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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2026

LBNF/DUNE Liquid Argon Roadmap

The Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE) is an international flagship venture to unlock the mysteries of neutrinos. Hosted at the Sanford Underground Research Facility (SURF) and supported by the Long-Baseline Neutrino Facility (LBNF), DUNE relies on nearly 75,000 tonnes of ultrapure liquid argon (LAr) housed in state-of-the-art cryostats. Transporting such vast quantities of LAr to its destination a mile underground in Lead, SD, is a logistical and engineering challenge. The process begins with securing large quantities of liquid argon from suppliers located far from the site, with major sources situated near Houston, TX and Chicago, IL. The receiving facility, located atop a mountain with steep, often snow-covered access roads, provides limited maneuverability for trucks and can only handle two deliveries simultaneously. The facility serves as an entry point for argon to the greater LBNF cryogenic system. It is furnished with truck unloading stations, limited buffer storage of some 280 tonnes capacity, and vaporizers. The last are crucial for converting liquid argon into gas for transfer down the Ross Shaft, eliminating the need for cryogens in the vertical pipeline. These constraints, along with other operational factors, cap the delivery rate at 70 tonnes per day. Once underground, the argon is purified and recondensed before filling the cryostats. This roadmap outlines the integrated supply chain and cryogenic systems that enable the delivery of LAr to support DUNE’s groundbreaking physics research.

Maciazka, Matt [Fermilab]↗
DOE OSTI2025

Complex surface topographic changes from explosive experiments at the Dry Alluvium Geology site, southern Nevada, United States

Understanding the surface topographic change that results from underground explosions is important for global security. Current techniques to relate the surface change to underground explosion characteristics usually involve assuming the earth has homogenous properties, leading to highly variable interpretations. Here we use an unoccupied aerial platform and a digital single lens reflex camera along with 200+ ground control points surveyed with a real-time kinematic global navigation satellite system to measure the surface topographic change resulting from two underground explosions at the Dry Alluvium Geology site in Yucca Flat, Nevada National Security Site, southern Nevada, United States. We find areas of 5–7 cm of subsidence that are not directly above the explosion source but rather 200–300 m away. For experiment DAG2, this zone is located south and west of the explosion, while for DAG4, there is a zone of subsidence located northeast of the explosion. In addition, late-time measurements show as much as 5 cm of horizontal change without measurable associated vertical change in the weeks following DAG4 but not DAG2. These indicate that the deformation resulting from underground chemical explosions can be very complex and bear little to no resemblance to predictions using half-space models. It is likely the tectonic environment plays a significant role in controlling the surface change, but the details are not fully understood.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Contaminant Transport Parameters for the Groundwater Flow and Contaminant Transport Model of Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nye County, Nevada, Revision 1

This document presents a summary and framework of available transport data and other information directly relevant to the development of the groundwater transport model for Central and Western Pahute Mesa (PM) corrective action units (CAU). This model is referred to as the “PM CAU transport model” in this document. Central and Western PM are two areas of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) that historically were used for underground nuclear testing. These nuclear tests resulted in groundwater contamination in the vicinity of the underground test areas. As a result, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program is currently conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) of the PM underground test areas. This work is a part of the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Hydrologic Data for the Groundwater Flow and Contaminant Transport Model of Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nye County, Nevada, Revision 1

This hydrologic data document (HDD) has been prepared for Corrective Action Units (CAUs) 101 and 102, Central and Western Pahute Mesa, in order to support the development of a groundwater flow and contaminant transport model. Central and Western Pahute Mesa are two of the five CAUs on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site [NTS]) used for underground nuclear testing (Figure 1-1). The nuclear tests resulted in groundwater contamination in the vicinity of the underground test areas. As a result, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program is currently conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) of the Pahute Mesa underground test areas. This work is a part of the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). The CAU groundwater flow and transport model is composed of two pieces, a flow model and a transport model, that together provide the contaminant boundary forecasts required by the FFACO. The hydrologic data necessary for the flow model portion of the CAU model are presented in this report. The transport data necessary for the transport model portion of the CAU model will be provided in a separate report.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

