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At least 343 records · Page 19
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Contaminant Migration Modeling to Support the In Situ Decommissioning of Hardened Nuclear Facilities - 20215

The decommissioning of hardened nuclear facilities provides a unique challenge in balancing current worker dose with exposure to future receptors and media. In situ decommissioning (ISD) is a cost-effective and safe option for the closure of such facilities but requires a detailed understanding of the threat that radioactive and hazardous constituents remaining in the facilities pose to groundwater and surrounding surface water. The Savannah River Site (SRS) extensively employs contaminant migration models within the decommissioning process to develop site-specific removal, grouting, and monitoring strategies in support of safe and effective final end states of nuclear facilities. This work discusses the use of contaminant migration modeling in the ISD process at SRS, including specific examples from the closure of P-Reactor and R-Reactor, Building 235-F, F-Canyon and F/H Laboratory Complex. Migration models developed during the closure of P-Reactor and R-Reactor were divided into four source areas: the reactor vessel, the process area, the disassembly basin, and the purification wing. Each source area was assigned a specific inventory and migration pathway and was then subject to varying hypothetical removal, capping, and grouting schemes. Modeling indicated that groundwater Maximum Concentration Limits (MCLs) might be exceeded if no action was taken for eleven and ten constituents of concern (COCs) at P-Reactor and R-Reactor, respectively. These exceedances could occur in as few as 200 to 500 years. Alternatively, the migration modeling demonstrated that the selected ISD actions reduced contaminant mobility which allowed for significant radioactive decay and resulted in fewer predicted exceedances of groundwater MCLs (five COCs for P-Reactor; eight COCs for R-Reactor). In response to the modeling results for P-Reactor and R-Reactor, effectiveness monitoring programs were developed to target contaminants, specific to each reactor, that may migrate to groundwater. Contaminant migration modeling also revealed that roof collapse was a large factor in the release of COCs to the environment, giving rise to roof improvements, and an inspection and vegetation control program to ensure roof stability over time. Contaminant migration modeling is also aiding in the closure planning for hardened facilities in F Area. Building 235-F housed the Actinide Billet Line, which produced Np-237 billets for irradiation in SRS reactors, and the Plutonium Fuel Form (PuFF) facility that produced Pu-238 heat sources for the space program. As a result of these missions, areas within Building 235-F contain considerable residual amounts of both Pu-238 and Np-237. Contaminant migration modeling of Building 235-F was originally performed in 2012 to identify the feasibility of ISD and the amount of radioactive material removal required to prevent the exceedance of groundwater MCLs. The original model indicated that a 60% reduction in the PuFF facility Pu-238 inventory could keep groundwater concentrations below standards, while Np-237 did not pose a threat to groundwater. However, updates to the model with an emphasis on source impact pathways revealed that, due to the orientation of the source areas relative to groundwater flow, no amount of reasonable removal of Pu-238 would keep groundwater concentrations below MCLs and that Np-237 could be a large contributor to localized MCL exceedances. With this insight, the refined 2019 model is being used to assist in the development of grouting plans specific to each facility source area, where bentonite may be utilized to slow the migration of Pu-238 and its daughter products from the PuFF facility and a reducing grout may decrease Np-237 transport by ensuring the nuclide remains in the less mobile +IV oxidation state. The beginning phases of contaminant migration modeling are underway for F-Canyon and associated facilities using lessons learned from the Reactors and Building 235-F. A contaminant migration pathway, similar to the pathway used for the reactor vessels, is being developed for the hot and warm canyons. The F-Canyon inventories are being spatially refined to identify specific and localized source zones, comparable to Building 235-F, that may impact groundwater. Contaminant migration modeling provides vital input within the ISD process, from facility investigation to post closure effectiveness monitoring, making it a valuable tool in the development of safe and effective end states for hardened nuclear facilities at SRS. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS1998

Refurbishment and Automation of the Thermal/Vacuum Facilities at the Goddard Space Flight Center

The thermal/vacuum facilities located at the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) have supported both manned and unmanned space flight since the 1960s. Of the 11 facilities, currently 10 of the systems are scheduled for refurbishment and/or replacement as part of a 5-year implementation. Expected return on investment includes the reduction in test schedules, improvements in the safety of facility operations, reduction in the complexity of a test and the reduction in personnel support required for a test. Additionally, GSFC will become a global resource renowned for expertise in thermal engineering, mechanical engineering and for the automation of thermal/vacuum facilities and thermal/vacuum tests. Automation of the thermal/vacuum facilities includes the utilization of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and the use of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. These components allow the computer control and automation of mechanical components such as valves and pumps. In some cases, the chamber and chamber shroud require complete replacement while others require only mechanical component retrofit or replacement. The project of refurbishment and automation began in 1996 and has resulted in the computer control of one Facility (Facility #225) and the integration of electronically controlled devices and PLCs within several other facilities. Facility 225 has been successfully controlled by PLC and SCADA for over one year. Insignificant anomalies have occurred and were resolved with minimal impact to testing and operations. The amount of work remaining to be performed will occur over the next four to five years. Fiscal year 1998 includes the complete refurbishment of one facility, computer control of the thermal systems in two facilities, implementation of SCADA and PLC systems to support multiple facilities and the implementation of a Database server to allow efficient test management and data analysis.

