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At least 343 records · Page 19
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2017

Model-Driven Development of Safety Architectures

We describe the use of model-driven development for safety assurance of a pioneering NASA flight operation involving a fleet of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) flying beyond visual line of sight. The central idea is to develop a safety architecture that provides the basis for risk assessment and visualization within a safety case, the formal justification of acceptable safety required by the aviation regulatory authority. A safety architecture is composed from a collection of bow tie diagrams (BTDs), a practical approach to manage safety risk by linking the identified hazards to the appropriate mitigation measures. The safety justification for a given unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operation can have many related BTDs. In practice, however, each BTD is independently developed, which poses challenges with respect to incremental development, maintaining consistency across different safety artifacts when changes occur, and in extracting and presenting stakeholder specific information relevant for decision making. We show how a safety architecture reconciles the various BTDs of a system, and, collectively, provide an overarching picture of system safety, by considering them as views of a unified model. We also show how it enables model-driven development of BTDs, replete with validations, transformations, and a range of views. Our approach, which we have implemented in our toolset, AdvoCATE, is illustrated with a running example drawn from a real UAS safety case. The models and some of the innovations described here were instrumental in successfully obtaining regulatory flight approval.

Safety case↗
NASA NTRS2010

Verification and Implementation of Operations Safety Controls for Flight Missions

There are several engineering disciplines, such as reliability, supportability, quality assurance, human factors, risk management, safety, etc. Safety is an extremely important engineering specialty within NASA, and the consequence involving a loss of crew is considered a catastrophic event. Safety is not difficult to achieve when properly integrated at the beginning of each space systems project/start of mission planning. The key is to ensure proper handling of safety verification throughout each flight/mission phase. Today, Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) operations engineers continue to conduct these flight product reviews across all open flight products. As such, these reviews help ensure that each mission is accomplished with safety requirements along with controls heavily embedded in applicable flight products. Most importantly, the S&MA operations engineers are required to look for important design and operations controls so that safety is strictly adhered to as well as reflected in the final flight product.

Smalls, James R.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Expanding the Envelope of UAS Certification: What it Takes to Type Certify a UAS for Precision Agricultural Spraying

One of the key challenges to the development of a commercial Unmanned Air-craft System (UAS) market is the lack of explicit consideration of UAS in the current regulatory framework. Despite recent progress, additional steps are needed to enable broad UAS types and operational models. This paper discusses recent research that examines how a risk-based approach for safety might change the process and substance of airworthiness requirements for UAS. The project proposed risk-centric airworthiness requirements for a midsize un-manned rotorcraft used for agricultural spraying and also identified factors that may contribute to distinguishing safety risk among different UAS types and operational concepts. Lessons learned regarding how a risk-based approach can expand the envelope of UAS certification are discussed.

Maddalon, J. M.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Latent-failure risk estimates for computer control

It is shown that critical computer controls employing unmonitored safety circuits are unsafe. Analysis supporting this result leads to two additional, important conclusions: (1) annual maintenance checks of safety circuit function do not, as widely believed, eliminate latent failure risk; (2) safety risk remains even if multiple, series-connected protection circuits are employed. Finally, it is shown analytically that latent failure risk is eliminated when continuous monitoring is employed.

Dunn, William R.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach for Defining IASMS Services, Functions, and Capabilities