The LBNF/DUNE Complex for Neutrino Science

The Long Baseline Neutrino Facility (LBNF) provides the underground detector caverns, the beamline to deliver a 1.2MW proton beam, and a target station to produce neutrinos for the international Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE). A mile underground, caverns are being excavated and outfitted at the Sanford Underground Research Facility in South Dakota. The beamline facility and an additional near detector facility will be constructed on the Fermilab site in Illinois. DUNE will make precision neutrino oscillation physics measurements and will be sensitive to neutrinos from supernova bursts, nucleon decay, and beyond-standard-model physics.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗
DOE OSTI2024

LBNF/DUNE Nitrogen Refrigeration System Update

The Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE) is supported by the infrastructure of the Long Baseline Neutrino Facility (LBNF). The central feature of DUNE is the liquid argon filled cryostats, which house the neutrino detector components. In order to maintain the argon in a liquid state, heat must be continuously removed. Argon condensers will remove this heat, and liquefy the argon, through the evaporation of liquid nitrogen. The supply of liquid nitrogen relies heavily on a near-industrial scale nitrogen refrigeration/liquefaction system. The nitrogen system will be a closed loop, in which the liquid nitrogen is supplied to users and, after being vaporized, is recycled to the nitrogen liquefaction units to be liquefied again. The system will also include nitrogen generation, to increase inventory in the closed loop, as well as to make up for losses. All of this will be installed nearly one mile underground (1.5km) on the 4850 level of the Sanford Underground Research Facility (SURF). The final DUNE vision requires 400kW of liquid nitrogen cooling capacity. Based on the operation modes and phased installation of the experiment, modularity of this cooling capacity is required. Nitrogen liquefaction will occur in four units which will afford a wide operational range of production (nominally 100kW each). Due to the experiment’s location deep underground in an inactive gold mine, there are unique and challenging constraints. These include limited access, footprint, and utilities. This poster describes the engineering effort, and provides an overview of the refrigeration system. The design includes a unique compressor arrangement which is covered in detail. Pictures and models are included where possible to help visualize the system.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Calibrating the DUNE LArTPC detectors for precision physics

The Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE) is an international collaboration focused on studying neutrino oscillation over a long baseline (1300 km). DUNE will make use of a near detector and $\mathcal{O}$(GeV) neutrino beam originating at Fermilab in Batavia, IL, and a far detector operating 1.5 km underground at the Sanford Underground Research Facility in Lead, South Dakota. The near and far detectors will use the LArTPC (Liquid Argon Time Projection Chamber) technology to image neutrino interactions. In order to make precise physics measurements at DUNE, such as the amount of CP violation in the neutrino sector, it is essential to be able to accurately reconstruct particle energies and other kinematic quantities; this in turn necessitates an extensive calibration program for DUNE s LArTPC detectors. In this presentation, we describe the requirements for calibrating the DUNE detectors, emphasizing the challenges of massive multi-kiloton LArTPC detectors which are to operate for multiple years deep underground. A preliminary DUNE detector calibration program, including use of both dedicated calibration hardware and cosmogenic/beam-induced calibration sources, is presented. First results on detector calibration at the ProtoDUNE-SP prototype detector located at CERN, and associated impact on calibrations at the DUNE far detector, are also emphasized.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

