Results for “Technical Risk Assessment” — Page 19

DOE OSTI2020

Development of the Mobile Systems for Conditioning of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources in Serbia - 20105

Sealed radioactive sources (SRS) are being used worldwide in the field of medicine, agriculture, industry and research. They can be found in mobile as well as stationary devices. SRS contains radioactive material that is (a) permanently sealed in a capsule or (b) closely bounded and in a solid form. The capsule or material of an SRS should be strong enough to maintain leak tightness under the conditions of use and purpose for which the source was designed, also in case of accidents. In this case only emitted radiation is utilized. Firstly, the hazard from external radiation has to be considered, but the possibility of contamination due to fracture of the capsule should not be disregarded. The radioactive sources are composed of the radiating isotope contained in the filling medium, the single or double isotope holder that partially or totally surrounds the filling medium, the outer cover that contains the parts mentioned above and the capsule closed airtightly by welding or using some other method. The capsule must be tested for leakage periodically. If the SRS is no longer needed (e.g. replaced by a different technique) or it becomes useless for the intended application (e.g. the activity becomes too weak, the equipment containing the source works poorly or becomes obsolete, the source is damaged or leaking) it is considered disused. Disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRS) are typically conditioned and disposed if a facility is available. If the disposal option is not available, conditioned DSRS should be stored under proper conditions. In some cases, the radionuclide(s) in DSRS can be recovered/recycled or the DSRS can be repurposed for other applications. Conditioning of DSRS ensures containment of the radioactive material, provides confinement for leaking sources, provides sufficient radiation shielding, reduces storage/disposal volume by allowing consolidation of multiple sources into a single storage/disposal container, facilitates transport operations and contributes to safety and security as well. Typically, conditioning technologies are deployed either as permanently installed stationary systems in centralized or mobile on-site waste processing facilities, or in a mobile configuration. Centralized stationary facilities provide a single processing location for multiple users that requires transport of the waste to the facility. On the other hand, mobile systems may be provided for the selection and application of the optimum technology for a specific waste stream (such as DSRS) by bringing the process to the point where the waste is generated. In addition, mobile systems could offer additional flexibility by sharing equipment among multiple waste generating sites for processing campaigns that vary in duration, from very short periods to several years. The term 'mobile processing system' refers to any radioactive waste processing system or component which is designed to be transportable and which is not considered permanently installed. Two mobile system for conditioning of disused sealed radioactive sources are developed in the Public Company Nuclear Facilities of Serbia. Development of these mobile systems was supported by SRB9005 national project via Technical Cooperation of the IAEA. The first mobile system, built inside the 20 feet ISO container, will be used for conditioning of DSRS category 3 to 5. The second mobile system, built inside the 7 m long vehicle (Iveco Daily Van), will be used for dismantling of ionizing smoke detectors mostly with Am-241 sources. Designs of the mobile systems were defined in cooperation with two companies from Belgium (Belgoprocess and Leniko) and a Croatian company Ekoteh as well as with the support of the IAEA experts. The generic safety assessment and operational procedures for the mobile systems are developed. Based on safety assessment the acceptance criteria and operational limits and conditions are established. Operational procedures include: (a) equipment and material requirements, (b) assembling procedure of the mobile unit, (c) procedure for acceptance of devices for dismantling and conditioning, (d) dismantling procedure for devices to recover the DSRS, (e) characterization of DSRS, (f) encapsulation procedure of DSRS, (g) disassembling procedure of the mobile unit, and (h) keeping records, identification and traceability. In addition, radiation safety, health safety, security and emergency preparedness plans are prepared. The generic safety assessment and operational procedures could be updated with site specific requirements, DSRS inventory, and different needs for future customers. Developed mobile systems could be used in all situations when it is feasible to perform conditioning of DSRS on the spot in the county and worldwide. Development of these mobile units was just the first step to create the Reference Center for Radioactive Waste Treatment and Disused Radioactive Sources Conditioning for Small Facilities which can become a regional training center in the future, and/or as a tool for comprehensive national search and secure programmes. In the next phases development of e-learning platforms and blended learning packages as well as application for the IAEA Qualified Technical Centre (QTC) for the management of DSRS is foreseen. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI1991

