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Roadmap for disposal of Electrorefiner Salt as Transuranic Waste.

The experimental breeder reactor (EBR-II) used fuel with a layer of sodium surrounding the uranium-zirconium fuel to improve heat transfer. Disposing of EBR-II fuel in a geologic repository without treatment is not prudent because of the potentially energetic reaction of the sodium with water. In 2000, the US Department of Energy (DOE) decided to treat the sodium-bonded fuel with an electrorefiner (ER), which produces metallic uranium product, a metallic waste, mostly from the cladding, and the salt waste in the ER, which contains most of the actinides and fission products. Two waste forms were proposed for disposal in a mined repository; the metallic waste, which was to be cast into ingots, and the ER salt waste, which was to be further treated to produce a ceramic waste form. However, alternative disposal pathways for metallic and salt waste streams may reduce the complexity. For example, performance assessments show that geologic repositories can easily accommodate the ER salt waste without treating it to form a ceramic waste form. Because EBR-II was used for atomic energy defense activities, the treated waste likely meets the definition of transuranic waste. Hence, disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southern New Mexico, may be feasible. This report reviews the direct disposal pathway for ER salt waste and describes eleven tasks necessary for implementing disposal at WIPP, provided space is available, DOE decides to use this alternative disposal pathway in an updated environmental impact statement, and the State of New Mexico grants permission.

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Disposition of transuranic residues from plutonium isentropic compression experiment (Pu-ICE) constucted at Z machine

In 1992, the U.S. Congress passed legislation to discontinue above- and below-ground testing of nuclear weapons. Because of this, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) must rely on laboratory experiments and computer-based calculations to verify the reliability of the nuclear stockpile. The Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) Z machine was developed to support the science-based approach for mimicking nuclear explosions and stockpile stewardship. Plutonium (Pu) isotopes with greater than ninety-eight percent enrichment were used in the experiments. In May 2006, SNL/NM received authority that the Z Machine Isentropic Compression Experiments could commence. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) provided the plutonium targets and loaded the target assemblies provided by SNL/NM. Three experiments were conducted from May through July 2006. The residues from each experiment, which weighed up to 913 pounds, were metallic and were packaged into a 55-gallon drum each. SNL/NM conducts the experiments and provides temporary storage for the drums until shipment to LANL for final waste certification for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico. This paper presents a comprehensive approach for documenting generator knowledge for characterization of waste in cooperation with scientists at the two laboratories and addresses a variety of essential topics.

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Evaluation of the Effect of Elevated Temperatures on the Waste Containers in Room 7 of Panel 7 to Determine if an Additional Reaction Hazard Has Been Introduced

The Los Alamos National Laboratory – Carlsbad Operations (LANL-CO) Difficult Waste Team has evaluated the effect of a heat generating event on the adjacent waste containers in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Room 7 of Panel 7 to determine if a heat event could have chemically or physically changed the waste and introduced a reaction hazard. This assessment relies upon documentation available to the LANL-CO and physical evidence in Room 7. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has not conducted testing to support these analyses. Unreacted drums of nitrate salt waste stream, LAMIN02-V.001, continue to pose a potential reaction hazard in Room 7. The other waste streams present in Room 7 are not likely to have developed reaction hazards as a result of heating.

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Neutron Measurements from Boron Carbide Addition to a Plutonium Waste Form

The Department of Energy (DOE) has identified the Dilute and Dispose approach as the preferred method for the disposition of surplus plutonium materials. Dilute and Dispose requires surplus plutonium to be converted to an oxide product and then dry blended with a multi-component adulterant mixture to reduce the Safeguards and Security attractiveness level of the materials. The resulting product will be discarded in a geologic repository at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).