Design of the DUNE APATF cryogenic system

Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (FNAL) is developing the international Long- Baseline Neutrino Facility (LBNF) and Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE) to advance neutrino science. The flagship of the DUNE project consists of a large particle detector constructed one-mile (1.6 km) beneath the surface at the Sanford Underground Research Facility (SURF) in Lead, SD. The SURF detector is the largest of its type ever built and is comprised of four cryostats totaling 70,000 tons of liquid argon (LAr) to record neutrino interactions with unprecedented precision. Each cryostat houses a detector, the first includes 150 Anode Panel Assemblies (APA) submersed within 17,500 tons of LAr. Before installing 150 APA within the SURF detector they will be cryogenically cooled to nominally 90 K at the APA Test Facility (APATF) utilizing nitrogen flows. The APATF cryogenic system is entirely located one-mile underground at the SURF facility and includes nominally 13 kW of refrigeration at 80 K, cryogenic transfer lines, APA test cryostats, a cryogenic control system, and various control and pressure safety elements to ensure performance and safety requirements are achieved. The APATF preliminary design is in progress and major considerations include an efficient, costeffective mechanism to deliver the required refrigeration to the APATF underground, support of rigid testing intervals to support the DUNE operating schedule, temperature stability of the APA and electronics within cryostats, efficient cryogenic system operation to minimize heat leak and/or liquid nitrogen consumption, thermo-mechanical stability and flexibility of components, and pressure safety of the APATF cryogenic system. Installation and integration of the APATF cryogenic system within the footprint and to adjacent sub-systems is also discussed.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Remote monitoring system

A remote monitoring system for monitoring parameters of an underground asset, such as an electric cable system, a pipeline serving as a conduit for water, gas, oil, sewage, or the like. Parameter detectors, such as sensors that measure temperature, voltage, current, moisture, etc., are distributed along the asset to provide electrical signals that represent respective monitored parameters of the asset. An underground hub disposed in an underground vault, or manhole, through which the asset passes is coupled to the parameter detectors to acquire the signals provided by the parameter detectors. The hub includes a controller to provide data derived from the acquired signals, the data being transmitted to a remote central location by a transceiver, or modem, via LP-WAN communication. Signals from the transceiver are transmitted directly from underground.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2019

Lessons Learned from the Development of the DGR Konrad - 19619

The Federal Republic Germany builds the deep geological repository Konrad. The repository is suitable for low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (LAW and MAW) and it is the first German repository site, which is not located in a salt geological formation. Konrad is a former iron ore mine in Salzgitter (in southeast Lower Saxony) with an active production time between 1961 and 1976. In 2007, the BGE started with the conversion of the mine infrastructure above and underground to build the repository while using the shafts and some roadways of the former mine. The experiences gained from ten years project progress with its complexities and difficulties can be used for similar repository projects in the future. The Konrad repository is designed for 303,000 m{sup 3} of LAW and MAW, which will be emplaced in chambers. The emplacement chambers are located outside of the existing mine, so an impairment by the old mine workings can be excluded. So far, the first area with emplacement chambers has been excavated. In order to be able to start repository operations in 2027, a wide range of work in building construction, civil engineering, shaft sinking and infrastructure development above and below ground has been necessary and will be completed in the next years. The main activities are focused on the Konrad 1 and 2 sites and the part of the infrastructure located in the future control area, which is used for repository operations. There are still many challenges to overcome in the Konrad repository project, although many processes have been put on the right track in recent years. Looking back on past activities and in the cautious preview, this paper gives some indications from which lessons can be drawn and should be applied to similar projects in the future. - Prefer small dimensions for the infrastructure, such as insets and roadway cross-section, and the appropriate machinery and handling equipment; - Detailed process planning for construction in existing infrastructure in the run-up to implementation; - Intensive communication with contracted partners on the preparation of planning documents for nuclear examination procedures and ensuring an excellent contract management; - Early start of the implementation planning for projects under nuclear law, taking into account the relevant boundary conditions; - Ensuring the support of the project by the local community and other stakeholders. Overall, the use of parts of the existing above and underground infrastructure for the construction of a new repository is more difficult than for a complete new construction. But using the shafts of an existing mine delivers the advantage of very good knowledge about the underground environment. In addition, the areas necessary for the construction and operation of the buildings and facilities are already available and secured and do not compete with other projects.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

An Overview of R and D on Retrievability and Retrieval Technology in Germany - 20462

