Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “radioactive material”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 343 records · Page 19

Systematic study of variation in radiation data in cluttered environments

There are many challenges to overcome during nuclear nonproliferation measurements, including a wide variety of clutter sources that may be introduced into a scene during acquisition. The ability to understand how the dissimilarity of various objects, or clutter, obscures a detector’s field of view and affects the measured response of the detector improves the input to detection alarm and nuclide identification algorithms. Additionally, having the capability to input clutter variation into radiation transport models would allow for more real-world scenarios to be modeled and understood. Efforts at Oak Ridge National Laboratory have been exploring the ability to determine specific natural background radiation contributions from surroundings, such as buildings, soil, asphalt, and concrete, and use those source terms in large-scale (100 + m) models. The capability to quantify different clutter terms, ranging from humans to large vehicles, allows researchers to inject realistic noise into these models. The work reported herein seeks to explore the effects that clutter introduces to quantify the expected signal variation inherent to both controlled and uncontrolled scenarios, specifically how the introduction of clutter into a scene introduces a variation in signals due to the attenuation of naturally occurring radioactive material distributed within the scene or by introducing non-threatening radioactive materials into the scene. Controlled measurements aim to quantify how different types of clutter of varying size and composition affects the response of a radiation detector. Using results from various controlled tests, the systematic effects of clutter and its effect on radiation readings is analyzed.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Nondestructive Assay Technical Infrastructure Program Mission and Vision

The Nondestructive Assay Program (NDAP) mission and vision is achieved by identifying and accomplishing a set of programmatic goals that correspond with eight broad technical program elements. The NDAP was created as a result of Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board Recommendation 2007-1, entitled “Safety-Related In Situ Nondestructive Assay of Radioactive Materials,” which emphasized the need to improve in situ measurements of radioactive material at US Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities. An NDAP five-year plan will define tasks to accomplish specific goals identified in the NDAP mission and vision. This mission and vision is applicable for eight technical program elements: Hardware/Software Development, Algorithm Development and Nuclear Data, Uncertainty Quantification, Nuclear Materials, Staffing, Personnel, And Training, Data Management, Requirement and Standards, and Information Preservation and Dissemination. An additional program element is technical support, which provides daily execution management support for the NDAP, site scope, and deliverable tracking via site task managers, along with technical advisement and support from the technical support group. The NDAP mission and vision provides attributes with specific goals for each program element, and some goals benefit multiple program elements. The goals and attributes defined herein are implemented via an NDAP five-year execution plan that defines site work scope, budget, and deliverables, all of which are updated annually. The NDAP is designed to benefit nondestructive assay (NDA) needs to support DOE nuclear criticality safety programs, ensuring that NDA technology is sufficiently capable of guaranteeing the safety of those who handle, store, process, or transport fissionable materials in the complex. Especially important for the NDAP is to maximize capabilities to identify, characterize, and manage in situ fissile material deposits in process equipment to ensure nuclear criticality safety at processing facilities.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Modeling and Simulation of Nuclear Fuel Materials

We review the state of modeling and simulation of nuclear fuels with emphasis on the most widely used nuclear fuel, UO2. The hierarchical scheme presented represents a science-based approach to modeling nuclear fuels by progressively passing information in several stages from ab initio to continuum levels. Such an approach is essential to overcome the challenges posed by radioactive materials handling, experimental limitations in modeling extreme conditions and accident scenarios, and the small time and distance scales of fundamental defect processes. When used in conjunction with experimental validation, this multiscale modeling scheme can provide valuable guidance to development of fuel for advanced reactors to meet rising global energy demand.

multiscale modeling↗

Induced Radioactivity in Recovered Skylab Materials

Four radioactive isotopes found in aluminum and stainless steel samples from Skylab debris were recovered in Australia. The low-level activity was induced by high-energy protons and neutrons in the space environment. Measurements of the specific activities are given.

