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DOE OSTI2021

Y-12 NATIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX LEU-MO FEEDSTOCK FABRICATION UPDATE

The Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) participates in the fuel fabrication pillar of lhe National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA's) Office of Material Minimization and Management (M3) Office of Conversion Pillar. Y-12's primary responsibility is to establish a reliable fabrication process of low-enriched uranium-molybdenum (LEU-Mo) feedstock tor United States High Performance Research Reactors (US HPRRs). This update compares US HPRR LEU-Mo feedstock fabrication ettorts over the past several casting campaigns at Y-12 which vary in process methodologies and fabrication parameters. With recent changes to the latest feedstock casting campaign, Process Design Standard-2 (PD-STD-2). Y-12 has seen a significant decrease in isotopic uranium variability of the fuel feedstock fabricated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

2019 Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report Summary

This document is a summary of the full 2019 Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. This summary provides an abbreviated and more readable version of the full NNSSER.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2022

Software Development for Data Visualization and Analysis of PN-Diodes & MOSFET Devices

The U.S. Department of Energy has a broad mission to ensure the nation’s security by addressing ongoing environmental challenges, developing novel energy production technologies, and mitigating nuclear security concerns. These efforts benefit from developing more effective semiconductor materials and devices. The research discussed in this report aims to further the development of these new electronics by improving implementations of vertical device structures, which offer theoretically better performance compared to lateral structures. Specifically, it reviews the background and development of a new and easy-to-use program for data processing and analysis from experiments run on vertical gallium nitride power devices. Current vertical structures fall short in critical performance metrics, such as On-Resistance and Breakdown Voltage, due to poor management of the device’s electric field. Junction termination extensions, or JTEs, are a field management technique that increases a device’s resilience to expected failure modes by controlling its surface electric fields. Each JTE design requires significant experimental validation, consisting of hundreds of tested devices, each outputting an enormous set of data points. The new software includes multiple methods of filtering large sets of device testing data to identify and remove flawed devices, automate device analyses, and provide statistical breakdowns for four metrics used to define the effectiveness of the JTE and the current carrying capacity of the device. These results can then be related back to fabrication techniques and device design, and in the future, be combined with processing simulations to further improve our understanding of the JTE mechanisms.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2025

Commercialization of the Transportation-Security, Tracking, and Reporting System (T-STAR)

The Transportation-Security, Tracking, and Reporting System (T-STAR) was developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration, NA-21, Office of Radiological Security (ORS) to provide a transportation security system for detection and tracking during transport of Category 1 and Category 2 radiological material. Few off-the-shelf systems for conveyance tracking offer detection of a cargo compartment breach or a removal of the cargo. Systems that do offer this capability often require permanent installation through modifying of the conveyance itself. This is not sustainable in many countries where ORS is building use, storage, and transport security capacity. The development of T-STAR has moved from fielding robust prototypes deployed in countries ranging from North America, Latin America and Central Asia to a commercially produced product that can now be deployed to provide enhanced security during transit. Each prototype deployment resulted in important lessons learned, which informed the requirements for the final commercial product. T-STAR uses both cellular and Iridium satellite modems to provide redundant communications to provide the configuration, status, and alerts to a server monitoring the shipment, which is accessible using a multilanguage browser-based user interface. A wireless security system employing using Z-wave sensors for intrusion detection located in the conveyance provide low cost but effective solution for a wide range of conveyance types. Additional capabilities include the ability to monitor a vehicles’ CANBUS (Controller Area Network) system, an ethernet port for high throughput sensor information such as video cameras, and the ability to power and use advanced external sensor payloads. These features make the T-STAR a capable and expandable security gateway that can be deployed on a variety of conveyances from box trucks to open trailers. The ability to provide tracking, monitoring, and detection provide a key component in overall best practices designed to protect shipments of radioactive material.

Schultze, Michael [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000283205671)↗

DOE OSTI2020

Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site, Radioactive Waste Management Complex (Q3 Transportation Report, FY20) Transportation Report

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) in Area 5.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2021

UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the TRU Waste Processing Center Mixed Low Level Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Transuranic (TRU) Waste Processing Center Mixed Low Level Waste (MLLW), FWORCHMLLW103, Revision 13 [TWPC 2021]), is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the TRU Waste Processing Center MLLW meets all performance objectives of DOE Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The TRU Waste Processing Center MLLW waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2025

Underground Test Area Activity Waste Management Plan; and Attachment 1 Fluid Management Plan for the Underground Test Area Activity

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office initiated the Underground Test Area Activity to characterize the risk posed to human health and the environment as a result of underground nuclear testing activities at the Nevada National Security Site. The UGTA Activity is now administered by the DOE Environmental Management Nevada Program. This document is a revision to NNSA/NSO (2009). The new document and revision number reflect EM Nevada Program as the current UGTA Activity administrator.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2022

Material Resilience in Harsh Service Conditions

Resilience describes the attributes of a material that allow it to withstand or resist detrimental environmental effects degrading properties and performance. In service, materials may experience harsh or extreme conditions, but even modest thermal or load conditions experienced over a long period can degrade performance. Thus, the National Nuclear Security Administration mission requires predictive understanding of materials performance in harsh and extreme conditions over long periods. This performance is particularly relevant for applications in which replacement is impractical, impossible, or costly. This area of leadership addresses the evolution of material properties in environments that include static and dynamic stress, radiation, and chemical or thermal extremes. A particular focus is on situations when environments coexist or for which collection of experimental data is challenging or impossible. The capability to predict and control the nature and evolution of properties to allow designing resilience is a crucial aspect of mission success in national nuclear, global, and energy security.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2022

Nuclear Forensics in Support of National Response Plans [Slides]

Become familiar with nuclear forensics methodologies in support of nuclear security investigations and how Los Alamos National Laboratory supports the development of sustainable global nuclear forensics capacities.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2021

CLOSURE REPORT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 577 AREA 5 CHROMIUM CONTAINING WASTE DISPOSAL CELLS

Report will be submitted to the state of Nevada Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS), was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office on April 25, 2019. The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste cells and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents (NDEP 2019). As stipulated in Paragraph 5C of the SA, a Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) was prepared that identified and evaluated risks and corrective action alternatives (CAAs) for CAU 577, provided the plan for implementing the recommended CAA, and presented the post-closure plan (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2022

NCSP – AWE Collaboration [Slides]

Several points of collaboration between NCSP and AWE are noted, including the CIDAAS IS589 installation plan, CIDAAS testing, nuclear verification and detector physics, nuclear material control and nuclear security, and hands on criticality safety training.