Donohue, John T.↗
NASA NTRS2005

D-Side: A Facility and Workforce Planning Group Multi-criteria Decision Support System for Johnson Space Center

"To understand and protect our home planet, to explore the universe and search for life, and to inspire the next generation of explorers" is NASA's mission. The Systems Management Office at Johnson Space Center (JSC) is searching for methods to effectively manage the Center's resources to meet NASA's mission. D-Side is a group multi-criteria decision support system (GMDSS) developed to support facility decisions at JSC. D-Side uses a series of sequential and structured processes to plot facilities in a three-dimensional (3-D) graph on the basis of each facility alignment with NASA's mission and goals, the extent to which other facilities are dependent on the facility, and the dollar value of capital investments that have been postponed at the facility relative to the facility replacement value. A similarity factor rank orders facilities based on their Euclidean distance from Ideal and Nadir points. These similarity factors are then used to allocate capital improvement resources across facilities. We also present a parallel model that can be used to support decisions concerning allocation of human resources investments across workforce units. Finally, we present results from a pilot study where 12 experienced facility managers from NASA used D-Side and the organization's current approach to rank order and allocate funds for capital improvement across 20 facilities. Users evaluated D-Side favorably in terms of ease of use, the quality of the decision-making process, decision quality, and overall value-added. Their evaluations of D-Side were significantly more favorable than their evaluations of the current approach. Keywords: NASA, Multi-Criteria Decision Making, Decision Support System, AHP, Euclidean Distance, 3-D Modeling, Facility Planning, Workforce Planning.

Tavana, Madjid↗
DOE OSTI2015

Andra's strategy and approach for operational safety of French underground facility Cigeo - 15127

According to the French Act on radioactive waste of 28 June 2006, Andra shall design a reversible repository. In response to this demand, Andra is developing the industrial project namely 'Cigeo', a reversible geological disposal facility for HLW and ILW located in Meuse/Haute-Marne. The previous safety cases of 2005, 2009 and 2012 give a sound basis to assess Cigeo's safety both for the operational and post-closure periods. Regarding operational safety, in this new stage of the project, the challenging issues for the preparation of the safety case are the following: - To adapt the various regulatory frameworks (nuclear and non-nuclear) to the underground facility - To design the underground facility and handling equipment's to reduce at first risks in the underground facility as such radioactive particles release, gas explosion, fire and co-activity and limit their consequence. - To establish waste acceptance criteria to be fulfilled by waste producers in line with operational safety and design options. The objective of the paper is to present the experience of Andra in operation safety of the underground facility of Cigeo. Operational safety for Cigeo is assessed as much as possible according to the existing French regulations and guidance for nuclear facilities. Indeed, compared to existing nuclear facilities, a geological repository is a specific case due to the existence of underground facilities with particularities such as: - ventilation management in a large scale underground facility, - fire risk management. As an input for the industrial design of Cigeo for operation, Andra defined a fire guidance and a specific reference safety guidance, based on the adaptation of the French nuclear regulatory texts for and when feasible to mines and tunnels regulatory texts and on its own experience gained through safety operational reports since 2005 and their reviews by the Safety Authority. - underground co-activity of nuclear operation with construction works. According to the common 'defense-in depth' principle for nuclear facilities, these guidelines for the industrial design of Cigeo for operation consider the successive levels of defense of: - Preventing the risk and its spreading by design and construction; - Detecting incidents and early fighting by design and operation dispositions (detection and control systems, survey procedure); - Controlling incidents and limiting of their consequences by safeguarding systems, specific procedures. At that stage, design options for Cigeo constitute an adequate response to the operational safety functions and requirements: - Two levels of containment are set up: the first one is ensured by the waste package, the second one is ensured from the surface facility to the disposal vaults by the transfer cask during the transfer of waste packages in the disposal vaults by the disposal vault itself and a nuclear ventilation with HEPA filter; - Favorable options for fire risk prevention and mitigation: transport system minimizing heat load (cable car for the transfer from the surface, electric transfer engines), twin access tunnels to ease fire-fighting and evacuation...; - Permanent complete physical separation of nuclear zone and construction zone (including ventilation systems). In practice, operation safety assessment of Cigeo, designed following the aforesaid reference safety guidelines, follows a common risk analysis (internal aggressions such as auxiliary losses, chemical and toxic risks, fall or collision, fire, human factors and external aggressions such as earthquake, air traffic, flooding) with the following steps: - Identification of the major risks and the design basis scenarios that have to be considered for dimensioning of the installations and the safety devices; - On the basis of these different situations, those who will have to be quantified are identified; one or more representative and envelop situations are chosen in order to evaluate robustness of the installation. Quantitative evaluation of these situations permits to: - identify the consequences on man, environment and installation, and in particular to gain confidence in the maintaining of the safety functions; - identify or define the technic and/or organisational dispositions classified as 'important elements for protection' (IEP); - Situations beyond dimensioning permit to verify the robustness of the installation. They permit, on one hand to identify possible complementary material or organisational dispositions; on the other hand, to define the 'hard core' i.e. structures, systems and components that permit to maintain the confinement function of radioactive substance. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