Fishman, G. J.↗

In Vivo Radiobioassay and Research Facility

Bioassay monitoring for intakes of radioactive material is an essential part of the internal dosimetry program for radiation workers at the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Hanford Site. This monitoring program includes direct measurements of radionuclides in the body by detecting photons that exit the body and analyses of radionuclides in excreta samples. The specialized equipment and instrumentation required to make the direct measurements of these materials in the body are located at the In Vivo Radiobioassay and Research Facility (IVRRF). The IVRRF was originally built in 1960 and was designed expressly for the in vivo measurement of radioactive material in Hanford workers. Most routine in vivo measurements are performed annually and special measurements are performed as needed. The primary source terms at the Hanford Site include fission and activation products (primarily 137Cs and 90Sr), uranium, uranium progeny, and transuranic radionuclides. The facility currently houses five shielded counting systems, men’s and women’s change rooms and an instrument maintenance and repair shop. Four systems include high purity germanium detectors and one system utilizes large sodium iodide detectors. These systems are used to perform an average of 7,000 measurements annually. This includes approximately 5000 whole body measurements analyzed for fission and activation products and 2000 lung measurements analyzed for americium, uranium, and plutonium. Various other types of measurements are performed periodically to estimate activity in wounds, the thyroid, the liver, and the skeleton. The staff maintains the capability to detect and quantify activity in essentially any tissue or organ. The in vivo monitoring program that utilizes the facility is accredited by the Department of Energy Laboratory Accreditation Program for direct radiobioassay.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

User’s Manual for RESRAD-BUILD Code V.4: Vol. 1 – Methodology and Models Used in RESRAD-BUILD Code

The RESRAD-BUILD computer code models radionuclide release and transport in indoor environments and performs pathway analyses to evaluate the potential radiological dose and risk incurred by an individual who works or lives in a building contaminated with radioactive material or housing radioactively contaminated furniture or equipment. The code provides four geometries to characterize a radiation source: point, line, area, and volume, in which radionuclides are homogeneously distributed. Radionuclides contained in a source are considered to be released to the indoor air due to various processes including erosion (mechanically or weathering), diffusion (for tritium and radon in a volume source), or emanation (radon in a point, line, or area source). The release can proceed through different time phases with different rates. In RESRAD-BUILD Version 4.0, a dynamic ventilation model is implemented to simulate the fate and transport of source material particles and radionuclides after their releases. This dynamic ventilation model considers (1) air exchange between rooms in the building and between the rooms and the outdoor environment, (2) deposition from air to floor, (3) resuspension from the floor to the air, and (4) periodical vacuuming that reduces the floor deposition. The fate and transport modeling provides estimates of radionuclide concentrations in the source, in the air, and on the floor at different times, which are then integrated over the exposure duration for the calculation of radiation doses and cancer risks. A single run of the RESRAD-BUILD code can model a building with up to 9 rooms, 10 sources, and 10 receptors. The potential radiation dose and cancer risk incurred by each receptor are calculated for seven exposure pathways: (1) external radiation directly from the sources (accounting for shielding), (2) external radiation from radioactive particles deposited on the floors, (3) external radiation from airborne radionuclides, (4) inhalation of airborne radionuclides, (5) inhalation of radon and radon progenies, (6) inadvertent ingestion of radioactive particles directly from the source, and (7) ingestion of radioactive particles deposited on the floors. Various exposure scenarios can be modeled with RESRAD-BUILD, including but are not limited to, office worker, renovation worker, decontamination worker, building visitor, and resident. Both deterministic and probabilistic analyses can be performed to obtain results in both text reports and graphic displays.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Performance Assessment of a New Gamma Spectroscopy Toolkit: Peak Doctor and the Spectral Nondestructive Assay Platform (SNAP) - 17397