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MANAGING HANFORD'S LEGACY NO-PATH-FORWARD WASTES TO DISPOSITION

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Richland Operations Office (RL) has adopted the 2015 Vision for Cleanup of the Hanford Site. This vision will protect the Columbia River, reduce the Site footprint, and reduce Site mortgage costs. The CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company's (CHPRC) Waste and Fuels Management Project (W&FMP) and their partners support this mission by providing centralized waste management services for the Hanford Site waste generating organizations. At the time of the CHPRC contract award (August 2008) slightly more than 9,000 m{sup 3} of waste was defined as 'no-path-forward waste.' The majority of these wastes are suspect transuranic mixed (TRUM) wastes which are currently stored in the low-level Burial Grounds (LLBG), or stored above ground in the Central Waste Complex (CWC). A portion of the waste will be generated during ongoing and future site cleanup activities. The DOE-RL and CHPRC have collaborated to identify and deliver safe, cost-effective disposition paths for 90% ({approx}8,000 m{sup 3}) of these problematic wastes. These paths include accelerated disposition through expanded use of offsite treatment capabilities. Disposal paths were selected that minimize the need to develop new technologies, minimize the need for new, on-site capabilities, and accelerate shipments of transuranic (TRU) waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico.

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Long-Term Performance of Transuranic Waste Inadvertently Disposed in a Shallow Land Burial Trench at the Nevada Test Site

In 1986, 21 m3 of transuranic (TRU) waste was inadvertently disposed in a shallow land burial trench at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site on the Nevada Test Site. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) TRU waste must be disposed in accordance with Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 191, Environmental Radiation Protection Standard for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level, and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is the only facility meeting these requirements. The National Research Council, however, has found that exhumation of buried TRU waste for disposal in a deep geologic repository may not be warranted when the effort, exposures, and expense of retrieval are not commensurate with the risk reduction achieved. The long-term risks of leaving the TRU waste in-place are evaluated in two probabilistic performance assessments. A composite analysis, assessing the dose from all disposed waste and interacting sources of residual contamination, estimates an annual total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) of 0.01 mSv, or 3 percent of the dose constraint. A 40 CFR 191 performance assessment also indicates there is reasonable assurance of meeting all requirements. The 40 CFR 191.15 annual mean TEDE for a member of the public is estimated to reach a maximum of 0.055 mSv at 10,000 years, or approximately 37 percent of the 0.15 mSv individual protection requirement. In both assessments greater than 99 percent of the dose is from co-disposed low-level waste. The simulated probability of the 40 CFR 191.13 cumulative release exceeding 1 and 10 times the release limit is estimated to be 0.0093 and less than 0.0001, respectively. Site characterization data and hydrologic process modeling support a conclusion of no groundwater pathway within 10,000 years. Monte Carlo uncertainty analysis indicates that there is reasonable assurance of meeting all regulatory requirements. Sensitivity analysis indicates that the results are insensitive to TRU waste-related parameters. Limited quantities of TRU waste in a shallow land burial trench can meet DOE performance objectives for disposal of TRU waste and contribute negligibly to disposal site risk. Leaving limited quantities of buried TRU waste in-place may be preferred over retrieval for disposal in a deep geologic repository.

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Why Cleanup Acceptance Is Running into Conflicts - Off-site Disposal Versus On Site Disposal - 19068

For years the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) identified several sites to receive shipments of various types of wastes. However, with the backlog at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), the inability to license Yucca Mountain, and the agency's desire to expedite cleanup, DOE is trying to 'dispose of' or 'store' more waste belonging to the Federal government on-site. Some states and communities that were 'promised' disposal of DoE's waste in geologic repositories and licensed landfills in arid locations, are now being told that on-site disposal is the best path forward. Competition for resources is forcing more sites to focus on near term cost savings of on-site disposal, rather than develop comprehensive life-cycle estimates representing a more realistic picture of costs associated with isolating radioactive and other hazardous materials on-site in perpetuity. The paper explores the issues and possible solutions in a case study on proposed on-site disposal of DOE waste, and concludes that DOE needs community support and community acceptance to successfully implement the agency's cleanup mission. Ongoing dialogue with the community saves both time and money but more importantly, cooperation helps ensure that effective long-term cleanup occurs. (author)

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Summary Report of Laboratory Testing to Establish the Effectiveness of Proposed Treatment Methods for Unremediated and Remediated Nitrate Salt Waste Streams