Assuring safety in the NAS with the inclusion of new entrants, such as Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), will require overcoming unique safety challenges that result from combining innovative technologies with novel airspace concepts for moving people and cargo using autonomous vehicles. The focus of the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) is to overcome AAM’s safety assurance challenges. The IASMS Concept of Operations (ConOps) describes an interconnected set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) designed to manage operational risks, identify unknown risks, and inform system designs. This paper describes an approach for defining SFCs based on technology trends in research, assessment of known and unknown risks in voluntary safety reports, and causal and contributing factors in aviation accidents and incidents. This approach would identify potential SFCs that further expand the Monitor, Assess, and Mitigate (M-A-M) functionality that represents the enabling framework of the IASMS. Safety implications that will result from integration of AAM in the transformation of the National Airspace System (NAS) were addressed in National Academies committees reports on AAM and IASMS. Development of a ConOps for IASMS was a top recommendation and can be represented as a reframing of safety assurance that builds on real-time alerting such as the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, and adds the more encompassing in-time temporal parameter in recognition of the different timelines for collecting and assessing safety data for risk mitigations. For example, mining for safety trends from data sources such as the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing system occurs over a longer time period. Research on AAM operations poses that SFCs can be designed to monitor the safety margin appropriate for AAM including with regards to the distance between current flight parameters and nominal ideal conditions. These in-time comparisons will become more complex as the density of operations increases at least in certain areas and can include planned and actual 4D trajectory, and in-time comparisons having implications on conflict modeling and prediction including expected and actual departure time, fix/waypoint crossing times, and arrival time. These comparisons would be integrated as part of SFCs that redefine and inform new safety margin. An increased safety margin improves management of operational risks while reducing the potential for anomalies. An increased safety margin also has implications for operator confidence in the certainty of its operations and trust in automation. Technology trends in research could be used to refine existing SFCs and define needs for additional SFCs that provide safety improvements to the design and operation of vehicles, airspace design, and operator performance requirements. NASA is developing innovative approaches to safeguard against major accidents and incidents that have occurred in the NAS and those anticipated with the inclusion of envisioned AAM operations. The innovations use operational performance data to monitor, detect, and predict flight variations exceeding safe nominal patterns, such as would be caused by navigational error, severe weather complications, or hijacking of UAS controls. These innovative approaches have high potential to prevent accidents and incidents in the new AAM era. It is anticipated that elements of the innovations will evolve into SFCs for the IASMS. Voluntary safety reports can be monitored to identify anomalies related to design or operational performance risks. Reports could be periodically monitored and assessed for specific topics. Reports might serve as weak signals or precursors indicative of emergent risk such as when combined with other safety information. The architecture could include SFCs that are based on voluntary safety reports recognizing the periodic temporal nature of data analysis. As previously mentioned, aviation accidents with their causal and contributing precursors can inform the need for SFCs in the IASMS. Accidents and incidents at San Francisco International Airport such as Asiana 214 and Air Canada 759 illustrate how combinations of different factors lead to increased risk. These types of precursors and different factors have implications on the types of SFCs that could be needed to monitor and manage different sources and types of design and operational risk. Continuing to assure the safety of AAM as designs and operations gain in complexity can be accompanied by defining SFCs that also increase in complexity. These SFCs can leverage information from findings and recommendations synthesized across on-going research, voluntary safety reports, and accident and incident reports. These SFCs can serve to refine accuracy of algorithms and resolve limitations with current practices. The IASMS architecture represents the framework for the SFCs and their critical role in safety assurance.

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗
NASA NTRS2022

NASA System-Wide Safety Wildland Firefighting Operations Workshop Report

On March 9-11, 2022, NASA’s System-Wide Safety Wildland Firefighting Operations Workshop engaged the broader wildland firefighting management ecosystem in a safety-oriented discussion via a virtual platform. This enabled a better understanding of how NASA and community expertise can be leveraged in the safe development of current and future firefighting systems and operations. The goals of the workshop were to: (1) identify and prioritize the top safety-oriented risks, gaps in capabilities, and emerging technologies to enhance wildland firefighting for both near-term and far-term concepts, with a specific focus on aviation operations and (2) engage the stakeholder community in defining emergent safety-oriented scope, roles, responsibilities, and procedures for agents undergoing increasingly complex wildland firefighting operations in information-rich, but uncertain environments. Workshop participants were solicited from wildland firefighting stakeholders across government, industry, and academia. All levels of government were engaged, as NASA sought attendees from federal, state, local, and tribal government agencies. Industry participants from traditional wildland firefighting domains such as data visualization and equipment manufacturers were invited, and corporate attendees from novel application domains such as aerial robotics and autonomous systems were present as well. The top three findings were as follows: (1) Enhancing situation awareness is a safety priority, especially in the use of aerial assets; (2) Timely access to information along with data fusion and integrated displays will enhance safety-critical decision-making both inside and outside aviation contexts; and (3) Tailorable standards and common operating pictures in the field will enhance inter-agency cooperation in the wildland firefighting lifecycle and enable the optimal use of limited resources such as aerial assets. The workshop helped inform NASA of the relevant safety-related wildland firefighting concerns and aided the broader ecosystem in understanding the potential safety-oriented role NASA might play in this community. Increased engagement with crucial governmental stakeholders (e.g., U.S. Forest Service, CAL FIRE, etc.) along with industry partners in cutting- edge information -centric domains is a fundamental next step. Additionally, the workshop findings will help define the first of a series of operationally challenging demonstrations, held in concert with strategic ecosystem partners, known as the Safety Demonstrator Series for NASA’s System-Wide Safety project. The first demonstration is set in the wildland firefighting application domain and will: (1) examine high risk operational scenarios to reduce their overall risk via services, functions or capabilities that act as risk mitigators (or transfer that risk to automated systems better able to tolerate it) and (2) explore novel tools and technologies that will enhance safety margins by enabling non-traditional or neoteric operational paradigms.