High resolution gamma spectroscopy (HRGS) is a widely used technique for non-destructive characterization of nuclear materials, and assay of radioactive waste. The ability to accurately evaluate raw spectral data is an important step in producing high-quality results. A spectral analysis application known as Peak Doctor has been developed under a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) between LANL and Pajarito Scientific Corporation (PSC). The software has undergone several years of testing and validation by the Radioactive Waste Characterization Team of the LANL Waste Management Services Group (WM-SVS). PeakDoctor is designed to work with the Spectral Nondestructive Assay Platform (SNAP{sup TM}) to provide a complete HRGS analysis engine. SNAP{sup TM} performs model specific corrections for attenuation and geometry. These applications are the major components of a new toolkit designed primarily for portable far-field non-destructive assay. Peak Doctor performs a very accurate peak fit analysis with the goal of improving upon the capabilities of existing commercially available routines. It is designed to be user-configurable and can be customized to any given type of detector and any given type of spectrum. Peak Doctor was developed to resolve many of the inherent complexities in gamma ray spectra including overlapping peaks, complex multiplet regions, large step peaks, backscatter regions and Compton edges. Unlike most spectral analysis platforms, Peak Doctor does not rely on the energy calibration and detector resolution parameters that are saved by the operator in the spectrum file. Instead, key parameters are pre-defined for individual detectors. The software fits a continuum using a series of splines between a series of junctions or 'knots'. Fitting techniques are used to join the splines together to create a near-continuous multi-element curve. Optimizing the location of the knots is one of Peak Doctor's most powerful features. The knots are initially configured using a pre-defined list and are removed or added automatically during the fitting process. Knots are also created when new features are identified such as Step Peaks and Compton Edges. The user can also manually specify knots in order to improve the continuum fit. The initial fit is improved on by removing any outlier regions (which are converted to peaks) and the continuum fitting process is repeated. At this stage, an experienced user can work interactively with the fit by manually converting peak regions to continuum or vice versa. The final step is to fit a series of peaks above the continuum based on detector parameters. Single and multiplet peaks are then processed by either the tailing (piecewise) or non-tailing (Gaussian) Levenberg Marquardt non-linear peak fitting routine depending on the user defined selection. Only a rough knowledge of the detector characteristics (energy calibration and resolution) is required for the fitting process to proceed with good accuracy. Any peaks that are missed can be manually added by the user and will also be fitted. Discontinuities in the peak / continuum fit can be rapidly identified by reviewing the 'residuals scale' plot. For waste streams that are well characterized, it is often the case that routinely encountered spectra will have similar peaks and continuum features. For these cases a handy 'One Step' method is available that proceeds in an automated fashion without user interaction. Peak Doctor has been configured with a set of default spectrum types including plutonium / transuranic waste (including Weapons Grade Pu, Heat Source Pu, Am-241, Am-243 and Np-237), depleted or enriched uranium, nuclear power plant / intermediate level waste (with fission and activation products such as Cs-137 and Co-60) as well as Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM). The user can easily add new spectrum types for specific waste streams or other types of radiological / special nuclear materials. The output from PeakDoctor (including net peak area, centroid energy and a list of minimum detectable activity levels at pre-defined regions) is used by SNAP{sup TM} to complete the data analysis process. Isotope activities are calculated using configurable template-driven geometry and attenuation correction methods. The software accounts for matrix and container wall effects, collimator / angular corrections, detector efficiency (based on calibration curves) and stand-off distance. SNAP{sup TM} uses published algorithms incorporating a series of decision points during its operation to allow the analyst to provide logical input to guide the software during the analysis of each unique spectrum. The Peak Doctor / SNAP{sup TM} toolkit has been extensively tested and validated under a variety of conditions using 'benchmark' reference spectra. Test scenarios reported include HPGe-based measurements of well characterized uranium and plutonium standards and radioactive sources with a variety of different geometries and matrix materials including surrogate drums and boxes. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Draft Summary Report on Irradiated Fuel Handling and Management for LOTUS

