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At least 343 records · Page 19

Monitoring Potentially Hazardous Areas at Korobkovo Deposit of the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly

The article reports the results obtained in the trial of elements of the monitoring system for potentially hazardous areas at Korobkovo deposit of the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly. The system is based on the seismic and deformation measurements aimed to estimate and control shear stiffness of potentially hazardous faults. The fault shear stiffness is estimated through the analysis of parameters of seismic waves in the vicinity of a fault. The sources of seismic signals in the trial were explosions carried out at the neighbor surface and underground mines.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Investigation of Non-Nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform Sites - 20447

The Plowshare Program was initiated by the Atomic Energy Commission, a predecessor agency to the US Department of Energy (DOE), to investigate peaceful uses of nuclear devices. 'Vela Uniform,' part of the broader Project Vela, was designed to use nuclear and other explosions to increase the capability of the United States to detect nuclear tests through seismicity. There were underground nuclear tests conducted off the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) as part of the Plowshare Program (e.g., the Gnome-Coach, New Mexico, Site) and the Vela Uniform Program (e.g., Project Shoal, Nevada, Site) at which the DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) has been conducting long-term surveillance and maintenance since fiscal year (FY) 2006. There are many additional locations, particularly for the Plowshare Program, that were considered for nuclear tests or used for non-nuclear tests off the NNSS. Some were only named on paper, but at 30 sites, field work such as drilling test wells and conducting tests using conventional explosives was done. A Plowshare nuclear explosion had been proposed at Project Chariot but was canceled in 1962. In 1992, the discovery of soils contaminated with radionuclides from tracer experiments led to a cleanup by the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) of the Project Chariot, Alaska, Site, which was completed in 1994. Following the cleanup of the Project Chariot site, EM was concerned that there might be environmental liabilities at other Plowshare or Vela Uniform sites where field investigations were done, even if the nuclear test was never conducted. The EM Program at the Nevada Site Office began examining records and visiting selected locations that were evaluated for Plowshare and Vela Uniform non-nuclear tests. In total, 161 Plowshare and 14 Vela Uniform sites or proposed projects were identified. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) created summaries of the work carried out at these sites and developed a collection of unclassified documents for them. Preliminary investigations had been conducted at these sites by both LM and EM since the early 2000's. In 2016, in preparation for accepting responsibility for the sites, LM started a program to determine if there were any environmental or safety liabilities associated with them. In 2019, LM formally accepted responsibility for these sites off the NNSS where non-nuclear explosive tests were conducted or where underground nuclear tests were proposed as part of the Plowshare and Vela Uniform programs but were never conducted. LM responsibilities will include maintaining institutional knowledge of the sites, responding to public inquiries, and addressing any concerns at each site. To minimize risk associated with site management, LM has archived all historical records compiled by DRI and has performed limited investigations at sites identified by the prior studies as having a higher potential liability. Preserving records related to site operations reduces the risk of doing unnecessary site investigations in the future caused by the loss of institutional knowledge. During the investigations, some maintenance needs were identified and will be addressed by the end of FY 2021. At the end of FY 2021, investigations, maintenance, and archiving activities will be complete. Remnants of test activities found at sites include craters, mud pits, debris, and open boreholes. Open boreholes are being plugged and abandoned in accordance with state regulatory standards. Other issues are being addressed in accordance with land owner requests and preferences as well as state regulations. Archiving activities include the development of project summaries identifying key operational details and current condition to allow site managers to be easily briefed. The LM experience at non-nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform sites applies to other programs where there is the potential for liability associated with the non-nuclear aspects of nuclear programs. This may include support activities or early phases of planned nuclear projects. Preserving institutional knowledge enables land managers to adequately address any concerns associated with operations and lowers risk. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Pre-Shot Simulations of Near-Field and Far-Field Ground Motion for the Source Physics Experiment (SPE) Explosions at the Climax Stock, Nevada National Security Site: SPE3

