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At least 343 records · Page 19

RCRA Part B Permit Application Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) for Waste Management Activities at the NNSS Mixed Waste Disposal Unit (MWDU)

This volume of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit application to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection provides facility information on the design, processes, and security features associated with the Cell 18 Mixed Waste Disposal Unit (MWDU) at the Nevada National Security Site, under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO). Onsite and offsite containerized low-level mixed waste (LLMW) that has an approved DOE nexus, DOE non-radioactive classified hazardous waste, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and other government agency non-radioactive classified hazardous waste (hereafter called waste) are disposed in the unit. Classified waste is the only non-radioactive waste accepted for disposal and is required to meet waste acceptance criteria for radioactive waste. The MWDU is located in the southeast portion of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC). The RWMC includes transuranic waste storage units, breaching and re-packaging facilities, and the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS). The RWMS is an active disposal site for waste. Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and friable and non-friable asbestos are accepted for disposal. The MWDU has been compliantly operating since January 26, 2011, and approximately 60 percent of its capacity has been used for disposal. In addition to the requirements of the RCRA, the MWDU is also subject to DOE orders, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations (for receipt of offsite waste), and State of Nevada requirements. General information and hazardous waste codes identified for disposal at the MWDU are described. State-only designated hazardous waste may also be received at the NNSS as hazardous waste. For safety and security reasons, some of the contents of the full application are not available for public viewing. This public version of the application contains most, but not all, of the contents as submitted to the regulatory agencies.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Effects of Hydrogen Redistribution at High Temperatures in Yttrium Hydride Moderator Material

We report advanced materials development, manufacturing, and modeling capabilities for innovative reactor designs support nuclear security and mission-focused science through enhanced technology for safer and more efficient and secure production of nuclear energy. The high temperature moderator material yttrium hydride poses a significant enhancement in small reactor design by thermalizing (slowing down) neutrons and decreasing the required fuel mass for a system. The research presented here supports understanding hydrogen distribution in yttrium hydride through: (1) the development of neutron-based hydrogen imaging and crystallographic characterization that allows us to understand fundamental diffraction behaviors and to observe changes in hydrogen distribution as a function of temperature and (2) subsequent neutron multiplication (reactivity) effects of changes in hydrogen distribution using measurement-based cross sections in a sample microreactor design. The main conclusions from the work are that: (1) hydrogen does not redistribute significantly below temperatures of 800°C in yttrium hydride and (2) hydrogen redistribution affects the reactivity slightly but not significantly.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Ares V: Game Changer for National Security Launch

NASA is designing the Ares V cargo launch vehicle to vastly expand exploration of the Moon begun in the Apollo program and enable the exploration of Mars and beyond. As the largest launcher in history, Ares V also represents a national asset offering unprecedented opportunities for new science, national security, and commercial missions of unmatched size and scope. The Ares V is the heavy-lift component of NASA's dual-launch architecture that will replace the current space shuttle fleet, complete the International Space Station, and establish a permanent human presence on the Moon as a stepping-stone to destinations beyond. During extensive independent and internal architecture and vehicle trade studies as part of the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS), NASA selected the Ares I crew launch vehicle and the Ares V to support future exploration. The smaller Ares I will launch the Orion crew exploration vehicle with four to six astronauts into orbit. The Ares V is designed to carry the Altair lunar lander into orbit, rendezvous with Orion, and send the mated spacecraft toward lunar orbit. The Ares V will be the largest and most powerful launch vehicle in history, providing unprecedented payload mass and volume to establish a permanent lunar outpost and explore significantly more of the lunar surface than was done during the Apollo missions. The Ares V consists of a Core Stage, two Reusable Solid Rocket Boosters (RSRBs), Earth Departure Stage (EDS), and a payload shroud. For lunar missions, the shroud would cover the Lunar Surface Access Module (LSAM). The Ares V Core Stage is 33 feet in diameter and 212 feet in length, making it the largest rocket stage ever built. It is the same diameter as the Saturn V first stage, the S-IC. However, its length is about the same as the combined length of the Saturn V first and second stages. The Core Stage uses a cluster of five Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne RS-68B rocket engines, each supplying about 700,000 pounds of thrust. Its propellants are liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen. The two solid rocket boosters provide about 3.5 million pounds of thrust at liftoff. These 5.5-segment boosters are derived from the 4-segment boosters now used on the Space Shuttle, and are similar to those used in the Ares I first stage. The EDS is powered by one J-2X engine. The J-2X, which has roughly 294,000 pounds of thrust, also powers the Ares I Upper Stage. It is derived from the J-2 that powered the Saturn V second and third stages. The EDS performs two functions. Its initial suborbital burns will place the lunar lander into a stable Earth orbit. After the Orion crew vehicle, launched separately on an Ares I, docks with the lander/EDS stack, EDS will ignite a second time to put the combined 65-metric ton vehicle into a lunar transfer orbit. When it stands on the launch pad at Kennedy Space Center late in the next decade, the Ares V stack will be approximately 381 feet tall and have a gross liftoff mass of 8.1 million pounds. The current point-of-departure design exceeds Saturn V s mass capability by approximately 40 percent. Using the current payload shroud design, Ares V can carry 315,000 pounds to 29-degree low Earth orbit (LEO) or 77,000 pounds to a geosynchronous orbit. Another unique aspect of the Ares V is the 33-foot-diameter payload shroud, which encloses approximately 30,400 cubic feet of usable volume. A larger hypothetical shroud for encapsulating larger payloads has been studied. While Ares V makes possible larger payload masses and volumes, it may alternately make possible more cost-effective mission design if the relevant payload communities are willing to consider an alternative to the existing approach that has driven them to employ complexity to solve current launch vehicle mass and volume constraints. By using Ares V s mass and volume capabilities as margin, payload designers stand to reduce development risk and cost. Significant progress has been made on the Ares V to support a plaed fiscal 2011 authority-to-proceed (ATP) milestone. The Ares V team is actively reaching out to external organizations during this early concept phase to ensure that the Ares V vehicle can be leveraged for national security, science, and commercial development needs. This presentation will discuss Ares V vehicle configuration, the path to the current concept, accomplishments to date, and potential payload utilization opportunities.