The National Reactor Innovation Center (NRIC) has conceptualized the design of the Laboratory for Operation and Testing in the United States (LOTUS) test bed to provide the United States Department of Energy (DOE) with the infrastructure necessary to make advanced reactor designs available for commercial developers. LOTUS will provide a test bed to developers with the capabilities of supporting a wide range of experiment design possibilities. Upon completion of the developers’ operations and experiments within the test bed, the irradiated fuel, reactor components, and other experiment materials must be removed. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) possesses significant capabilities for radioactive material handling such as casks, carts, and forklifts. However, given the unique environment presented by the NRIC-LOTUS test bed, located inside the Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System (PIDAS) area at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) and the complexity of novel removal activities of recently operated reactor experiments through the new proposed access tunnel. The efficacy was not apparent for existing equipment to provide all the needed capability. To bridge the potential gaps in cask designs, storage, and transportation, NRIC requested the development of trade studies for the transfer, handling, and storage requirements of irradiated fuel salts and other radioactive materials. NRIC directed Boston Government Services, LLC (BGS) to perform the trade studies and develop a report analyzing alternatives. In addition to the BGS reports, the Idaho National Lab’s (INL), provided by the first potential user’s Advanced Reactor Development (ARD) team, prepared a feasibility study for the storage of specific irradiated fuel within the existing ZPPR vault.This summary report is intended to present the trade studies, options, and alternatives that were investigated. The maturity level of LOTUS, the reactor, fuel salt containers, gloveboxes, and reactor testing campaign and concept of operations were not at a level sufficient to base critical decisions on. This report is not intended to present a final recommendation. The final recommendations for fuel storage location, transport, handling equipment, and operations will be made in FY 2024 and will be based on known materials, test campaign requirements, funding, and final analysis of the fuel and equipment to be used.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Safety aspects of dry spent fuel storage and spent fuel management

As with the storage of all radioactive materials, the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) must conform to safety requirements. Safety aspects like safe enclosure of radioactive materials, safe removal of decay heat, nuclear criticality safety and avoidance of unnecessary radiation exposure must be achieved throughout the storage period. The implementation of these safety requirements can be achieved by dry storage of SF and HLW in casks as well as in other systems such as dry vault storage systems or spent fuel pools, where the latter is neither a dry nor a passive system. After the events of Fukushima, the advantages of passively and inherently safe dry storage systems have become more obvious. TUV and BAM, who work as independent experts for the competent authorities, present the licensing process for sites and casks and inform about spent nuclear fuel management and issues concerning dry storage of spent nuclear fuel, based on their long experience in these fields. All safety relevant issues like safe enclosure, shielding, removal of the decay heat or behavior of cask and building under accident conditions are checked and validated with state-of-the-art methods and computer codes before the license approval. It is shown how dry storage systems can ensure the compliance with the mentioned safety criteria over a long storage period. Exemplarily, the process of licensing, erection and operation of selected German dry storage facilities is presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Opportunities for Cost Effective Disposal of Radioactively Contaminated Solid Waste on the Oak Ridge Reservation, Oak Ridge, TN - 13045