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 32, No. 4, October-December 1991]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 477 Report on the International Symposium on the Use of Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Operational Safety—PSA '91, S. Chakraborty and M. Khatib-Rahbar; 488 Good Relationships Are Pivotal in Nuclear Data Bases, A. S. Heger and B. V. Koen; 494 Technical Note: The Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel's Evaluation of the Ulysses Space Mission, J. A. Sholtis, Jr., D. A. Huff, L. B. Gray, N. P. Klug, and R. O. Winchester; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 502 The Severe Accident Analysis Program for the Savannah River Nuclear Production Reactors, M. L. Hyder; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 511 A Framework for Selecting Suitable Control Technologies for Nuclear Power Plant Systems, R. A. Kisner; DESIGN FEATURES: 521 Containments for Gas-Cooled Power Reactors History and Status, P.W. Williams; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 537 Indoor Radon: A Natural Risk, N. H. Harley and J.H. Harley; On the Importance of the Atmospheric Parameters in the Fission Products Distribution of a Severe Reactor Accident, M. C. Barla and A. R. Bayulken; Book Review: Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation BEIR V, C. R. Richmond; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 555 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 567 Effects of Component Aging on the Westhinghouse Control Rod Drive System, K. Sullivan and W. Gunther; 577 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 580 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 582 Operating U 8 Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 596 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 610 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 614 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1991; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 520 Workshop on PC PRAISE: A Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Personal Computer Code for Nuclear Power Plant Piping Reliability Assessment; 536 Fifth Workshop on Nuclear Power Plant Containment Integrity; 624 New OECD "International Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE)"; 625 Harvard School of Public Health Announces Short Courses; 625 Eighth Power Plant Dynamics, Control and Testing Symposium; 626 Second Training Course on Off-Site Emergency Planning and Response for Nuclear Accidents; 618 The Authors; 622 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol 32.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Risk-Informed Approach for Regulatory Approval of Microreactor Transport

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is addressing the challenges associated with safe transport of microreactors including the development and evaluation of regulatory options. PNNL developed a risk-informed regulatory framework for the licensing of the transportation of microreactors in which irradiated nuclear fuel is part microreactor transportation package. The framework lays out a viable regulatory pathway, including decision points for regulatory options and the supporting technical evaluations for those options in phases from near to long term. A microreactor and its contents will likely not be able to meet all the federal regulatory requirements as a Type B or fissile material transportation package under 10 CFR Part 71 (“Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material”). However, the regulatory framework developed by PNNL lays out a viable risk-informed licensing options that are safe and feasible. Risk assessment such as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) can be used to show comparable safety to that provided by a Type B or fissile material package for surface transport. The framework includes guidance on applicable regulations and discusses historical precedence in using risk information for transportation licensing. The framework includes guidance for performing a microreactor transportation PRA, use and development of risk evaluation criteria, and factors such of defense-in-depth and safety margin concepts. Key advantages of using the approach are (1) increasing the likelihood of successfully obtaining regulatory transportation package approval, (2) informing the design on the relative risk significance of microreactor containment and shielding, and (3) informing the need for transportation compensatory measures. This paper focuses on two primary elements of the framework which are development of a transportation PRA for microreactor packages and development of the risk acceptance guidelines to assess the results of the PRA for regulatory decision-making.

microreactor, micro nuclear power plant, MNPP, ris↗

NASA NTRS1988

NASA's post-Challenger safety program - Themes and thrusts

The range of managerial, technical, and procedural initiatives implemented by NASA's post-Challenger safety program is reviewed. The recommendations made by the Rogers Commission, the NASA post-Challenger review of Shuttle design, the Congressional investigation of the accident, the National Research Council, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, and NASA internal advisory panels and studies are summarized. NASA safety initiatives regarding improved organizational accountability for safety, upgraded analytical techniques and methodologies for risk assessment and management, procedural initiatives in problem reporting and corrective-action tracking, ground processing, maintenance documentation, and improved technologies are discussed. Safety issues relevant to the planned Space Station are examined.

