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328 records · Page 19

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DOE OSTI2020

Retrieval of Transuranic Drums with Deflagration to Detonation Potential from a Vault at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory - 20207

During the final phase of a long-term project, a total of 80 TRU waste drums at ORNL have been retrieved from a below-grade storage vault in which they have remained untouched for about 25 years. The drums, which house material generated from past ORNL operations, are now stored and ready for eventual transfer to the Transuranic Waste Processing Center, located on Highway 95 in Oak Ridge. The Transuranic Waste Processing Center will process and ship the drums to WIPP in Carlsbad, New Mexico, for disposal. Workers lifted the drums one-by-one from the underground storage vault with a 110-ton crane over a one-week period in October 2017. Although the physical work was performed in one week, years of detailed planning preceded the fieldwork. A key obstacle needed to be overcome before the project could safely proceed. This obstacle involved the need to ensure controls were developed for the Deflagration to Detonation Transition (DDT) potential. DDT refers to a phenomenon in ignitable mixtures of a flammable gas and air (or oxygen) when a sudden transition takes place from a deflagration type of combustion to a detonation type of explosion. Basically, these drums, under certain circumstances, have a potential to detonate and overpressurize. Extensive analysis of the drums verified that detonation, while unlikely, was possible. Of the total 103 drums that were retrieved or moved in preparation for retrieval, 18 had DDT potential. Extensive security requirements were also necessary, due to the nature of the material, and this added another layer of complexity to the fieldwork. Prior to retrieving the drums from the underground storage vault, space needed to be made for them within the various above-grade facilities. Inventory and security requirements dictated what could be stored where, and the first step of the field work involved a number of drum movements in preparation for storage of the newly retrieved drums. This effort involved moving 21 drums already in the storage area to facilitate the addition of the newly retrieved ones. The retrieval project required a total of 107 critical lifts using the 110-ton crane, under 3 critical lift plans. The TRU waste storage facility is a Category 2 Nuclear Facility and is managed under an extensive Documented Safety Analysis. The TRU retrieval project was conducted in accordance with DOE Order 425.1D and included three Implementation Verification Reviews, two Management Assessments, one Readiness Assessment, and seven mock-ups in preparation for the field work. Despite being stored for 25 years, the drums were in good shape due to the integrity of the facilities where the drums were stored. Of the 80 drums that were retrieved, 12 were placed in special containers called 'overpacks' based on their content. The drums were removed safely and without incident, thanks to a lot of preparation and the efforts of a highly skilled team. Lessons learned through the DDT control development and the drum retrieval and overpacking process could be beneficial to others having to manage similar drums of TRU waste. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Analysis of Air-Purifying Respirator (APR) and Powered Air-Purifying Respirator (PAPR) Cartridge Performance Testing on Hanford Tanks BY-108 and BY-110 Volume 1

Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) tested four types of chemical cartridges for use in air-purifying respirators (APR) and powered air-purifying respirators (PAPR). These tests were undertaken to determine the period of time that the cartridges would provide adequate performance for APRs and PAPRs used to protect workers when exposed to a mixture of Chemicals of Potential Concern (COPC) from vapors exiting the headspaces of Hanford BY-108 and BY-110 waste storage tanks. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) considers cartridge testing to be a valid approach for establishing cartridge change schedules. Testing commonly is applied in situations where mixtures of COPCs exist, and where other approaches, such as manufacturer recommendations and modeling, are less reliable. The tests were designed and conducted to assure measurement and/or control of the key variables OSHA identified as important to estimate the cartridge service life, including temperature, humidity, COPC concentration, breathing rate, and cartridge adsorption capacity. Cartridge tests were conducted over two days from February 23-25, 2018, using headspace vapors from Hanford tanks BY-108 and BY-110. Headspace vapors from the BY-108 tank were fed to the PAPR respirator cartridge test stand, while vapors from the BY-110 headspace were fed to the APR respirator cartridge test stand. Both the APR and PAPR test stands were developed by WRPS in collaboration with HiLine Engineering (Richland, Washington). Two different cartridges were assessed on each tank. Multipurpose APR cartridges—SCOTT 7422-SD1 and SCOTT 7422-SC1 (SCOTT Safety, Monroe, North Carolina)—were assessed for vapors from BY-110 using the APR cartridge test stand. Multipurpose PAPR cartridges—MSA OptiFilter TL (MSA Safety Inc., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) and 3M FR-57 (3M Company, Maplewood, Minnesota)—also were assessed for vapors from BY-108 over the same two days using the PAPR cartridge test stand. Sample media (i.e., sorbent tubes) were used to collect samples of the vapor stream entering and exiting the respirator cartridges, and the samples then were analyzed for COPC concentrations. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory was tasked with conducting an independent analysis of the analytical results and making recommendations based on the results for respiratory cartridge performance and service life. The key conclusions from the analysis are described below.