The status of LILW disposal facility construction in Korea - 15158

In this paper, we discuss the experiences during the construction of the first LILW disposal facility in South Korea. In December 2005, the South Korean Government designated Gyeongju-city as a host city of Low- and Intermediate-Level Radioactive Waste (LILW) disposal site through local referendums held in regions whose local governments had applied to host disposal facility in accordance with the site selection procedures. The LILW disposal facility is being constructed in Bongil-ri, Yangbuk-myeon, Gyeongju. The official name of the disposal facility is called 'Wolsong Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Center (LILW Disposal Center)'. It can dispose of 800,000 drums of radioactive wastes in a site of 2,100,000 square meters. At the first stage, LILW repository of underground silo type with disposal capacity of 100,000 drums was completed by the end of June 2014. The Wolsong Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Center consists of surface facilities and underground facilities. The surface facilities include a receipt and inspection facility, an interim storage facility, a radioactive waste treatment building, and supporting facilities such as main control center, equipment and maintenance shop. The underground facilities consist of a construction tunnel for transport of construction equipment and materials, an operation tunnel for transport of radioactive waste, an access shaft for workers, and six silos for final disposal of radioactive waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

In-Situ Gamma-Ray Assay of the 235-F Plutonium Fuel Form Facility at the Savannah River Site - 16293

The Plutonium Fuel Form (PuFF) Facility is located in Building 235-F near the geographic center of the Savannah River Site. Between 1978 and 1984, the facility was used to produce approximately 165 kilograms of iridium-encapsulated Pu-238 spheres and pellets for use as radioisotope thermal generators, primarily for the space program. The facility is divided between two cell lines, the east cell line used to process powdered Pu-238 oxide raw material into fuel forms and the west cell line used to encapsulate the fuel forms in iridium. Scoping in-situ gamma-ray assays were performed in the PuFF Facility in 2006 and estimated that hundreds of grams of Pu-238 holdup were within the facility. Using this holdup estimate as a source term, SRS has performed a risk analysis that indicated a seismic event that induces a full-facility fire in 235-F could lead to a 28,800 rem dose to a co-located worker. Based on this risk assessment, SRS is taking steps to decontaminate the facility. One of the first steps taken has been to improve upon the quality of the in-situ gamma-ray assay data. Carts and collimators were specially designed to survey the equipment in the PuFF Facility. The cell interiors were assayed along with the furnaces and storage coolers that protrude beneath the cells. While the previous scoping work consisted of 32 measurements, the current series of measurements included nearly 400 measurements using both high-purity germanium and lanthanum bromide detectors. Data analysis for the current set of measurements was conducted with greater rigor as well. MCNP5 was used to evaluate a variety of possible physical distributions for the Pu-238 source term and estimate cross-talk between neighboring cells. Data analysis was performed using three gamma-rays emitted by Pu-238 (99.85 keV, 152.7 keV, and 766.4 keV) providing three independent estimates of the mass of Pu-238 holdup in each of the cells. This also allowed the application of matrix correction factors to adjust gamma-ray attenuation. The weighted mean of these three results was used as the best estimate of Pu-238 holdup in the PuFF facility. This work lowered the estimate of holdup in the PuFF facility by approximately 100 grams compared to the previous estimate, a 0.55's difference. The uncertainty in the Pu-238 holdup was also reduced substantially relative to the 2006 scoping assay. Further radiological measurements are planned for the near future including in-situ gamma-ray assays of wing cabinets in the east cell line maintenance area, the transfer tube between the two cell lines, and some of the furnaces and storage coolers. A germanium gamma imager, the GeGI, will also be used to map out the distribution of the Pu-238 source term in the PuFF Facility. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Implementation of Increased Salt and Decreased Sludge Volumes in the Defense Waste Processing Facility - 19597