Rodney, G. A.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Acoustic treatment of the NASA Langley 4- by 7-meter tunnel: A feasibility study

A feasibility study for upgrading the NASA Langley 4- by 7-Meter Tunnel so that it may be used for aeroacoustic research related to helicopters is described. The requirements for noise research leading to the design of the next generation of helicopters impose a set of acoustic test criteria that no existing wind tunnel in the United States can presently meet. Included in this feasibility study are the following considerations: (1) an evaluation of general wind-tunnel requirements and desired tunnel background noise levels for helicopter aeroacoustic research; (2) an assessment of the present acoustic environment for testing model rotors; (3) a diagnostic investigation of tunnel background noise sources and paths; (4) acoustic treatment options for tunnel background noise reduction and a trade-off study between these options; (5) an engineering feasibility assessment of the selected option; and (6) an integrated analysis of study components and recommendations of treatment for an approach to meet the tunnel background noise reduction goal. It is concluded that the Langley 4- by 7-Meter Tunnel is a fundamentally suitable facility for helicopter aeroacoustic research. It is also concluded that acoustic treatment of this facility for meeting the required tunnel background noise goal can be accomplished technically at reasonable risk and cost.

Yu, J. C.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Cost and Benefit Analysis of Orbital Debris Remediation, Mitigation,Tracking, and Characterization

Orbital debris may collide with crewed and robotic spacecraft, placing them at risk. The wide range of debris, from 9,000-kilogram rocket bodies to millions of millimeter-size debris, has led to a similarly wide range of proposed actions for addressing the risks posed by debris. However, the costs and benefits of these actions have historically been unknown. This is a challenge for decision makers who are choosing which actions to support through technology development or policy changes. NASA’s Office of Technology, Policy, and Strategy is addressing these technical and economic uncertainties by building a capability to (1) complete rigorous calculations of the net present value of each action, (2) identify an optimal portfolio of actions to reduce risk, and (3) quantitatively analyze policies related to space sustainability. This report describes our progress toward that capability and to solicit feedback from the space and economic communities. Our previous work(Colvin, Karcz, and Wusk. 2023), referred to here as Phase 1, assessed the costs and benefits of performing debris remediation on operationally relevant timescales. The current paper summarizes the work of Locke and Colvin (2024), which contains major updates to the risk model used in Phase 1 and expands the breadth of actions considered to include mitigating the creation of debris, improving the ability to track debris, and more methods for cleaning up existing debris. We demonstrate that our approach of measuring risks in dollars allows for the effectiveness of seemingly incommensurate actions to be compared and generates insights that other approaches to measuring risk have missed.