wildland firefighting↗
NASA NTRS2016

Managing a Safe and Successful Multi-User Spaceport

Encouraged by the creation of the Office of Commercial Space Transportation within the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 1984 and the Commercial Space Act of 1998, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) now relies on an extensive network of support from commercial companies and organizations. At NASA's Kennedy Space Center (KSC), this collaboration opens competitive opportunities for launch providers, including repurposing underutilized Shuttle Program resources, constructing new facilities, and utilizing center services and laboratories. The resulting multi-user spaceport fosters diverse activity, though it engenders risk from hazards associated with various spaceflight processing activities. The KSC Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate, in coordination with the center's Spaceport Integration and Center Planning & Development organizations, has developed a novel approach to protect NASA's workforce, critical assets, and the public from hazardous, space-related activity associated with KSC's multi-user spaceport. For NASA KSC S&MA, the transformation to a multi-user spaceport required implementing methods to foster safe and successful commercial activity while resolving challenges involving: Retirement of the Space Shuttle program; Co-location of multiple NASA programs; Relationships between the NASA programs; Complex relationships between NASA programs and commercial partner operations in exclusive-use facilities; Complex relationships between NASA programs and commercial partner operations in shared-use facilities. NASA KSC S&MA challenges were met with long-term planning and solutions involving cooperation with the Spaceport Integration and Services Directorate. This directorate is responsible for managing active commercial partnerships with customer advocacy and services management, providing a dedicated and consistent level of support to a wide array of commercial operations. This paper explores these solutions, their relevance to the current commercial space industry, and the challenges that continue to drive improvement with a focus on areas of safety management and risk assessment that have been crucial in KSC's evolution into a multi-user spaceport. These solutions may be useful to government entities and private companies looking to partner with the commercial space industry.

Range↗
NASA NTRS2008

From Lunar Regolith to Fabricated Parts: Technology Developments and the Utilization of Moon Dirt

The U.S. Space Exploration Policy has as a cornerstone the establishment of an outpost on the moon. This lunar outpost wil1 eventually provide the necessary planning, technology development, testbed, and training for manned missions in the future beyond the Moon. As part of the overall activity, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is investigating how the in situ resources can be utilized to improve mission success by reducing up-mass, improving safety, reducing risk, and bringing down costs for the overall mission. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), along with other NASA centers, is supporting this endeavor by exploring how lunar regolith can be mined for uses such as construction, life support, propulsion, power, and fabrication. An infrastructure capable of fabrication and nondestructive evaluation will be needed to support habitat structure development and maintenance, tools and mechanical parts fabrication, as well as repair and replacement of space-mission hardware such as life-support items, vehicle components, and crew systems, This infrastructure will utilize the technologies being developed under the In Situ Fabrication and Repair (ISFR) element, which is working in conjunction with the technologies being developed under the In Situ Resources Utilization (ISRU) element, to live off the land. The ISFR Element supports the Space Exploration Initiative by reducing downtime due to failed components; decreasing risk to crew by recovering quickly from degraded operation of equipment; improving system functionality with advanced geometry capabilities; and enhancing mission safety by reducing assembly part counts of original designs where possible. This paper addresses the need and plan for understanding the properties of the lunar regolith to determine the applicability of using this material in a fabrication process. This effort includes the development of high fidelity simulants that will be used in fabrication processes on the ground to drive down risk and increase the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) prior to implementing this capability on the moon. Also discussed in this paper is the on-going research using Electron Beam Melting (EBM) technology as a possible solution to manufacturing parts and spares on the Moon's surface.

McLemore, C. A.↗
NASA NTRS1976

Atmospheric, Magnetospheric and plasmas in Space (AMPS) spacelab payload definition study; Volume 4: Part 3, Labcraft instrument systems general specification

Guidelines and general requirements applicable to the development of instrument flight hardware intended for use on the GSFC Shuttle Scientific Payloads Program are given. Criteria, guidelines, and an organized approach to specifying the appropriate level of requirements for each instrument in order to permit its development at minimum cost while still assuring crew safety, are included. It is recognized that the instruments for these payloads will encompass wide ranges of complexity, cost, development risk, and safety hazards. The flexibility required to adapt the controls, documentation, and verification requirements in accord with the specific instrument is provided.

