates. The HLW glass compositions and additive blends were developed to maintain high waste loadings, high processing rates, and acceptable product glass properties. This was accomplished through a combination of crucible-scale and DM100 melter system tests.

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Enhancement of HLW glass property-composition models

Since the WTP compositional space of HLW glasses is extremely large, development of HLW property-composition models is a multi-year task consisting of multiple phases. The primary focus of this work was to enhance the WTP HLW models of interest including PCT releases, spinel crystallization (T1%), viscosity, electrical conductivity, and TCLP-Cd response. Model development to predict nepheline formation upon CCC is the subject of a separate task. In particular, the earlier work has produced property-composition models for glass melt viscosity and glass melt electrical conductivity that showed good performance, while models for PCT releases and spinel crystallization (T1%) required improvement. Therefore, more efforts were directed in the present work to collect data and improve model performance for HLW glass PCT releases and spinel crystallization than for other properties. The present work is a continuation of earlier development phases and is responsive to the applicable Test Plan.

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Testing of operating envelope to support DF LAW operations

The primary objective of the present work was to investigate the potential impact of likely process variations on the nominal glass composition for LAW AP-107 waste that is determined by the LAW glass correlation (AP107WDFL). This was accomplished by evaluating glass and feed variations at crucible scale and DM100 melter tests.

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Improbability of Post-Closure Criticality in Array of Transuranic Waste Containers after Compaction by Salt Creep at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Based on the rationale presented, post-closure nuclear criticality is improbable when room closure compacts containers disposing transuranic (TRU) waste emplaced at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt in southeastern New Mexico. As described in the original WIPP certification, a qualitative estimate of the probability of post-closure criticality in TRU waste produced from atomic energy defense activities has been low either because remote-handled TRU waste canisters are neutronically isolated by the bedded salt or because the low fissile mass in an array of contact-handled TRU waste drums cannot be compacted sufficiently by room closure from salt creep. These situations are still valid for the majority of TRU waste that is disposed at WIPP without any disposal constraints, as updated herein. This report also qualitatively evaluates the probability of criticality after disposal of TRU waste in pipe overpack containers (POC) where every POC in a shipment may have the maximum 200 fissile gram equivalent of 239Pu content. The probability of criticality for a disposal room filled with POCs is estimated during four representative phases of repository evolution: (1) a large salt block falls onto POCs in the first 20 years, (2) salt creep closes a disposal room in the first 1000 years without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation, which permits maximum compaction, (3) some brine seepage occurs into the closed room, which initiates consumption of the fiberboard (cellulose) impact absorber in the POC in the second 1000 years, and (4) full brine inundation of a room and consumption of all fiberboard thereafter. Salt-block fall in the first phase does not greatly disrupt three tiers of POCs. The compacted spacing of POCs in the later three repository conditions is calculated through high-fidelity, geomechanical modeling. Criticality evaluation of compacted 200-g 239 Pu spheres at the compacted spacing shows that neither 12-inch nor 6-inch POCs are critical after the first 1000 years, the second 1000 years, or thereafter as the sea of reflector material changes to represent the three repository conditions. Specifically, fiberboard and iron isolates 239 Pu while dry, and brine reduces the reactivity when a room is partially and fully inundated. Because POC behavior bounds behavior of other standard TRU waste containers, post-closure criticality caused by room closure compacting containers is omitted in the performance assessments for the 2019 and 2026 WIPP compliance re-certification applications to the US Environmental Protection Agency.

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Improbability of Post-Closure Criticality in Compacted Criticality Control Overpacks after Room Closure at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

As part of its periodic re-certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities, the United States Environmental Protection Agency expects a re-evaluation of features, events, and processes, such as post-closure nuclear criticality. Although salt creep beneficially encapsulates the TRU waste in the closed WIPP repository, the spacing between an array of waste packages is disrupted as the salt creep closes disposal rooms and containers lose structural integrity. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality evaluation was updated, however, because of the introduction of criticality control overpack (CCO) containers, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCO containers during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual disposal room closure from salt creep. Geomechanical models of roof fall demonstrate three tiers of CCO containers are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure) were used to predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Models of spheres or cylinders with 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular compacted spacing demonstrate that an array of CCO containers is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the mass of hydrogenous material shipped in CCO containers (usually plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.

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Electrochemical hydrogen isotope fractionation - fundamental insights leading to process scale up

Introduction Deuterium and tritium, the two isotopes of hydrogen besides protium, are utilized in many industries. Deuterium is routinely used as a nuclear reactor moderator and molecular labeling agent, while tritium is used as an autoradiography label in medical imaging, and in an emerging market for self-powered lighting for watches, exit signs, firearm night-sights and future fusion fuel. Tritium is produced naturally at very low steady-state levels due to cosmic rays, natural nuclear decay reactions, as well as commercial nuclear fission reactors, and terrestrial nuclear testing conducted primarily in the mid-twentieth century. Tritium often accumulates in the heavy water used in nuclear fission reactors and sometimes appears in groundwater near nuclear reactors due to slight leakage from water sources in the reactor. Because of the health and environmental impacts from tritium leaking into the water sources, as well as the value of this precious material, it is desirable to remove and recover as much tritium as reasonably possible from contaminated water.

