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Remediation Guidance for Major Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack

This document provides general guidelines for airport managers, local officials, and other stakeholders for developing a response and recovery plan for a major airport following the release of a biological warfare agent, with specific guidance for remediation. San Francisco International Airport was selected as the example airport during development of the guidance to illustrate specific details. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis was selected as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the agents most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The focus of the guidance is on cleanup and disposal activities associated with the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance Phases that are defined herein. Activities associated with the Notification and First-Response Phases are brieÀy discussed in Appendixes A and B, respectively. In addition to the main text of this Remediation Guidance document and associated appendixes, a data supplement was developed specifically for San Francisco International Airport. Requests for the data supplement must be made directly to the Emergency Planning Operations Division of San Francisco International Airport. This document does not describe public health responses to release of a biological warfare agent. If laboratory analytical results confirm the presence of a biological agent, the responsible public health agency involved in the response will commence appropriate public health actions, such as treatment (CDC 2004) and decontamination of potentially contaminated individuals, distribution of prophylaxis, and medical examinations. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site for more information on emergency public health responses (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). Effective communication with the media and the public is an essential component of airport remediation and recovery. Whereas such communication is beyond the scope of this document, many helpful resources are available. (See Section 1.1 for more information.) The concept of operations described in this document for cleanup of a Bacillus anthracis release at a major airport conforms to the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2008) and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). In most cases, a Unified Command would be formed to direct the cleanup process jointly and to take ultimate responsibility for all cleanup decisions. The Unified Command would likely include the Airport Manager or Airport Emergency Operations Manager, representatives from state and local public health and emergency management agencies, and Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Unified Command and Incident Command Staff would ideally be co-located in an Incident Command Post in an uncontaminated area of the airport. If a release is large or complex, co-location of all key players may not be possible. If a major incident is declared, a Principal Federal Official may be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal support to the Unified Command. In some facilities and jurisdictions, additional response plans or procedures (such as BioWatch or other emergency response plans, procedures, or protocols) may govern notification and first response. Facility personnel, responders, and emergency management coordinators should be aware of all applicable plans and procedures and how to implement them. Cleanups following the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the U.S. pre-dated the NRF and NIMS and did not make use of a NIMS Incident Command System as we know it today. Most Incident Commanders for the larger of those cleanups chose to convene a Technical Working Group (TWG) of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, outside experts to advise in developing sampling and decontamination plans. Most of the Incident Commanders also convened a separate Environmental Clearance Committee (ECC) to independently review pre- and post decontamination sampling data as well as data on decontamination parameters, to evaluate whether the decontamination was effective, and to add credibility regarding a decision that decontaminated areas may be reoccupied. Use of such specialized technical expertise is strongly recommended, although it would now operate within the construct of the NIMS Incident Command System. The TWG, if convened, would act in an advisory capacity to the Environmental Unit within the Planning Section. Likewise, the ECC, if convened, would provide independent peer review of products and recommendations by the Environmental Unit. For maximum impartiality, the ECC could also provide recommendations directly to the Unified Command. Cleanup activities commence with site characterization. The principal goal of characterization is to define the extent of contamination and to gather information needed to design the decontamination approach. Initial sampling data collected by first responders are assessed to approximate the location(s) of contamination. Confirmation of the agent type and viability is obtained from a Laboratory Response Network laboratory. Additional characterization data are collected to determine the extent of contamination and where decontamination actions are needed. Areas suspected of being contaminated are contained and isolated to the degree possible to prevent further movement of an agent to uncontaminated areas or the environment, and to reduce the potential for future exposure from the agent or fumigant, if fumigation is needed. Agent air monitoring in areas adjacent to the contained contamination zones is done to ensure the protection of remediation personnel and to monitor any release from the contained zones. Various sampling approaches are considered. For example, wipe samples can be used to sample hard, nonporous surfaces. Swab samples can be used to sample nooks, crannies, joints, and seams. Appendix I is a