Sumrall, Phil↗

Computer Security for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants - Literature Review for Korea Hydro Nuclear Power Central Research Institute

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is providing training and consultation activities on security planning and design for the Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Central Research Institute (KHNPCRI). As part of this effort, SNL performed a literature review on computer security requirements, guidance and best practices that are applicable to an advanced nuclear power plant. This report documents the review of reports generated by SNL and other organizations [U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Nuclear Energy Institute, and International Atomic Energy Agency] related to protection of information technology resources, primarily digital controls and computer resources and their data networks. Copies of the key documents have also been provided to KHNP-CRI.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Advanced Utilization of the Payload Executive Processor (PEP) Ethernet Port to Support JSL Based Payloads

Increased interest by Payload Developers in utilization of the Joint Station LAN (Local Area Network) (JSL) for command and data transactions has driven the investigation of providing bi-directional Ethernet communication with PEP (Payload Executive Processor). Ethernet-only payload developers are interested in taking advantage of the services provided by PEP. Enabling Ethernet communications within PEP requires more than just turning on the hardware. PEP contains no Operating System (OS) or Ethernet stack so it does not inherit any built in functionality for Ethernet support. Both hardware drivers and application software must be developed from scratch. In the absence of an OS (Operating System) the design must address security issues in terms of access and data transferred, i.e. blocking unauthorized users and preventing denial of service. Developing a design to process Ethernet data within the existing real-time constraints of PEP requires a few compromises: data rates, supported protocols, custom packet format and limited client connections to name a few. Integration of the light weight internet protocol (LwIP). Ethernet stack provides a customizable solution for the embedded real-time environment. As utilization of the JSL increases, the successful implementation of an Ethernet interface enhances the utilization of PEP, and provides a new path for future Ethernet-only payloads to gain access to around the clock command and data services.

Guyette, Greg↗

Proposed Classifications of Remote Operations for Nuclear Reactors Based on Physical and Cybersecurity Considerations

The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Silo Storage Preconceptual Design

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has a need to develop and field a low-cost option for the long-term storage of a variety of radiological material. The storage option’s primary requirement is to provide both environmental and physical protection of the materials. Design criteria for this effort require a low initial cost and minimum maintenance over a 50-year design life. In 1999, Argonne National Laboratory-West was tasked with developing a dry silo storage option for the BN-350 Spent Fuel in Aktau Kazakhstan. Argon’s design consisted of a carbon steel cylinder approximately 16 ft long, 18 in. outside diameter and 0.375 in. wall thickness. The carbon steel silo was protected from corrosion by a duplex coating system consisting of zinc and epoxy. Although the study indicated that the duplex coating design would provide a design life well in excess of the required 50 years, the review board was concerned because of the novelty of the design and the lack of historical use. In 2012, NNSA tasked Idaho National Laboratory (INL) with reinvestigating the silo storage concept and development of alternative corrosion protection strategies. The 2012 study, “Silo Storage Concepts, Cathodic Protection Options Study” (INL/EST-12-26627), concludes that the option which best fits the design criterion is a passive cathotic protection scheme, consisting of a carbon steel tube coated with zinc or a zinc-aluminum alloy encapsulated in either concrete or a cement grout. The hot dipped zinc coating option was considered most efficient, but the flame-sprayed option could be used if a thicker zinc coating was determined to be necessary.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Quantifying Security Threats and Their Potential Impacts: A Case Study