The Source Physics Experiment (SPE) is designed to improve ground motion prediction capabilities for underground nuclear testing through the development of new physics-based models together with validation via new chemical explosion data. The SPE shots consist of different size and depth chemical explosions in a granite borehole at the Climax Stock on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The third shot in the series (SPE3) will be the same size (1000 kg TNT equivalent) and depth (45 m canister centroid) as the previous shot (SPE2). The main purpose of the SPE3 is to investigate the effects of the damage zone caused by the SPE2 chemical explosion on the SPE3 explosion, keeping all other parameters (e.g. size, depth, explosive type) the same. This SPE3 pre-shot report addresses progress made in simulation of the expected wavefield in the both the near- and the far-field. In this report we consider the far-field to be where seismic wave motion can be characterized by elastic or visco-elastic approximations, in contrast to the near-field where other, often non-linear effects, play a major role. The current simulations build on previous work from the SPE1 and SPE2 shots. The simulations are intended to highlight differences between SPE2 and SPE3 using a variety to approximations intended to mimic the expected effect of the damage zone. The simplest physics of damage zone effects suggest changes in the source region material properties (density, velocity), and in the yield strength (coupling) of the rock, should both impact the far-field signal. We can illustrate this in a simplistic way for P-waves in Figure A using the empirical Mueller-Muphy (1971) far-field explosion model (MM). First if the SPE2 explosion-induced damage reduces velocities and densities without affecting the yield strength or coupling, then by energy conservation the amplitudes for SPE 3 would increase as shown in the top of Figure A. Similarly if the explosion induced damage increased density (say by compacting pore space) the amplitude would decrease. This impedance effect, where the product of the density, wave-velocity, and ground-velocity squared is conserved, is well known. The second and harder effect to quantify, are changes in the energy coupling or yield strength. In the simple MM model this is represented by the coupling factor between cavity radius and yield. If we assume the granite was slightly weakened by SPE2 such that the cavity radius increases slightly then the overall amplitudes of SPE3 decrease relative to SPE2 as shown in the bottom of Figure A. In reality both effects, may exist due to the damage zone, and furthermore we know they are interrelated in complex ways. For S-waves we expect even more complex effects due to motion on joints and faults. For this reason we are developing physics-based near field simulation models coupled to far-field propagation codes to predict the overall effects of changes in the source emplacement region on observed signals. Near-field simulations have been performed using the Eulerian code (GEODYN). An ensemble model, calibrated to match records from past large-scale nuclear events is used. Both 2D axisymmetric (no faults) and fully three-dimensional GEODYN calculations (with /without faults) were conducted in which the damage zones sustained by SPE2 are retained as the initial condition for the SPE3 calculations. The results indicate that the waveform peak amplitudes are slightly decayed since the ensemble model includes no softening mechanism. The pulse widths are reduced, indicating the energy is dissipated more by the damage zone as expected. The dominant motions calculated in all the scenarios are spherically symmetric and non-spherical components are small as seen for the SPE2 calculations. The arrival time of the SPE3 waveform at the boreholes is shorter than SPE2 due to compaction during the previous explosion. As shown in the SPE 1 and 2 observations shear waves are generated, indicating the potential contributions from the induced motion on distributed joints. The effects of joints are evaluated using the Lagrangian hydrocode (GEODYN-L), which was benchmarked against the GEODYN calculations for the ensemble model. A new granite model calibrated for samples from the SPE site is used. The new model includes effects of poroelasticity and water saturation and may be scaled allowing application to both small and large scales. Parametric tests were performed to evaluate the effect of joints within the granite and the results demonstrate that in situ joints introduce anisotropy and significant tangential motions.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Oxidative decomposition of formaldehyde catalyzed by a bituminous coal

It has been observed that molecular hydrogen is formed during long-term storage of bituminous coals via oxidative decomposition of formaldehyde by coal surface peroxides. This study has investigated the effects of coal quantity, temperature, and water content on the molecular hydrogen formation with a typical American coal (Pittsburgh No. 6). The results indicate that the coal's surface serves as a catalyst in the formation processes of molecular hydrogen. Furthermore, the results also indicate that low temperature emission of molecular hydrogen may possibly be the cause of unexplained explosions in confined spaces containing bituminous coals, for example, underground mines or ship holds. 20 refs., 4 figs., 6 tabs.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Analysis of the Monitoring Network at the Salmon, Mississippi, Site