Department of Energy (DOE) requirements for the release of non-real property, including solid waste, containing low levels of residual radioactive materials are specified in DOE Order 458.1 and associated guidance. Authorized limits have been approved under the requirements of DOE Order 5400.5, predecessor to DOE Order 458.1, to permit disposal of solid waste containing low levels of residual radioactive materials at solid waste landfills located within the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR). Specifically, volumetric concentration limits for disposal of solid waste at Industrial Landfill V and at Construction/Demolition Landfill VII were established in 2003 and 2007, respectively, based on the requirements in effect at that time, which included: an evaluation to ensure that radiation doses to the public would not exceed 25 mrem/year and would be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), with a goal of a few mrem/year or less (in fact, these authorized limits actually were derived to meet a dose constraint of 1 mrem/year); an evaluation of compliance with groundwater protection requirements; and reasonable assurance that the proposed disposal is not likely to result in a future requirement for remediation of the landfill. Prior to approval as DOE authorized limits, these volumetric concentration limits were coordinated with the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) and documented in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the TDEC Division of Radiological Health and the TDEC Division of Solid Waste Management. These limits apply to the disposal of soil and debris waste generated from construction, maintenance, environmental restoration, and decontamination and decommissioning (D and D) activities on the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation. The approved site-specific authorized limits were incorporated in the URS/CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) waste profile system that authorizes disposal of special wastes at either of the RCRA Subtitle D landfills. However, a recent DOE assessment found that implementation of the site-specific authorized limits for volumetrically contaminated waste was potentially limited due in part to confusion regarding the applicability of volumetric concentration limits and/or surface activity limits to specific wastes. This paper describes recent efforts to update the authorized limits for Industrial Landfill V and Construction/Demolition Landfill VII and to improve the procedures for implementation of these criteria. The approved authorized limits have been evaluated and confirmed to meet the current requirements of DOE Order 458.1, which superseded DOE Order 5400.5 in February 2011. In addition, volumetric concentration limits have been developed for additional radionuclides, and site-specific authorized limits for wastes with surface contamination have been developed. Implementing procedures have been revised to clarify the applicability of volumetric concentration limits and surface activity limits, and to allow the use of non-destructive waste characterization methods. These changes have been designed to promote improved utilization of available disposal capacity of the onsite disposal facilities within the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation. In addition, these changes serve to bring the waste acceptance requirements at these DOE onsite landfills into greater consistency with the requirements for commercial/ public landfills under the TDEC Bulk Survey for Release (BSFR) program, including two public RCRA Subtitle D landfills in close proximity to the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

INTRINSIC DOSIMETRY: A POTENTIAL NEW TOOL FOR NUCLEAR FORENSICS INVESTIGATIONS

Thermoluminescence (TL) dosimetry was used to measure dose effects on the raw stock material of borosilicate container glass from different geographical locations. Effects were studied at times up to 60 days post-irradiation at doses from 0.15 to 20 Gy. The minimum detectable dose using this technique was estimated to be 0.15 Gy which is roughly equivalent to a 24 hr irradiation 1 cm from a 50 ng source of 60Co. Two peaks were identified in the TL glow curve, a relatively unstable peak around 125°C and a more stable peak around 225°C. Differences in TL glow curve shape and intensity were also observed for the glasses from different geographical origins. We investigate radiation induced defects in glass to further develop the technique of intrinsic dosimetry–the measurement of the total absorbed dose received by the walls of a container holding radioactive material. Intrinsic dosimetry is intended to be used as an interrogation tool to provide enhanced pathway information on interdicted or newly discovered waste containers of unknown origin or history by considering the total absorbed dose received by a container in tandem with the physical characteristics of the radioactive material housed within that container. One hypothetical scenario is presented to illustrate the application of intrinsic dosimetry to waste management and nuclear forensics.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Remote monitoring of Alpha Gamma hot cell facility by ARG-US RFID system - 15177

Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) has developed a monitoring and tracking system for nuclear materials based on radio frequency identification (RFID) technology. The system, called ARG-US ('Watchful Guardian'), has been in fielding testing and applications at selected U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites since 2010. ARG-US utilizes battery-powered tags to remotely and continuously monitor the environmental parameters, e.g., radiation levels, of the tagged items such as containers of radioactive materials. To demonstrate that the system can monitor nuclear and radiological facilities as well, a compact system was installed in the Alpha Gamma Hot Cell Facility (AGHCF) at Argonne in 2013. AGHCF is a Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facility that is being decommissioned. It is also being used to support de-inventory of other facilities on the Argonne site. As such, large quantities of radioactive materials and wastes are being discharged from the hot cell, loaded into transport containers, and shipped away. The deployed ARG-US system monitors worker areas, material transfer areas, cell exhaust HEPA filters, and?on a rover/robot?in-cell locations of AGHCF. Thus far, the system is performing as designed and yielding results that can be corroborated by existing surveillance means. The in-cell unit is particularly valuable, as it yields information that would otherwise be hard to obtain. In time, the benefits of automated monitoring 24/7 by ARG-US should become apparent and may lead to a fuller system with more distributed tags in the hot cell areas until the facility is fully decommissioned. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The IAEA Assistance and Training Programme for Transport Security