template for preparing an incident-specific, operational characterization plan. Upon completion of the characterization plan, an internal review is initiated. Upon approval of the plan by the Unified Command, characterization commences. The Site Safety Officer develops a Health and Safety Plan to ensure that coordinated health and safety measures are in place for all responding personnel. This plan describes physical, chemical, and biological hazards at the site, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination procedures, and emergency procedures to be used by sampling and remediation personnel. An incident-specific Remediation Action Plan is developed, which describes the decontamination methods to be used and other details, including waste disposal. Under NIMS, this overall plan, as well as other plans described below, are implemented through a series of standardized, shorter-term Incident Action Plans, which describe specific activities that will take place during a shift or a day. The template in Appendix J is designed to facilitate preparation of the Remediation Action Plan. If fumigation will be done, a Sampling and Analysis Plan will be needed, as well as an Ambient Air Monitoring Plan, which can be a component of the Remediation Action Plan. These three plans are needed to obtain a crisis exemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for authorized use of an unregistered sterilant or pesticide during cleanup. If pesticide products become registered for inactivation of B. anthracis in the future, the three plans will likely be required by the product’s labeling, but the plans would no longer be submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval; rather, the Incident Commander would approve them. If fumigation is used, an Emergency Response Plan is also recommended, although such a plan is not required for a crisis exemption. For some nonpersistent biological warfare agents, natural attenuation may be an adequate decontamination option. In cases where contamination is not extensive or an agent is not persistent, application of surface decontaminants or other methods of medical infection control may be effective. For extensive contamination by persistent agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, fumigation may be necessary. In those cases, the Decontamination Phase commences with source reduction, such as pre-cleaning surfaces to reduce the contaminant load. To expedite cleanup and prevent costs from escalating unnecessarily, a cost–benefit analysis should be incorporated in the decision process related to retention versus disposal of facility items and materials. Certain materials and structural components can be decontaminated for reuse, but it may not be feasible or cost-effective to decontaminate other items. Those items must be pre-treated, packaged (with the package decontaminated externally), and removed for disposal as waste. Site preparation includes sealing openings to prevent leaks and setting up equipment. Decontamination reagents and delivery systems are selected, and pre-testing all systems is done before carrying out chemical treatment(s). The important choice of decontamination technologies depends on characteristics of the agent, the nature and extent of contamination, and other site parameters identified during characterization. Decontamination-related decisions can have a major impact on waste-disposal costs, and it is necessary to develop a disposal plan that identifies a means of disposal, necessary approvals, transportation, and other details. A clearance strategy is developed to ensure that after decontamination, the risk of exposure to residual contamination is negligible. A clearance sampling plan is developed, which sets clearance criteria, specifies how to determine whether the criteria have been met, and describes how and where to collect clearance samples after decontamination. In most cases, clearance sampling includes both surface and aggressive air samples. Appendix K is a clearance plan template that identifies the types of required information. To determine whether the decontaminated area may be reoccupied, the Environmental Unit (and the ECC separately, if one is convened) evaluates the results of clearance samples. For the anthrax incidents to date, and given methods that have been used, cleanup was considered successful only when there was no growth of B. anthracis cultured from any environmental samples taken after decontamination. Other factors that will be considered include the decontamination process parameters (e.g., temperature, relative humidity, decontaminant concentration, and contact time) and the results from post-decontamination culture of biological indicators that may have been used during fumigation or sterilization processes. From such an evaluation the Environmental Unit or ECC, or both, recommend whether the area may be reoccupied, or whether further decontamination is necessary. The UC makes the final decision that a facility is appropriately decontaminated for reoccupancy. The facility owner or responsible public health agency makes the final decision to reopen a decontaminated facility. A theme that is emphasized throughout this document is that many activities can greatly reduce the time required to restore airport operations if those activities are conducted prior to an actual release of biological warfare agent. A summary of specific resources (such as Federal, state, and local agency contacts; contractors; prospective team members; subject-matter experts; laboratory facilities; and other entities) that should be identified in advance by airport officials is provided in each pertinent section of this document, and summary contact lists of such resources are provided in Appendix L. A summary of overall pre-planning actions that should be completed by airport officials is presented at the end of this document.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Guidance for the Implementation and Follow-up of Identified Energy and Water Efficiency Measures in Covered Facilities