The Savannah River Site (SRS) Liquid Waste System (LWS) safely stores and treats high-level radioactive waste. The LWS consists of 51 waste storage tanks (eight of which are operationally closed and filled with grout), waste evaporators, treatment facilities, and solidification facilities such as the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) and Saltstone Production Facility (SPF). The disposition of high-level waste (HLW) into a glass waste form poured into canisters at the DWPF began in 1996. DWPF processed a sludge only flowsheet until 2008 when the Actinide Removal Process (ARP) and Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit (MCU) began treating the salt waste from the underground liquid storage tanks by striking with monosodium titanate (MST) to remove actinides, when necessary to meet downstream acceptance criteria, and removing the MST and entrained sludge solids (SS) by filtration before using an organic solvent to strip the cesium from the salt, creating two new concentrated HLW streams. This change caused the DWPF to begin processing under both a sludge-only and a coupled operations flowsheet where salt streams would only be added when available. This strategy allows for continuous glass canister production at DWPF. Recently, DWPF completed a 10-month melter replacement in December 2017 and the Concentrate, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF) has completed repairs to the 3H Evaporator system. These facility outages have caused delays in preparing the next batch of sludge feed for DWPF. Concurrent with these facility outages, the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) has been undergoing system testing and commissioning, working toward startup. SWPF is designed to process salt waste in the same manner as ARP/MCU, but with much higher throughput volumes produced per unit time. In order to process the SWPF salt streams efficiently, DWPF will implement a coupled operation only flowsheet. Based on the facility outages mentioned above, efforts have been made to identify strategies to minimize sludge volumes and maximize salt volumes in the DWPF until the next sludge batch is ready for processing in DWPF. Savannah River Remediation (SRR) recently performed an evaluation that examines the effects of reducing the volume of sludge and maximizing the addition of the cesium-rich concentrated salt solution in each Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT) batch in order to extend the existing sludge batch as long as possible until the next sludge batch is ready. These effects include a reduction of weight percent solids in the DWPF processing vessels, an increase in cycle time, a new canister heat generation value that remains within regulatory limits, and higher gamma source that remains within bulk facility gamma shielding. Balancing the above parameters resulted in a small reduction of sludge volume per SRAT batch under SWPF operation and maximizing the salt volumes for both ARP/MCU and SWPF operation. This slight reduction in sludge volume and increase in salt volumes allows SRR to mitigate some of the schedule impact incurred by the facility outages. This strategy was evaluated for both ARP/MCU and SWPF operation. This strategy has been successfully implemented under ARP/MCU operation using small step changes in the current process. This paper provides an overview of the evaluation performed for DWPF with ARP/MCU and DWPF with SWPF operations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Findings on subtask 3.3 – applicability of automated brine chemistry determinations for treatment and recovery processes through facility automation/modularization: engineering design study

Under the Energy & Environmental Research Center’s (EERC’s) ~$\$$22 million Phase II Brine Extraction and Storage Test (BEST) Program, a multimillion-dollar brine treatment technology test bed facility was established in western North Dakota to provide a platform for evaluating developing technologies and approaches for brine treatment and volume reduction. The initial facility, and associated research effort, was funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), with in-kind contributions provided by several industry participants and the state of North Dakota. Since its opening, the Brine Technology Test Facility (BTTF) has supported performance evaluations of desalination technologies capable of treating high-salinity produced water (PW) and enabled data collection for multiple approaches of PW management and critical material recovery. As part of the decommissioning process for the original project, facility ownership and liability were transferred to Select Water, which is providing the EERC with a continuing site access option for state or federal research and/or commercial technology development. This report documents the findings from a design study conducted by the EERC and the engineering firm that was originally contracted to design and construct the facility (Advanced Engineering and Environmental Services, LLC [AE2S]) that evaluated the current status of BTTF and its systems and developed a retrofit design to increase the facility’s capabilities through automation and modularization of its PW treatment infrastructure. The proposed retrofit will provide DOE and industry with an expanded range of conditioned PW that can be produced at the facility for evaluating fit-for-purpose water treatment technologies, online instrumentation for brine chemistry determination, and systems that recover critical materials like lithium and magnesium. The current facility consists of an 9600-square-foot facility that includes a 40-foot by 65-foot Class 1, Division 2-rated demonstration area and associated control rooms and lab-ready space capable of sourcing oil and gas PW and wastewater from industrial sources or tailoring brine compositions up to 300,000 mg/L total dissolved solids (TDS) and supplying them at rates up to 25 gpm for extended-duration technology demonstrations. The colocation of the facility with Select Water’s water management facilities allows for access and unloading of more than 10,000 bbl/day of trucked water delivered to site and associated access to on-site Class I and Class II brine disposal wells and nearby hazardous waste landfills operated and/or contracted by Select Water to dispose of concentrate and/or effluents associated with the testing.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
NASA NTRS1991