The Salmon site in southern Mississippi was the location of two underground nuclear tests and two methane-oxygen gas explosion tests conducted in the Tatum Salt Dome at a depth of 2,715 feet below ground surface. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (a predecessor agency of the U.S. Department of Energy [DOE]) and the U.S. Department of Defense jointly conducted the tests between 1964 and 1970. The testing operations resulted in surface contamination at multiple locations on the site and contamination of shallow aquifers. No radionuclides from the nuclear tests were released to the surface or to groundwater, although radionuclide-contaminated drill cuttings were brought to the surface during re-entry drilling. Drilling operations generated the largest single volume of waste materials, including radionuclide-contaminated drill cuttings and drilling fluids. Nonradioactive wastes were also generated as part of the testing operations. Site cleanup and decommissioning began in 1971 and officially ended in 1972. DOE conducted additional site characterization between 1992 and 1999. The historical investigations have provided a reasonable understanding of current surface and shallow subsurface conditions at the site, although some additional investigation is desirable. For example, additional hydrologic data would improve confidence in assigning groundwater gradients and flow directions in the aquifers. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency monitored groundwater at the site as part of its Long-Term Hydrologic Monitoring Program from 1972 through 2007, when DOE's Office of Legacy Management (LM) assumed responsibility for site monitoring. The current monitoring network consists of 28 monitoring wells and 11 surface water locations. Multiple aquifers which underlie the site are monitored. The current analyte list includes metals, radionuclides, and volatile organic compounds (VOCs).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Underground infrastructure damage for a Chicago scenario

Estimating effects due to an urban IND (improvised nuclear device) on underground structures and underground utilities is a challenging task. Nuclear effects tests performed at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) during the era of nuclear weapons testing provides much information on how underground military structures respond. Transferring this knowledge to answer questions about the urban civilian environment is needed to help plan responses to IND scenarios. Explosions just above the ground surface can only couple a small fraction of the blast energy into an underground shock. The various forms of nuclear radiation have limited penetration into the ground. While the shock transmitted into the ground carries only a small fraction of the blast energy, peak stresses are generally higher and peak ground displacement is lower than in the air blast. While underground military structures are often designed to resist stresses substantially higher than due to the overlying rocks and soils (overburden), civilian structures such as subways and tunnels would generally only need to resist overburden conditions with a suitable safety factor. Just as we expect the buildings themselves to channel and shield air blast above ground, basements and other underground openings as well as changes of geology will channel and shield the underground shock wave. While a weaker shock is expected in an urban environment, small displacements on very close-by faults, and more likely, soils being displaced past building foundations where utility lines enter could readily damaged or disable these services. Immediately near an explosion, the blast can 'liquefy' a saturated soil creating a quicksand-like condition for a period of time. We extrapolate the nuclear effects experience to a Chicago-based scenario. We consider the TARP (Tunnel and Reservoir Project) and subway system and the underground lifeline (electric, gas, water, etc) system and provide guidance for planning this scenario.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Materials in extreme environments.

Nature is rich with examples of phenomena and environments we might consider extreme, at least from our familiar experience on Earth's surface: large fluxes of radiation and particles from the Sun, explosive asteroid collisions in space, volcanic eruptions that originate deep underground, extraordinary pressures and temperatures in the interiors of planets and stars, and electromagnetic discharges that occur, say, in sunspots and pulsars. We often intentionally create similar extreme environments - for example, in high-powered lasers, high-temperature turbines, internal-combustion engines, and industrial chemical plants. The response of materials to the broad range of such environments signals the materials underlying structure and dynamics, provides insight into new phenomena, exposes failure modes that limit technological possibility, and presents novel routes for making new materials.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Nevada National Security Site Underground Radionuclide Inventory, 1951-1992: Accounting for Radionuclide Decay through September 30, 2012