The IAEA Office of Nuclear Security is working cooperatively with the U.S. Department of Energy's Global Threat Reduction Initiative, European Union and Australia to provide transport security assistance to countries throughout the world. Assistance is available to countries in reviewing and upgrading their transport security programs at all levels: (1) National level (regulatory and other government agencies); and (2) Operator level (shippers and carriers). Assistance is directed at implementing a consistent level of security throughout the life cycle of radioactive material (same level of security during transport as when in a fixed facility) Upgrade assistance can include: (1) Expert advisory missions to provide advice and guidance; (2) Training courses for regulatory, governmental and industry personnel; (3) Transport security awareness; (4) Detailed training on designing and implementing transport security programs; (5) Planning to identify and prioritize needs (developing security approaches and plans); (6) Developing model security plans and procedures; and (7) Equipment (vehicles, packages, command and control equipment, etc.). Country visits are now being scheduled to initiate transport security cooperative activities. A training course has been developed to assist countries in developing and implementing transport security programs. The training course has been given as a national training course (three times) and as a Regional training course (three times). The course addresses recommended security provisions for the transport of all radioactive material.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Effects of Gain Changes on RPM Performance

The mission of the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration's (DOE/NNSA's) Office of the Second Line of Defense (SLD) is to strengthen the capability of foreign governments to deter, detect, and interdict the illicit trafficking of special nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders and through the global maritime shipping system. The goal of this mission is to reduce the probability of these materials being fashioned into a weapon of mass destruction or radiological dispersal device that could be used against the United States or its international partners. This goal is achieved primarily through the installation and operation of radiation detection equipment at border crossings, airports, seaports, and other strategic locations around the world. In order to effectively detect the movement of radioactive material, the response of these radiation detectors to various materials in various configurations must be well characterized. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) investigated two aspects of Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) settings, based on a preliminary investigation done by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL): source-to-detector distance effect on amplifier gain and optimized discriminator settings. This report discusses this investigation. A number of conclusions can be drawn from the ORNL testing. First, for increased distance between the source and the detector, thus illuminating the entire detector rather than just the center of the detector (as is done during detector alignments), an increase in gain may provide a 5-15% increase in sensitivity (Fig. 4). However, increasing the gain without adjusting the discriminator settings is not recommended as this makes the monitor more sensitive to electronic noise and temperature-induced fluctuations. Furthermore, if the discriminators are adjusted in relation to the increase in gain, thus appropriately discriminating against electronic noise, the sensitivity gains are less than 5% (Fig. 6). ORNL does not consider this slight increase in sensitivity to be a worthwhile pursuit. Second, increasing the ULD will increase sensitivity a few percent (Fig. 7); however, it is not clear that the slight increase in sensitivity is worth the effort required to make the change (e.g., reliability, cost, etc.). Additionally, while the monitor would be more sensitive to HEU, it would also be more sensitive to NORM. Third, the sensitivity of the system remains approximately the same whether it is calibrated to a small source on contact or a large source far away (Fig. 6). This affirms that no changes to the existing calibration procedure are necessary.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Report on a 2009 mini-demonstration of the ARG-US Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system in transportation.