In earlier works, we present a computational infrastructure that allows an analyst to estimate the security of a system in terms of the loss that each stakeholder stands to sustain as a result of security breakdowns. In this paper, we illustrate this infrastructure by means of an e-commerce application.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Failure Impact Analysis of Key Management in AMI Using Cybernomic Situational Assessment (CSA)

In earlier work, we presented a computational framework for quantifying the security of a system in terms of the average loss a stakeholder stands to sustain as a result of threats to the system. We named this system, the Cyberspace Security Econometrics System (CSES). In this paper, we refine the framework and apply it to cryptographic key management within the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) as an example. The stakeholders, requirements, components, and threats are determined. We then populate the matrices with justified values by addressing the AMI at a higher level, rather than trying to consider every piece of hardware and software involved. We accomplish this task by leveraging the recently established NISTR 7628 guideline for smart grid security. This allowed us to choose the stakeholders, requirements, components, and threats realistically. We reviewed the literature and selected an industry technical working group to select three representative threats from a collection of 29 threats. From this subset, we populate the stakes, dependency, and impact matrices, and the threat vector with realistic numbers. Each Stakeholder s Mean Failure Cost is then computed.

Algorithms↗

Quantifying Security Threats and Their Impact

In earlier works, we present a computational infrastructure that allows an analyst to estimate the security of a system in terms of the loss that each stakeholder stands to sustain as a result of security breakdowns. In this paper we illustrate this infrastructure by means of a sample example involving an e-commerce application.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Modeling Stakeholder/Value Dependency through Mean Failure Cost

In an earlier series of works, Boehm et al. discuss the nature of information system dependability and highlight the variability of system dependability according to stakeholders. In a recent paper, the dependency patterns of this model are analyzed. In our recent works, we presented a stakeholder dependent quantitative security model, where we quantify security for a given stakeholder by the mean of the loss incurred by the stakeholder as a result of security threats. We show how this mean can be derived from the security threat configuration (represented as a vector of probabilities that reflect the likelihood of occurrence of the various security threats). We refer to our security metric as MFC, for Mean Failure Cost. In this paper, we analyze Boehm's model from the standpoint of the proposed metric, and show whether, to what extent, and how our metric addresses the issues raised by Boehm's Stakeholder/Value definition of system dependability.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Software Requirements for a System to Compute Mean Failure Cost

In earlier works, we presented a computational infrastructure that allows an analyst to estimate the security of a system in terms of the loss that each stakeholder. We also demonstrated this infrastructure through the results of security breakdowns for the ecommerce case. In this paper, we illustrate this infrastructure by an application that supports the computation of the Mean Failure Cost (MFC) for each stakeholder.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Risk Assessment Methodology Based on the NISTIR 7628 Guidelines

Earlier work describes computational models of critical infrastructure that allow an analyst to estimate the security of a system in terms of the impact of loss per stakeholder resulting from security breakdowns. Here, we consider how to identify, monitor and estimate risk impact and probability for different smart grid stakeholders. Our constructive method leverages currently available standards and defined failure scenarios. We utilize the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Interagency or Internal Reports (NISTIR) 7628 as a basis to apply Cyberspace Security Econometrics system (CSES) for comparing design principles and courses of action in making security-related decisions.