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DOE OSTI2020

Evaluation of H-Canyon Ventilation Exhaust Tunnel Inspection at the Savannah River Site - 20052

The Department of Energy (DOE) H-Canyon Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is operated by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). The Facility Structural Integrity Program [1] provides a process to inspect, evaluate, and document the conditions of passive safety related structural systems and components, their degradation mechanisms and their impact on the safety envelope. The Structural Integrity Program performs periodic visual inspections to confirm the systems and components can perform their safety function and recommend corrective actions before the function is compromised. The H-Canyon Exhaust Tunnel is part of the H-Canyon Ventilation System and is periodically inspected under the Structural Integrity Program. The Tunnel performs a Safety Class passive design feature function that is available 100% of the time. The underground reinforced concrete Tunnel directs Canyon process air from the Canyon to the Sand Filter System. The radiological and chemical airborne activity coupled with the physical configuration of the tunnel precludes a manned entry into the tunnel to perform the inspection. Unlike active systems that can be subjected to physical testing to confirm capability, qualification calculations, including modeling, is performed to assess passive design feature capabilities relative to operational, accident and natural phenomena hazards events. Input for these calculations come from knowledge of field conditions, design drawings and conservative assumptions. The knowledge of field conditions comes from concrete and soil testing activities as well as inspection data. The use of cameras on crawlers to obtain inspection data and how that data is used in qualification calculations is the focus of this discussion. Remote Tunnel inspections have been performed using cameras on a stick, referred to as pole cameras, prior to Calendar Year 2003 (CY2003). Since CY2003, six camera equipped crawlers have been used. Crawlers have evolved and improved by incorporating lessons learned from the previous inspections. The latest 2019 crawler successfully traveled the entire length of the tunnel between the Canyon and Sand Filter System and captured images that were previously unseen, thus providing key visual data for the Structural Integrity Program report [2]. The inspection data serves as 1) input to qualification calculations, 2) validates current conditions remain bounded by qualification calculations, and 3) documents a record of change over time. This data is vital for the effective evaluation of the tunnel structure and aids with predicting the life cycle service life safety envelope to protect the public, environment, and facility worker. The goal of the 2019 deployment was to use a more robust vehicle to ensure travel over obstacles, perform the inspection with higher resolution cameras, and have the ability to elevate the cameras to view surfaces previously obscured by abandon-in-place ducts in the tunnel. The inspection information will serve to strengthen the input basis for qualification calculations, versus using excessive conservative calculation assumptions. This 2019 inspection was compared with previous crawler visual evidence to identify change over time to project remaining service life and confirm field conditions remain bounded by qualification calculations. The results of the 2019 Exhaust Tunnel inspection continue to improve and provide a firm basis to make sound engineering judgements regarding tunnel capability and approaches in projecting remaining service life with an aging system and component. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Respirator Cartridge Performance on Mixed Vapors from Hanford Tank Headspaces and Exhausters - 20427

Between 2016 and 2018, the Hanford Tank Operations Contractor - Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) - conducted a series of tests of air-purifying respirator (APR) chemical cartridges commonly used at Hanford tank farms to determine the period of time for which the cartridges would provide adequate performance when used in APRs and powered-air-purifying respirators (PAPRs) to protect workers when exposed to a mixture of vapors exiting tank headspaces. Although cartridge manufacturers provide service life estimating tools for individual chemical compounds, the projected performance of these cartridges on complex vapor mixtures is not available, and the adequacy of APRs for tank farm applications represents an important workforce concern. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration identifies cartridge testing as a valid approach for establishing cartridge service life. The primary function of the WRPS Cartridge Test Program was to obtain objective data to determine service lives for the APR and PAPR cartridges used at Hanford tank farms. WRPS contracted with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to analyze the test data and offer an independent analysis of and recommendations based on respirator cartridge performance. A total of 28 APR and 10 PAPR cartridge tests were conducted between 2016 and 2018 on 12 different tank headspaces and tank farm exhauster slipstreams. Two APR cartridges from SCOTT (now 3M) and two PAPR cartridges from MSA Safety, Inc. and 3M were evaluated using a cartridge testing system specifically designed to measure and monitor test conditions and sample cartridge inlet and outlet vapor streams for important chemical compounds. Testing focused on analysis of approximately 61 tank vapor chemicals of potential concern (COPCs) that have been previously detected in tank vapors at levels above 10% of their occupational exposure limits (OELs). Each test was conducted over 16 hours of run time. Evidence of chemical breakthrough was assessed by comparing inlet and outlet COPC concentrations over the duration of each test. The breakthrough threshold was normally defined as exceeding 10% of the compounds OEL at the cartridge outlet. Ammonia breakthrough was observed in a majority of the cartridge tests and occurred earlier than breakthrough of any other chemical compound. Several other COPCs did exhibit breakthrough behavior, including mercury, 1,3-butadiene, furan, 2,5 dihydrofuran, and N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA), but only in a very limited number of cartridge tests and only after ammonia breakthrough had occurred. In addition, tests results suggest that breakthrough of some of these COPCs may have been affected by competition with and breakthrough of other non-COPC organics, such as ethanol and acetone, with substantially lower toxicological hazard. Comparison of cartridge manufacturers' service life estimates with the experimentally derived breakthrough times indicates that manufacturers' estimates are generally conservative, even in the presence of the complex mixed vapor streams experienced in these tests. With consideration of appropriate safety margins, these results provide valuable insights on cartridge performance to inform industrial hygiene professionals in establishing appropriate cartridge change-out schedules for APR and PAPR use in the Hanford tank farms. (authors)

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