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This book is a comprehensive history of Brazil's nuclear activities and diplomacy. The author provides an in-depth explanation of the country's decision to give up the nuclear arms option and to accept nonproliferation norms after decades of opposition.
Information barriers are trusted measurement systems to confirm the authenticity of nuclear warheads based on their radiation signatures. Traditional inspection systems rely on complex electronics both for data acquisition and processing. Several research efforts have produced prototype systems, but it has proven difficult to demonstrate that hidden switches and side channels do not exist. After almost thirty years of research and development, no viable and widely accepted system has emerged. We pursue a fundamentally different approach: Our prototype of an inspection system uses vintage hardware built around a 6502 processor. The processor uses 8-micron technology and has only about 4,200 transistors. Vintage electronics may have a number of important advantages for applications where two parties need to simultaneously establish trust in the hardware used. CPUs designed in the distant past, at a time when their use for sensitive measurements was never envisioned, drastically reduce concerns that the other party implemented backdoors or hidden switches on the hardware level. We demonstrate the performance of a prototype system using an Apple IIe and a custom-made open-source data-processing board connected to a standard sodiumiodide radiation detector for low-resolution gamma spectroscopy. Data processing and analysis is exclusively done on the Apple IIe hardware. We show that subtle differences in radiation signatures can be detected in 2–3 minutes based on the result of a simple chi-squared test. Vintage electronics may therefore offer a new path toward fieldable, trusted information barriers.
Development of the Passive Gamma Emission Tomography (PGET) and Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity (PNAR) methods in the context of the Finnish geological repository for spent nuclear fuel has shown that they provide, for BWR fuel assemblies, the comprehensive verification needed to meet the nuclear safeguards objectives of the repository. The principles of the PGET and PNAR methods and the design and operation of the respective instruments are presented. A few results from measurements at the spent fuel storage pools at the Finnish nuclear power plants are discussed. The directions of ongoing and future developments are indicated.
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We reply to a comment that Paul G. Richards (Richards, 2026) directed to an article by Carmichael et al. (2025). Richards expressed concern over two issues. The first issue relates to the size of the explosions discussed in the article. The second relates to the probability that earthquakes and explosions sourced near the same location coincide in time, by chance. We do not address the first issue because the original article does not assign significance to the size of the explosions from the point of view of an experimental party. We do respond to Richards’ comment on the second issue and claim that it can be explained through a clarification about conditional versus joint probabilities. Our present discussion, therefore, describes the difference between the conditional probability that a correlator fails, given that an explosion and earthquake coincidently occur in the same place, and the joint probability that a correlator fails while an earthquake and explosion also coincidentally occur in the same place. This latter, joint probability appears to be rare. We clarify that our original article did not treat the joint probability, only the conditional probability.
Here, we introduce a transportable technique to determine the yield and depth of burial (DOB) from seismic source spectra of underground nuclear explosions. We demonstrate this technique on the six declared North Korean nuclear tests. This approach derives source spectra in absolute units from regional phase (Pg) amplitudes by correcting the observations for geometric spreading, attenuation, and site amplification. We couple the source spectra and explosion source models with a probabilistic programming framework that integrates deep learning techniques and Bayesian modeling. This approach permits the exchange of information across various data categories to quantify both the data and model uncertainty. This technique stands out as an innovative use of broad‐area propagation models, making it transportable across various geologic settings. This method proves to be effective in scenarios with diverse and/or limited observational data, even when the source depth is unknown. We present new independent estimates of absolute yield and DOB that are consistent with the prior assessments, underscoring the potential of this method in enhancing transportable nuclear explosion monitoring capabilities.
Uranyl sulfates are important constituents of uranium ores and represent a significant fraction of U(VI) minerals discovered in recent years owing to their propensity to form in mine tailings and legacy sites related to uranium exploration. Recently, we surveyed all published Raman spectra for uranium minerals and found significantly less easily accessible data available for uranyl sulfates relative to other groups of uranium minerals (Spano et al. 2023). In that work, we described average spectra for groups of uranyl minerals to understand common vibrational spectroscopic features attributable to similarities in oxyanion chemistry among U(VI) minerals, but only data for three uranyl sulfate minerals were included in the study. The present work reports on Raman spectra collected for 18 additional uranyl sulfate minerals. In conclusion, to better understand underlying structural and chemical features that give rise to spectroscopic observables, we relate differences in structural topology, charge-balancing cations, and locality of origin to features observed in the Raman spectra of selected natural uranyl sulfates.
The term “separation” means multiple things when applied to radiochronometry efforts in C-NR: 1) How efficiently and rapidly can we separate trace-level nuclides used for age dating from bulk matrices? 2) Do we have pure (separated) well-calibrated single isotope tracers needed for high-precision trace level quantification of nuclides? 3) How much knowledge do we have about how nuclides used for radiochronometry are separated during uranium and plutonium production?