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Evaluation of the Radiological Characterization for Off-Site Source Recovery Program Waste Streams LA-OS-00-01.001, LA-OS-00-03, and LA-OS-00-04

The purpose of this memorandum is to satisfy the requirements of Section 4.4 of the CCP Acceptable Knowledge Documentation procedure CCP-TP-005 (Ref. 1). This evaluation is updating the previously issued memo NEN3:24-045 issued in August 2024. CCP-TP-005 requires an AK Expert and the OSRP group to evaluate the radionuclide characterization of a waste stream and prepare the NDA Memorandum (letter to CCP Records). This NDA memorandum was written with input from the OSRP group, as required by CCP-TP-005. This memo includes a discussion of the limitations for the radiological characterization and a description of the characterization method.

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Compliance of NNSS Activities with P322-4 Issues Management and NNSSWAC Requirements

The Institutional Quality and Performance Assurance Division's Quality Support Services Group conducted a surveillance of the compliance of Waste Management Program activities to Issues Management/Corrective Action requirements communicated in P322-4 and the Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance criteria (NNSSWAC). All corrective actions reviewed and records examined were found to be compliant with appropriate and relevant procedures. There were no Findings or Opportunities for Improvement noted.

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Results for the October 2025 Semiannual Salt Waste Processing Facility Decontaminated Salt Solution Sample

In this Technical Report, the chemical and radionuclide contaminant results from the October 2025 Semiannual sample of the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) Decontaminated Salt Solution (DSS) salt solution are presented in tabulated form. The information from this characterization will be used by Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC) for the transfer of aqueous waste from SWPF to the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) where the waste will be treated and disposed in the Saltstone Disposal Facility. This Technical Report compares results, where applicable, to SPF Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) LIMITS and TAR GETS that were established at the time the SWPF DSS sample was obtained. 1 The October 2025 Semiannual sample of the SWPF DSS is a composite from one month of SWPF processing during the Third Quarter Fiscal Year 2025 (3QFY2025) and two months of SWPF processing during the Fourth Quarter Fiscal Year 2025 (4QFY2025).

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Annual Summary Report (FY 2025) Performance Assessment for the Disposal of Low-Level Waste in the 200 West Area Burial Grounds

This annual review provides the projected dose estimates of radionuclide inventories disposed in the 200 West Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds (LLBGs) since September 26, 1988. All the trenches in these burial grounds except two have remained inactive since July 2004. The only active trenches that continue to receive low-level and mixed low-level waste are Trenches 31 and 34 that are located in the southern portion of the 218-W-5 Burial Ground. During this reporting period (fiscal year 2025, from October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025), waste was disposed in Trench 31 only.

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Annual Summary Report (FY 2025) Performance Assessment for the Integrated Disposal Facility

The purpose of this Annual Summary Report (ASR) for fiscal year (FY) 2025 is to evaluate the continued adequacy of the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) Performance Assessment (PA) and Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS). This report consolidates relevant monitoring data, modeling analyses, and regulatory reviews to demonstrate a reasonable expectation that the PA objectives and performance measures will be met, as required under DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. The ASR follows the guidance in DOE-STD-5002-2017, Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation, which provides a framework for maintaining the validity of the DAS through periodic assessment of facility performance and compliance with waste disposal requirements.

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Annual Summary Report (FY 2025) Performance Assessment for the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility

Beginning in 1996, the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) started accepting low-level radioactive, hazardous, and mixed wastes that were generated during cleanup activities at the Hanford Site. ERDF is composed of a series of cells or disposal areas and can accommodate future design expansions as needed. Currently, there are eight cells and two supercells in ERDF. Each supercell is the equivalent of two cells. During this reporting period, fiscal year (FY) 2025, extending from October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025, approximately 50,653 metric tons (55,835 U.S. tons) of waste was disposed at ERDF. From ERDF inception through September 30, 2025, approximately 17.3 million metric tons (19.1 million U.S. tons) of waste has been disposed at ERDF, which equates to consumption of approximately 91.0% of the currently constructed disposal volume. According to the design of ERDF, the facility has the ability to be expanded as needed. In 2023, the Department of Energy approved the construction of supercell 11 to provide additional disposal capacity to meet the cleanup mission at the Hanford Site. The construction of supercell 11 began in FY 2025, and it is expected to take up to two years. Construction of the new cell will not affect ongoing waste disposal activities at ERDF.

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