This report is an update of report LA-13859-MS (Bowen et al., 2001). In that original report, the underground radionuclide inventory at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) was decay corrected to September 23, 1992, the date of the last underground nuclear test at the NNSS. In this report, the inventory is updated to account for the decay of radionuclides over two additional decades (1992-2012) and revised tritium, fission product and actinide inventory figures and tables are presented. The maximum contaminant levels for radionuclides were also updated to Safe Drinking Water Act Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs) (CFR, 2013). Also, a number of minor errata found in the original publication were corrected. An inventory of radionuclides produced by 828 underground nuclear tests conducted at the NNSS by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Department of the Defense from 1951 to 1992 includes tritium, fission products, actinides, and activation products. The inventory presented in this report provides an estimate of radioactivity remaining underground at the NNSS after nuclear testing. The original test inventory is decayed to September 30, 2012, and predictions of inventory decay over the subsequent 1000 years are presented. For the purposes of summary and publication, the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory authors of this report subdivided the inventory into five areas corresponding to the principal geographic test centers at the NNSS. The five areas roughly correspond to Underground Test Area “Corrective Action Units” (CAUs) for remediation of groundwater. In addition, the inventory is further subdivided for the Yucca Flat region by tests where the working point depth is more than 328 feet (100 meters) above the water table and tests that were detonated below that level. Water levels used were those from the U. S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (1997), now called the Nevada Field Office. Curie activities and atoms are reported as of September 30, 2012. This inventory is strictly a compilation of the residual radiologic inventory remaining from the underground nuclear tests conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Department of the Defense from 1951 to 1992 and does not include radioactivity from other types of nuclear testing (e.g., atmospheric, reactors, rocket engines). A companion classified report (Miller et al., 2002) contains test-specific data for each test performed at the NNSS. This work has been sponsored by the U. S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Historical Evaluation of the U15 Complex, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This report presents a historical evaluation of the U15 Complex on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Three underground nuclear tests and two underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were conducted at the complex. The nuclear tests were Hard Hat in 1962, Tiny Tot in 1965, and Pile Driver in 1966. The Hard Hat and Pile Driver nuclear tests involved different types of experiment sections in test drifts at various distances from the explosion in order to determine which sections could best survive in order to design underground command centers. The Tiny Tot nuclear test involved an underground cavity in which the nuclear test was executed. It also provided data in designing underground structures and facilities to withstand a nuclear attack. The underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were Heater Test 1 from 1977 to 1978 and Spent Fuel Test - Climax from 1978 to 1985. Heater Test 1 was used to design the later Spent Fuel Test - Climax experiment. The latter experiment was a model of a larger underground storage facility and primarily involved recording the conditions of the spent fuel and the surrounding granite medium. Fieldwork was performed intermittently in the summers of 2011 and 2013, totaling 17 days. Access to the underground tunnel complex is sealed and unavailable. Restricted to the surface, four buildings, four structures, and 92 features associated with nuclear testing and fuel storage experiment activities at the U15 Complex have been recorded. Most of these are along the west side of the complex and next to the primary access road and are characteristic of an industrial mining site, albeit one with scientific interests. The geomorphological fieldwork was conducted over three days in the summer of 2011. It was discovered that major modifications to the terrain have resulted from four principal activities. These are road construction and maintenance, mining activities related to development of the tunnel complex, site preparation for activities related to the tests and experiments, and construction of drill pads and retention ponds. Six large trenches for exploring across the Boundary geologic fault are also present. The U15 Complex, designated historic district 143 and site 26NY15177, is eligible to the National Register of Historic Places under Criteria A, C, and D of 36 CFR Part 60.4. As a historic district and archaeological site eligible to the National Register of Historic Places, the Desert Research Institute recommends that the area defined for the U15 Complex, historic district 143 and site 26NY15117, be left in place in its current condition. The U15 Complex should also be included in the NNSS cultural resources monitoring program and monitored for disturbances or alterations.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