This document provides specific guidance to agencies on the implementation and follow-up of energy and water efficiency measures identified and undertaken per Section 432 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) (42 U.S.C. 8253(f)(4) and (5)) This guidance also provides context for how these activities fit into the comprehensive approach to facility energy and water management outlined by the statute and incorporates by reference previous DOE guidance released for Section 432 of EISA and other related documents. 42 U.S.C. 8253(f)(7)(A) specifies that facility energy managers shall certify compliance for each covered facility with the 42 U.S.C. 8253(f)(2)-(5) requirements via a web-based tracking system and make it publicly available. This document also describes the role of the tracking system that has been developed for the collection and reporting of data needed for the demonstration of compliance and progress toward meeting all energy and water efficiency requirements outlined in the statute.

Guidance, Implementation, Energy, Water, Efficienc↗

Grid Architecture Guidance Specification for FAST-DERMS (V.1.0)

This document provides grid architecture guidance to support the Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium (GMLC) Federated Architecture for Secure and Transactive Distributed Energy Resource Management Solution (FAST-DERMS) project. The FAST-DERMS project seeks to develop an architecture and reference implementation solution that enables the provision of reliable, resilient, and secure transmission and distribution (T&D) grid services through the scalable aggregation and near-real-time management of utility-scale and small-scale distributed energy resources (DERs).

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Best Practices for the Design, Development, and Operation of Robust and Reliable Space Vehicle Guidance, Navigation, and Control Systems

This document summarizes and updates the NESC Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) Technical Discipline Team’s (TDT) work to synthesize and document the current best practices for the design & development of robust and reliable GN&C systems for robotic and crewed (human-rated) spacecraft. These GN&C best practices for future science and exploration missions were derived from the lessons learned, both positive and negative, on earlier spaceflight projects, both robotic and crewed. An attempt has been made to capture preferred practices that reflect the key considerations, trades, and processes directly attributed to past mission success.

Guidance, Navigation, and Control↗

Space shuttle GN and C equation document no. 23: Energy dissipation rate guidance for approach phase

The approach guidance routine for taking the space shuttle orbiter from the entry phase of approximately 100,000 feet to the start of the final landing maneuver is discussed. The approach guidance system is a closed feedback loop scheme. The vehicle energy is managed by controlling the rate at which energy is dissipated during a straight in approach. The spacecraft performance during each segment of the approach flight is analyzed. Equations of motion are developed to describe the spacecraft guidance and flight path.

Elias, A.↗

HFE Process Guidance and Standards for potential application to updating NRC guidance

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviews and evaluates the human factors engineering (HFE) programs of applicants for nuclear power plant construction permits, operating licenses, standard design certifications, and combined operating licenses. The purpose of these safety reviews is to help ensure that personnel performance and reliability are appropriately supported. Detailed design review procedures and guidance for the evaluations is provided in three key documents: the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800), the HFE Program Review Model (NUREG-0711), and the Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700). These documents were last revised in 2007, 2004 and 2002, respectively. The NRC is committed to the periodic update and improvement of these guidance documents to ensure that they remain state-of-the-art design evaluation tools. Thus, the NRC has initiated a project with BNL to update the NRC guidance to remain current with recent research on human performance, advances in HFE methods and tools, and new technology. INL supported Brookhaven National Lab (BNL) to update the detailed HFE review criteria contained in NUREG-0711 and NUREG-0700 based on (1) feedback obtained from end users, (2) the results of NRC research and development efforts supporting the NRC staff’s HFE safety reviews, and (3) other material the project staff identify as applicable to the update effort. INL submitted comments on development plans and sections of NUREGs 0800, 0711, and 0700. The contractor prepared the report attached here as the deliverable for this work.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Major Sources: Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional Boilers - Guidance for Calculating Emission Credits Resulting from Implementation of Energy Conservation Measures

The purpose of this document is to provide guidance for developing a consistent approach to documenting efficiency credits generated from energy conservation measures in the Implementation Plan for boilers covered by the Boiler MACT rule (i.e., subpart DDDDD of CFR part 63). This document divides Boiler System conservation opportunities into four functional areas: 1) the boiler itself, 2) the condensate recovery system, 3) the distribution system, and 4) the end uses of the steam. This document provides technical information for documenting emissions credits proposed in the Implementation Plan for functional areas 2) though 4). This document does not include efficiency improvements related to the Boiler tune-ups.