Keeley, J. T.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Risk Assessment and Control through Countermeasure System Iplementation for Long-term Crew Exposure to Microgravity

Experience with the International Space Station (ISS) program demonstrates the degree to which engineering design and operational solutions must protect crewmembers from health risks due to long-term exposure to the microgravity environment. Risks to safety and health due to degradation in the microgravity environment include crew inability to complete emergency or nominal activities, increased risk of injury, and inability to complete safe return to the ground due to reduced strength or embrittled bones. These risks without controls slowly increase in probability for the length of the mission and become more significant for increasing mission durations. Countermeasures to microgravity include hardware systems that place a crewmember s body under elevated stress to produce an effect similar to daily exposure to gravity. The ISS countermeasure system is predominately composed of customized exercise machines. Historical treatment of microgravity countermeasure systems as medical research experiments unintentionally reduced the foreseen importance and therefore the capability of the systems to function in a long-term operational role. Long-term hazardous effects and steadily increasing operational risks due to non-functional countermeasure equipment require a more rigorous design approach and incorporation of redundancy into seemingly non- mission-critical hardware systems. Variations in the rate of health degradation and responsiveness to countermeasures among the crew population drastically increase the challenge for design requirements development and verification of the appropriate risk control strategy. The long-term nature of the hazards and severe limits on logistical re-supply mass, volume and frequency complicates assessment of hardware availability and verification of an adequate maintenance and sparing plan. Design achievement of medically defined performance requirements by microgravity countermeasure systems and incorporation of adequate failure tolerance significantly reduces these risks. Future implementation of on-site monitoring hardware for critical health parameters such as bone mineral density would allow greater responsiveness, efficiency, and optimized design of the countermeasures system.

Gernand, Jeremy M.↗
NASA NTRS2024

Assessment of Some IASMS-relevant Data Sources for Aviation Safety

An In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) [1,2] is a set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) necessary for monitoring known hazards and emergent risks, assessing safety data for anomalies, precursors, and trends, mitigating hazards that reach safety thresholds, and assuring efficacy of controls in mitigating hazards. An IASMS will continually monitor the NAS to collect data on the status of aircraft, air traffic management systems, weather, and airports. Within the NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) System-Wide Safety (SWS) project’s technical challenge called In-time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS) for Commercial Aviation Operations, which we often refer to as Technical Challenge 6 (TC-6), we have performed an assessment of several aviation data sources we have found that are relevant to assessing the safety of the National Airspace System (NAS) in the context of an IASMS. This assessment includes understanding the nature of the data themselves and using some data analytics tools on these data to show how they can be used to identify potential safety issues. We also describe how the data and analytics are part of a system that can allow for other data and analytics to be performed and for the results to be visualized for use by appropriate operators to identify potential safety issues and develop mitigations. This report is a step toward the ultimate goal of TC-6, which is to develop a prototype IASMS system that demonstrates the potential of an IASMS and inspire operators to build analogous systems to make the best possible use of the significant investments that they make in collecting, storing, and managingdata related to their operations.

aviation safety↗
DOE OSTI2022

A risk-informed assessment tool to support review of license amendment requests for spent nuclear fuel dry cask storage systems

We report that while risk-informed safety evaluations are common methodologies used by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), their application in the field of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage has received limited attention. For instance, license amendment requests (LARs) for SNF dry cask storage systems (DCSSs) are evaluated according to U.S. NRC standard review plans (SRPs). However, risk-informed LAR review strategies could improve the understanding of critical system modifications, and lead to more predictable, efficient, and consistent LAR review processes. A methodology to develop a risk-informed LAR review tool is presented. Although focused on DCSSs, this methodology can be used to develop similar tools for a broad spectrum of safety-relevant systems. The end product (i.e., the tool) includes a tree diagram to help visualize the review risk significances assigned to a predefined set of system modifications and supporting rationale documentation. Instructions support correct tool application and provide the user with a path to incorporate currently unevaluated modifications in the tool structure. The demonstration of the methodology leads to the conclusion that risk-informed reviews of DCSS LARs are possible, although the tool precision could benefit from additional risk information. Further, the results indicate that many typical LARs involve low-risk or medium-risk modifications.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach for Identifying IASMS Services, Functions, and Capabilities From Data Sources

Assuring safety in the NAS with the inclusion of new entrants that are part of Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) will require overcoming unique safety challenges that result from combining innovative technologies with novel airspace concepts for moving people and cargo using semi-autonomous/autonomous vehicles. Overcoming these AAM safety assurance challenges is the focus of the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). The IASMS Concept of Operations (ConOps) describes an interconnected set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs)designed to manage operational risks, identify unknown risks, and inform system design to mitigate risk. This paper describes a broad approach for identifying SFCs involving technology trends in research, assessment of known and unknown risks in safety reports, and causal and contributing factors in aviation accidents and incidents. This approach leverages these sources to identify potential SFCs that enable the Monitor, Assess, and Mitigate (M-A-M)functionality that represents the enabling framework of the IASMS.