Nuclear electric propulsion development and qualification facilities

This paper summarizes the findings of a Tri-Agency panel consisting of members from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) that were charged with reviewing the status and availability of facilities to test components and subsystems for megawatt-class nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) systems. The facilities required to support development of NEP are available in NASA centers, DOE laboratories, and industry. However, several key facilities require significant and near-term modification in order to perform the testing required to meet a 2014 launch date. For the higher powered Mars cargo and piloted missions, the priority established for facility preparation is: (1) a thruster developmental testing facility, (2) a thruster lifetime testing facility, (3) a dynamic energy conversion development and demonstration facility, and (4) an advanced reactor testing facility (if required to demonstrate an advanced multiwatt power system). Facilities to support development of the power conditioning and heat rejection subsystems are available in industry, federal laboratories, and universities. In addition to the development facilities, a new preflight qualifications and acceptance testing facility will be required to support the deployment of NEP systems for precursor, cargo, or piloted Mars missions. Because the deployment strategy for NEP involves early demonstration missions, the demonstration of the SP-100 power system is needed by the early 2000's.

Dutt, D. S.↗
NASA NTRS1977

Construction bidding cost of KSC's space shuttle facilities

The bidding cost of the major Space Transportation System facilities constructed under the responsibility of the John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) is described and listed. These facilities and Ground Support Equipment (GSE) are necessary for the receiving, assembly, testing, and checkout of the Space Shuttle for launch and landing missions at KSC. The Shuttle launch configuration consists of the Orbiter, the External Tank, and the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB). The reusable Orbiter and SRB's is the major factor in the program that will result in lowering space travel costs. The new facilities are the Landing Facility; Orbiter Processing Facility; Orbiter Approach and Landing Test Facility (Dryden Test Center, California); Orbiter Mating Devices; Sound Suppression Water System; and Emergency Power System for LC-39. Also, a major factor was to use as much Apollo facilities and hardware as possible to reduce the facilities cost. The alterations to existing Apollo facilities are the VAB modifications; Mobile Launcher Platforms; Launch Complex 39 Pads A and B (which includes a new concept - the Rotary Service Structure), which was featured in ENR, 3 Feb. 1977, 'Hinged Space Truss will Support Shuttle Cargo Room'; Launch Control Center mods; External Tank and SRB Processing and Storage; Fluid Test Complex mods; O&C Spacelab mods; Shuttle mods for Parachute Facility; SRB Recovery and Disassembly Facility at Hangar 'AF'; and an interesting GSE item - the SRB Dewatering Nozzle Plug Sets (Remote Controlled Submarine System) used to inspect and acquire for reuse of SRB's.

Brown, Joseph Andrew↗
NASA NTRS2004

Refining the W1 and SE1 Facilities

The Engine Research Building (ERB) houses more than 60 test rigs that study all aspects of engine development. By working with Mary Gibson in the SE1 and W1A Turbine Facilities, I became aware of her responsibilities and better acquainted with the inner workings of the ERB. The SE1 Supersonic/Subsonic Wind Tunnel Facility contains 2 small wind tunnels. The first tunnel uses an atmospheric inlet, while the second uses treated 40-psig air. Both of the tunnels are capable of subsonic and supersonic operation. An auxiliary air supply and exhaust piping providing both test sections with suction, blowing, and crossfire capabilities. The current configuration of SE1 consists of a curved diffuser that studies the blockage along the endwalls. The W1A Low Speed Compressor Facility provides insight for the complex flow phenomena within its 4-stage axial compressor, sand the data obtained from W 1A is used to develop advanced models for fluid dynamic assessment. W1A is based off of a low speed research compressor developed by GE in the 1950's. This compressor has a removable casing treatment under rotor 1, which allows for various tip treatment studies. The increased size and low speed allows instrumentation to be located in the compressor s complex flow paths. Air enters the facility through a filtered roof vent, conditioned for temperature and turbulence, and then passed through the compressor W1A is described as a dynamic facility with many projects taking place simultaneously. This current environment makes it challenging to follow the various affairs that are taking place within the area. During my first 4 weeks at the NASA Glenn Research Center, I have assisted Mary Gibson in multiple tasks such as facility documents, record keeping, maintenance and upgrades. The facility has lube systems for its gearbox and compressor. These systems are critical in the successful operation of the facility. I was assigned the task of creating a facility estimate list, which included the filters and strainers required for the compressor. For my remaining time spent here, we expect to complete a facility parts listing and a virtual project summary so that W1A and SE1 will become ergonomic facilities that will make it easier for people to observe the capabilities and history of the area and the employees that operate. Bolstering our efforts in achieving these goal are the online technical tutorials, software such as Microsoft Excel. Macromedia Flash MX Macromedia Dreamweaver MX, Photoshop 6.0 and the assistance of several NASA employees.