A Historical Evaluation of the U15 Complex, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This report presents a historical evaluation of the U15 Complex on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Three underground nuclear tests and two underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were conducted at the complex. The nuclear tests were Hard Hat in 1962, Tiny Tot in 1965, and Pile Driver in 1966. The Hard Hat and Pile Driver nuclear tests involved different types of experiment sections in test drifts at various distances from the explosion in order to determine which sections could best survive in order to design underground command centers. The Tiny Tot nuclear test involved an underground cavity in which the nuclear test was executed. It also provided data in designing underground structures and facilities to withstand a nuclear attack. The underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were Heater Test 1 from 1977 to 1978 and Spent Fuel Test - Climax from 1978 to 1985. Heater Test 1 was used to design the later Spent Fuel Test - Climax experiment. The latter experiment was a model of a larger underground storage facility and primarily involved recording the conditions of the spent fuel and the surrounding granite medium. Fieldwork was performed intermittently in the summers of 2011 and 2013, totaling 17 days. Access to the underground tunnel complex is sealed and unavailable. Restricted to the surface, four buildings, four structures, and 92 features associated with nuclear testing and fuel storage experiment activities at the U15 Complex have been recorded. Most of these are along the west side of the complex and next to the primary access road and are characteristic of an industrial mining site, albeit one with scientific interests. The geomorphological fieldwork was conducted over three days in the summer of 2011. It was discovered that major modifications to the terrain have resulted from four principal activities. These are road construction and maintenance, mining activities related to development of the tunnel complex, site preparation for activities related to the tests and experiments, and construction of drill pads and retention ponds. Six large trenches for exploring across the Boundary geologic fault are also present. The U15 Complex, designated historic district 143 and site 26NY15177, is eligible to the National Register of Historic Places under Criteria A, C, and D of 36 CFR Part 60.4. As a historic district and archaeological site eligible to the National Register of Historic Places, the Desert Research Institute recommends that the area defined for the U15 Complex, historic district 143 and site 26NY15117, be left in place in its current condition. The U15 Complex should also be included in the NNSS cultural resources monitoring program and monitored for disturbances or alterations.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

A Historical Evaluation of the U15 Complex, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This report presents a historical evaluation of the U15 Complex on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Three underground nuclear tests and two underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were conducted at the complex. The nuclear tests were Hard Hat in 1962, Tiny Tot in 1965, and Pile Driver in 1966. The Hard Hat and Pile Driver nuclear tests involved different types of experiment sections in test drifts at various distances from the explosion in order to determine which sections could best survive in order to design underground command centers. The Tiny Tot nuclear test involved an underground cavity in which the nuclear test was executed. It also provided data in designing underground structures and facilities to withstand a nuclear attack. The underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were Heater Test 1 from 1977 to 1978 and Spent Fuel Test - Climax from 1978 to 1985. Heater Test 1 was used to design the later Spent Fuel Test - Climax experiment. The latter experiment was a model of a larger underground storage facility and primarily involved recording the conditions of the spent fuel and the surrounding granite medium. Fieldwork was performed intermittently in the summers of 2011 and 2013, totaling 17 days. Access to the underground tunnel complex is sealed and unavailable. Restricted to the surface, four buildings, four structures, and 92 features associated with nuclear testing and fuel storage experiment activities at the U15 Complex have been recorded. Most of these are along the west side of the complex and next to the primary access road and are characteristic of an industrial mining site, albeit one with scientific interests. The geomorphological fieldwork was conducted over three days in the summer of 2011. It was discovered that major modifications to the terrain have resulted from four principal activities. These are road construction and maintenance, mining activities related to development of the tunnel complex, site preparation for activities related to the tests and experiments, and construction of drill pads and retention ponds. Six large trenches for exploring across the Boundary geologic fault are also present. The U15 Complex, designated historic district 143 and site 26NY15177, is eligible to the National Register of Historic Places under Criteria A, C, and D of 36 CFR Part 60.4. As a historic district and archaeological site eligible to the National Register of Historic Places, the Desert Research Institute recommends that the area defined for the U15 Complex, historic district 143 and site 26NY15117, be left in place in its current condition. The U15 Complex should also be included in the NNSS cultural resources monitoring program and monitored for disturbances or alterations.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