boiler↗

Secure Data Transfer Guidance for Industrial Control and SCADA Systems

This document was developed to provide guidance for the implementation of secure data transfer in a complex computational infrastructure representative of the electric power and oil and natural gas enterprises and the control systems they implement. For the past 20 years the cyber security community has focused on preventative measures intended to keep systems secure by providing a hard outer shell that is difficult to penetrate. Over time, the hard exterior, soft interior focus changed to focus on defense-in-depth adding multiple layers of protection, introducing intrusion detection systems, more effective incident response and cleanup, and many other security measures. Despite much larger expenditures and more layers of defense, successful attacks have only increased in number and severity. Consequently, it is time to re-focus the conventional approach to cyber security. While it is still important to implement measures to keep intruders out, a new protection paradigm is warranted that is aimed at discovering attempted or real compromises as early as possible. Put simply, organizations should take as fact that they have been, are now, or will be compromised. These compromises may be intended to steal information for financial gain as in the theft of intellectual property or credentials that lead to the theft of financial resources, or to lie silent until instructed to cause physical or electronic damage and/or denial of services. This change in outlook has been recently confirmed by the National Security Agency [19]. The discovery of attempted and actual compromises requires an increased focus on monitoring events by manual and/or automated log monitoring, detecting unauthorized changes to a system's hardware and/or software, detecting intrusions, and/or discovering the exfiltration of sensitive information and/or attempts to send inappropriate commands to ICS/SCADA (Industrial Control System/Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

GUIDANCE FOR THE PROPER CHARACTERIZATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF LOW SPECIFIC ACTIVITY MATERIALS AND SURFACE CONTAMINATED OBJECTS FOR DISPOSAL

Regulatory concerns over the proper characterization of certain waste streams led CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) to develop written guidance for personnel involved in Decontamination & Decommissioning (D&D) activities, facility management and Waste Management Representatives (WMRs) involved in the designation of wastes for disposal on and off the Hanford Site. It is essential that these waste streams regularly encountered in D&D operations are properly designated, characterized and classified prior to shipment to a Treatment, Storage or Disposal Facility (TSDF). Shipments of waste determined by the classification process as Low Specific Activity (LSA) or Surface Contaminated Objects (SCO) must also be compliant with all applicable U.S. Department of Transportation (DOE) regulations as well as Department of Energy (DOE) orders. The compliant shipment of these waste commodities is critical to the Hanford Central Plateau cleanup mission. Due to previous problems and concerns from DOE assessments, CHPRC internal critiques as well as DOT, a management decision was made to develop written guidance and procedures to assist CHPRC shippers and facility personnel in the proper classification of D&D waste materials as either LSA or SCO. The guidance provides a uniform methodology for the collection and documentation required to effectively characterize, classify and identify candidate materials for shipping operations. A primary focus is to ensure that waste materials generated from D&D and facility operations are compliant with the DOT regulations when packaged for shipment. At times this can be difficult as the current DOT regulations relative to the shipment of LSA and SCO materials are often not clear to waste generators. Guidance is often sought from NUREG 1608/RAMREG-003 [3]: a guidance document that was jointly developed by the DOT and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and published in 1998. However, NUREG 1608 [3] is now thirteen years old and requires updating to comply with the newer DOT regulations. Similar challenges present themselves throughout the nuclear industry in both commercial and government operations and therefore, this is not only a Hanford Site problem. Shipping radioactive wastes as either LSA or SCO rather than repacking it is significantly cheaper than other DOT radioactive materials shipping classifications particularly when the cost of packages is included. Additionally, the need to 'repackage' materials for transport can often increase worker exposure, necessitated by 'repackaging' waste materials into DOT 7 A Type A containers.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Major Sources: Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional Boilers - Guidance for Calculating Efficiency Credits Resulting from Implementation of Energy Conservation Measures

The purpose of this document is to provide guidance for developing a consistent approach to documenting efficiency credits generated from energy conservation measures in the Implementation Plan for boilers covered by the Boiler MACT rule (i.e., subpart DDDDD of CFR part 63). This document divides Boiler System conservation opportunities into four functional areas: 1) the boiler itself, 2) the condensate recovery system, 3) the distribution system, and 4) the end uses of the steam. This document provides technical information for documenting emissions credits proposed in the Implementation Plan for functional areas 2) though 4). This document does not include efficiency improvements related to the Boiler tune-ups.