The inadvertent creation of transuranic waste carrying hazardous waste codes D001 and D002 requires the treatment of the material to eliminate the hazardous characteristics and allow its eventual shipment and disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). This report documents the effectiveness of two treatment methods proposed to stabilize both the unremediated and remediated nitrate salt waste streams (UNS and RNS, respectively). The two technologies include the addition of zeolite (with and without the addition of water as a processing aid) and cementation. Surrogates were developed to evaluate both the solid and liquid fractions expected from parent waste containers, and both the solid and liquid fractions were tested. Both technologies are shown to be effective at eliminating the characteristic of ignitability (D001), and the addition of zeolite was determined to be effective at eliminating corrosivity (D002), with the preferred option1 of zeolite addition currently planned for implementation at the Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility. During the course of this work, we established the need to evaluate and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed remedy for debris material, if required. The evaluation determined that Wypalls absorbed with saturated nitrate salt solutions exhibit the ignitability characteristic (all other expected debris is not classified as ignitable). Follow-on studies will be developed to demonstrate the effectiveness of stabilization for ignitable Wypall debris. Finally, liquid surrogates containing saturated nitrate salts did not exhibit the characteristic of ignitability in their pure form (those neutralized with Kolorsafe and mixed with sWheat did exhibit D001). As a result, additional nitrate salt solutions (those exhibiting the oxidizer characteristic) will be tested to demonstrate the effectiveness of the remedy.

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Summary Report of Comprehensive Laboratory Testing to Establish the Effectiveness of Proposed Treatment Methods for Unremediated and Remediated Nitrate Salt Waste Streams

The inadvertent creation of transuranic waste carrying hazardous waste codes D001 and D002 requires the treatment of the material to eliminate the hazardous characteristics and allow its eventual shipment and disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). This report documents the effectiveness of two treatment methods proposed to stabilize both the unremediated and remediated nitrate salt waste streams (UNS and RNS, respectively) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The two technologies include the addition of zeolite (with and without the addition of water as a processing aid) and cementation. Surrogates were developed to evaluate both the solid and liquid fractions expected from parent waste containers, and both the solid and liquid fractions were tested. Both technologies are shown to be effective at eliminating the characteristic of ignitability (D001), and the addition of zeolite was determined to be effective at eliminating corrosivity (D002), with the preferred option1 of adding zeolite currently planned for implementation at LANL’s Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility (WCRRF). The course of this work verified the need to evaluate and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed remedy for debris material, if required. The evaluation determined that WypAlls, cheesecloth, and Celotex absorbed with saturated nitrate salt solutions exhibit the ignitability characteristic (all other expected debris is not classified as ignitable). Finally, liquid surrogates containing saturated nitrate salts did not exhibit the characteristic of ignitability in their pure form (those neutralized with Kolorsafe and mixed with sWheat did exhibit D001). Sensitivity testing and an analysis were conducted to evaluate the waste form for reactivity. Tests included subjecting surrogate material to mechanical impact, friction, electrostatic discharge and thermal insults. The testing confirmed that the waste does not exhibit the characteristic of reactivity (D003). Follow-on testing was conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of zeolite stabilization for ignitable WypAll and cheesecloth debris and additional nitrate salt solutions (those exhibiting the oxidizer characteristic) to demonstrate the effectiveness of the remedy. Follow-on testing also included testing of surrogate materials containing Waste Lock 770, which is present in four of the RNS containers, and potential items of debris such as plywood and Celotex material. Testing to evaluate the effectiveness of the remedy was performed using the specific remediation processes that are planned for use at the WCRRF. Finally, testing was also performed to evaluate the holding capacity of zeolite using a highly acidic surrogate solution and to characterize the composition of gases generated during mixing of zeolite with surrogate solutions. All these tests demonstrated the effectiveness of adding zeolite as the planned remedy.