A Historical Evaluation of the U15 Complex, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This report presents a historical evaluation of the U15 Complex on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Three underground nuclear tests and two underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were conducted at the complex. The nuclear tests were Hard Hat in 1962, Tiny Tot in 1965, and Pile Driver in 1966. The Hard Hat and Pile Driver nuclear tests involved different types of experiment sections in test drifts at various distances from the explosion in order to determine which sections could best survive in order to design underground command centers. The Tiny Tot nuclear test involved an underground cavity in which the nuclear test was executed. It also provided data in designing underground structures and facilities to withstand a nuclear attack. The underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were Heater Test 1 from 1977 to 1978 and Spent Fuel Test - Climax from 1978 to 1985. Heater Test 1 was used to design the later Spent Fuel Test - Climax experiment. The latter experiment was a model of a larger underground storage facility and primarily involved recording the conditions of the spent fuel and the surrounding granite medium. Fieldwork was performed intermittently in the summers of 2011 and 2013, totaling 17 days. Access to the underground tunnel complex is sealed and unavailable. Restricted to the surface, four buildings, four structures, and 92 features associated with nuclear testing and fuel storage experiment activities at the U15 Complex have been recorded. Most of these are along the west side of the complex and next to the primary access road and are characteristic of an industrial mining site, albeit one with scientific interests. The geomorphological fieldwork was conducted over three days in the summer of 2011. It was discovered that major modifications to the terrain have resulted from four principal activities. These are road construction and maintenance, mining activities related to development of the tunnel complex, site preparation for activities related to the tests and experiments, and construction of drill pads and retention ponds. Six large trenches for exploring across the Boundary geologic fault are also present. The U15 Complex, designated historic district 143 and site 26NY15177, is eligible to the National Register of Historic Places under Criteria A, C, and D of 36 CFR Part 60.4. As a historic district and archaeological site eligible to the National Register of Historic Places, the Desert Research Institute recommends that the area defined for the U15 Complex, historic district 143 and site 26NY15117, be left in place in its current condition. The U15 Complex should also be included in the NNSS cultural resources monitoring program and monitored for disturbances or alterations.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Assessing Dynamic Time Warping Techniques for Discriminating Seismic Sources at Local and Regional Distances

Effective monitoring of seismic explosions and hazard assessment relies heavily on the accurate discrimination of underground seismic sources. This study investigates the application of novel nonlinear alignment techniques, specifically Dynamic Time Warping (DTW), for event-type discrimination at regional and local distances. Building on prior research that used DTW and Elastic Shape Analysis (ESA) in discrimination at regional distances, we evaluate the performance of recently developed variants of DTW, including a method that employs Pearson cross-correlation as a measure of warping distance and a time distortion coefficient that quantifies the type and degree of time distortion between signals. By analyzing observational datasets that include different source types, we assess the performance of these approaches for realistic monitoring scenarios. Specifically, we consider a dataset recorded at regional distances in the Korean Peninsula and a local-distance subset from the Unconstrained Utah Event Bulletin catalog to evaluate DTW-based discrimination across multiple distance scales. Additionally, we introduce the maximum cross-correlations of warped waveforms as a similarity metric for event classification. Through hierarchical cluster analysis and dendrogram interpretation, we present our findings, highlighting the strengths and limitations of these techniques in seismic event classification.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Pyroclastic Deposits in the Floor-fractured Crater Alphonsus