The Packaging Certification Program (PCP) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM), Office of Packaging and Transportation (EM-14), has developed a radio frequency identification (RFID) tracking and monitoring system for the management of nuclear materials during storage and transportation. The system, developed by the PCP team at Argonne National Laboratory, consists of hardware (Mk-series sensor tags, fixed and handheld readers, form factor for multiple drum types, seal integrity sensors, and enhanced battery management), software (application programming interface, ARG-US software for local and remote/web applications, secure server and database management), and cellular/satellite communication interfaces for vehicle tracking and item monitoring during transport. The ability of the above system to provide accurate, real-time tracking and monitoring of the status of multiple, certified containers of nuclear materials has been successfully demonstrated in a week-long, 1,700-mile DEMO performed in April 2008. While the feedback from the approximately fifty (50) stakeholders who participated in and/or observed the DEMO progression were very positive and encouraging, two major areas of further improvements - system integration and web application enhancement - were identified in the post-DEMO evaluation. The principal purpose of the MiniDemo described in this report was to verify these two specific improvements. The MiniDemo was conducted on August 28, 2009. In terms of system integration, a hybrid communication interface - combining the RFID item-monitoring features and a commercial vehicle tracking system by Qualcomm - was developed and implemented. In the MiniDemo, the new integrated system worked well in reporting tag status and vehicle location accurately and promptly. There was no incompatibility of components. The robust commercial communication gear, as expected, helped improve system reliability. The MiniDemo confirmed that system integration is technically feasible and reliable with the existing RFID and Qualcomm satellite equipment. In terms of web application, improvements in mapping, tracking, data presentation, and post-incident spatial query reporting were implemented in ARG-US, the application software that manages the dataflow among the RFID tags, readers, and servers. These features were tested in the MiniDemo and found to be satisfactory. The resulting web application is both informative and user-friendly. A joint developmental project is being planned between the PCP and the DOE TRANSCOM that uses the Qualcomm gear in vehicles for tracking and communication of radioactive material shipments across the country. Adding an RFID interface to TRANSCOM is a significant enhancement to the DOE infrastructure for tracking and monitoring shipments of radioactive materials.

42 ENGINEERING↗

On the Alpha Radiation Damage to the O-Ring Seal of the SAVY-4000 Container

In this memo, the dose to an O-ring from the alpha decay of 238 PuO 2 is calculated. These calculations were made in order to assess possible radiation damage to the O-ring, which could lead to failure and loss of integrity of the seal created by the O-ring. The O-ring being discussed here provides the seal between the lid and bottom of a nuclear materials container. The container will be used for the storage and transport of a number of different radioactive materials. The analysis is made using 238 PuO 2 as it would create the greatest damage to the O-ring when considering the materials that may be stored in it. Contamination of the O-ring is not expected to occur. But in the event radioactive material comes in contact with the O-ring, these calculations provide an estimate of the radiation damage.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Nanocomposite Materials for Radionuclide Sequestration from Groundwater Environments

The half-lives of radionuclides range from fractions of a second to billions of years. Since no practical method of altering radioactive decay exists, and since exposure to either the energy emitted from radioactive decay or chemical properties of radionuclides poses dire health risks, radioactive materials must be segregated and controlled. The capture, treatment, and disposition of radioactive materials remain an extraordinary challenge. In here, we focus our attention on the synthesis and characterization of a unique class of nanocomposite materials that have potential for removal of radionuclide contamination. Specifically, we report a simple approach to decorate the surface of iron-based (Fe/FexOy) material with various nano-catalysts. Specifically, copper (Cu), tin (Sn), and silver (Ag) nanoparticles were prepared through two different reduction approaches, namely, citrate and cetyltrimethylammonium bromide (CTAB) methods, on the iron-based material surface. All samples were characterized by a variety of analytical tools, which included scanning electron microscopy (SEM), electron-dispersive X-ray microanalysis (EDS), and EDS mapping to elucidate materials’ morphology as well as nano-catalysts’ loading and location on the iron-based structures.

Hunyadi Murph, Simona E.↗

Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