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Safer Transportation and Disposal of Remote Handled Transuranic Waste - 12033

Since disposal of remote handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) began in 2007, the Department of Energy (DOE) has had difficulty meeting the plans and schedule for disposing this waste. PECOS Management Services, Inc. (PECOS) assessed the feasibility of proposed alternate RH-TRU mixed waste containerisation concepts that would enhance the transportation rate of RH-TRU waste to WIPP and increase the utilization of available WIPP space capacity for RH-TRU waste disposal by either replacing or augmenting current and proposed disposal methods. In addition engineering and operational analyses were conducted that addressed concerns regarding criticality, heat release, and worker exposure to radiation. The results of the analyses showed that the concept, development, and use of a concrete pipe based design for an RH-TRU waste shipping and disposal container could be potentially advantageous for disposing a substantial quantity of RHTRU waste at WIPP in the same manner as contact-handled RH waste. Additionally, this new disposal method would eliminate the hazard associated with repackaging this waste in other containers without the requirement for NRC approval for a new shipping container. (authors)

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WIPP PA Sensitivity Studies in Support of CRA-2014 Completeness Determination and Compliance Decision - 18209

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) has been developed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for the geologic (deep underground) disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste. Containment of TRU waste at the WIPP is regulated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The DOE demonstrates compliance with the containment requirements by means of performance assessment (PA) calculations. WIPP PA calculations estimate the probability and consequence of potential radionuclide releases from the repository to the accessible environment for a regulatory period of 10,000 years after facility closure. Since TRU waste was first received at the WIPP in 1999, compliance recertification applications (CRAs) have been required by the EPA on five-year cycle. The latest CRA (CRA-2014) was submitted by the DOE to the EPA in 2014. As part of the application, a formal set of PA calculations (CRA-2014 PA) was performed and results were documented in detail. The CRA-2014 PA incorporated several parameter updates based on new data, as well as the implementation of a different model for panel closures, barriers planned for the opening of each waste panel. The results presented as part of the CRA-2014 showed via the required complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) release curves that the estimated releases were within compliance limits. As part of their process for reviewing the completeness of the CRA-2014 [1], the EPA formally requested that the DOE perform sensitivity studies based on EPA-requested changes to model parameters. The DOE performed and documented the results of three sensitivity studies described below: CRA14-SEN2 [2], CRA14-SEN3 [3], and CRA14-SEN4 [4]. In each case, the new analysis results were compared to CRA- 2014 PA (CRA14) results to determine the impact of the EPA-requested changes. CRA14-SEN2: the application of EPA-requested modified parameters in the operations and experimental (non-waste) areas of the repository to simulate an accelerated (instantaneous) creep closure, the inclusion of capillary pressure effects on relative permeability, and an increase in initial/residual brine saturation and residual gas saturation. The modifications to the repository model resulted in increased pressures and decreased brine saturations in waste areas and increased pressures and brine saturations in the operations and experimental areas. However, the overall effects on total high-probability mean releases from the repository were entirely insignificant. It was concluded that the modeling assumptions associated with the operations and experimental areas of the repository have an insignificant effect on the prediction of total releases from the repository and/or adequacy of the current (CRA14) model to demonstrate compliance with the regulatory limits. CRA14-SEN3: the application of EPA-requested modified parameters in the panel closure areas and operations and experimental (non-waste) areas of the repository to simulate an accelerated (instantaneous) creep closure, the inclusion of capillary pressure effects on relative permeability, and an increase in initial/residual brine saturation and residual gas saturation. The modifications to the repository model predominantly result in increased pressures and decreased brine saturations in waste areas, increased pressures and brine saturations in the operations and experimental areas, and decreased brine and gas flows across all panel closures. The pressure increases in repository waste regions yielded slightly decreased brine saturations (on average) in those areas. However, the overall effects on total high-probability mean releases from the repository are entirely insignificant. It was concluded that the modeling assumptions made for this sensitivity study which were associated with the panel closures and north end areas of the repository have only a small effect on the prediction of total releases from the repository and/or adequacy of the current (CRA14) model to demonstrate compliance with the regulatory limits. CRA14-SEN4: the application of several changes to the current WIPP PA model (CRA14), including: parameter changes, use of an updated code, and a revised computational grid for the BRAGFLO code. The modifications to the repository model resulted in increased releases in all primary release mechanisms. The impacts of each EPA-requested change to CRA14 were analyzed with respect to each release mechanism in the CRA14-SEN4 study. Overall, total high-probability predicted mean releases from the repository were increased by about 15%. Total low-probability predicted mean releases were increased by about 107%. It was concluded that the EPA-requested changes to the CRA14 result in increases to the predicted total releases from the repository. However, releases calculated in the CRA14-SEN4 analysis remained below regulatory limits, demonstrating continued compliance of the WIPP. In January 2017, the EPA determined that CRA-2014 was complete and then began a technical evaluation of CRA-2014 to determine whether the WIPP continued to comply with the radiation protection standards for disposal. During their evaluation, the EPA utilized the sensitivity study results to inform their ultimate determination in July 2017 that the WIPP continues to comply with regulatory standards. (authors)