Alphonsus, the 118 km diameter floor-fractured crater, is located immediately east of Mare Nubium. Eleven pyroclastic deposits have been identified on the crater's floor. Early telescopic spectra suggest that the floor of Alphonsus is noritic, and that the pyroclastic deposits contain mixtures of floor material and a juvenile component including basaltic glass. Head and Wilson contend that Nubium lavas intruded the breccia zone beneath Alphonsus, forming dikes and fractures on the crater floor. In this model, the magma ascended to the level of the mare but cooled underground, and a portion broke thru to the surface in vulcanian (explosive) eruptions. Alternatively, the erupted material could be from a source unrelated to the mare, in the style of regional pyroclastic deposits. High-resolution images and spectroscopy from the Moon Mineralogy Mapper (M3), Diviner Lunar Radiometer, and Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter Camera Narrow Angle Camera (NAC) provide data to test these formation models. Spectra from M3 confirm that the crater floor is primarily composed of noritic material, and that the Nubium lavas are basaltic. Spectra from the three largest pyroclastic deposits in Alphonsus are consistent with a minor low- Ca pyroxene component in a glass-rich matrix. The centers of the 2 micron absorption bands have wavelengths too short to be of the same origin as the Nubium basalts. Diviner Christiansen feature (CF) values were used to estimate FeO abundances for the crater floor, Nubium soil, and pyroclastic deposits. The estimated abundance for the crater floor (7.5 +/- 1.4 wt.%) is within the range of FeO values for Apollo norite samples. However, the estimated FeO abundance for Nubium soil (13.4 +/- 1.4 wt.%) is lower than those measured in most mare samples. The difference may reflect contamination of the mare soil by highland ejecta. The Diviner-derived FeO abundance for the western pyroclastic deposit is 13.8 +/- 3.3 wt.%. This is lower than the values for mare soil samples, but within the range of analyzed pyroclastic glasses. The NAC images of the pyroclastic vents highlight their bright wall materials. The M3 spectra of the southeastern vent indicate that this bright material is noritic, likely crater floor material exposed by explosive eruption. These observations address the hypothesis that Nubium lavas intruded the fracture network beneath Alphonsus, leading to localized vulcanian-style eruptions. This model implies that the eruption products should be dominated by crystalline basalt fragments similar in elemental composition and mineralogy to mare lavas. The bright noritic material exposed in the vent walls is consistent with explosive eruptions. The estimated FeO abundances for the pyroclastic deposits are too low to be consistent with FeO abundances measured in mare basalts, but are within the range of pyroclastic glass samples. The visible- to near-infrared (VIS-NIR) spectra of the pyroclastic deposits and Nubium soils are significantly different, suggesting that the pyroclastics are unrelated to the mare basalts. The pyroclastic spectra are consistent with Fe-bearing glass plus small amounts of noritic wall rock. Similar glassy materials dominate regional pyroclastic deposits, suggesting a deep source for the pyroclastics observed in Alphonsus.

Allen, Carlton C.↗

A discrete model for compressible flows in heterogeneous media

This work deals with the building of a discrete model able to describe and to predict the evolution of complex gas flows in heterogeneous media. In many physical applications, large scales numerical simulation is no longer possible because of a lack of computing resources. Indeed the medium topology may be complex due to the presence of many obstacles (walls, pipes, equipments, geometric singularities etc.). Aircraft powerplant compartments are examples where topology is complex due to the presence of pipes, ducts, coolers and other equipment. Other important examples are gas explosions and large scale dispersion of hazardous materials in urban places, cities or underground involving obstacles such as buildings and various infrastructures. In all cases efficient safety responses are required. Then a new discrete model is built and solved in reasonable execution times for large cells volumes including such obstacles. Quantitative comparisons between experimental and numerical results are shown for different significant test cases, showing excellent agreement.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Office of Nuclear Verification FY 2023 Quarterly Report TSVT Q1

This project encompasses the continued development and training of a U.S. operational team, the Test Site Verification Team (TSVT), supporting verification of nuclear testing activities. TSVT builds on decades of U.S. nuclear testing history and nuclear explosion monitoring experience. The Team maintains readiness to deploy internationally on short notice to provide field-based support of verification of declared or undeclared nuclear testing and associated activities, as well as follow-on activities including monitoring and capability disablement and dismantlement, as established by negotiated agreement or treaty. The roles and structure of the TSVT are integrated with other NA-243 deployable verification teams and the interagency. FY23 TSVT activities focus on continued capability buildup within the team, including Team trainings and exercises with a focus on missions in confined spaces (e.g., tunnels, mines, other underground facilities), increased familiarity with foreign nuclear weapons testing programs, demonstration of Team capacity to deploy, train, and practice sustained OPSEC in non-western locations, establishment of sustainable storage and maintenance of equipment, specification and procurement of additional equipment to support field observations, further evolution of concepts of operation documents (CONOPs), and mission coordination with Headquarters and associated Stakeholders. Activities will culminate with a full-scale domestic team exercise at the end of FY23 focusing on underground activities signatures/observations and safety including advanced outdoor safety and familiarity in working around explosive test environments. In addition, we will be further articulating approaches and capacity relevant to the identification of nuclear tests, as well as monitoring of nuclear testing activities and/or dismantlement of nuclear test sites and anticipate developing additional equipment requests in support of this evolution. The TSVT Team Leads will also coordinate with its Senior Advisor, the TSVT Logistics and Readiness (L&R) Training Lead, and NNSA Headquarters to draft a five-year TSVT training and exercise plan, that strategically and incrementally builds capacity and expertise in key areas of significance for the continuum of nuclear and nuclear-related testing activities that fall within the team’s mission space.