Orbital Debris↗

DOE OSTI1991

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 32, No. 4, October-December 1991]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 477 Report on the International Symposium on the Use of Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Operational Safety—PSA '91, S. Chakraborty and M. Khatib-Rahbar; 488 Good Relationships Are Pivotal in Nuclear Data Bases, A. S. Heger and B. V. Koen; 494 Technical Note: The Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel's Evaluation of the Ulysses Space Mission, J. A. Sholtis, Jr., D. A. Huff, L. B. Gray, N. P. Klug, and R. O. Winchester; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 502 The Severe Accident Analysis Program for the Savannah River Nuclear Production Reactors, M. L. Hyder; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 511 A Framework for Selecting Suitable Control Technologies for Nuclear Power Plant Systems, R. A. Kisner; DESIGN FEATURES: 521 Containments for Gas-Cooled Power Reactors History and Status, P.W. Williams; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 537 Indoor Radon: A Natural Risk, N. H. Harley and J.H. Harley; On the Importance of the Atmospheric Parameters in the Fission Products Distribution of a Severe Reactor Accident, M. C. Barla and A. R. Bayulken; Book Review: Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation BEIR V, C. R. Richmond; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 555 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 567 Effects of Component Aging on the Westhinghouse Control Rod Drive System, K. Sullivan and W. Gunther; 577 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 580 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 582 Operating U 8 Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 596 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 610 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 614 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1991; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 520 Workshop on PC PRAISE: A Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Personal Computer Code for Nuclear Power Plant Piping Reliability Assessment; 536 Fifth Workshop on Nuclear Power Plant Containment Integrity; 624 New OECD "International Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE)"; 625 Harvard School of Public Health Announces Short Courses; 625 Eighth Power Plant Dynamics, Control and Testing Symposium; 626 Second Training Course on Off-Site Emergency Planning and Response for Nuclear Accidents; 618 The Authors; 622 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol 32.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Hot Springs and Geysers: Exploring Historical and Modern Impacts of Geothermal Energy Production on Associated Natural Surface Systems and Standardizing Management Practices

Surface thermal features, most notably hot springs and geysers are increasingly being recognized for their importance to ecosystems, indigenous cultures, and in some cases agriculture, recreation, and tourism. Geothermal project development poses a potential risk to these natural features but current regulatory requirements for assessing and managing these risks during exploration, permitting and monitoring are somewhat inconsistent and unpredictable across different geothermal fields. This has resulted in uncertainty and increases in exploration risk for geothermal energy developers that have led to costly project delays, cancellations, or hesitation to commit. Varying regulatory requirements may also influence public perception, fostering confusion, distrust and ultimately opposition to geothermal projects, further contributing to project delays or cancellations. At a time when there is an increasing urgency for reliable baseload clean energy, geothermal is a net-zero, renewable solution that additionally provides access to more equitable and environmentally just clean power. Continued integration of geothermal energy into the national energy roadmap can be facilitated through consistent and predictable permitting, providing regulators the framework they need, developers a clear path forward, and transparency that the public deserves. This project, currently in its beginning phases, seeks to address this important issue by providing a technical basis from which to build a preliminary protocol for assessing and managing potential impacts from new or existing geothermal energy projects to surface thermal features and their associated ecosystems. Development of this preliminary protocol will be informed by (1) a literature review of well-documented case studies in the western U.S. and New Zealand to understand the range of conditions that exemplify geothermal-surface thermal systems; (2) development of generic illustrative conceptual-numerical models to quantify, understand, and predict the first-order controls (e.g., pressure and permeability) on surface flows; and (3) additional independent and scientifically rigorous evaluations of geothermal-surface thermal system case studies from the Basin and Range Province that incorporate publicly available data as well as data provided by industry through data-sharing agreements. Learning from the successes of the process used to develop the Induced Seismicity Management Protocol (ISMP), we ultimately aim to use these initial efforts as a springboard for establishing a surface thermal feature management working group that will work collaboratively to finalize the protocol as well as co-create recommended best practices for implementation. We envision that the working group will primarily be composed of representatives from regulatory entities, government agencies, Tribes, academia, national laboratories, and industry, and will include early and regular engagement with community organizations and environmental groups. This will help ensure broad acceptance and implementation of the protocol, which will facilitate a more consistent, predictable, and standardized regulatory process, and help to ensure that geothermal energy continues to provide a reliable source of clean energy, and a pathway to achieving greater energy equity in the U.S.