Kyle Ellis↗
DOE OSTI2021

RAVEN User Manual

RAVEN is a generic software framework to perform parametric and probabilistic analysis based on the response of complex system codes. The initial development was aimed to provide dynamic risk analysis capabilities to the Thermo-Hydraulic code RELAP-7, currently under development at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Although the initial goal has been fully accomplished, RAVEN is now a multi-purpose probabilistic and uncertainty quantification platform, capable to agnostically communicate with any system code. This agnosticism includes providing Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). These APIs are used to allow RAVEN to interact with any code as long as all the parameters that need to be perturbed are accessible by inputs files or via python interfaces. RAVEN is capable of investigating the system response, and investigating the input space using Monte Carlo, Grid, or Latin Hyper Cube sampling schemes, but its strength is focused to- ward system feature discovery, such as limit surfaces, separating regions of the input space leading to system failure, using dynamic supervised learning techniques. The development of RAVEN has started in 2012, when, within the Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program, the need to provide a modern risk evaluation framework became stronger. RAVEN principal assignment is to provide the necessary software and algorithms in order to employ the concept developed by the Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) program. RISMC is one of the pathways defined within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program. In the RISMC approach, the goal is not just the individuation of the frequency of an event potentially leading to a system failure, but the closeness (or not) to key safety-related events. Hence, the approach is interested in identifying and increasing the safety margins related to those events. A safety margin is a numerical value quantifying the probability that a safety metric (e.g. for an important process such as peak pressure in a pipe) is exceeded under certain conditions. The initial development of RAVEN has been focused on providing dynamic risk assessment capability to RELAP-7, currently under development at the INL and, likely, future replacement of the RELAP5-3D code. Most the capabilities that have been implemented having RELAP-7 as principal focus are easily deployable for other system codes. For this reason, several side activates are currently ongoing for coupling RAVEN with soft- ware such as RELAP5-3D, etc. The aim of this document is the explanation of the input requirements, focalizing on the input structure.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS2023

Machine Learning Framework for Hazard Extraction and Analysis of Trends (HEAT) in Wildfire Response

This research proposes a natural language processing enabled risk analysis framework, named Hazard Extraction andAnalysis of Trends (HEAT), and applies the framework to the ICS-209-PLUS data set of wildfire incident responseforms. The HEAT framework produces safety- and risk- relevant analyses, consisting of: (1) a set of hazards extractedfrom text data, (2) a primary analysis using hazard-relevant metrics, such as rate and severity, to form an FMEA-styletable and risk matrix, (3) a time series analysis of metric trends, and (4) a secondary analysis examining potentialpredictors for hazards. Results from HEAT provide quantitative risk-relevant information for high-level hazards doc-umented in existing-state operations. Because of the generalizability of the steps and limited data requirements, HEATcan be applied to any dataset containing narrative text, thus providing a framework for data-driven machine learning-enabled quantitative risk analysis across a variety of domains. To demonstrate HEAT in a case study, we apply theframework to the ICS-209-PLUS dataset of wildland fire incident response forms. Hazards identified in wildfire re-sponse arise from environmental conditions, the mission, and the wildland urban interface. The resulting risk matrixidentifies evacuations as high-risk hazards, while all other identified hazards are medium or serious risk.

natural language processing↗
NASA NTRS2016

Risk-based SMA for Cubesats

This presentation conveys an approach for risk-based safety and mission assurance applied to cubesats. This presentation accompanies a NASA Goddard standard in development that provides guidance for building a mission success plan for cubesats based on the risk tolerance and resources available.

Small Satellites↗
NASA NTRS2010

2009 NASA Range Safety Annual Report

This year, NASA Range Safety transitioned to a condensed annual report to allow for Secretariat support to the Range Safety Group, Risk Committee. Although much shorter than in previous years, this report contains full-length articles concerning various subject areas, as well as links to past reports. Additionally, summaries from various NASA Range Safety Program activities that took place throughout the year are presented, as well as information on several projects that may have a profound impact on the way business will be done in the future. The sections include a program overview and 2009 highlights; Range Safety Training; Range Safety Policy; Independent Assessments Support to Program Operations at all ranges conducting NASA launch operations; a continuing overview of emerging range safety-related technologies; and status reports from all of the NASA Centers that have Range Safety responsibilities.

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