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Future Transition of WIPP from EM to Another DOE Office - 19256

The U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) has a primary mission to assist federal government entities disposition transuranic (TRU) radioactive waste. The main resource for disposition is the deep geologic repository known as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Other resources include a complete transportation system and a program that assists in the certification and shipment of TRU waste to WIPP known as the National TRU Program (NTP). All of these resources are managed by CBFO, which currently is part of the DOE Environmental Management (EM) program. EM's primary mission for DOE is to clean up the legacy remaining from many years of nuclear weapons research and production. But, CBFO estimates the need for WIPP and NTP will continue beyond the mission of EM and will assist other entities such as the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Office of Science (OS) and the Navy. As the inventory of legacy TRU waste is reduced, the inventory of new TRU waste will continue from ongoing missions. So, over the life span of WIPP the primary customers of CBFO will shift from legacy EM sites to newly-generated TRU waste sites. And, somewhere along the way CBFO estimates that it will transition, primarily from an EM support (legacy waste) entity to a primarily a NNSA support (newly-generated waste) entity to facilitate ongoing DOE missions. This paper will address the need for that change at a programmatic level and will include some ideas for conceptual planning for such a transition. (author)

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A Study into the Benefits of Using Discrete Event Simulation in TRU and Mixed Low-Level Waste (MLLW) Disposal at Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Plant (AMWTP) - 19536

As part of the 1995 Settlement agreement reached between the Idaho State Government and the Idaho National laboratory, it was agreed that the approximately 65,000 cubic metres of waste stored at the AMWTP site was to be shipped out of the state to the waste isolation pilot plant (WIPP) in New Mexico or a similar disposal facility by the end of December 2018. In June 2016, the operation of AMWTP was taken over by Fluor Idaho, a subsidiary of Fluor Inc. To improve their capability of processing all of the varied waste contained on the extensive site, Fluor Idaho requested the assistance of DBD Ltd. We were tasked with producing an all-encompassing operational research (OR) model/discrete event simulation (DES) model of the site, which is able to produce live end-date predictions based on current inventory and waste tracking against milestones. The DES model, is capable of predicting years worth of plant operation in a matter of minutes including the variation caused by such complexities as resource/staff availability, equipment breakdown and maintenance, prioritisation of different waste types, and varying shift patterns of both staff and facilities. The DES model can be run from its own bespoke dashboard, that can be customised to suit the audience it is being used to inform, producing clear key performance indicator (KPI) graphics and high-level overviews for senior management, down to drum by drum breakdowns of the predicted feed plans for each individual facility on the AMWTP site for a work planner to analyse and compare to the current operations. Simulation can produce these types of outputs for very low cost and low risk, as it avoids experimentation to find potential alternatives to the status-quo that could result in loss of production or time. These methods can also be used to produce cost benefit analyses for suggested processing options feeding into optioneering studies and cost reduction strategies. As a tool for plant optimisation and tracking, discrete event simulation can provide detailed results quickly and reliably. (authors)

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WIPP Space Faces TRU Waste Disposal Limits; The Volume Reducing Solution - 18365