Best Practices↗

DOE OSTI2023

Plant-specific Model and Data Analysis using Dynamic Security Modeling and Simulation

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large on-site physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an update on the progress in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available force-on-force simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework or MASS-DEF. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report does not contain any plant's sensitive information and/or Safeguards Information. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity Assessment Tools for Distributed Energy Resources

This growing number of smart devices that support DERs can increase the number of access points outside a utility’s administrative domain, which can increase the potential for cyberattack. With the integration of DERs at federal sites, the cybersecurity vulnerabilities of DER systems must be understood and addressed. This presentation covers two NREL tools available. The Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) is a web-based holistic tool for evaluating cybersecurity posture including governance, physical security and technical management. The Distributed Energy Resource Risk Manager (DER-RM) extends the DER-CF by applying it to the NIST risk management framework process. It will be downloadable application that runs locally and documents all the major requirements for achieving Authority to Operate the DER.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

DOE OSTI2022

The dynamic nature of risk in DOE facilities in the surveillance and maintenance program–with observations for risk communications

Here, we explore three case studies of facilities at two US Department of Energy (DOE) former nuclear weapons research and production sites—the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Hanford site—whose risk profiles have changed during their long-term management under the DOE's surveillance and maintenance (S&M) program. These case studies provide examples of the challenges faced in communicating to external stakeholders, such as federal and state regulators, local communities surrounding the site, as well as the general public, the circumstances surrounding unexpected events or the emergence/discovery of new risk-important information at historically high-risk sites. We identify common topics of importance from these case studies and suggest a taxonomy for risk communicators to use in informing the dialogues with individuals and organizations that may not be technically oriented or fully informed on the subject matter. The taxonomy is based on technical insights from the quintessential definition of risk known as the Kaplan–Garrick “risk triplet” as well as insights from regulatory guidance documents on risk communication with external stakeholders originally developed for the commercial nuclear power industry.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2020

Multi-Mechanism Flood Hazard Assessment: Critical Review of Current Practice and Approaches

This report documents the initial findings from the Nuclear Regulatory commission (NRC)-sponsored research project Methods for Estimating Joint Probabilities of Coincident and Correlated Flooding Mechanisms for Nuclear Power Plant Flood Hazard Assessments.1 This research project is a part of NRC’s Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment (PFHA) Research Program and will aid the development of guidance on the use of PFHA methods to evaluate infrastructure safety for existing and proposed US nuclear power plants (NPPs). More specifically, this project intends to provide technical background for the development of flood hazard curves for multi-mechanism floods (MMFs). MMFs are flood events caused by more than one flooding mechanism (e.g., flood events due to the simultaneous occurrence of precipitation-induced river flooding and storm surge). Project activities include three main tasks: Task 1—Survey of current concepts and methods in assessing MMF hazards; Task 2—Critical assessment of selected methods and approaches for quantifying probabilistic MMF hazard risk; Task 3—Development of example case studies to illustrate best practices for quantifying probabilistic MMF hazard risk The initial findings from Tasks 1 and 2 are documented in this report. Task 1 comprised a survey of approaches and methods that have been applied to understand and assess flood hazards due to MMFs. Task 2 involved a critical review of the selected approaches and methods. To that end, the scope of this report includes documentation of (1) a reconnaissance-level survey of the current state of concepts and practice for MMF hazard assessment; (2) a generalized MMF assessment framework to address the distinctions among various types of flood-forcing phenomena, flood mechanisms (grouped into three mechanism types), and flood severity metrics; (3) a wide-ranging survey of approaches and methods that have been applied to various flooding phenomena and settings; and (4) a critical assessment of MMF hazard assessment methods. Studies were identified involving MMFs related to coastal flooding mechanisms, fluvial (rivers/streams) flooding mechanisms, and associated combinations of coastal and fluvial flooding mechanisms. Studies were also identified that address MMFs involving coastal and fluvial flooding mechanisms as well as coastal flooding mechanisms along with extreme precipitation (without specific attribution to fluvial or pluvial mechanisms). The studies identified for review in this report included assessments at varying spatial scales (from local to global) with differing geographic regions of focus using both observed and synthetic data. The majority of studies identified and reviewed were site-specific assessments focusing on relatively short return periods. Studies considered a range of flood severity metrics, made differing assumptions regarding the occurrence of extrema, and used multiple statistical techniques; the use of copulas for the development of joint distributions was a particularly popular analysis technique. The literature review highlighted the differences among existing studies relative to terminology used, means of presenting results, framework and techniques employed, and level of sophistication regarding the number and types of variables considered. Despite the significant diversity in existing studies, the review identified several promising techniques that will be considered in future work under this project, including the development of joint distributions for MMFs using copula and Bayesian-motivated approaches.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NASA NTRS1976