Papar, Riyaz↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Major Sources: Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional Boilers; Guidance for Calculating Emission Credits Resulting from Implementation of Energy Conservation Measures

The purpose of this document is to provide guidance for developing a consistent approach to documenting efficiency credits generated from energy conservation measures in the Implementation Plan for boilers covered by the Boiler MACT rule (i.e., Subpart DDDDD of CFR Part 63).

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

The Low-Yield Nuclear Monitoring (LYNM) Experimental Science Plan

The Low-Yield Nuclear Monitoring (LYNM) Program is a long-term NNSA research and development effort designed to improve the United States’ explosion monitoring capabilities, particularly with respect to low-yield and potentially evasive underground nuclear testing. The LYNM Program focuses on researching, discovering, and exploiting unique and useful signatures, from all available technologies and sensors (e.g., seismic, acoustic, electromagnetic, gases, and particulates (both stable and radioactive)). Four Department of Energy laboratories participate in LYNM and together are referred to as the ‘quad-lab’. The R&D program execution is performed under NNSA defined structures known as “ventures”. Four science ventures were established: 1) Explosion Source Functions; 2) Containment of Low-Yield Underground Tests; 3) Local Signatures; 4) Dynamic Monitoring Networks. To organize and execute the large field scale experiment a fifth venture was established: 5) Physics Experiment One (PE-1). As part of the LYNM Program, a series of experiments are planned at various scales and levels of venture involvement. These vary from those that involve a subset of labs and/or LYNM ventures (e.g., small experiments), to full quad-lab LYNM Program field-scale integrated experiments. Such experiments may involve chemical explosions with tracer materials or other means of simulating the expected signals from a nuclear explosion. The LYNM Program does not conduct actual nuclear explosions. Since 1992, the U.S. has observed a moratorium on underground nuclear explosions. This document is intended to provide the underlying scientific basis for the LYNM planned experimental work. Each specific LYNM experiment will develop a goals, objectives, and requirements (GOR) plan following the guidance in this document. The LYNM technical staff will define the numbers and types of experiments required over the course of the Program based on technical needs and within funding constraints. As with any scientific experiment series, the number and types of experiments may change based upon the experimental results obtained. An experiment that agrees with models/codes/software signature predictions may need fewer repetitions/variations, depending upon the level of statistical rigor desired, as compared to one in which the predictions and experimental data do not match. The large LYNM field-scale integrated experiments require the longest lead-time for planning, and these are discussed in more detail near the end of this document.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Making intelligent systems team players: Additional case studies

Observations from a case study of intelligent systems are reported as part of a multi-year interdisciplinary effort to provide guidance and assistance for designers of intelligent systems and their user interfaces. A series of studies were conducted to investigate issues in designing intelligent fault management systems in aerospace applications for effective human-computer interaction. The results of the initial study are documented in two NASA technical memoranda: TM 104738 Making Intelligent Systems Team Players: Case Studies and Design Issues, Volumes 1 and 2; and TM 104751, Making Intelligent Systems Team Players: Overview for Designers. The objective of this additional study was to broaden the investigation of human-computer interaction design issues beyond the focus on monitoring and fault detection in the initial study. The results of this second study are documented which is intended as a supplement to the original design guidance documents. These results should be of interest to designers of intelligent systems for use in real-time operations, and to researchers in the areas of human-computer interaction and artificial intelligence.

Malin, Jane T.↗

Hospital Energy Benchmarking Guidance - Version 1.0

This document describes an energy benchmarking framework for hospitals. The document is organized as follows. The introduction provides a brief primer on benchmarking and its application to hospitals. The next two sections discuss special considerations including the identification of normalizing factors. The presentation of metrics is preceded by a description of the overall framework and the rationale for the grouping of metrics. Following the presentation of metrics, a high-level protocol is provided. The next section presents draft benchmarks for some metrics; benchmarks are not available for many metrics owing to a lack of data. This document ends with a list of research needs for further development.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Value Based Decision Approach to Help Inform Waste Management Guidance for VLLW Following an RDD Detonation - 19510