Radioactive sealed sources have been in general use for more than 100 years. Sealed sources are used in medicine, research, agriculture, construction, oil and gas exploration…every day. Not all sources owned by licensees have a commercial disposal pathway. For over 20 years the OSRP mission has been to remove those unwanted radioactive sealed sources that pose a potential risk to national security, public health and safety.
Abstract not provided.
The Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy (PINS) is a commercialized system developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to examine chemical warfare agents (CWA) non-destructively, utilizing Prompt Gamma Neutron Activation Analysis (PGNAA) techniques. The PINS system takes advantage of a high-resolution gamma-ray spectrum from a mechanically-cooled high-purity germanium (HPGe) detector, and gamma-ray peak analysis provides input to its chemical identification logic with a probabilistic decision tree (PDT). The effectiveness of the chemical identification algorithm is determined by the availability of a wide range of data to train the algorithm to identify chemical-fills with accuracy. INL has a collection of gamma-ray spectra of various chemical-fills from the field-deployed PINS systems over the years, and it was envisaged to leverage such a database with the Artificial Neural Network (ANN) technique. Therefore, an ANN-based chemical identification algorithm was developed as an independent verification of the current algorithm. The ANN-based algorithm’s performance was evaluated against the U.S. Army blind test data, and results were presented and discussed in this study.
Special nuclear material (SNM) detection using portable, highly efficient detectors is of paramount importance to national security for treaty verification and nonproliferation monitoring. The most mature technology for neutron detection is the 3He proportional counter; however, despite its high efficiency and ubiquitous use, 3He detectors have significant drawbacks, including long absorption lengths, high voltage requirements, and dependence on the availability of 3 He. The goal of this project is to synthesize a novel, boron-based perovskite semiconductor crystals to create a more efficient and more portable neutron detector. This innovative material will lead to a significant decrease in power and size requirements with higher operating temperatures than other traditional solid-state detectors. Directly incorporating 10 B eliminates the need for a conversion layer and leads to high neutron absorption coefficients. In this seedling project, we successfully synthesized millimeter sized crystals using inverse temperature crystallization with sizes of 1.73 mm in length and 480 μm in thickness.
The Department of Defense Science Board has stated that the United States is "not prepared to defend againsr cyber-attacks and that the military could lose "trust in the information and ability to control U.S. systems and forces [including nuclear forces]." One potential weak spot in cyber-security is storing encryption keys in computer memory. This paper explores the use of hardware devices (so-called Physical Unclonable Functions, or PUFs) to generate, in the nuclear weapon itself, unique encryption keys each time they are needed. Not only do we find that this has the potential to mitigate a number of cyberthreats, but such hardware has the potential to greatly diminish the total uncertainty associated with radiation-based warhead authentication procedures; a procedure many analysts feel will be key to future arms control regimes. After outline the use of PUFs in nuclear command, control, and communications--and indicating some of the areas that still require further research--we discuss their application to arms control and warhead authentication
This University Engagement project challenged engineering students at universities, without nuclear engineering degrees but with research reactors, to incorporate Safeguards by Design concepts into their Senior Capstone Design Project. This University Engagement project was part of the U. S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Office of International Nuclear Safeguards, Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, Human Capital Development: University Engagement Program. This program exposed university students with Mechanical Engineering major and Nuclear Engineering minors to the concepts of international nuclear safeguards. FY19, three teams at the University of Rhode Island and one team at the University of Texas - Austin participated in researching, designing, building, and testing projects to support international nuclear safeguards measurements or verification. The projects involved engaging in activities at the university’s research reactors. All the projects engaged students with prototyping a design and/or tool for application at the Universities’ Research Reactor. At the end of the course, most of the students expressed the experience was a positive and they learned more about international nuclear safeguards and applying requirements than they had previously encountered.
During the fourth quarter of FY19, we completed task 1.2 of Phase 1, the data analysis of the experimental campaign conducted at the Irradiated Fuel Examination Laboratory (IFEL) at ORNL. The best part of the analysis was conducted during the third quarter and the relevant findings can be found in the FY19 Q3 report. Phase II of the project was started during the month of September, more specifically Task 2. All experiments so far were conducted with ultrasmooth flat optics with a periodic multilayer coating with reflectivity of >80% in the 100 keV range. We have been determining the best available simulation tools to model X-ray focusing optics, typically made of quadratic surfaces, in order to survey the relevant parameter space and conduct the design study. Candidate focusing optics designs are Wolter I optics, Kirkpatrick-Baez or KB optics and Schmidt optics. Informed by the IFEL results, we are also considering a single-reflection concentrator design to attempt to quantify possible trade-off between bandpass multilayers overall reflectivity, multiple reflections and energy selectivity.
Students will spend the majority of their time working either individually or in small teams with a LANL staff member on a research project that has a strong connection to nuclear security science and nonproliferation.
No abstract provided.
No abstract provided.