42 ENGINEERING↗

The rise, collapse, and compaction of Mt. Mantap from the 3 September 2017 North Korean nuclear test

Surveillance of clandestine nuclear tests relies on a global seismic network, but the potential of spaceborne monitoring has been underexploited. Here we used satellite radar imagery to determine the complete surface displacement field of up to 3.5 meters of divergent horizontal motion with 0.5 meters of subsidence associated with North Korea’s largest underground nuclear test. Combining insight from geodetic and seismological remote sensing, we found that the aftermath of the initial explosive deformation involved subsidence associated with subsurface collapse and aseismic compaction of the damaged rocks of the test site. The explosive yield from the nuclear detonation with best-fitting source parameters for 450-meter depth was 191 kilotonnes of TNT equivalent. Finally, our results demonstrate the capability of spaceborne remote sensing to help characterize large underground nuclear tests.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Serpentine: Finite Difference Methods for Wave Propagation in Second Order Formulation

Wave propagation phenomena are important in many DOE applications such as nuclear explosion monitoring, geophysical exploration, estimating ground motion hazards and damage due to earthquakes, non-destructive testing, underground facilities detection, and acoustic noise propagation. There are also future applications that would benefit from simulating wave propagation, such as geothermal energy applications and monitoring sites for carbon storage via seismic reflection techniques. In acoustics and seismology, it is of great interest to increase the frequency bandwidth in simulations. In seismic exploration, greater frequency resolution enables shorter wave lengths to be included in the simulations, allowing for better resolution in the seismic imaging. In nuclear explosion monitoring, higher frequency seismic waves are essential for accurate discrimination between explosions and earthquakes. When simulating earthquake induced motion of large structures, such as nuclear power plants or dams, increased frequency resolution is essential for realistic damage predictions. Another example is simulations of micro-seismic activity near geothermal energy plants. Here, hydro-fracturing induces many small earthquakes and the time scale of each event is proportional to the square root of the moment magnitude. As a result, the motion is dominated by higher frequencies for smaller seismic events. The above wave propagation problems are all governed by systems of hyperbolic partial differential equations in second order differential form, i.e., they contain second order partial derivatives of the dependent variables. Our general research theme in this project has been to develop numerical methods that directly discretize the wave equations in second order differential form. The obvious advantage of working with hyperbolic systems in second order differential form, as opposed to rewriting them as first order hyperbolic systems, is that the number of differential equations in the second order system is significantly smaller. Another issue with re-writing a second order system into first order form is that compatibility conditions often must be imposed on the first order form. These (Saint-Venant) conditions ensure that the solution of the first order system also satisfies the original second order system. However, such conditions can be difficult to enforce on the discretized equations, without introducing additional modeling errors. This project has previously developed robust and memory efficient algorithms for wave propagation including effects of curved boundaries, heterogeneous isotropic, and viscoelastic materials. Partially supported by internal funding from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, many of these methods have been implemented in the open source software WPP, which is geared towards 3-D seismic wave propagation applications. This code has shown excellent scaling on up to 32,768 processors and has enabled seismic wave calculations with up to 26 Billion grid points. The WPP calculations have resulted in several publications in the field of computational seismology, e.g.. All of our current methods are second order accurate in both space and time. The benefits of higher order accurate schemes for wave propagation have been known for a long time, but have mostly been developed for first order hyperbolic systems. For second order hyperbolic systems, it has not been known how to make finite difference schemes stable with free surface boundary conditions, heterogeneous material properties, and curvilinear coordinates. The importance of higher order accurate methods is not necessarily to make the numerical solution more accurate, but to reduce the computational cost for obtaining a solution within an acceptable error tolerance. This is because the accuracy in the solution can always be improved by reducing the grid size h. However, in practice, the available computational resources might not be large enough to solve the problem with a low order method.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