Shuttle/TDRSS Ku-band downlink study

Assessing the adequacy of the baseline signal design approach, developing performance specifications for the return link hardware, and performing detailed design and parameter optimization tasks was accomplished by completing five specific study tasks. The results of these tasks show that the basic signal structure design is sound and that the goals can be met. Constraints placed on return link hardware by this structure allow reasonable specifications to be written so that no extreme technical risk areas in equipment design are foreseen. A third channel can be added to the PM mode without seriously degrading the other services. The feasibility of using only a PM mode was shown to exist, however, this will require use of some digital TV transmission techniques. Each task and its results are summarized.

Meyer, R.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Magnetic Levitation for Long-Life Space Mechanisms: Technology Assessment and Remaining Challenges

Spacecraft mechanisms and mechanical systems must operate reliably and without failure to enable successful, long-term space missions. Such requirements place demands upon the tribological elements, especially bearings, which are frequently difficult or impossible to satisfy. Several recent, high-profile bearing failures in coolant fluid pumps and attitude control system (ACS) momentum wheels provided the impetus to assess the state-of-the-art non-contacting magnetic levitation-based, rotor support technologies.Magnetic levitation technology continues to gain acceptance for terrestrial applications and has been spaceflight demonstrated in mechanical systems such as reaction wheels (RWs) but is not in widespread use. The specific reasons inhibiting this new technology are not readily clear but include cost, weight, performance, and perceived risk. These reasons arise from a variety of real and perceived technical limitations in areas like materials, controls, sensors, thermal management and others. This white paper seeks to determine, define, and quantify the technical hurdles and gaps that must be overcome to enable the broad adoption of non-contacting bearings for long-life space mechanisms. It is anticipated that a better understanding of this complex topic may guide resource investments and clear the path to improved performance mechanical systems for spacecraft.

Samuel A Howard↗

DOE OSTI2025

ARC-100 Reactor Security-by-Design Summary 2025

This report applies the security-by-design methodology developed in a previous National Nuclear Security Administration–sponsored work to the ARC-100, a sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) being developed by ARC Clean Technology, Inc (ARC). The report contains no proprietary information specific to the ARC 100 reactor. The insights developed in this report are high-level, and generally applicable to other sodium fast reactor designs. The information presented here is the result of a qualitative safety-based analysis and would not inform any potential adversary beyond what would be found in a docketed safety analysis report. The scope of this present report covers ARC-100’s reactor core, used fuel storage, used fuel assembly wash station, cesium trap, sodium cold trap, noble gas decay tanks, used fuel dry storage facility, damaged fuel storage facility, and radioactive waste building. These systems are also compared to a generic SFR design assumed in the previous study. The security assessment results show changes in structures, systems, and components (SSCs) safety importance relative to the generic SFR SSCs. Several SSCs have higher importance rankings than others, and it is recommended that protection efforts are prioritized for these SSCs. Results from this work will furnish a technical justification for the feasibility of these solutions for the ARC reactor's design and, where applicable, identify any regulatory benefits conferred by the proactive design aspect within a risk management framework. This initiative will contribute to a more secure design of the ARC reactor and support its licensing process.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