Chambers, Rodney D.↗
DOE OSTI2014

Definition of Capabilities Needed for a Single Event Effects Test Facility

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is contemplating new regulations mandating testing of the vulnerability of flight-critical avionics to single event effects (SEE). A limited number of high-energy neutron test facilities currently serve the SEE industrial and institutional research community. The FAA recognizes that existing facilities have insufficient test capacity to meet new demand from such mandates; it desires more flexible irradiation capabilities to test complete, large systems and would like capabilities to address greater concerns for thermal neutrons. For this reason, the FAA funded this study by Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) staff with the ultimate aim of developing options for SEE test facilities using high-energy neutrons at the SNS complex. After an investigation of current SEE test practices and assessment of future testing requirements, three concepts were identified covering a range of test functionality, neutron flux levels, and fidelity to the atmospheric neutron spectrum. The costs and times required to complete each facility were also estimated. SEE testing is generally performed by accelerating the event rate to a point where the effects are still dominated by single events and double event causes of failures are negligible. In practice, acceleration factors of as high as 10 6 are applicable for component testing, whereas for systems testing acceleration factors of 10 4 seem to be the upper limit. It is strongly desirable that the irradiation facility be tunable over a large range of high-energy neutron fluxes of 10 2 - 10 4 n/cm²/s for systems testing and from 10 4 - 10 7 n/cm²/s for components testing. The most capable, most flexible, and highest-test-capacity option is a new stand-alone target station named the High-Energy neutron Test Station (HETS). It is also the most expensive option, with a cost to complete of approximately $100 million. Dual test enclosures would allow for simultaneous testing activity effectively doubling overall test capacity per HETS operating hour. Using about 1 kilowatt (kW) of proton power extracted from the accelerator before injection in the accumulator ring, its operation would be unnoticeable by neutron scattering users at the SNS target station. The H beam laser stripping technique would allow for control of beam power on the HETS target independent from power delivered to the SNS. Large systems with frontal areas of up to 1 x 2 m² could be accommodated with integral high-energy flux values (above 10 megaelectron-volt, or MeV) to at most 10 4 n/cm²/s; components could also be tested with flux levels to at most 10 7 n/cm²/s on beam sizes of up to 0.2 x 0.2 m². Selectable moderating material and neutron filters would allow tailoring of the neutron spectrum to user demands; charged particle deflectors could be switched to allow or deflect protons, pions, and muons. It is estimated that HETS would take 5 years to complete after award of contract, including engineering design and construction. Commissioning would take at least another 6 months. Interference with SNS principal operations was not considered in the construction time estimate; connection of the proton transport line and tunnel from the accelerator high energy beam transport (HEBT) and construction around existing site utilities would require careful planning and coordination with beam operations at the SNS. A high-energy (HE) neutron test facility using an available beam line on the SNS target station is a technically and financially attractive option. Inspired by the new ChipIR instrument on the ISIS TS 2 spallation source in the UK, a similar facility could be placed on an unused beam line in the SNS instrument hall [e.g., on beam line 8 (both A and B channels would be needed) or on beam line 10]. The performance would approach that of an HETS (~80%), but it would be operationally more limited, with only a single user at a time. Space is more limited, so the maximum system size would be about half of that in an HETS. Flexibility to tailor the spectrum would be somewhat more limited. While this concept was not as fully developed and characterized, preliminary work indicates very high HE flux levels should be possible, with ample thermal neutrons as well. Flux control would be more difficult than at HETS because proton power on target be whatever the SNS was operating at for neutron scattering. Neutron attenuation devices would have to be employed with as-yet undetermined control resolution. However, no new buildings would be needed, and the necessary utilities are already present in the SNS Experiment Hall. The estimated cost for a beam line option is around $15 million; the time to complete would be 3 years after award of contract, plus at least 6 months for commissioning. Interference of construction activities with SNS operations should be negligible. This option would require negotiation with the Department of Energy Basic Energy Sciences (BES) office -- the primary stakeholder of SNS -- for an application outside the usual scope of neutron scattering sciences. Furthermore, these presently open beam lines are highly desirable locations for proposed neutron scattering instruments and obtaining one of them for an SEE test facility will come only with persuasive and timely arguments to SNS leadership and the DOE BES. The third option is a tunnel extension/target cave facility providing the most basic system-level irradiation capability with minimal flexibility. Again not as well developed a concept as HETS, it would use a laser-stripping technique like an HETS, redirecting protons to a tunnel similar to the initial HETS proton transport tunnel. Indeed, this concept is intended to be upgradable to a full HETS facility. Only a small fraction of a watt of proton power would be used in this basic configuration, though. An uncooled target and primitive shielding arrangement would provide beam on modestly sized systems that must be placed in close proximity to the target. The neutron fluence would be less uniform over the system than with the HETS or the beam line option. A data acquisition room and support area would be located on the ground level; access to the target cave would be via elevator and/or stairway. As a result of the required excavation, new tunnel construction, shielding, data acquisition building, utilities, and other items, the estimated cost is $30 million. The time to complete is expected be more than 3 years; here again construction interference with SNS operations has not been accounted for, but it could have a significant impact.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2017