Transuranic (TRU) waste packaging for removal from a glovebox has for many years involved the use of bags as the primary containment. In many cases, many hydrogenous layers of bags, yards of tape, and multiple filters are added to the waste stream in order to get the TRU waste into the final 55 gallon drum package to be shipped and buried at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The WIPP is currently limited to a total finite disposed volume of Contact Handled (CH) and Remote Handled (RH) TRU waste. As of early 2014 over half of the allotted WIPP volume had been filled with mainly CH-TRU waste. Based on current bag operation packaging methods used, the Department of Energy's (DOE) remaining CH and RH waste will not fit in the remaining limited WIPP space. Bag operations, can be performed safely by good operators following tedious repetitive processes and many Administrative Safety Controls. Since the bag is the only confinement layer between the contamination and the operator, contamination incidents can occur. Bag-out operations require close proximity to the waste to perform the process. With some waste streams, this close to waste proximity increases operator radiation dose. Central Research Laboratories (CRL), based in Red Wing Minnesota, who for many decades has developed proven engineered material transfer solutions based around their Rapid Transfer Port (RTP) technology, has worked with DOE sites to develop a TRU Waste Management Solution. The solution is a single filtered large Polyethylene (PE) or Stainless Steel (SST) Rapid Transfer Port container in a standard Department of Transportation (DOT) 7A, Type A drum, which allows for loading of TRU waste directly from the operational glovebox without the use of bags, sleeves or tapes to provide leak tight containment. All operator interventions to connect and disconnect a drum to and from the glovebox are achieved in an upright ergonomic position by one (1) operator in less than three (3) minutes. Minimal As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) levels are achieved during connect and disconnect of the drum, due to the engineered safety controls of the RTP. The CRL RTP solution allows glovebox or re-packaged TRU waste to be safely transferred to the final 55 Gallon drum container without additional bags or tape. The high diffusion coefficient filter on the CRL RTP 55G container and elimination of added hydrogenous packaging, improves the Decay Heat Limit (DHL) per drum for most TRU waste types compared with bagged drums, and in most cases allows more TRU waste to be loaded per drum. Inorganic TRU waste materials can be packaged directly into the CRL RTP SST drum container to the maximum DHL and Fissile Gram Equivalent (FGE) allowable for a drum. This paper will show how highly efficient TRAMPAC approved TRU waste packaging of CH and RH TRU waste can be accomplished in a safer, cost effective manner without adding any additional packaging materials to the waste stream, thus increasing the chance of placing all DOE's legacy and to be generated TRU waste in the remaining WIPP space. (authors)

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Solidification of REDC Organics and Airborne Release Fraction Measurements

The Radiochemical Engineering Development Center (REDC) generates various liquid organic wastes from processing irradiated targets to recover heavy elements. In the past, these organics were discharged to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) liquid low-level waste (LLLW) system, along with the aqueous waste. Because of a reduction in aqueous LLLW from other ORNL generators and an increase in the radionuclide concentration, particularly 238 Pu, in the organic waste stream, the organics can no longer be discharged to the LLLW system. The plan is to solidify the liquid organic waste for disposal as solid debris waste. The documented safety analysis for REDC uses an airborne release fraction of 5 x 10 -4 with a respirable fraction of 0.2 for plutonium and other actinides from packaged solid debris waste during a fire scenario, for an overall airborne release fraction/respirable fraction of 10 -4 . Solidifying the organic liquids, either by using PM-199 Organoclay ® or by grouting, would produce solid waste forms with no free liquid, which should qualify for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. The use of Organoclay would be much simpler to implement inside a hot cell. Granular Organoclay can be added to the organic waste solutions until there is a dry layer on top of the liquid and then allowed to cure for a few hours. Grouting the liquids would require using multiple ingredients and mixing steps. Both methods produced waste forms that trapped cerium, as a surrogate for plutonium, inside the waste, with airborne release fractions during fire scenario tests of well below the 10 -4 limit.

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Crushed salt reconsolidation at elevated temperatures.

There is a long history of testing crushed salt as backfill for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant program, but testing was typically done at 100 C or less. Future applications may involve backfilling crushed salt around heat-generating waste packages, where near-field temperatures could reach 250 C or hotter. A series of experiments were conducted to investigate the effects of hydrostatic stress on run-of-mine salt at temperatures up to 250 C and pressures to 20 MPa. The results of these tests were compared with analogous modeling results. By comparing the modeling results at elevated temperatures to the experimental results, the adequacy of the current crushed salt reconsolidation model was evaluated. The model and experimental results both show an increase in the reconsolidation rate with temperature. The current crushed salt model predicts the experimental results well at a temperature of 100 C and matches the overall trends, but over-predicts the temperature dependence of the reconsolidation. Further development of the deformation mechanism activation energies would lead to a better prediction of the temperature dependence by the crushed salt reconsolidation model.