DOE OSTI2022

Results of ISO/TS 6336-22 Evaluating Full Contact Zone

ISO/TS 6336-22 (Calculation of load capacity of spur and helical gears - Part 22: Calculation of micropitting load capacity) is the ISO technical specification containing a proposal for calculations of the risk of micropitting in gear sets. Micropitting is a Hertzian fatigue phenomenon that appears as ultra-fine cracking and pitting on the flanks of gear teeth. Since progressive micropitting can lead to macropitting and flank damage, critical applications such as wind turbines, marine drives, and high-speed gear drives seek to accurately predict whether their designs are susceptible to this damage. ISO/TS 6336-22 assesses micropitting risk through a safety factor which is calculated as the minimum specific film thickness in the contact zone divided by a permissible specific film thickness. In the previous paper, the calculations were performed using the simplified method (Method B) that evaluates points on the path of contact. This was done for three gear sets that experienced micropitting in operation. The minimum specific film thickness for the two field cases was very high, which indicates that the gears were operating in the full elastohydrodynamic lubrication (EHL) regime. A more accurate calculation for these cases (Method A) calculates the specific film thickness across the entire contact zone. This paper applies this Method to the case study from the previous paper. The results are compared to micropitting observed in operation. Results are also compared to the results of the previous paper. Conclusions are made regarding the accuracy of both Methods compared to the field cases and relative to each other.

ENGINEERING,WIND ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2022

Results of ISO/TS 6336-22 Evaluating Full Contact Zone: Preprint

ISO/TS 6336-22 (Calculation of load capacity of spur and helical gears — Part 22: Calculation of micropitting load capacity) is the ISO technical specification containing a proposal for calculations of the risk of micropitting in gear sets. Micropitting is a Hertzian fatigue phenomenon that appears as ultra-fine cracking and pitting on the flanks of gear teeth. Since progressive micropitting can lead to macropitting and flank damage, critical applications such as wind turbines, marine drives, and high-speed gear drives seek to accurately predict whether their designs are susceptible to this damage. ISO/TS 6336-22 assesses micropitting risk through a safety factor which is calculated as the minimum specific film thickness in the contact zone divided by a permissible specific film thickness. In the previous paper, the calculations were performed using the simplified method (Method B) that evaluates points on the path of contact. This was done for three gear sets that experienced micropitting in operation. The minimum specific film thickness for the two field cases was very high, which indicates that the gears were operating in the full elastohydrodynamic lubrication (EHL) regime. A more accurate calculation for these cases (Method A) calculates the specific film thickness across the entire contact zone. This paper applies this Method to the case study from the previous paper. The results are compared to micropitting observed in operation. Results are also compared to the results of the previous paper. Conclusions are made regarding the accuracy of both Methods compared to the field cases and relative to each other.

gearbox↗

DOE OSTI2022

Results of ISO/TS 6336-22 Evaluating Full Contact Zone

ISO/TS 6336-22 (Calculation of load capacity of spur and helical gears - Part 22: Calculation of micropitting load capacity) is the ISO technical specification containing a proposal for calculations of the risk of micropitting in gear sets. Micropitting is a Hertzian fatigue phenomenon that appears as ultra-fine cracking and pitting on the flanks of gear teeth. Since progressive micropitting can lead to macropitting and flank damage, critical applications such as wind turbines, marine drives, and high-speed gear drives seek to accurately predict whether their designs are susceptible to this damage. ISO/TS 6336-22 assesses micropitting risk through a safety factor which is calculated as the minimum specific film thickness in the contact zone divided by a permissible specific film thickness. In the previous paper, the calculations were performed using the simplified method (Method B) that evaluates points on the path of contact. This was done for three gear sets that experienced micropitting in operation. The minimum specific film thickness for the two field cases was very high, which indicates that the gears were operating in the full elastohydrodynamic lubrication (EHL) regime. A more accurate calculation for these cases (Method A) calculates the specific film thickness across the entire contact zone. This paper applies this Method to the case study from the previous paper. The results are compared to micropitting observed in operation. Results are also compared to the results of the previous paper. Conclusions are made regarding the accuracy of both Methods compared to the field cases and relative to each other.

gearbox↗