Algorithms↗

Transmission Line Security Monitor: Final Report

The Electric Power Transmission Line Security Monitor System Operational Test is a project funded by the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG). TSWG operates under the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office that functions under the Department of Defense. The Transmission Line Security Monitor System is based on technology developed by Idaho National Laboratory. The technology provides a means for real-time monitoring of physical threats and/or damage to electrical transmission line towers and conductors as well as providing operational parameters to transmission line operators to optimize transmission line operation. The end use is for monitoring long stretches of transmission lines that deliver electrical power from remote generating stations to cities and industry. These transmission lines are generally located in remote transmission line corridors where security infrastructure may not exist. Security and operational sensors in the sensor platform on the conductors take power from the transmission line and relay security and operational information to operations personnel hundreds of miles away without relying on existing infrastructure. Initiated on May 25, 2007, this project resulted in pre-production units tested in realistic operational environments during 2010. A technology licensee, Lindsey Manufacturing of Azusa California, is assisting in design, testing, and ultimately production. The platform was originally designed for a security monitoring mission, but it has been enhanced to include important operational features desired by electrical utilities.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

An Investigation into the Transportation of Irradiated Uranium/Aluminum Targets from a Foreign Nuclear Reactor to the Chalk River Laboratories Site in Ontario, Canada - 12249

This investigation required the selection of a suitable cask and development of a device to hold and transport irradiated targets from a foreign nuclear reactor to the Chalk River Laboratories in Ontario, Canada. The main challenge was to design and validate a target holder to protect the irradiated HEU-Al target pencils during transit. Each of the targets was estimated to have an initial decay heat of 118 W prior to transit. As the targets have little thermal mass the potential for high temperature damage and possibly melting was high. Thus, the primary design objective was to conceive a target holder to dissipate heat from the targets. Other design requirements included securing the targets during transportation and providing a simple means to load and unload the targets while submerged five metres under water. A unique target holder (patent pending) was designed and manufactured together with special purpose experimental apparatus including a representative cask. Aluminum dummy targets were fabricated to accept cartridge heaters, to simulate decay heat. Thermocouples were used to measure the temperature of the test targets and selected areas within the target holder and test cask. After obtaining test results, calculations were performed to compensate for differences between experimental and real life conditions. Taking compensation into consideration the maximum target temperature reached was 231 deg. C which was below the designated maximum of 250 deg. C. The design of the aluminum target holder also allowed generous clearance to insert and unload the targets. This clearance was designed to close up as the target holder is placed into the cavity of the transport cask. Springs served to retain and restrain the targets from movement during transportation as well as to facilitate conductive heat transfer. The target holder met the design requirements and as such provided data supporting the feasibility of transporting targets over a relatively long period of time. A suitable transport cask was selected and a device for housing irradiated targets for loading, unloading and transportation has been designed, built and validated. The device was successful in meeting all design requirements for this feasibility study. Experiments were conducted with a custom test facility to confirm that the design met the maximum temperature requirements during shipping. Results from tests showed that the peak temperature in the apparatus was 300 deg. C. By compensating for experimental considerations, such as reduced thermal conductivity of the test cask versus that of the actual cask the expected maximum target temperature reduces to 231 deg. C. This is below the designated peak value of 250 deg. C. It can therefore be concluded, based on the content of this paper and from a heat-removal standpoint, the feasibility of transporting targets from a foreign nuclear reactor to Canada is possible, although further testing with irradiated targets and a full size cask would be a recommended next step. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Feasibility study of an Integrated Program for Aerospace vehicle Design (IPAD). Volume 4: IPAD system design

The computing system design of IPAD is described and the requirements which form the basis for the system design are discussed. The system is presented in terms of a functional design description and technical design specifications. The functional design specifications give the detailed description of the system design using top-down structured programming methodology. Human behavioral characteristics, which specify the system design at the user interface, security considerations, and standards for system design, implementation, and maintenance are also part of the technical design specifications. Detailed specifications of the two most common computing system types in use by the major aerospace companies which could support the IPAD system design are presented. The report of a study to investigate migration of IPAD software between the two candidate 3rd generation host computing systems and from these systems to a 4th generation system is included.

Goldfarb, W.↗

Enabling Secure and Resilient XFC: A Software/Hardware-Security Co-Design Approach

Extremely fast charging (XFC) has the potential to reduce the charging time of battery electric vehicles (BEV) to be equivalent to the filling time of internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEV), thus eliminating one of the few advantages ICEV still poses for light- and heavy-duty vehicles. Enabling XFC will, however, require coordination and cooperation between the grid, charging stations, and the vehicles themselves, which leads to an inevitable increase in the attack surface for all systems combined. In securing the overall system, we must not only embrace traditional cybersecurity, which is chiefly concerned with communications and the operation of digital systems, but also cyber-physical systems security as the proper operation of XFC is critically dependent on systems’ abilities to know about (sense) and interact with (actuate) the physical world. The project team consists of academic and industry researchers with backgrounds in cybersecurity, cyber-physical systems security, learning in adversarial environments, transportation security, grid security and resilience, wireless power transfer, converter design, and battery management systems.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