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AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE STABILITY OF VESSEL-SPANNING BUBBLES IN CYLINDRICAL & ANNULAR & OBROUND & AND CONICAL CONTAINERS

This report provides a summary of experiments that were performed by Fauske & Associates on the stability of vessel-spanning bubbles. The report by Fauske & Associates, An Experimental Study of the Stability of Vessel-Spanning Bubbles in Cylindrical, Annular, Obround and Conical Containers, is included in Appendix A. Results from the experiments confirm that the gravity yield parameter, Y{sub G}, correctly includes container size and can be applied to full-scale containers to predict the possibility of the formation of a stable vessel spanning bubble. The results also indicate that a vessel spanning bubble will likely form inside the STSC for KE, KW, and Settler sludges if the shear strengths of these sludges exceed 1820, 2080, and 2120 Pa, respectively. A passive mechanism installed in the STSC is effective at disrupting a rising sludge plug and preventing the sludge from plugging the vent filter or being forced out of the container. The Sludge Treatment Project for Engineered Container and Settler Sludge (EC/ST) Disposition Subproject is being conducted in two phases. Phase 1 of the EC/ST Disposition Subproject will retrieve the radioactive sludge currently stored in the K West (KW) Basin into Sludge Transport and Storage Containers (STSCs) and transport the STSCs to T-Plant for interim storage. Phase 2 of the EC/ST Disposition Subproject will retrieve the sludge from interim storage, treat and package sludge for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. The STSC is a cylindrical container; similar to previously used large diameter containers. A STSC (Figure 1) with a diameter of 58 inches will be used to transport KE and KW originating sludge (located in Engineered Containers 210, 220, 240, 250, and 260) to T-Plant. A STSC with an annulus (Figure 2) will be used to transport Settler Tank sludge, located in Engineered Container 230. An obround small canister design was previously considered to retrieve sludge from the basin. The obround design was selected in Small Canister Design Selection, PRC-STP-00052. However, the small canister was not selected for transporting the sludge. The STSC was selected for sludge loading and transport to T-Plant as discussed in Decision Report for Direct Hydraulic Loading of Sludge into Sludge Transport and Storage Containers, PRC-STP-00112. The STSC will be directly loaded with sludge as described in the Preliminary STP Container and Settler Sludge Process System Description and Material Balance, HNF-41051.

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Waste Control Specialists Technical Review Team Report

1. Modeling of Drum 68660 and the WCS Drums: A calibrated model of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Drum 68660 indicates that pressurization of the drum by restriction of drum venting could have led to the thermal runaway reaction at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in 2014, supporting the hypothesis that the contents of the drum were not fundamentally different from the overall remediated nitrate salt (RNS) waste stream. 2. Nitric Acid Reactions and Aging of the Waste: The stability of the WCS RNS waste with respect to autocatalytic thermal runaway due to nitric acid chemistry should increase over time as the nitric acid is depleted from chemical reactions in the drum. However, this cannot be confirmed because of the lack of long-term experimental data on the impact of aging on the reactivity of RNS waste. The calibrated model indicates that the waste drums retain most of their reactive components, metal nitrate salts and sWheat Scoop ® , even after eight years. 3. Pressure Effects and Runaway Reactions: The calibrated model indicates that if the drums and standard waste boxes (SWBs) are not allowed to pressurize during transport or storage and they are stored at historical WIPP repository temperatures, then an autocatalytic thermal runaway event is not expected to occur. Since the cause of Drum 68660 pressurization is not known, decision makers are not able to tailor mitigating strategies to the initiating event. Consequently, mitigating strategies must consider all feasible internal and external events that could lead to the pressurization of the drums. 4. Temperature Effects and Runaway Reactions: Temperature also has a strong influence on the stability of the waste. The calibrated model indicates that cooling the drums or SWBs can reduce the possibility of autocatalytic thermal runaway reactions. Simulations suggest that for a drum with a plugged vent, the probability of thermal runaway may be reduced or eliminated if wastes are maintained at or below 43 °F through active cooling measures from the initiation of transport until emplacement at WIPP.

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