The detonation of a radiological dispersal device in an urban environment or similar large-scale radiological event has the potential to spread radioactive contamination over a large area. The resulting effort to clean up and dispose of this waste will involve input and coordination from a wide variety of stakeholder groups, especially if the waste crosses municipal and state boundaries. Guidance designed to help effectively and safely deal with the wastes generated from incident cleanup will need to navigate the intersection of stakeholders at the local, regional, and national levels. At the same time, the sheer size of such a cleanup effort and the volumes of wastes generated will require innovative and potentially novel solutions compared to current Low-Level Radioactive Waste disposal practices. A structured decision-making approach incorporating value-focused thinking is one method that could be employed to help build stakeholder confidence in a given cleanup guidance strategy and documentation. This approach would help ensure that all stakeholder perspectives were accounted for in a given decision situation and to promote transparency in the decision-making process. This paper will discuss research into the role and development of a public stakeholder tool used to gather input from relevant stakeholders in order to help inform cleanup and disposal guidance of Very Low-Level Radioactive Waste following a radiological disaster. This tool is being designed to draw on aspects of value-focused decision making. Case studies from two prominent recent events will be discussed to illustrate some of the key issues that could benefit from such an approach to stakeholders. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Information security management system planning for CBRN facilities

The focus of this document is to provide guidance for the development of information security management system planning documents at chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) facilities. It describes a risk-based approach for planning information security programs based on the sensitivity of the data developed, processed, communicated, and stored on facility information systems.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Streamlining NIF Design Engineering Processes

As a new project and facility, the National Ignition Facility (NIF) located a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), adopted a design standard that incorporated a safety criteria process that all equipment was to be designed with thorough design documentation and a level of safety evaluation that guaranteed tractability and success in the commissioning of this new asset. The documentation is in the form of a Mechanical Engineering Safety Note (MESN) or Engineering Note (EN), which is a complete stand-alone review document of each design, with backup support, detailed analysis, drawings and a full review committee signoff. The design safety review process was given conservative Factors of Safety (FS) and guidance to evaluated design adequacy, leading to robust support structures. The MESN, EN, FS and guidance requirements were primarily driven by a need for confidence in the early success of the facility and the importance of personnel safety concerns. As the NIF facility and operations have matured and design loads, usage and risks have been become well defined and empirically validated, and we now have an opportunity to streamline the design process by not requiring such strict adherence to historical practice, specifically for non-personnel safety related requirements. This streamlining helps support a congressional review that was performed on NIF to determine cost saving opportunities in all areas of operation and development. This proposed NIF design guidance design approach would save design time, schedule and material costs. The new design approach includes reductions in FS and reduction in formal documentation, and will be implemented through the release of a NIF Design Guidance Document. This document will be used actively by designers, project engineers, structural analysts, safety engineers, scientists and engineering management to prepare, evaluated and approve designs for NIF experiments. This document will also be used as a general supporting reference for all design reviews involving the active stakeholders. The active stakeholders will gain through a faster design cycle time, from requirements, to concept, to final design, using less expensive materials and fewer design iterations. The passive stakeholders will gain through lighter weight equipment, easier to acquire materials, easier to manufacture parts and shorter schedules to get equipment in the hands of the user.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Design Guidelines for Deployable Wind Turbines for Military Operational Energy Applications

This document aims to provide guidance on the design and operation of deployable wind systems that provide maximum value to missions in defense and disaster relief. Common characteristics of these missions are shorter planning and execution time horizons and a global scope of potential locations. Compared to conventional wind turbine applications, defense and disaster response applications place a premium on rapid shipping and installation, short-duration operation (days to months), and quick teardown upon mission completion. Furthermore, defense and disaster response applications are less concerned with cost of energy than conventional wind turbine applications. These factors impart design drivers that depart from the features found in conventional distributed wind turbines, thus necessitating unique design guidance. The supporting information for this guidance comes from available relevant references, technical analyses, and input from industry and military stakeholders. This document is not intended to be a comprehensive, prescriptive design specification. This document is intended to serve as a written record of an ongoing discussion of stakeholders about the best currently available design guidance for deployable wind turbines to help facilitate the effective development and acquisition of technology solutions to support mission success. The document is generally organized to provide high-level, focused guidance in the main body, with more extensive supporting details available in the referenced appendices. Section 2 begins with a brief qualitative description of the design guidelines being considered for the deployable wind turbines. Section 3 provides an overview of the characteristics of the mobile power systems commonly used in U.S. military missions. Section 4 covers current military and industry standards and specifications that are relevant to a deployable wind turbine design. Section 5 presents the deployable turbine design guidelines for the application cases.

17 WIND ENERGY↗