Retrievability is a term that is included in most radioactive waste management programs around the world. Although national definitions vary, the overall understanding of retrievability concerns the ability to recover waste packages from the repository mine after their emplacement. Different countries may implement retrievability in very different ways, ranging from a built-in reversibility into the emplacement process to the stipulation that retrievability may in no way impede passive safety in the post-closure phase. Germany takes a middle course such that retrievability in a HLW repository (repository for high level radioactive waste) may have no significant detrimental effect on passive safety. In Germany, the current siting process considers rock salt, clay rock, and crystalline rock as potential host rocks. Therefore, Research and Development (R and D) has been investigating repository concepts and retrievability in all host rocks. After introduction of retrievability in 2010, existing repository concepts were modified to facilitate retrieval. The changes made comprised, for example, equipping boreholes with steel liners, developing new technologies, and modifying existing emplacement devices. Apart from retrieval of HLW, retrieval of other wastes from underground repositories that were designed and operated without retrievability in mind, poses major technical and scientific challenges. Currently, studies are under way to investigate the feasibility and costs of partial retrieval of waste from an underground repository for hazardous and highly toxic waste in France, Stocamine. With regard to retrieval, the rock-mechanical conditions are deteriorating rapidly, so time is of the essence. In the Asse II mine in Germany, about 126,500 waste casks with low and intermediate level waste await retrieval. The repository mine suffers from difficult rock-mechanical conditions and inflow of brine, locally into emplacement areas. The Federal Company for Radioactive Waste Disposal (BGE) is legally required to retrieve all wastes from the Asse. Due to the specific challenges, R and D is needed to develop technical solutions for the safe retrieval from each of the emplacement chambers. R and D on retrievability and retrieval technology does not only address challenges in radioactive or toxic waste retrieval but may also help to germinate innovation to better master complex underground situations in general, e.g. in deep mining, tunneling, or repository construction. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Subsurface cosmogenic and radiogenic production of 42 Ar

Radioactive decays from 42 Ar and its progeny 42 K are potential background sources in large-scale liquid-argon-based neutrino and dark matter experiments. In the atmosphere, 42 Ar is produced primarily by cosmogenic activation on 40 Ar. The use of low radioactivity argon from cosmogenically shielded underground sources can expand the reach and sensitivity of liquid-argon-based rare event searches. We estimate 42 Ar production underground by nuclear reactions induced by natural radioactivity and cosmic-ray muon-induced interactions. At 3,000 mwe, 42 Ar production rate is 1.8×10 -3 atoms per ton of crust per year, 7 orders of magnitude smaller than the 39 Ar production rate at a similar depth in the crust. In conclusion, by comparing the calculated production rate of 42 Ar to that of 39 Ar for which the concentration has been measured in an underground gas sample, we estimate the activity of 42 Ar in gas extracted from 3,000 mwe depth to be less than two decays per ton of argon per year.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

A New Method for High Resolution Surface Change Detection: Data Collection and Validation of Measurements from UAS at the Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, USA

The use of uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) increases the opportunities for detecting surface changes in remote areas and in challenging terrain. Detecting surface topographic changes offers an important constraint for understanding earthquake damage, groundwater depletion, effects of mining, and other events. For these purposes, changes on the order of 5–10 cm are readily detected, but sometimes it is necessary to detect smaller changes. An example is the surface changes that result from underground explosions, which can be as small as 3 cm. Previous studies that described change detection methodologies were generally not aimed at detecting sub-5-cm changes. Additionally, studies focused on high-fidelity accuracy were either computationally modeled or did not fully provide the necessary examples to highlight the usability of these workflows. Detecting changes at this threshold may be critical in certain applications, such as global security research and monitoring for high-consequence natural hazards, including landslides. Here we provide a detailed description of the methodology we used to detect 2–3 cm changes in an important applied research setting—surface changes related to underground explosions. This methodology improves the accuracy of change detection data collection and analysis through the optimization of pre-field planning, surveying, flight operations, and post-processing the collected data, all of which are critical to obtaining the highest output data resolution possible. We applied this methodology to a field study location, collecting 1.4 Tb of images over the course of 30 flights, and location data for 239 ground control points (GCPs). We independently verified changes with orthoimagery, and found that structure-from-motion, software-reported root mean square errors (RMSEs) for both control and check points underestimated the actual error. We found that 3 cm changes are detectable with this methodology, thereby improving our knowledge of a rock’s response to underground explosions.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2019