As-Built Characterization and Monitoring System for the RH-LLW Disposal Facility

The performance assessment (PA) for the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Remote Handled Low Level Waste (RH LLW) disposal facility (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE]-ID 2012) is required to demonstrate that the facility design will meet the performance objectives established for long term protection of the public and the environment following closure of the facility as outlined in DOE Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” Protectiveness of the facility in terms of the groundwater pathway is a function of the design features that control the hydrologic and geochemical conditions within and below the vault system. The facility design includes features to promote drainage of infiltrating water to limit accumulation of moisture next to the reinforced concrete disposal vaults and containerized waste. The PA groundwater pathway model accounts for a cement impacted geochemical environment within and below the vault system to inhibit corrosion of stainless steel waste containers (i.e., waste liners), steel reinforcement in the concrete vault, and the effects on release and migration of non anionic radionuclides. Upon closure of the facility, an engineered barrier (i.e., cover) will be placed over the facility to reduce infiltration through the waste zone, retarding the release and migration rate of radionuclides beneath the facility. Crediting the long-term performance of the vault system requires characterization of the hydraulic and concrete performance over time. Verification of the vault performance requires monitoring for radiologic releases from the facility. The purpose of this document is to provide the description of the characterization and monitoring system installed at the facility to accomplish these two objectives.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Calculating Methane Emissions from Offshore Facilities Using Bottom-Up Methods

With changing demands in regulation, understanding methane emissions from offshore oil and gas production infrastructure has become increasingly important. Reported emissions from facilities in the Gulf of Mexico range from zero to thousands of tons of methane per hour, but these is currently no clear understanding of how this range compares to expected emissions from normally operating facilities. To generate realistic emission estimates, we create two bottom-up models that simulate emissions from facilities operating in the Gulf of Mexico. We estimate type 1 prototypical facilities (typically unmanned, older, lower-producing platforms in shallow water with little processing equipment, compressors, or storage tanks) to emit an average of 13 kg CH 4 h −1 , which corresponds to a loss of 2.7% of the average facility production. Type 2 prototypical facilities (continuously manned, higher production and operate in deeper water with processing equipment, oil storage tanks, compressors and power generation) emit an average of 88 kg CH 4 h −1 , which corresponds to a loss of 2.5% of production. The average measured emission from type 1 facilities was 18 kg CH 4 h −1 with a median production loss estimated at 8%. The average measured emission from type 2 facilities was 36 kg CH 4 h −1 with a median production loss estimated at 2.4%. Using emission factors that consider the long-tail emission distribution partly reconciles the difference between modelled and measured emission estimates, but we suggest the current the fugitive emission estimate may be an underestimate and more data on the number and size of fugitive emissions could explain differences between the modelled and measured emission estimate. We suggest the bottom-up approach described here that uses production data coupled with facility equipment could be used to identify facilities that have abnormally large measured emissions, caused by methodological failure or larger than expected fugitive emissions, which should be targeted for further evaluation resulting in remeasurement or identification of source type so that a more accurate estimates can be made on the absolute emission.