Execution of an Alternative Modeling Strategy for Closure of the Rainier Mesa Corrective Action Unit at the Nevada National Security Site - 19099

The Underground Test Area (UGTA) Project of the U.S Department of Energy (DOE) is investigating radionuclide contaminant movements in groundwater derived from a decades-long period of underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) to support regulatory corrective action and closure requirements. The project is built around an integrated campaign of drilling and sampling, data interpretation, computer modeling, and broader monitoring activities conducted under a joint Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order (1996 as amended) (FFACO) between the State of Nevada, the DOE, and the U.S. Department of Defense. The FFACO strategy is applied to individual Corrective Action Units (CAUs) that roughly envelop disparate geographic testing areas at the NNSS. The Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RMSM) CAU is a geologically and hydrologically complex system lying in a remote up-gradient section of the NNSS. It was the site of 67 underground tests conducted between 1957 and 1992, 61 at Rainier Mesa proper, and 6 at Shoshone Mountain, isolated to its south. The original strategy to close the RMSM CAU required a simulation-based investigation to define the evolution of contaminated volumes of groundwater (in 3D) under uncertainty as a means to define a surface-projected contaminant boundary and to serve as a basis for longer term monitoring activities. Early models developed under this strategy proved to be quite complex and difficult to calibrate. Additional costs required to better characterize the system were judged to be out of balance with the low risks associated with this particular CAU. As a result, an Alternative Modeling Strategy (AMS) was adopted. The AMS removes the requirement for developing ensembles of 3D simulations and replaces it with a simpler one requiring the generation of multiple 1D streamline models. These are meant to encompass a range of alternative, yet plausible release and transport scenarios as a means to bound the overall lateral extent of contaminant transport. This paper will review the modeling approach developed under the AMS and its application to the Rainier Mesa portion of the CAU. Preliminary model results made under different parametric assumptions and boundary condition scenarios will be presented. Additional refinements of the model and its further application will be discussed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Emplacement Room Mock-up Structure for Testing the Placement of Nuclear Waste Within a Deep Geologic Repository - 19271

The Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) has conceptualized a unique method of long-term storage for spent nuclear waste. The concept encompasses all aspects of the end-of-life process from the point the spent fuel is no longer in-service; including handling, shipping, containing, storing, monitoring, and finally decommissioning. The equipment developed for each process is unique and designed specifically for each operation. Since these methods have not been implemented before, it is required to prove each process and the related equipment through simulations and eventually practical tests to evaluate performance and to confirm effective and safe operation. The spent fuel will be stored in an underground repository several hundred meters below the surface using autonomous machinery. Considering the significant investment and labour involved in creating full-scale tests underground, it would be impractical at this project stage to attempt tests of the newly developed machinery and methods in other than a surface setting. Therefore, our scope was to provide a customizable mock-up structure to simulate the conditions and constraints an underground repository would present. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Nature and State of Groundwater Contamination at the Nevada National Security Site: What Have We Learned from Decades of Groundwater Analysis? - 20337