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DOE OSTI2017

Resolution of Technical Issues at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Pretreatment Facility - 17281

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Pretreatment (PT) Facility has a number of first-of-a-kind technical challenges that have required additional expert analysis and testing activities to resolve. In 2006, an External Flowsheet Review Team identified 28 technical vulnerabilities with the plant design or future operability. Over a period of three months starting in September 2012, a number of top scientists and engineers conducted a review of the major technical issues associated with the design and operability of the WTP. These experts also provided independent advice on some of the broader challenges associated with completing the Hanford tank waste mission - highlighting the linkage between the physical and chemical properties of the tank waste and the PT Facility technical issues. In 2012 and early 2013, DOE's Office of River Protection (ORP) directed the WTP contractor to suspend production work on the PT Facility until the outstanding technical issues could be resolved and the nuclear safety basis could be updated and brought into alignment with any updates to the facility design and/or process flowsheet. By late 2016, DOE and the WTP contractor resolved three of the eight outstanding technical issues: - (T1) Hydrogen Gas in Vessels; - (T2) Criticality in PT Facility Vessels; - (T3) Hydrogen in Piping and Ancillary Vessels (HPAV). Resolving all three of these issues required a combination of engineering studies and updates to foundational PT Facility safety basis documents to ensure both the design features and safety control strategies were adequately developed and fully supportable. The five remaining unresolved technical issues are Pulse-Jet Mixing (PJM) of Vessels (T4), Erosion and Corrosion in WTP Vessels and Piping (T5), PT Facility Optimization (T6), Black Cell Vessel Structural Integrity (T7), and Facility Ventilation (T8). Specific plans for resolving each of the five remaining technical issues have been developed by the WTP contractor. This paper provides a synopsis of the status of PT Facility technical issue resolution, and how resolution of the issues will enable DOE to make an informed decision to establish a new performance baseline for the PT Facility at a future date. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2017

Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC, Excess Facility Disposition Program - 17289

Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS), the management and operating contractor for the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and the Pantex Plant (Pantex) in Amarillo, Texas, has developed an integrated strategy to address badly deteriorating excess facilities presenting risks to people, the environment, and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) mission. The comprehensive, integrated Excess Facilities Disposition Program (EFDP) incorporates NNSA scope for excess facility risk reduction, preparation of facilities to be transferred to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) for demolition, and demolition of non-process contaminated facilities. The Program has been developed using the NNSA Office of Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations (NA-50) Program Management Plan as a guide. The Program has undertaken actions to address the most immediate risks associated with CNS excess facilities. At Y-12, new foam roofs have been installed on Buildings 9201-5 (Alpha 5), 9204-4 (Beta 4), and 9206 to minimize further facility degradation. Tanks and dikes outside of Alpha 5 and Beta 4 are also being disconnected, drained, and filled with concrete. In addition, Beta 4 will be getting a new electrical system as its Manhattan Project-era system will be replaced by a temporary 'construction power' setup that will provide as-needed electricity to the building that is safer, more reliable, and will ease demolition activities in the future. The EFDP is also focusing on the basement of Alpha 5 and is planning to remove the water from the aging facility's flooded basement, which in some areas contains up to 54 inches of water. The EFDP is also planning several efforts to remove excess materials from Alpha 5 and Beta 4, de-inventory the Alpha 5 Mercury House System and numerous transformers, and de-inventory Beta 4 hydraulic pumps and systems. Efforts are also underway to deactivate and decommission non-process-contaminated facilities at Y-12 and at Pantex. The EFDP has prioritized the performance of work to reduce risk while at the same time supporting the preparation of process-contaminated Y-12 facilities for transfer to EM. The Program aligns with the EM goal to have the NNSA scope completed in Alpha 5 and Beta 4 by the end of FY 2020, and Building 9206 completed by the end of FY 2024. These dates and project sequencing will support the Y-12-related DOE EM cleanup initiatives. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2014

Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

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DOE OSTI2025

A census of fish passage facilities at US hydropower developments across the conterminous United States

Hydropower provides reliable and secure electricity and contributes significantly to the flexibility and stability of the US electricity grid. Hydropower dams generally are aquatic barriers and hazards to migratory fish in rivers. Fish passage facilities mitigate risks from hydropower to migratory fish, but information on these facilities is incomplete for the conterminous United States (CONUS). Here, we present the first CONUS-scale dataset of fish passage facilities at US hydropower developments in over 30 years. The existence of fish passage facilities (presence or absence) was specified for 1909 hydropower features, 390 of which had at least one facility. Most features had a single passage facility that provided passage in only one direction, with downstream being more common than upstream passage. Bypasses and ladders accounted for 60 % of the fish passage facility types. While we documented 659 fish passage facilities across CONUS, facilities were most common in the New England, Pacific Northwest, Mid-Atlantic, and Great Lakes regions. In general, fish passage facilities were more common at features that were closer to the ocean, at lower elevations, and at shorter dams, but not related to installed electrical generation capacity. Hydrologic sub-basins containing salmonids also contained the largest number of hydropower features, but the proportion of features with passage was generally higher in sub-basins containing multiple migratory taxa. This census provides valuable information on existing fish passage mitigation and is a benchmark to gauge progress toward a modernized hydropower fleet that provides affordable, reliable energy while protecting fishery resources and river ecosystems.

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