The regulatory framework for remediating radionuclide contamination from underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) is based on a combination of characterization and modeling studies, monitoring, and institutional controls [1]. Currently, tritium is the largest contributor (∼90%) to the estimated 44.6 million-curie radionuclide inventory resulting from underground testing [2]. Because of its short half-life (12.32 years), its relative contribution reduces below 10% of the total radiologic inventory over the next 120 years as a result of radioactive decay. Although tritium levels are observed well above the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) in groundwater, other radionuclides are well below their MCLs except within the nuclear test near-field (nuclear test cavity and chimney) environment. In fact, most device-derived radionuclides are below their MCL in groundwater even in samples collected from this near-field environment. The distribution of radionuclides following the nuclear detonation greatly influences the availability of potential contaminants for groundwater transport. Tritium is initially distributed in the gas phase, later as tritiated water in steam, and finally as liquid water, and is available to groundwater transport away from the near-field environment. Other radionuclides that are mobile in groundwater are {sup 14}C, {sup 36}Cl, {sup 99}Tc, and {sup 129}I though their radiologic inventory is small when compared to tritium. Many radionuclides (e.g. U, Pu, Am) are incorporated to a significant extent into the melt glass at the bottom of the cavity and are accessible to groundwater primarily through the slow process of glass dissolution. These radionuclides are also adsorbed to the surfaces of the crushed rock within the cavity and chimney which limits their migration in groundwater. Although colloid facilitated transport of radionuclides at the NNSS has been observed [3], radionuclide concentrations decrease with time and migration distances due to desorption and colloid filtration processes. Current studies indicate that radionuclides associated with colloids are unlikely to migrate downgradient from NNSS underground nuclear tests at concentrations above the SDWA MCL [4][5]. The results of over 50 years of sampling, along with an understanding of these post detonation processes, indicate that tritium is the only contaminant of concern downgradient of testing and that even tritium will not exceed its MCL in groundwater after ∼120 years. Although other longer-lived radionuclides may continue to be released slowly from the near-field environment they will likely never reach levels exceeding their MCLs in groundwater downgradient of the NNSS. Groundwater monitoring will continue to verify these observations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Low-Radioactivity Argon for Rare-Event Searches

39Ar and 42Ar produce irreducible backgrounds for several argon-based dark matter and neutrino experiments. The use of low-radioactivity underground argon (UAr) could be a solution to the problem. The DarkSide-50 experiment demonstrated that argon derived from underground sources can contain a much lower concentration of 39Ar than atmospheric argon. Following this success, the Global Argon Dark Matter Collaboration (GADMC) is procuring hundreds of tons of UAr for the DarkSide-20k detector. To serve the broader community need, it is increasingly important to identify new sources of low-radioactivity argon. In addition, understanding the underground production mechanisms of argon radioisotopes and devising methods to measure them at ultra-low levels is necessary. The use of low-radioactivity argon could be crucial to expanding the physics goals and sensitivity of next-generation large-scale argon-based experiments.

Radioargon isotopes, Underground argon, Isotope pr↗
DOE OSTI2019

Hydrothermal Alteration of Nuclear Melt Glass, Colloid Formation, and Plutonium Mobilization at the Nevada National Security Site, U.S.A.

Approximately 2.8 t of plutonium (Pu) has been deposited in the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) subsurface as a result of underground nuclear testing. Most of this Pu is sequestered in nuclear melt glass. However, Pu migration has been observed and attributed to colloid facilitated transport. In this study, to identify the mechanisms controlling Pu mobilization, long-term (~3 year) laboratory nuclear melt glass alteration experiments were performed at 25 to 200 °C to mimic hydrothermal conditions in the vicinity of underground nuclear tests. The clay and zeolite colloids produced in these experiments are similar to those identified in NNSS groundwater. At 200 °C, maximum Pu and colloid concentrations of 30 Bq/L and 150 mg/L, respectively, were observed. However, much lower Pu and colloid concentrations were observed at 25 and 80 °C. These data suggest that Pu concentrations above the drinking water Maximum Contaminant Levels (0.56 Bq/L) may exist during early hydrothermal conditions in the vicinity of underground nuclear tests. However, formation of colloid-associated Pu will tend to decrease with time as nuclear test cavity temperatures decrease. Furthermore, median colloid concentrations in NNSS groundwater (1.8 mg/L) suggest that the high colloid and Pu concentrations observed in our 140 and 200 °C experiments are unlikely to persist in downgradient NNSS groundwater. In conclusion, while our experiments did not span all groundwater and nuclear melt glass conditions that may be present at the NNSS, our results are consistent with the documented low Pu concentrations in NNSS groundwater.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